December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I wrong?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had been working on a series of questions/problems with the Assasination Politics idea as initially presented, to be sent to Jim and to people on the NWLIBERTARIANS list, as he requested, but you've kind of preempted one of them. From: IN%"lunaslide(a)loop.com" 7-FEB-1996 06:57:58.30 >Further, I don't believe you have enough support for your claim that other targets would not be sought. It is one thing to say that enough people won't vote for someone picked out of the phone book, but what if the predicted individual is a doctor who performs abortions, or an activist for gay rights (or *against* gay rights), or Bill Gates ;-). There are also the individuals who are trying to bring about change in society that is unpopular, but is still in the interest of humanity. Abraham Lincoln surely would have been killed by this system, for example. Also, big corporations would be able to cut down their political enemies such as envornment activists, fair business practice activists and competetors' high ranking officers. Even if only one person in charge of such a business were to put out a digital contract, he would have no problem suppling the money for the hit. People who have tried to make changes for humanity that went against the social norm at the time are revered today for their efforts. In this system, they would likely be assasinated. Nothing would ever change because people are always afraid of change and afraid of things they do not understand and the people who fight that ignorance will likely be killed. Your statement that Organization B, the one that collects for any target, is not well supported. They would still be doing *plenty* of business, in spite of the higher prices. ----------------- Jim has the argument against the organization that collects for any target that nobody'd want to support it because they'd be afraid of being killed themselves by an unlimited organization. However, I am afraid that there is the problem with this that another organization (let's call it C) could spring up that used different principles than libertarian ones to decide which contracts to take, but still had strict principles. Thus, someone who was not violating those principles could use that organization without fear... and its contracts would be lower in price, like Organization A's. One concrete example would be the Christian Coalition, which I am certain has at least some members who are fanatical enough to want to restart the Crusades and Inquisition with conservative Protestantism rather than conservative Catholicism. For instance, anyone doing research on abortifacient drugs or methods could be targeted. >Organization B would thrive, make no mistake. And the people who would be getting in on all the action are the rich. All the politicians who oppose their interests would be hit immediately. Anyone trying to change the status quo would be eliminated. Why do you think we are still using combustion engines in the last decade of the 20th century? We could have had better alternatives 20 years ago, but the oil companies would loose out so they have either bought out these ideas or had killed the inventors and bought their patents and are sitting on them. A capitalist economy does not always breed competition that brings out the best and most desireable products because some advancements are bad for all the businesses involved in that market. Big business and the rich would benifit the most from the Assination Politics model. ------------------------ Umm.... as much as it seems otherwise, this is not ConspiracyPunks. Actually, the involvement of wealth instead of votes (the first can be lost, the second cannot) is an argument in _favor_ of Assasination Politics. I generally have the objection to most anarcho-capitalist systems that the average person does not have enough foresight to do the kind of banding together most of them require. This one has the advantage of increased power to the wealthy, who have enough foresight to gain their wealth (or at least keep it, in the case of inheritance). ------------------------ >But what if OrgB stops taking donations for "predictions" for "Non-Initiation Of Force Principle" (NIOFP) offenders? Some other organization will crop up to take their place AND the people operating OrgB could be hit for their "ethical" action. There is simply too much opportunity offered by OrgB type organizations for people to pass up. They will not let the higher prices stop them. If the answer to that problem is to regulate the lists of "victims", then the next question is who are these people who are regulating and what guidelines are they following? Who decides who gets to be the moderators? Could there be exceptions to the (NIOFP)-offender standard? Who would they be and why? Could the organizations be anonymous as well? How would the money be transmitted to them in that case? How can we trust or redress grivances with an organization? There are still many concerns regarding the organizations. If the organizations fail, the whole system fails. --------------------- The organizations themselves can be perfectly anonymous, especially with some improvements onto the basic system that I am considering (and researching). One idea to keep things more honest would be a "deathstamping" organization, which would be above-board and have the "legitimate" function of ecash life insurance (I'll explain further later). -Allen

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Re: POTP gets good press
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert "Bob" Harvey once hung out at BBN. Maybe he is the one who seeks slick-kill ripoff with aptly snake-oily-named Internet Security Corp., which may be telephoned at 617-863-6400. POTP was pummeled last fall on c'punks. For the latest lubrications see: URL: http://www.elementrix.co.il/home.html Audacious marketing, these NatSec privatizing firms, and the log-rollers for USMA and SAIC, preaching dire threats, promising if-you-knew-what-we-knew security, info-warrioring fundamentalism.

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Type I capabilities added to mix@zifi.genetics.utah.edu
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- howdy folks, the purpose of this message is to announce the addition of Type I capabilities to the remailer at mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu. mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu now supports the standard cpunk commands. here's the section of the help file that pertains to the Type I remailer, the whole help file available by sending a message to mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu with Subject: remailer-help. the Type I remailer is Matt Ghio's code. all commands are supported EXCEPT usenet posting which would probably just get me in trouble. the pgp key for the remailer is included in the message below. in addition, you can obtain the key by fingering remailer(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu. the whole help file is also available by fingering mixmaster(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu. thanks, - -patrick finerty Part II - Type I remailer features I have an automated mail handling program installed here which will take any message with the proper headers and automatically re-send it anonymously. You can use this by sending a message to mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu, with the header Anon-To: containing the address that you want to send anonymously to. (Only one recipient address is permitted.) If you can't add headers to your mail, you can place two colons on the first line of your message, followed by the Anon-To line. Follow that with a blank line, and then begin your message. For Example: > From: joe(a)site.com > To: mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu > Subject: Anonymous Mail > > :: > Anon-To: beth(a)univ.edu > > This is some anonymous mail. The above would be delivered to beth(a)univ.edu anonymously. All headers in the original message are removed, with the exception of the Subject (and Content-Type, if present). She would not know that it came from Joe, nor would she be able to reply to the message. However, if Beth suspected that Joe had sent the message, she could compare the time that the message was received with the times that Joe was logged in. However, this problem can be avoided by instructing the remailer to delay the message, by using the Latent-Time header: > From: joe(a)site.com > To: mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu > Subject: Anonymous Mail > > :: > Anon-To: beth(a)univ.edu > Latent-Time: +1:00 > > This is some anonymous mail. The above message would be delayed one hour from when it is sent. It is also possible to create a random delay by adding an r to the time (ie +1:00r), which would have the message be delivered at a random time, but not more than an hour. Another problem is that some mailers automatically insert a signature file. Of course, this usually contains the senders email address, and so would reveal their identity. The remailer software can be instructed to remove a signature file with the header "Cutmarks". Any line beginning with the same text at in the cutmarks header, and any lines following it will be removed. > From: sender(a)origin.com > To: mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu > Subject: Anonymous Mail > > :: > Anon-To: recipient(a)destination.com > Cutmarks: -- > > This line of text will be in the anonymous message. > -- > This line of text will not be in the anonymous message. You can add additional headers to the output message by preceeding them with ## > From: chris(a)nifty.org > To: mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu > Subject: Nifty Anon Msg > > :: > Anon-To: andrew(a)hell.edu > > ## > Reply-To: acs-314159(a)chop.ucsd.edu > > A Message with a reply address. By seperating messages with cutmarks, you can send more than one message at once: > From: me@mysite > To: mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu > Subject: message 1 > > :: > Anon-To: recipient1(a)site1.org > Cutmarks: -- > > Message one. > -- > :: > Anon-To: recipient2(a)site2.org > > ## > Subject: message 2 > > Message two. The two messages will be delivered seperately. For added security, you can encrypt your messages to the remailer with PGP. The remailer software will decrypt the message and send it on. Here is the remailer's public key: - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQCNAzEY6mQAAAEEAMqdj6BCAb95C7KDM7UWTieGdCWVNmI8sKcDdX5JIyBWGo7Y hKnxF3OgO+sTxjeeabCG8xWHNe9w8CzXPbOBE3soEedvY+FqaRBYdO8a3Eex4nSp WomnKtcKcBet7G93PErGf4srEwR1OqMRsi+1CbDayNSu6IDU2P69KCmvu47hAAUR tCpsZWFkIHJlbWFpbGVyIDxtaXhAemlmaS5nZW5ldGljcy51dGFoLmVkdT6JAJUD BRAxGOraTdCj+UbQAfkBAVu9A/4kPaTN84+giuDkeiqbwTRMGAUQZ3N65hSR6snt cQp3cvpY30d4i8r3PiBR+5LUAsO/vrrGGyW106X/PHKQpb2lJ5SbcoJ+fMhMcBFc /UPxkwJGbcc7ftBkrIUNVetPik8PoRTlzgbBSypv97HiApYdZc6fKr2NuLv8OhmG fdWcEYkAlQMFEDEY6oX+vSgpr7uO4QEBoUMD+wfpS5YhYHfVp37iklOSYhQdzpcl pefg/RxgroWMWMzLYCeMvcoqlCIEznfYA8fSEPsmVDH22lQvZaLSbXM5WQ1gpZsE 6qR5SicFI9oX5ciVa2M+KgH3sxwS9TDFqcWBSgSnWPHzDT1oUBI/PLI2k/FGN5Hq rbYH2gPobLez9N9z =ms21 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- To utilize this feature, create a message with two colons on the first line, then the Anon-To line, then any other headers, such as cutmarks or latency, then a blank line, and then the message. Encrypt this with the remailer's public key. Then send it to the remailer, adding the header "Encrypted: PGP". If you forget this, the remailer won't know that it needs to be decrypted. Also be sure to use the -t option with PGP, or the linefeeds might not be handled properly. > To: mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu > From: me(a)mysite.org > > :: > Encrypted: PGP > > -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- > Version: 2.3a > > hIkCuMeAjnwmCTUBA+dfWcFk/fLRpm4ZM7A23iONxkOGDL6D0FyRi/r0P8+pH2gf > Hai4+1BHUhXDCW2LfLfay5JwHBNMtcdbgXiQVXIm0cHM0zgf9hBroIM9W+B2Z07i > 6UN3BDhiTSJBCTZUGQ7DrkltbgoyRhNTgrzQRR8FSQQXSo/cf4po0vCezKYAAABP > smG6rgPhdtWlynKSZR6Gd2W3S/5pa+Qd+OD2nN1TWepINgjXVHrCt0kLOY6nVFNQ > U7lPLDihXw/+PPJclxwvUeCSygmP+peB1lPrhSiAVA== > =da+F > -----END PGP MESSAGE----- Any unencrypted text after the PGP message is also remailed. This is to allow sending to someone who is anonymous. If you create a PGP-encrypted message to yourself via my remailer, and then you give it to someone, they can send you a message by sending the encrypted message to the remailer. The remailer will then decrypt it and send it to you. The message gets anonymized in the process, so the sender will need to include a return address if he wants a reply. Messages sent this way can be encrypted using the Encrypt-Key: feature. Any text following a line beginning with ** will be encrypted with this key. For example, if you put in your PGP message: > :: > Anon-To: you(a)yourhost.org > Encrypt-Key: your_password > > ** The appended message after the ** will be encrypted with the key "your_password", using PGP's conventional encryption option. Part III - Common Features Can mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu post to News? No. News posting is not supported at this time. Abuse Policy: I consider the following to be inappropriate use of this anonymous remailer, and will take steps to prevent anyone from doing any of the following: - - Sending messages intended primarilly to be harassing or annoying. - - Use of the remailer for any illegal purpose. If you don't want to receive anonymous mail, send me a message, and I will add your email address to the block list. "Those that give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." -- Benjamin Franklin (1773) finger for PGP key zifi runs LINUX 1.3.57 -=-=-=WEB=-=-=-> http://zifi.genetics.utah.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by mkpgp1.6, a Pine/PGP interface. iQCVAwUBMRkfF03Qo/lG0AH5AQFJ9gQAly+8Jko2cikOh254fcl/j2/ts7S/hgeR IpLNGHbJlT4BQtFZT6JT/e6cuijVt5x2u6pBVphRpAp/om033mwgIcMwYnIvDMEo ijnxb6dskrdQf6zV9lRV7HJ4izIX85btI41e9VNDrIT/VVgsJ/MVPYYfB6xNdM9h UbzGt/x9I58= =AG+5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Reasons in support of crypto-anarchy WAS Re: Why am I (fwd)
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:05 PM 2/6/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"ravage(a)ssz.com" "Jim Choate" 6-FEB-1996 22:50:35.24 > >>What is described is not self-defence by any stretch of the imagination. It >is a pre-meditated act which causes any plea of self-defence to fail. >------------------ > If someone has comitted serious enough violations of rights in the >past, then I would call killing that person justified. First, it prevents any >future violations of rights by that person. Second, it serves to discourage >people if they know they can get killed if they do so. (I realize that >capital punishment by governments doesn't appear to do much good, but the >people in question- government agents, etcetera- are generally a bit different >than the gang members who so regularly ignore prison sentences and the death >penalty.) Third, and getting away from the self-defense argument, it is >justice. The job of a government, if it has one, is to defend individual >liberties. It is given privileges in order to enforce that. The abuse of such >privileges should be met by death. (Yes, I would be in favor of changing >current laws to remove sovereign immunity and institute a death penalty for >governmental rights violations. Unfortunately, among the people subject to such >a law are the ones making the laws.) Thank you for such a well-written defense of my philosophy. Clearly, the government is now out of effective control of the citizenry; it is hard for me to understand how anybody could fail to see this. The system I describe, while it may appear to some to be extreme, is a sincere attempt to return control to the populace. >------------------------ > >>How many people have to decide that another should be killed for it to be >ethical? In short, how many people does it take to decide it is a legitimate >act to take your own life? >---------------------- > Why should "how many people" make a difference? If I violate someone's >rights enough to justify such a course of action, then I should be dead even if >everyone except the victim is cheering. Yes, I realize that Jim Bell's system >does depend on a group of people. But so, in the end, do all such systems- >whether they call themselves governments or anarcho-capitalist societies. If >the Christian Coalition got too many people with guns in the latter, they'd >rule. > Any further discussion would appear to belong in private email; I >suspect that Jim Bell would appreciate a cc. > -Allen Yes, please. Frankly, Allen, it's a pleasure to see people really UNDERSTAND what I'm talking about! You obviously do, better than mos t.

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digital cash &c.
by Carlos Perez 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard any developments on the forthcoming Visa "Cash" cards? Release date or other info? (for those who haven't heard of it _is_ anonymous, can be refilled at ATMs. Supposedly in a test release in Atlanta.) Has any attempt been made to remove the "munitions" classification from cryptographic materials. It seems a lot of our legal difficulties start there...

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Edited Edupage 6 Feb 1996
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"educom(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" 7-FEB-1996 14:51:59.08 COLLEGES WORRY ABOUT NEW LIABILITY FOR INTERNET CONTENT The recent passage of the telecommunications reform bill has some college administrators worried over new liability issues for educational institutions that might unknowingly make "indecent" material available to minors through their Internet access operations. In addition, they've expressed concern over potential First Amendment violations if they censor the content too heavily. "We have programs on campus about date rape, unwanted pregnancy, and reproductive-health options, so I don't see how we'd tolerate censorship of that kind of information in the electronic format," says the head of telecommunications at Carnegie Mellon University. (Chronicle of Higher Education 9 Feb 96 A23) ---------------------- Edupage is written by John Gehl (gehl(a)educom.edu) & Suzanne Douglas (douglas(a)educom.edu) Voice: 404-371-1853, Fax: 404-371-8057. Technical support is provided by the Office of Information Technology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. *************************************************************** EDUPAGE is what you've just finished reading. (Please note that it's "Edupage" and not "EduPage.") To subscribe to Edupage: send a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu and in the body of the message type: subscribe edupage Willie Loman (assuming that your name is Willie Loman; if it's not, substitute your own name). ... To cancel, send a message to: listproc(a)educom.unc.edu and in the body of the message type: unsubscribe edupage. (Subscription problems? Send mail to educom(a)educom.unc.edu.)

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Re: Defeating untrustworthy remailers?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com" "Deranged Mutant" 7-FEB-1996 00:44:18.29 >Here's another idea (don't laugh): to set up a system where mailing lists and newsgroups have public keys that you can encrypt directly to. Advantage for anonymous mail is that if a remailer is untrustowrthy, there's still some security in the final remailing of the document. ------------------ The newsgroups part of the idea has the problem that you've got to have either a centralized place from which the newsgroup is run that has the private key (a problem for controversial newsgroups, which are precisely the ones to which people will tend to use remailers to post to), or lots of places having the private key (an obvious problem from the cryptographic standpoint). -Allen

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personal web proxy?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know whether there's a freely available web proxy available anywhere? Even a "personal" one somewhere on my ISP's UNIX box would be a simple way to beat superficial logging/resolution of my static IP. Something like the Nutscapify or Canadianizer proxies, minus all the blinking and "hoser, eh?" stuff. Thanks.

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anti-CDA graphic
by David K. Merriman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've put Gordon Campbell's anti-CDA graphic up on the CP ftp site, in the incoming directory. File name is nobabies.jpg Dave Merriman------------------------------------------------------------- "It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error." Robert H. Jackson (1892-1954), U.S. Judge <><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><> My web page: http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1148

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Re: digital cash &c.
by Jordan Hayes 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> it _is_ anonymous ... And then: > can be refilled at ATMs You make a deposit or something? How does the transaction clear? When they finally look in the envelope, they credit the card? Or do you mean just 'anonymous' between the user and the merchant? /jordan

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