December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: For the New Year: A Symbol for Information Freedom
by groundfog＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In talk.politics.crypto, ptupper(a)direct.ca (Peter Tupper) wrote: > A Symbol for Information Freedom > by Peter Tupper <ptupper(a)direct.ca> > 1996 is off to a discouraging start when it comes to the >future of information freedom. The American Congress seems >determined to impose censorship on the Internet. The legal >status of strong dual-key cryptography is still in debate. >Telephone companies, cable TV services and publishing services >are all eagerly trying to seize control of the Internet and >eliminate the many-to-many nature of the medium. The accidental >wonder that is the Internet seems to be threatened on all sides, >in danger of being destroyed or denatured before reaching its >potential. > My proposal is only a small contribution to the solutions to >this problem. I believe a symbol is needed; a simple yet >recognizable item that will communicate to others that you are: > -for freedom of speech and expression in all realms, >particularly via computer mediated communications. > -against the imposition of arbitrary community standards by >centralized authority on communications. > -for making access to communications available to everyone. > -against the violation of individual privacy by wiretapping, >intercepting computer communications, compiling dossiers by >government or commercial organizations or other forms of >surveillance. > -for making strong, dual-key encryption programs without >back-doors available to the public. > -against building surveillance measures into communications >and financial infrastructures. > -for a future of communications that is by, for and of the >people, not the state or the market. > The symbol I have chosen is the paper clip. Why a paper >clip? > There are many reasons: > Pragmatic: Paper clips are readily available for >practically nothing, all over the world. They can be applied to >collars, lapels, scarves, pocket edges, suspenders and neck ties >without damaging them and without risk of the pin breaking the >skin. > Aesthetic: The paper clip is a simple, elegant design that >is easily recognized the world over. It can be rendered in many >colors or plated with precious metals. > Symbolic: The paper clip is a simple but effective piece of >technology. An individual uses it to bundle together documents >from disparate sources to create a unified document upon a given >subject, which may be dismantled and remade for another topic. >Furthermore, a paper clip may be bent out of its regular shape >and used as an improvised tool for any number of purposes. > Historic: During the German occupation of Norway in World >War II, Norwegians wore paper clips on their collars as a sign of >solidarity against the invaders. > Commercial: While anybody can obtain a plain paper clip >with little trouble, funds for Information Freedom can be raised >by marketing electroplated or designer paper clips. > The cause of awareness of and activism about AIDS had a >simple, readily recognized symbol, the folded red ribbon. Just >as every celebrity who wears a red ribbon, no matter how trite >and self-promoting it is, is a reminder to those watching that >AIDS is happening and that many people are concerned, >celebrities appearing at the Academy Awards or Grammies with a >designer, gold-plated paper clip on their outfit reminds the >world that information freedom is under fire and that people are >concerned. It will make the Internet community a visible reality >in the public sphere. It will bring these issues into the public >eyes, and give those involved a rallying symbol. It will make a >small difference, but it will contribute to the greater good. > Advertising couldn't hurt.

3 2

Ah, the future...
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, 12 31 95 Associated Press reports: Ah, the future ... At least part of what will happen in the coming year seems clear. Cyberspace will be regulated -- kicking and screaming -- and the court battles over free speech will begin. "It's going to throw the Internet into a state of uncertainty for several years," said [Bob] Smith [of Interactive Services Association]. You may recall the question I asked in an earlier message: And when the State DECIDES...? But that's all right... Despite that, business growth on the net will begin to catch up with the phenomenal increase in accounts. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The newsstory's headline? YEAR OF THE INTERNET: What a tangled web we weave. Its dateline? (Dec 31, 1995 - 00:23 EST). Accessed at? Nando News (www.nando.net) Online filename? info306_3.html That message? Date: Wed, 22 Nov 1995 04:16:50 -0500 (EST) From: "James M. Cobb" <jcobb(a)ahcbsd1.ovnet.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Secrets of the Internet This critical essay, "Ah, the future..." was composed 12 31 95.

1 0

Re: Australian "calculatorcard"
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: David Lesher \ Internet: (wb8foz(a)nrk.com) To: amp \ Internet: (alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com) cc: Cees de Groot \ Internet: (c.degroot(a)inter.nl.net) cc: cypherpunks \ Internet: (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) Subject: Re: Australian "calculatorcard" > sounds like the card i use for remote dialup to certain non-public > systems i use at work. it has a six digit number on the front that > changes every 60 seconds. DS> Do these card systems use a window to handle clock-slip? i'm not sure. i would image so. DS> I'd think you could have the server safely accept # N, N-60 sec, and DS> N+60 seconds; and adjust the server's idea of your card's clock speed DS> from that. DS> What new risk would that create? i would figure the server would give a minute or so for slippage. basically the risk is that it would give someone 3 minutes to do a brute force attack rather than one. if you have decent security on the server side, i.e., disallow the card for 5 minutes or more after 3 or so failed attempts, brute attacks would be minimized. however, if the actual window for a single code is 3 minutes, that increases your chance of hitting it as 3 separate numbers would be valid for a given card at any given time. amp <0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) <alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 21:59

2 1

Re: Australian "calculatorcard"
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: Vin McLellan \ Internet: (vin(a)shore.net) > it's Pretty Good >(tm) security, but like anything not biometric, it is vulnerable to >black-bag attacks. physical possession being all that is required. VM> Actually, all ACE/Server or ACE software modules _require_ a VM> user-memorized PIN. Physical possession of a stolen token is not VM> enough to gain illicit access. >if >you know the algorithm and the serial number of the card and the >time, even that isn't necessary. VM> Bleep! Earth to amp! Check your voltage, lately? The token's VM> serial number has nothing whatsoever to do with the generation of a VM> SecurID's PRN token-code. hmmmm, let me see... yup. you are right. voltage low. give me a second to plug back in... VM> and distribution. The serial number stuck to the back of a SecurID VM> after it is programmed with its secret key -- a unique PRN VM> "significantly longer" than 56 bits -- but they are not the same VM> thing. The cpu in a SecurID doesn't even "know" the serial number VM> stuck on the back of the token. VM> (It would be Pretty Stupid <TM> to glue or emboss a secret on VM> the back of the damn token, wouldn't it?) I should note that Alan is VM> just regergitating one of the most widely circulated rumors about VM> SecurIDs -- which like any popular crypto device attracts a lot of VM> wiLd & w00ly speculation. actually, i was speaking pretty much off the top of my head. it's been a while since i registered it, but all i basically had to tell the server the first time i used it was the s/n. and yes, i think it would be Pretty Damn Stupid to have the s/n have anything to do with the actual seed or pin. VM> Getting the algorithm for SDI's one-way hash is no big deal, VM> given that it sits in software in thousands of SDI customer VM> installations, protected only by contract and trade secret status. VM> (The integrity of the product -- the unpredictability of the VM> token-code PRN series, and the secrecy of a specific token's seed or VM> key -- rightly depends cryptographic strength of the hash, not the VM> secrecy of the algorithm.) Getting a token-specific secret key would VM> hopefully be a much greater challenge. one would certainly hope so. <g> personally, i like the card. it offers pretty good security and thus gives me remote access to systems my employer would otherwise laugh in my face for access to (and did, more than once before we got these things). its main weakness would be a black bag job where someone gains physical posession. at that point, all bets on its securty are off for obvious reasons. luckily, because of the nature of the device, i can simply report it as stolen and it quickly becomes a rather worthless piece of silicon. amp <0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) <alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 22:15

1 0

List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 1 Jan 96 6:49:52 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org +.-+++-.-*** 47:18 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *****+****** 8:12 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*#+#+##++*# 3:50 99.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****+**+*** 6:58 99.98% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +--++* 1:32:43 99.97% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de -+-++-+--+++ 2:16:40 99.97% hroller hroller(a)c2.org #.-##+-.-#*# 23:11 99.94% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +.-----+-++ 2:35:44 99.93% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net *.--+-.--.-+ 4:33:40 99.88% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -++--------- 3:31:08 99.85% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com +++++++ #### 15:42 99.81% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com __.------+- 6:43:02 99.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com --.-------- 5:40:08 99.69% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * **+ *** * 13:04 98.86% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi --- *+++++++ 3:07:11 98.86% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +###*++*-- # 31:22 98.14% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net ----- - -* 1:22:32 98.12% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #####+##- # 26:19 97.36% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net -+++++++++ 1:33:37 90.69% rahul homer(a)rahul.net -+##*+*+#### 5:20 99.99% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com #+#*#*# :40 89.19% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org -#___.## 16:32:15 67.10% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -*+..* 15:03:39 46.77% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

1 0

96R_azz
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-1-96: NYP: Denise Caruso offers '96 resolutions on Nscp/Aol bugs, Web rubes, daft pols, Gates' dogs, crypto zip, Apple rot, W$ dupes. 96R_azz

1 0

Who sent me this message?
by Steve14571＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone from this list sent me a message encrypted with the international version of PGP 2.6.2. Unfortunately, my system crashed and lost the email address... Plaintext of the message follows: Hi Stephen, >Me too 8^) This is a 2047 bit key (I think big) :-) As I can see. How did you generate this key? Are you using a special version of PGP? Maybe something about myself to start with: I'm from Belgium (that small spot between France, Germany and the Netherlands). I work in a bank (no, this does not mean that I'm swimming in money!) as a system engineer. We work mainly with A-Series mainframes from UNISYS. At home I spent some time on the internet, my PC, reading a good book and last but not least having a beer with my friends. That's it for now, looking forward to hear from you again. Happy New Year! Luc Whoever sent me this message please write back, and send a public key so that I can respond.

1 0

Re: Can We Cut the Crap?
by Gordon Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:18 PM 12/31/95 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: > >Really, the S/N ratio is approaching all-time lows, even for the Silly >Season of Xmas. A week or so ago there was a massive flame war involving >insults and counter-insults--I returned from my Xmas vacation to find the >list melting down. Now, a week later, a new flamewar has erupted. As a lurker on the list, I'd like to second this opinion. The cypherpunks list is held up to be this almighty oracle of cryptographic information. Yet, every time I subscribe to it (this is the fourth time in a year) I have to wade through irrelevant personal attacks and various other rubbish. I mean, really. This is worse than Fidonet. However, I suppose that with any gathering of (mostly) intelligent, liberty and privacy minded people, there are likely to be clashes of one sort or another. If the anonymous twits will grow up and stop stirring things up, maybe the rest of us can learn something. Just my $0.02 ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request.

1 0

Canadian Cypherpunks
by Tim Philp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there some interest in a meeting of Canadian Cypherpunks? If you are a Canadian (or an American who is fortunate enough to live near our sainted shores ;-)) send me a private E-mail message. Because Canada is such a big country, I propose that we start with a meeting in Toronto or area. If there is enough interest, I will arrange for a meeting place. Regards, Tim Philp =================================== For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to: pgp-public-keys(a)swissnet.ai.mit.edu In Subject line type: GET PHILP ===================================

1 0

TSCM.COM Counter Surveillance, Privacy, & Security Page
by jmatk＠tscm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Happy New Year!!!!! TSCM Technical Surveillance Counter Measure - new materials finished... Check it out... http://www.tscm.com/ New section on TSCM test equipment New section on TSCM training and career paths Coming Soon, TSCM Hand tools TSCM and Technical Surveillance books - James M. Atkinson "...shaken, not stirred"

1 0