December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: FTC Privacy Initiative (fwd)
by blancw＠accessone.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jyri Kaljundi From: Internet Marketing Discussion List The US Federal Trade Commission has launched a "Privacy Initiative" to investigate whether the information collected at websites (either that affirmatively submitted by a visitor via a form or information collected based upon a visitor's selection of pages at a site to reflect personal interests) should be the subject of regulation by the FTC. ............................................... "Hey, we can't just stand around here with nothing to do. Give us something to regulate - anything, pro or con; we must regulate something." Dang! .. Blanc

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Re: ex encrypted script
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Is there a way to encrypt a script yet still allow it to be runnable? I >know that the simple answer is to write it in C and compile it but I don't >have the means of doing that at the moment. (i.e. there is not compiler on >the system) Given your constraints: no. /r$

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Re: The Problem With Blaze And Weinstein
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> MIT is practically floating on government subsidies. Actually, if you discount Lincoln Labs, not really. /r$

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Surprise telecommunications bill?
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While watching the national news (NBC, I think) they mentioned that there had been a "surprising agreement on a telecommunications bill". From the sparse description, it sounded pretty nasty. Does anyone have any additional information on this? | Remember: Life is not always champagne. Sometimes it is REAL pain. | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | alano(a)teleport.com |

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An Apology to Mr. Merzger
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry and members of this list, I want to publicly apologize to Mr. Metzger. On reviewing the events of the day, it seems that I misunderstood a post by Perry. It seems that I was missing a previous post that was being referenced. As to the misunderstood message, I have to now agree with Perry and his reponse. Please accept this apology. Dan

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Re: Microsoft Flame[tm] [NOISE]
by RobL 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:32 AM 12/21/95 CST, Roy M. Silvernail wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >There's a lot of finger waving going on over Microsoft's alleged >predatory practices. I just want to remind the pro-MS folks of >something. Microsoft has a documented track record of using >undocumented entry points in their OS and Windows products. These entry >points allow MS apps to do some things more efficiently than a [snip] > >While this isn't the grand-scale conspiracy some people seem to see, >IMHO it's still predatory. Perhaps the call to separate the OS and apps >divisions is a good idea. It would be interesting to see if Microsoft >could maintain its edge in applications when it had no sub rosa >advantage in OS access. IMHO, I see nothing wrong with predatory behavior.. then again, I hunt in the fall, so it must be a redneck thing.. MS and any of the other software companies are competing for domination in a narrow field.. MS just happens to be the only real choice for OS anymore.. well, for a standard, out of the box OS anyways. The fact that they have to leave in undisclosed hooks to get their own software to excell over others just points to the poor software they produce overall. I have to admit that I like, possibly admire, the way the Bill and crew have captured the market.. from a marketing standpoint, they did a first rate job of running with the ball until there was no pursuit.. Sure, from time to time, someone tries to throw a blocker in thier path, but they just overrun it and keep going.. Forget about the monopoly aspects for a second and look at MS as an American success story. It has all the classic elements: started small, with a crew of social misfits and eventually grew up. Just a few cents worth.. RobL ------------------|----------------------------------------------------------- Rob Lowry | PO Box 288 | Rockford Wa 99030 | ral(a)otc.mhs.compuserve.com robl(a)on-ramp.ior.com

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Re: What ever happened to... Cray Comp/NSA co-development
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anitro wrote: >O.K. Just a factor of 16 increase over the CM architecture right? Not knowing >the computational capabilities of the individual processors, it might be >difficult to say what the machine is capable of. Wouldn't that have some >bearing? Not in cracking "truly large" problems by brute force. Even if each of the million processors is capable of 100 MIPS (which is unlikely, given the PIM approach and the fine-granularity, few-bit-or-less word size, etc.), this is only 10^8 MIPS. For problems that (for instance) 10^75 machines would have to spend 10^10 years on, not even a drop in an ocean. The point is that no existing machines are going to make a dent in these calculations, though algorithmic cleverness _might_ make factoring much easier (personally, I doubt it). >> Second, there was work on a "processor-in-memory" architecture, in >> conjunction with a Bowie, Maryland spook-connected company. Perhaps this is >> what you are thinking of? > >I didn't mention a 'processor-in-memory' architecture and neither did the NYT >article. Don't know about any other company involvement, just CCC and NSA. I wrote my response before seeing the other response someone else (Thaddeus J. Beier) gave the name of the company. Thad's details match what I recall about this Bowie company. The archives should have articles on this, dating back about a year or so ago. As I recall, someone on the list knew people working at the Supercomputer Research outfit. >> Third, all avenues of continued funding having fallen through, Cray >> Computer (not Cray Research, of course) was shut down and assets >> liquidated. I haven't heard what's become of Seymour, though. (He is >> undoubtedly an asset, buy I doubt the Agency would have him liquidated.) > >You mean the avenues that are of PUBLIC record. The possibility could always >exist that the development continues 'in-house'. It wouldn't be the first time >that sort of move has been played. You, whoever you are, asked about the operational status of Cray Computer, and I answered. It entered Chapter Seven liquidation, parts of existing computers were sold for scrap or museum/curio objects, the GaAs fab was sold to another company, and the employees scattered. Claiming the NSA moved it "in-house" is implausible, at least in terms of these events. >> Huh? First, what evidence do you have for this claim? Second, who cares? >> Implementing Clipper in a Cray Computer machine--why bother? > >[Rant mode on] >Speculation Tim... I'm SPECULATING. Could, in theory... AND my kind of theory >probably has holes you could drive a FLEET of Mack trucks through. I have NO >evidence. I'm not sure WHO would care. I'M A PARANOID DILLUSIONAL PSYCHOPATH! >O.K. well maybe not that last part... but I'm asking the questions, remember? >I said I'm new here, so if your going to blow holes in my pet theories, then >do me the 'kindness' of using an accurate weapon... that's why I posted... I asked what evidence you have for this claim. Idle speculation, based on innumerate estimates of plausibility are helpful to no one. >> As to the claim that a million-processor machine could do this, you need to >> work out the math. (If a backdoor exists, or the LEAF has been gotten, a >> supercomputer is not needed....) > >Again... I claimed NOTHING! SPECULATED MUCH! Now it's your turn... Why would >YOU build a machine like this? What could POSSIBLY be it's capabilities? >Speculate with me for a moment... *_take a chance_*. On our list, and in the circles I am familiar with, "speculations" are not treated with more respect than are actual "claims" (whatever they are). If you speculate that "really, really fast computers" will make today's ciphers insecure, based on not even the simplest of calculations, expect to be either ignored or called to task. This is the way science works, by falsification of theories (and speculations). >> If you mean using supercomputers to brute force the general factoring of an >> RSA modulus, this is nonsense. While there may be math shortcuts we don't >> yet publically know about which make factoring easier than we currently >> think it is, a mere million or even a billion processors will not make a >> dent in the factoring of, say, a 700-digit modulus. See the tables in >> Schneier and elsewhere for some estimates of factoring efforts needed. > >Nonsense? Is that 700 decimal digits or 700 binary digits? I don't have the >tables that you refer to. Where may I find them? (LOL) A 2048-bit key, such as many of us use, uses a roughly 700-decimal-digit modulus. "Schneier," mentioned in my paragraph, is "Applied Cryptography." Page 284 of the 1st Ed. has a discussion of the work involved in factoring large moduli. Rivest has made some more detailed estimates. Given your rudeness and self-professed ignorance of even the basic math, I see no point in wasting any more of my time on your posts. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Digicash and capital adequacy
by Simon Spero 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This came out of a corridor discussion yesterday as to how digicash would affect future banking systems: How does digicash interact with capital adequacy requirements? Should each digi-dollar issued require a corresponding hunk'o'assets in the customers account, or should the bank be able to issue digicash using existing rules? Digicash can have a much faster velocity than real cash, so I can sort of imagine their being periods where adequacy limits could be exceeded. What's the panels view? Simon p.s. I got to see the movie "Hackers" while I was sick in bed after WWW IV. The movie was pretty bogus, but the soundtrack was pretty cool. The wonderful movie website had nothing about any soundtrack albums; anyone know if there was one?

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QCF_dec
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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the problem with attacks on Blaze & Weinstein
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The "Blaze & Weinstein are devils in disguise" business is ridiculous, as is the notion of "cypherpunk purity". Cypherpunks is a mailing list. If Blaze and Weinstein were up to something especially tricky, they'd probably post from accounts not traceable to their employers (like, say, anonymous remailers). Suggesting that a person is not to be trusted because they work for organization "X" is particularly silly where the suggestor isn't willing to provide the details of their own organizational ties. This is a mailing list. Mailing lists are for discussing things - like technological defenses for privacy. People may have interesting things to contribute because of, in spite of, or irrespective of their employment or other relationships with large organizations. (And, in fact, they do. Both Matt Blaze and Jeff Weinstein have done and said pro-privacy things despite the equivocal-to-hostile stance their employers have taken with respect to privacy. Brian Davis, the list's token prosecutor :), has recently been sending messages re the limits of governmental power in the context of criminal investigations. Microsoft employees have posted re Microsoft's choices about privacy and encryption/security. And so on.) If this were a secret organization and we were splitting up into individual cells for revolutionary/forbidden activity, your suspicion/paranoia might be useful. But we're not (it's an open list, archived on full-text searchable Web servers), so it's not. And, apart from whether or not they're valuable list contributors, the list really isn't in a position to not "tolerate" unwanted or unproductive readers or authors. The tools which make identity difficult to fix make it difficult to restrict/deny access to an unpopular or unwanted identity. Get used to it. Adapt or die, hmm? -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- | Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks | gbroiles(a)netbox.com every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." | -- Antonin Artaud |

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