December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Announcing a new alpha release of premail
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You sez: : This is to announce that premail version 0.42 is now available. It : is a full alpha version of the new premail, containing all the : features and functions planned for the production release. [..] : If you are in the US or Canada, you can download premail now, from : the premail Distribution Authorization Form: : http://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/premail-form.html : Raph Levien ftp://ftp.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/incoming

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Re: Only accepting e-mail from known parties
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:53 12/25/95 -0500, Adam Shostack wrote: > The basic problem is that (personal) spam is a social, not a >technical problem. If someone wants to annoy you via the internet, >they can do so. You can raise the cost of their annoying you, but you >need to be careful not to make it difficult to talk to you. It seems to me that one of the technical problems of the personal spam is the way it can grow into a denial of service attack on your system. If it takes you more horsepower to filter the spam than it takes to generate it, then you are particulary vunerable. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Proxy/Representation?
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:46 AM 12/28/95 -0500, perry(a)piermont.com wrote: >"David E. Smith" writes: >> The question is: how do the current software packages handle representatives >> and proxies for a given is-a-person? Using PGP as an example, I can't sign >> a message with Helen's key. >Nor should you be able to, actually. And I can't :) >The right way to do this in the digital world, IMHO, is to have a >standard for "Power of Attorney" documents, and for the entity >receiving something signed in your key that should be signed in >another person's key to also see the digitally signed power of >attorney document. Then the entity can check the signature on the >power of attorney was in Helen's key, and that the signed key in that >document was the key that signed the document signed by the "attorney". That's more of what I was looking for. I suppose that (I'm still using PGP as my example) there could be a shared PGP key, signed by Helen and myself, where only the two of us know the passphrase, with a keyid of "David Smith <dsmith(a)midwest.net> on behalf of Helen Jones <helen(a)devnull.org>" or something similar. The obvious problem is that in sharing the pass phrase the security is weakened. (Paranoid threat model: at some point we have to decide on the pass phrase, and we are videotaped/bugged/spied upon while this takes place.) dave ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745, +1(573)339-3814 PGP ID 0x92732139, homepage http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ Dec15-Jan15: (618)244-3340/2209 Perkins, Mt Vernon IL 62864

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DOP_lip
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-27-95. WashP: The CIA's close-rankled directorate of operations aim to trashtalk Deutch out of depensioning the veteran Paris CoS for French economic spay of pigs. DOP_lip

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DejaNews and Alta Vista Search Tools, and Privacy Implications
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Side note: I seem to have returned from my holiday away from this area and away from computers to a war zone, with multiple flames and threats of legal action. Being a part of the Cypherpunks group, and potentially part of the "criminal conspiracy" to defame, am I included in the lawsuits? I wonder.) Anyway, a point of clarification of a point, lest there be the belief that _all_ Cypherpunks are opposed to comprehensive Web search tools: At 8:46 PM 12/23/95, Steven L. Baur wrote: >Furthermore, no one has mentioned the positive changes made to ^^^^^^^^? >Dejanews since it got bashed thoroughly on this list a few weeks ago. >They've significantly turned down the amount of old information >indexed, and have restricted the groups (and mailing lists) they >archive. I for one don't consider this to be a positive development. Reducing the time horizon for searches has no real effect on the compilation of dossiers (for example), but certainly makes DejaNews less useful. (And I'd be willing to bet that the time horizon was scrunched down for space and time reasons, not for reasons of privacy; the horizon will likely _increase_ as users ask for, and perhaps are willing to pay a bit for, longer time horizons.) And I don't believe the dominant thinking of folks who commented was that DejaNews was worthy of "bashing." In fact, I found it all very interesting, and a confirmation of what many of us expected would soon happen, i.e., fast access to past comments. I think I and several others commented on the major implications for privacy, especially vis-a-vis the way corporations will be able to see compilations of postings to "outrageous" groups. Indeed, I know of some people hiring programmers who are already using such tools to get a better understanding of whom they may be hiring, or not. But my comments were not in the vein of "something has to be done," but of recognition that a Brave New World is fast unfolding. Thinking that one is "safe" because a particular search service is not including all the groups or mailing lists it _could_ include is illusory (one is reminded of ostriches....). The same thinking happened several years ago when a great hue and cry in the media caused Lotus to abandon plans to sell a CD-ROM to individuals with publically available census and other data on it about neighborhoods, phone numbers, etc. Inasmuch as the non-individual entities (corporations, mass mailers, courts, law enforcement, etc.) already have full access to such databases, all the hue and cry really accomplished was to give individuals a false sense of security and privacy. A triumph of feelgood style over substance. Real privacy and security comes from steps taken to make the information private in the first place, not to ex post facto limit access. (I am not claiming that Steven Bauer or anyone else on our list is calling for laws to limit Web search engines, just giving my views about this. As a matter of fact, however, I am hearing rumblings in other places that "there ought to be a law" about these archives, indexes/indices, etc. Same old story. Kind of hard to enforce such laws when the indexes are in Holland, or Byelorussia, or "somewhere in cyberspace." ) Face it, every single word written by any of us to any Usenet newsgroup, going back to the beginning of Usenet, and expanding out to many ostensibly-private mailing lists, will fairly soon be searchable. (Add some digital cash and proxy/remailer features, and someone will be incentivized to put some really big arrays of optical disks up for searching. And if the U.S. tries to "regulate" such searches....well, I'm preaching to the choir here....) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Proxy/Representation?
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Caveat: I haven't yet looked through the archives, and it's late. This may sound even less intelligent than most of what's on the list as of late (although what with the flamewars about I'm not sure if that's possible). Today I made a purchase at a local store using a personal check that wasn't mine. It very clearly wasn't mine (since the name on the check was Helen and mine is Dave), but I am a duly appointed representative of Helen in certain affairs. Including this one, which was <blush> grocery shopping </blush>. (There are also other affairs, some with actual legal consequences, and there is paperwork to that effect in a lawyer's safe somewhere.) The question is: how do the current software packages handle representatives and proxies for a given is-a-person? Using PGP as an example, I can't sign a message with Helen's key. And a message signed with my key won't hold as much weight because "Dave" is not "Helen." And if every message I send on behalf of Helen has to be followed up by a message from Helen stating "yes, Dave may act on my behalf for this instance" then much of the point of the proxy process is lost. (i.e. the reduction of Helen's workload etc.) I'm sure that this has already popped up, so I'll just ask for pointers. dave ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745, +1(573)339-3814 PGP ID 0x92732139, homepage http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ Dec15-Jan15: (618)244-3340/2209 Perkins, Mt Vernon IL 62864

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VEL_cro
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-28-95. NYPaper reports on Communications Security Establishment's spying on citizens and allies, citing Jane Shorten's unzips (earlier bared here). Deputy PM Sheila Copps velcros fig leaf, "If, in fact, there has been illegal activity going on, we'll want to deal with that in as public a way as possible." VEL_cro

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Re: Only accepting e-mail from known parties
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Dec 27, 1995 00:50:13, '"Robert A. Rosenberg" <hal9001(a)panix.com>' wrote: >At 13:23 12/26/95, tallpaul wrote: > >>I hadn't picked up the problem you mentioned. Thanks for pointing it out. >> > >You're welcome - You _did_ ask for comments/analysis <g>. > I wasn't being sarcastic with the "thank you" and I don't usuallly treat criticism as a neo-flame. As you may have inferred from other posts of mine, I am more interested and knowledgable about the social aspects of the privacy/crypto/anon debates then the code/algo aspects. I know other peoplw who share my interests but who proceed to write, publish, comment on the tek issues without understanding them. Getting a better understanding of them is one of the reaons I'm on the list. Sometimes I'll venture a view on one of the tek issues, in part to test by knowledge of those issues from the tek angle. Criticism is first a small price to pay for the ability to do this. Second, it improves my knowledge of the tek. --tallpaul

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(fwd) RSA CEO Bidzos on USML/ITAR
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: softwa19(a)us.net (Charles R. Smith) Newsgroups: talk.politics.crypto Date: Tue, 26 Dec 1995 16:55:09 GMT RSA CEO/President D. James Bidzos, in a speech before the Commonwealth Club of California, openly stated his opposition to current USML/ITAR controls. "We stand to lose a significant part of our industry due to export controls", said Bidzos in the taped address shown on C-Span 12/25/95. The recent teaming of Sun with ex-Soviet programmers to avoid U.S. export controls on encryption was cited by Bidzos as an example of exactly how jobs and opportunities are being forced off shore by U.S. policy. Bidzos statements echo the remarks from Microsoft CEO, Bill Gates, who also lashed out at federal export restrictions in his comments before the National Press Club in early Decemeber. This author noted some months ago the teaming of Ernst & Young and SOFTWARE (AG), a german based software firm, to provide encryption security with no import regulations. Foreign companies are allowed freely to compete in the U.S. domestic market while U.S. citizens are restricted from the international market. This imbalance costs american jobs, taxes, rapidly erodes our lead in this important area of science and is unfair. The regulations, instead of limiting access to foriegn criminals and terrorists, has led to a U.S. funded explosion of better off-shore products that are beyond law enforcement control. In fact, the Federal government not only encourages this effort but even has a multi-million dollar contract with SOFTWARE (AG). The time for these regulations has clearly passed. Yet, our government is not geared for quick action, nor will self-seeking bureaucrats ever be convinced to let go. The world, however, will quickly leave us behind unless we act soon. 1 if by land, 2 if by sea. Paul Revere - encryption 1775 Charles R. Smith - President SOFTWAR, Richmond VA http://www.ultimate.org/2292/

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[reply to anonymous] Re: rsaref
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

to whom it may concern: rsaref20 is available on ftp.hacktic.nl since may 1995 in /pub/replay/pub/crypto/LIBS/rsaref20.zip -AJ-

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