December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Timing Attack Paper
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:39 PM 12/11/95 CST, gibo wrote: >I went to > >http://www.cryptography.com/timingattack.html > >and found the whole thing to be totally incomprehensible from >a layman's point of view. I apologize for having not read >"Applied Cryptography", which might have made the abstract a >simpler read - but even if I had I'd have been baffled by a >lot of the terminology and equations in this paper. > >Can anyone post a brief summary which explains the essential >workings of the attack? I'd be very grateful. Briefly, most public-key calculations are _slow_, and use 512-2048-bit numbers which get represented as arrays of machine integers. The amount of time they take depends on the values you're multiplying together, especially because the algorithms used to do the arithmetic less slowly take shortcuts whenever possible to avoid unnecessary work. If you watch the time that it takes for a machine to do calculations using its private keys, for some algorithms you can guess a bit or two of the key. If you're clever, and have the ability to feed the victim different numbers for it to calculate on (e.g. make a bunch of connections using Diffie-Hellman), you can guess different bits each time, and gradually get the whole thing. It helps to watch this a number of times to get better statistics, so you can tell what's real calculation and what's just speed-randomness. Obviously, it also helps if you're running a program on the same machine as the target you're trying to hit, but you can still gain some information if you're running across a network and having to estimate random network delays. In these cases, you just have to watch longer to get stats. A common algorithm for doing modular exponentiation (the core of the Diffie-Hellman and RSA algorithms) looks like this: To calculate y**x mod m (all this arithmetic is multiple-precision) (and maybe there's an off-by-one error or two in this :-) This uses successive squaring to do the calculation in log2(x) time instead of just doing x multiplies by y, which would be very slow since x is typically 500-1000 bits long... Remember that multiplying two 1024-bit numbers typically involves multiplying two arrays of 32 numbers 32 bits long, which takes 32*32 or 1024 multiply steps. And modulo calculations are also slow. prod = 1 square = y log2x = number of bits in x for i = 1 to log2x+1 { if (x odd) then { prod = prod * square if ( prod > m ) then prod = prod mod m } # else if (x even), don't bother square = square * square if (square > m) square = square mod m x = x / 2 } You can figure out the timing for the squaring calculations yourself. Since you get to pick y, you can manipulate it to guess a bit about how long x is, and notice from the different timings how many times there was a prod*square calculation (which tells you how many bits were odd), as well as how many prod mod m calculations. You can get a certain amount of defense by keeping around prod1 and prod2, and calculating prod1 = prod1 * square (the real value) for odd and prod2 = prod2 * square (a dummy you'll discard later) for even, and doing something useful to obscure the mod m calculations, like keeping a dummy around to divide if prod1 or prod2 is less than m. Aside from slowing things down by 50%, if you're not careful, there's still information that leaks from the timing. For other algorithms, sometimes the calculations you've got to do timings on are more subtle, like DES, but you can still often guess things, and Paul gives a bunch of calculations for these. They're more statistical, since the effects you're chasing are subtler, but you still get information. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Plaintiff's Opposition in Karn vs State Dept
by Phil Karn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Monday, December 11, my attorneys filed a Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the case of Karn vs US Dept of State et al. I have HTMLized our filings and added them to my web page. Please feel free to peruse them. Also, let me know if you spot any obvious typos; I had to do quite a bit of manual editing, particularly in the footnotes, to make the result look good in HTML. The government now gets the chance to answer our opposition. They were originally scheduled to do by December 13, but since our own filing was delayed over the weekend by the judge's concurrence the government will probably get a few extra days to respond. Note that we have asked to make oral arguments on the motion. I'll let everyone know if or when this will happen. The web page is: http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export Phil

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Re: The Elevator Problem
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK. I'll bite. I realize that whenever non-heavy crypto people tackle heavy crypto problems, the answers are virtually always: (a) obviously wrong; (b) proposed 400 years ago; (c) not even related to the original question; (d) all of the above. Alice says to Bob, in front of all of the other people on the elevator: "I have generated a large(ish) amount of large(ish) prime numbers and have recorded all of them. I have multipled two of the numbers to get an even larger non-prime number. I have done this a large(ish) number of times until I have a 'large(ish)/2' set of non-prime numbers. The elements of this set are [Alice reads off the set of non-prime numbers and Bob along with the other people on the elevator record them.] Bob, go home and pick one of the non-prime numbers in the set. Factor it. Use the largest prime as a private key in your message to me. Since I know what the numbers all are, I'll try all of them to see which one decrypts your message." Bob has to factor one large(ish) prime. Alice has to *try* an average of "large(ish)/2" private keys to decrypt Bob's message. The other people on the elevator have to *factor* an average of "large(ish)/2/2" number of large(ish) numbers to decrypt the message. The *relative* security then depends on the number of digits in the large(ish) primes and the number of products in the set Alice reads to Bob. E.G. Imagine that Alice previously generates 2,000,000 prime numbers, giving her a set of 1,000,000 products. Neither Bob nor anyone else on the elevator knows the 2,000,000 primes that Alice has generated. She reads all 1,000,000 products to Bob and everyone else on the elevator. Imagine that any given product can be factored in 100 MIP days (i.e. a 100 MHz Pentium running for 24 hours or "P-Day"). Bob factors one and only one of the numbers and uses the factor as a private key to generate the message. Neither Alice nor anyone else on the elevator knows what product Bob picked to factor. Alice receives the message. She takes the 2,000,000 privately recorded primes and runs a brute force attack on the encrypted message, decrypting it in an average of 1,000,000 tries. The other people on the elevator need to factor each number and then run it has a brute force attempt to decrypt the message. This takes them an average of 500,000 P-Days to factor the numbers plus whatever the brute force time requires. The relative security develops because it is faster to generate large(ish) primes and to brute force decryption then to factor the large(ish) primes. The absolute time it takes to generate the primes and to brute force the decryption sets the relative time Alice is willing to spend to get a different relative level of security. If the nasties are the NSA, then 500,000 P-Days is too insecure. If the nasties are Alice and Bob's nosey neighbor, then 500,000 P-Days is "excessively" secure. If Alice and Bob are sweet patooties, and the nasty is Alice's father who runs the comp sci department at the university, then 500,000 P-Days is about right. Now, if any of you want to waste some time, you can play "kick the newbie" re points (a) through (d) above. --tallpaul

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Blinding against Kocher's timing attacks
by ljo＠ausys.se 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ron Rivest wrote (at sci.crypt): >The simplest way to defeat Kocher's timing attack is to ensure that the >cryptographic computations take an amount of time that does not depend on the >data being operated on. For example, for RSA it suffices to ensure that >a modular multiplication always takes the same amount of time, independent of >the operands. > >A second way to defeat Kocher's attack is to use blinding: you "blind" the >data beforehand, perform the cryptographic computation, and then unblind >afterwards. For RSA, this is quite simple to do. (The blinding and >unblinding operations still need to take a fixed amount of time.) This doesn't >give a fixed overall computation time, but the computation time is then a >random variable that is independent of the operands. Does anyone know whether David Chaum's patent on blind digital signatures extends to this application? Kind regards, /Lars Johansson ljo(a)ausys.se http://www.ausys.se/defaulte.htm

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AOGOLD Trojan Program
by WheatonB＠603cs.croughton.af.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FYI. Thanks. ... Kev Kevin P. Knox, SSgt, USAF Systems Administrator, IP Network Manager Novell Certified NetWare Engineer Royal Air Force Croughton, United Kingdom Near Brackley, Northamptonshire My PGP public key can be obtained via anonymous FTP from nsc.croughton.af.mil (131.56.128.5) From: pch(a)assist.mil Subject: ASSIST 95-46, AOLGOLD Trojan Program. To: assist-bulletin(a)assist.mil Date sent: Mon, 4 Dec 1995 16:06:54 -0500 (EST) Copies to: assist(a)assist.mil -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Automated Systems Security Incident Support Team _____ ___ ___ _____ ___ _____ | / /\ / \ / \ | / \ | | / Integritas / \ \___ \___ | \___ | | < et /____\ \ \ | \ | | \ Celeritas / \ \___/ \___/ __|__ \___/ | |_____\ <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Bulletin 95-46 Release date: 4 December, 1995, 4:00 PM EST (GMT -5) SUBJECT: AOLGOLD Trojan Program. SUMMARY: A trojan program called AOLGOLD.ZIP that deletes c: drive files when executed is being distributed around America Online and other networks. BACKGROUND: The AOLGOLD Trojan program was recently discovered on America Online (AOL). Notice about the Trojan has been circulated to all America Online subscribers. An e-mail message that contained an attached archive file named AOLGOLD.ZIP was circulated on AOL. A README file that is in the archive describes the fictitious AOLGOLD as a new and improved interface for the AOL online service. Reading or downloading the included file will not damage your system, the trojaned program must be executed for damage to occur. If you unzip the archive, you get two files: INSTALL.EXE and README.TXT. The README.TXT file again describes AOLGOLD as a new and improved interface to the AOL online service. The INSTALL.EXE program is a self-extracting ZIP archive. When you run the install program, it extracts 18 files onto your hard drive: MACROS.DRV VIDEO.DRV INSTALL.BAT ADRIVE.RPT SUSPEND.DRV ANNOY.COM MACRO.COM SP-NET.COM SP-WIN.COM MEMBRINF.COM DEVICE.COM TEXTMAP.COM HOST.COM REP.COM EMS2EXT.SYS EMS.COM EMS.SYS README.TXT The file list includes another README.TXT file. If you examine the new README.TXT file, it starts out with "Ever wanted the Powers of a Guide" and continues with some crude language. The README.TXT file indicates that the included program is a guide program that can be used to kick other people off of AOL. If you stop at this point and do nothing but examine the unzipped files with the TYPE command, your machine will not be damaged. The following three files contain the Trojan program: MACROS.DRV VIDEO.DRV INSTALL.BAT The rest of the files included in the archive appear to have been chosen at random and included to simply fill up the archive and make it look official. The Trojan program is started by running the INSTALL.BAT file. The INSTALL.BAT file is a simple batch file that renames the VIDEO.DRV file to VIRUS.BAT and then runs it. VIDEO.DRV is an amateurish DOS batch file that starts deleting the contents of several critical directories on your C: drive, including: c:\ c:\dos c:\windows c:\windows\system c:\qemm c:\stacker c:\norton It also deletes the contents of several other directories, including those for several online services and games, such as: c:\aol20 c:\prodigy c:\aol25 c:\mmp169 c:\cserve c:\doom c:\wolf3d When the batch file completes, it prints a crude message on the screen and attempts to run a program named DoomDay.EXE. Bugs in the batch file prevent the DOOMDAY.EXE program from running. Other bugs in the file cause it to delete itself if it is run from any drive but the C: drive. IMPACT: When the INSTALL.EXE program is executed, files on the users c: drive are deleted. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS: NOTE: Do not copy any files onto your hard disk before trying to recover your hard drive. The files are deleted with the DOS del command, and can be recovered with the DOS undelete command. The files are still on your disk, only the directory entries have been removed. If you copy any new files onto your hard disk, they will likely be written over the deleted files, making it impossible to recover the deleted files. If you have delete protection installed on your system, recovery will be relatively easy. If not, the DOS undelete command can be used, but you will have to supply the first letter of each file name as it is recovered. In many cases, you will probably want to restore the directories by reinstalling them from the original installation disks, but do that last. You must recover any unreplaceable files first using undelete and then replace any others by copying or reinstalling them from the distribution disks. To recover the system: (1) Boot the system with a clean, locked floppy containing the recovery program for the recovery files you have installed, or the DOS UNDELETE.EXE program if you do not have recovery files installed. (2) Type the VIRUS.BAT file to get a list of the directories the Trojan tried to delete. Ignore any directories that don't exist on your machine. (3) Run the recovery program and recover your files. You may have to help it find the recovery files, such as MIRROR, which will be in the root directory. You may have to recover the MIRROR file first and then use it to recover the other files. If you are using only the DOS undelete command, type: undelete directory where directory is the name of the directory to examine. To undelete the files in the dos directory, use: undelete c:\dos The undelete program will present you with a list of deleted files with the first letter replaced with a question mark. Without delete protection, you will have to supply this letter in order to undelete the file. (4) After you have restored as many files as you want or can using the UNDELETE command, replace any others by reinstalling them using the original installation disks. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ASSIST would like to thank the Department of Energy CIAC for information contained in this bulletin. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ASSIST is an element of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), and provides service to the entire DoD community. Constituents of the DoD with questions about ASSIST or computer security issues, can contact ASSIST using one of the methods listed below. Non-DoD organizations/institutions, contact the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) representative. To obtain a list of FIRST member organizations and their constituencies send an email to docserver(a)first.org with an empty "subject" line and a message body containing the line "send first-contacts". ASSIST Information Resources: To be included in the distribution list for the ASSIST bulletins, send your Milnet (Internet) e-mail address to assist-request(a)assist.mil. Back issues of ASSIST bulletins, and other security related information, are available from the ASSIST BBS at 703-607-4710, 327-4710, and through anonymous FTP from assist.mil (IP address 199.211.123.11). Note: assist.mil will only accept anonymous FTP connections from Milnet addresses that are registered with the NIC or DNS. If your system is not registered, you must provide your MILNET IP address to ASSIST before access can be provided. ASSIST Contact Information: PHONE: 800-357-4231, COMM 703-607-4700, DSN 327-4700. ELECTRONIC MAIL: assist(a)assist.mil. ASSIST BBS: COMM 703-607-4710, DSN 327-4710, leave a message for the "sysop". FAX: COMM 703-607-4735, DSN 607-4735 ASSIST uses Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 2.6.2 as the digital signature mechanism for bulletins. PGP 2.6.2 incorporates the RSAREF(tm) Cryptographic Toolkit under license from RSA Data Security, Inc. A copy of that license is available via anonymous FTP from net-dist.mit.edu (IP 18.72.0.3) in the file /pub/PGP/rsalicen.txt, and through the world wide web from http://net-dist.mit.edu/pgp.html. In accordance with the terms of that license, PGP 2.6.2 may be used for non-commercial purposes only. Instructions for downloading the PGP 2.6.2 software can also be obtained from net-dist.mit.edu in the pub/PGP/README file. PGP 2.6.2 and RSAREF may be subject to the export control laws of the United States of America as implemented by the United States Department of State Office of Defense Trade Controls. The PGP signature information will be attached to the end of ASSIST bulletins. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by ASSIST. 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YOUR ADVICE AND HELP PLEASE......
by tjm＠easynet.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear fellow Cypherpunks, I write to ask for your help. In the new year I am to begin a three level internet course - beginners, intermediate and advanced. Both privacy and security have been and are an interest of mine and unlike many courses which I have approached and conversed with I do not see these areas as some remote aspect of the advanced level - I see them as constituents of each level, through out the levels, and certainly from the beginning - as I have lurked here for the past while as a subscriber and prior that from afar I believe we all would agree with this. Yes, I am a virgin cypherpunk but not a virgin to both privacy and security as growing up in Northern Ireland I have seen them both in abundance and at other times lacking - the official / the unofficial - how they both took away life.... What I write to ask for is some pointers to direct me and if possible some personal comments in regards to these aspects. I personally use PGP but am ignorant to where this program is in the broader field of cryptography and what other programs are which have been mentioned on the mailing list. Excuse my lack of knowledge in technical terms but I am acute to them in the realm of the street. THE STREETS HAVE CHANGED TO CABLES AND THE BUILDINGS HAVE BECOME CPUs - WE ARE ALL GRAPHICS/TEXT/SOUNDS/VIDEO...........LANGUAGE. Can you please help me, as this information shall be passed on to others to make them aware and to help them - as it has helped you all, as it is helping me.... Thanking you all, in anticipation of hearing from you and wishing all a very happy as well as a safe Xmas and a lucky new year. Yours faithfully, Terence. "Irish eyes are smiling, I miss the emerald isle." -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCPAzCsvtYAAAEEANjIsO3Q0cSdEgYifAiA5+aUEVSBFFZTZIpqQXbgXxExsrjk bFiJ6haaWaD60KPjxH8QJ8PHr9x2tk2K1ktpbcL2+YjPHd+fJzqgz3llu2FV1Xu/ k1C7SWA5G8Do66I0MrQD3/jbAI2zp/0LnVoiI7LWCvPPKoxYCiHdIQ/n5PcJABEB AAG0JVRlcmVuY2UgSi4gTWFsbG9uIDx0am1AZWFzeW5ldC5jby51az6JAJUDBRAw uju1Id0hD+fk9wkBAXuUBACjGEmj3AO/rSUD0WRRHdYjDfR8L1FvcV0J/ZNwp7WJ 2cmHvtecLaOlTVWulRhVI6suUSwwzBYZFWmHJA7lR67gLZN8xqWyo/jWPVLDxAte pdC7ruZI1ZrFc90uPpymnVdC00gwgcG3F4RDQ9B1uY+4KiNG//fULwT6xUVzthak qA== =QN61 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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F. Y. I.
by WheatonB＠603cs.croughton.af.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all. This is something I received from a fellow Internet user in the States. I don't know where he got this info, but I thought we may all benefit from this warning. SrA Lounsbury sends... ______________________________ Forward Header __________________________________ Just in case you missed this info.... >>>>>>SUBJECT: VIRUSES--IMPORTANT PLEASE READ IMMEDIATELY >>>>>> >>>>>> There is a computer virus that is being sent across the >>>>>>Internet. If you receive an e-mail message with the subject >>>>>>line "Good Times", DO NOT read the message, DELETE it >>>>>>immediately. Please read the messages below. Some miscreant >>>>>>is sending e-mail under the title "Good Times" nation wide, >>>>>>if you get anything like this, DON'T DOWN LOAD THE FILE! It >>>>>>has a virus that rewrites your hard drive, obliterating >>>>>>anything on it. Please be careful and forward this mail to >>>>>>anyone you care about. >>>>>> >>>>>>************************************************************* >>>>>> >>>>>>WARNING!!!!!!! INTERNET VIRUS >>>>>> >>>>>> The FCC released a warning last Wednesday concerning a >>>>>>matter of major importance to any regular user of the >>>>>>Internet. Apparently a new computer virus has been >>>>>>engineered by a user of AMERICA ON LINE that is unparalleled >>>>>>in its destructive capability. Other more well-known viruses >>>>>>such as "Stoned", "Airwolf" and "Michaelangelo" pale in >>>>>>comparison to the prospects of this newest creation by a >>>>>>warped mentality. What makes this virus so terrifying, said >>>>>>the FCC, is the fact that no program needs to be exchanged >>>>>>for a new computer to be infected. It can be spread through >>>>>>the existing e-mail systems of the Internet. Once a computer >>>>>>is infected, one of several things can happen. If the >>>>>>computer contains a hard drive, that will most likely be >>>>>>destroyed. If the program is not stopped, the computer's >>>>>>processor will be placed in an nth-complexity infinite binary >>>>>>loop -which can severely damage the processor if left running >>>>>>that way too long. >>>>>> >>>>>> Unfortunately, most novice computer users will not >>>>>>realize what is happening until it is far too late. Luckily, >>>>>>there is one sure means of detecting what is now known as the >>>>>>"Good Times" virus. It always travels to new computers the >>>>>>same way in a text email message with the subject line >>>>>>reading "Good Times". Avoiding infection is easy once the >>>>>>file has been received- not reading it! The act of loading >>>>>>the file into the mail server's ASCII buffer causes the "Good >>>>>>Times" mainline program to initialize and execute. >>>>>> >>>>>> The program is highly intelligent- it will send copies of >>>>>>itself to everyone whose e-mail address is contained in a >>>>>>receive-mail file or a sent-mail file, if it can find one. It >>>>>>will then proceed to trash the computer it is running on. The >>>>>>bottom line here is - if you receive a file with the subject >>>>>>line "Good Times", delete it immediately! Do not read it" >>>>>>Rest assured that whoever's name was on the "From" line was >>>>>>surely struck by the virus. Warn your friends and local >>>>>>system users of this newest threat to the Internet! It could >>>>>>save them a lot of time and money. _________________________________________________________ Category:

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PGP status in russia
by PasPossible＠hudson.lm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

does anybody know the legal status of using encrypted email in russia? i'm trying to talk nasty to a lady in moscow who's using a borrowed account and we'd like to keep the messages somewhat private anybody know the law there? thanks

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chaotic signal cryptography
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 11 Dec 1995 12:00:38 -0500 (EST), L. Den-Hollander wrote (in part): >A few years back i ran thru a paper emanating >from a navy labs researcher (i think the name was Peccora) >about using synchronised chaotic signal generators as a >signal scrambling/encrytpion scheme. I too am interested in this technique. I may be wrong, but it seems like a variation on the one-time pad. Any comments on this technique (usefulness, robustness, etc.)? Hooker

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(dcsb) CIS SEMINAR--December 15--Manasse, Micali, Rivest, Shamir--2:00pm
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: lethin(a)ai.mit.edu (Rich Lethin) Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 14:12:26 -0500 To: bsdc(a)ai.mit.edu Subject: [joanne(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu: CIS SEMINAR--December 15--Manasse, Micali, Rivest, Shamir--2:00pm] Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: lethin(a)ai.mit.edu (Rich Lethin) Seminar at MIT. Return-Path: <joanne(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu> From: joanne(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu (Joanne Talbot) Date: Tue, 12 Dec 95 12:38:38 EST To: theory-seminars(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu Reply-To: theory-seminars-request(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu Subject: CIS SEMINAR--December 15--Manasse, Micali, Rivest, Shamir--2:00pm **Of interest. CIS-SEMINAR Title: Micropayment schemes, light-weight signatures, and public-key certification Speakers: Mark Manasse, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Silvio Micali Time: 2:00-3:30 Friday, December 15th, 1995 Where: Room NE43-518, 545 Technology Square Abstract: We present four short talks on related subject matter: (1) Mark Manasse will present his micropayment scheme "Millicent". (2) Ron Rivest will present the "PayWord" micropayment scheme. (3) Adi Shamir will present the "MicroMint" micropayment scheme. (4) Silvio Micali will present an enhanced certificate revocation system. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 958-3971 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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