December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

GAK the Spooks not the Civilians
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Message-Id:<v03003e00ace84506f548(a)[129.46.82.85]> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" X-Sender: Level Seven Design X-PGP-KeyID-Fprnt: 4AAF00E5 - 30D81F3484E6A83F 6EC8D7F0CAB3D265 X-PGP: http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/htbin/pks-extract-key.pl?op=get&search=lsd X-Floppyright: (f)1995 LSD.com _ Unlicensed retransmission prohibited. Date: Mon, 4 Dec 1995 04:40:07 -0800 To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: Dave Del Torto <ddt(a)lsd.com> Subject: GAK the Spooks not the Civilians Cc: hungary-online(a)hungary.yak.net, zamir-chat-l(a)igc.apc.org #define GAK Government Access to Keys, aka "key escrow": a copy of the secret half of your secret/public cryptographic key-pair, normally known only to you, is held in a "vault" somewhere by your government in case they decide they need to read your encrypted private email with/without your knowledge. Here's an argument in favor of a _limited_ GAK* system, and a timely example of why I think it's necessary. As I see it, there are two main varieties of GAK-mail: #1: GAK for Citizens' keys #2: GAK for Government employees' keys I'm disregarding #1 right off as being totally unacceptable, but I favor a form of #2 "...of, by and for the People" directed at the government itself and monitored by the elected representatives of the Executive and Legislative branches as perhaps being essential to Democracy's survival. Where official business is concerned, some form of GAK could go a long way toward preventing the majority of everyday abuses by subrosa forces in a government. It might be useless to aim it at teflon-coated, black-budgeted outfits like the CIA or NSA, but it could keep a lot of other officials honest as they go about doing the everyday business of running OUR government for us through email. One of the main reasons that the TLAs are pushing so hard for GAK is the Culture of Distrust they stew in. They choose it: they breed and feed upon and among the very sorts of minds who become involved in covert activities: spooks. A Spook Culture begets a Spook Attitude towards other spheres of social interaction -- like secure email between PGP, Eudora and Netscape users who just desire private communications. I think this Spook psychology is unavoidable, but if they'd just stick to loosing their creations on *themselves*, then fine. I just learned from CBS's "60 Minutes" program, along with millions of other Americans, about a disturbing event involving the Clinton administration, the State Dept and the CIA. I say "alledgedly" to be fair (after all, no indictments have been handed down...yet) but it looks reasonably clear to me: the interview was with the main individual involved and he was quite clear about what had happened. Even if it's untrue, it's a roadmap for what could easily happen if back-channel operators are allowed to run the government during those milliseconds when the people we elect to do it turn their heads. You may remember the incident not so long ago where a US naval vessel was set to deploy a peace-keeping force of Marines in the capital city of Haiti so that President-elect Aristide could later assume office (foreshadowing IFOR). The USS Harlan County was within a few thousand meters of docking, when a small riot developed on the quay (in full view of camera crews). Clinton decided reluctantly to abandon the landing at the last minute. There were apparently only 40 or so FRAP members involved, but there they were on the US nightly news that evening (interesting, but another topic). One "Mr. Toto Constant," a leader of the right-wing Haitian militia group FRAP and reportedly a longtime CIA contact/operative, claimed in an interview on the CBS report that he met with the CIA station chief in Port-au-Prince BEFORE the scheduled landing and assured him that the planned FRAP "media frenzy" on the docks was going to be peaceful, was to be performed for the benefit of the cameras only and would be no threat to US personnel whatsoever. The CIA refused to confirm these allegations, but according to CBS, Warren Christopher later implied that Constant was telling the truth about having dealt with the CIA in the past. Hmmm. The plot thickens: this CIA station chief alledgedly then disinformed President Clinton, the Secretary of State Christopher and the cabinet (and one assumes the Congressional overseers as well) about Mr. Constant's assurances that there was no danger to the US Marines. Because he was unaware of the lack of a real threat and because he was also misinformed by the CIA that there might in fact be a threat, Clinton's hand was forced by popular fears and media speculation about another "Somalia" scenario, and he made the difficult decision not to land the troops. The domestic result was cries of "cowardice" from conservatives and frustration among US voters. Does this smack of Watergate-style dirty tricks to anyone besides me? Rogue elements in the CIA manipulate intelligence information, provide the President of the US (up for re-election) with faulty information, advise him to make an embarrassing foreign policy decision in contradiction to information they possess and then conservatives in the US Congress and Republican party accuse him of being soft and unable to show leadership. And people suggest Fred Cohen is overdoing his caffein intake? Pour me a cup, Fred. These are the same guys suggesting they'll hang on to a copy of my secret key. Yeah, sure. The riots quickly evolved into murder squads consisting of Haitian military units and former Ton-Ton Macoutes who purged the Aristide supporters among their fellow Haitians until Clinton sent Jimmy Carter down, followed closely by the Marines. The resulting genocidal catastrophe was an atrocity, a blow against Caribbean stability and a major embarrassment to the Clinton administration. Meanwhile, the CIA (and maybe Army and Navy Intelligence) quietly raided a Haitian facility and "confiscated" 150,000 items of evidence, which they still refuse to turn over to Aristide, even though it reportedly contains info on the CIA's contacts within FRAP, the group still trying to destabilize his government. To add insult to injury, the US still insists Aristide step down in February 1996, years short of a full term, if you count the time he spent in forced exile after his original election while the Haitian elite stripped the paintings off the walls and headed for Switzerland. It's hard to blame Aristide for being a bit upset about under these circumstances, but he made his bargain with the You-know-what... Besides the Haitians who died in the subsequent political violence, and the blow to the stability of the developing Haitian democracy and US foreign policy, this incident, even if it only has roots in the truth, is a troubling indication that "shadow governments" operating inside and behind the elected US governement have a profound effect on our lives. After all, it's CIA intelligence that supposedly tells us when it's safe to drive the 1st Armoured's A-1's down to Sarajevo, right? It also brings up some other interesting questions: + Did CIA take the same guy they had in Haiti and rotate him to Bosnia to lunch with Karadzic? + Information is power: do the intelligence services of our government wield it _at_ their own Executive branch "handlers?" + In this climate, are CIA and related intelligence branches having an impact on the specifications (eg. Fortezza) for methods and systems that could exert controls over the information we as citizens can keep private -- solely for purposes of self-preservation? If the Executive branch's policy initiatives (whether we like them or not) are at the mercy of forces WITHIN it, how can they possibly hope to store our escrowed keys safely, much less guarantee a US democracy? Who is it in the White House that keeps an eye on the message traffic of this CIA station chief? Who keeps a copy of HIS secret key escrowed and who vets the intelligence he generates before it ends up at cabinet-level decision-making meetings where US troop movements are decided? Just who the heck is running this country? Sure, Clinton and Gore want a national crypto policy: given what their own dogs may be doo-ing it's not that hard to understand, but hey, watch where yer pointin' that GAK there, Bubba. Granted, the more crypto-savvy ophidians in the intelligence services are bound to find other methods for passing such conspiratorial information if they are prone to that, but how many bottom-feeders in our government are trying little maneuvers of this nature through "normal" channels - and how much of _that_ type of activity should be actively monitored (and who polices _those_ police)? Maybe we need to take a closer look as a nation at implementing a better GAK system for the State Department and the Intelligence branches. BTW, the CBS reporters at "60 Minutes" (Ed Bradley, et alia) received a faxed CIA statement while preparing their report, stating that "...the CIA collects and analyzes intelligence, it does not formulate policy..." and that any implication that they manipulated intelligence regarding the Hatian incident "is false." Excuse me while I clear my throat. So, make those GAK versions for the feds, Netscape, but be sure you make the rest of us a vanilla version. I don't need to send my mail from Netscape: I'll stick with an untampered PGP for now. Clinton should require GAK for govt employees doing official business only: if they go home, boot up a non-GAKed system and start sending mail to their spook peers, their traffic should be monitored and they should be hauled up in front of Congress. Hey, couldn't be all bad, right? Later, they can write a book about their experiences, and maybe run for public office like Ollie North. ;) dave ____________________________________________________________________________ "I mixed this myself. (holds up glass of water) Two parts "H," one part "O." I don't trust _anybody_!" --Steven Wright -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Verbum sapienti satis est. iQCVAwUBMMLsQKHBOF9KrwDlAQEgYQP+ITWALlvdS68sdkydQwG/DMgJ1CSI01wX X1U3yWG6txLykUppFPP3hs476KqHLpoeL1tCscj2QRCqYY1sz4NoZ3ZEkJXcMP1Y 6Qt/KpHr/AXTDSDQD7QIFIYzZ4S+69hXiMV7mSK76nRLkbke8REA+k15w03atN+R 2l/vGhu4mzo= =DeD3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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SEN_sor
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-4-95. NYPeeper: "The Rand Corporation salutes E-mail as the new foundation of democracy." Denise Caruso's column. Are we ready, as a society, for ubiquitous Government- mandated electronic communication? Not yet. E-mail today does not have the same constitutional free-speech and privacy protections already afforded the telephone and postal mail. In addition, free speech on the Net is far from assured. There are several bills pending in Congress right now that would severely restrict what people can say in either private or public forums on the Internet. Despite Rand's finding that virtual communities are powerful tools for democratic discourse, it will be difficult for communities to form under constant threat of censorship. "Java Backers Taking Aim At Microsoft's Dominance." A number of Silicon Valley companies plan announcements on Monday that together constitute an anti-Microsoft campaign. The most noteworthy: A plan by Sun and Netscape for a user-friendly version of the Java software technology for the Web. The strategies being announced this week represent opening skirmishes in what may be the next great standards battle in the industry. "Nearing the $500 Computer for Internet Use." Acorn is about to introduce a stripped-down machine for Net surfing that sells for about $900. By stripping it of its monitor and hard disk drive, and adding a high-speed modem, Acorn executives say they can hit a retail price less than $500. They plan to ship the Netsurfer by early next year, and are discussing licensing with Oracle and a number of American and Asian companies. SEN_sor (16 kb)

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Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: ALICE'S ADDRESS REVEALED.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 4 Dec 1995, Don M. Kitchen wrote: > Someone posing as Alice said: It wasn't anyone "posing" as Alice. It was the real banana. > > As I promised, I've now opened a channel so that anyone who wants to > > can send Alice de 'nonymous email. I can now be reached via > > an455120(a)anon.penet.fi. Mail sent to Alice de 'nonymous at that > > address will get to me, and I will do my best to reply to you as well, > > but I can't guarantee, anything. > > Laszlo Vecsey <master(a)internexus.net> said: > > > I don't think that was a smart thing to do. Your real email is now > > registered in some database in Finland - how difficult would it be to > > retrieve it? From what I remember organizations like Scientology had no Soory ... beg to differ ... my real email is not registered in some database in Finland. No offence, but you have no idea what I have registered in Finland. Whatever lies behind the anon address is simply something which is "reasonably" reliable. It could be a dummy account, or it could even be a chain of remailers and processes. Who knows?? Do you? How difficult would it be to retrieve it from Finland? I don't really know. It really hadn't crossed my mind. I thought that Julf might run a good outpost in Finland. And that he'd take reasonable efforts (i.e. not go down with the ship) to protect my privacy. He strikes me as reasonably reliable that way. > Not _nearly_ as hard as breaking/finding an appropriately encrypted key. Maybe, maybe not. It depends on a lot of things, now doesn't it? And breaking or finding an appropriately encrypted key, doesn't *quite* address the problem of people sending email to me without any hassle, does it?? I think that the ISP who hosts my remailer has already had to deal with a slew of mail over the "Alice" antics, and the spoofed posts. This way, if someone wants to take issue with something which they've read, the ISP can simply ask them to write the author. > I for one am not going to even bother with the penet address unless the > posts come from there. After all, it's a forgery anyway. The real Alice > already posted a PGP key. I wouldn't be reading this list if I were > going to fall over for a simple impersonation. Great that's your choice and your perogative. I don't see what on earth you'd have to say to me in any event. And before you go patting yourself on the back about impersonations, have a look at my last post to this list. The one under the subject of "Do the Right Thing." Right at the bottom of the post is my signature, and ... ta dah ... my penet address. What does that *logically* tell you?? Maybe that the author of that post, the long-winded one that criticizes Jim Clark for his stand on GAK and his short-sighted views will accept email via penet.fi at an455120(a)anon.penet.fi?? > Of course, if our impersonating, trusts-penet-not-PGP-coworkers-think- > of-everything-but-a-packet-sniffer Alice were to post from penet, > then everyone (including procmail ;) would have to believe his claims > of pseudo-identity. I trust penet to do one thing for me. I trust penet not to send me email that is larger than 1 Megabyte. And the reason I trust penet not to do that is that Julf's mailer won't handle it. His mailer will choke on it. That's it. If you think that I'm relying on Julf to protect me, then you are sadly mistaken. Many, many people already share in the secret of who Alice is. That's a fact. I'm not looking for anyone to keep my identity a "secret". I'm simply looking for some peace so that I can do some reading, some writing, and some "thinken". And Julf protects me from huge emails. That's it. And now, if anyone wants to establish a dialogue with me, they can. Or if they don't want to (like you) then that's not a problem for me either. My previous way of getting contacted (via postmaster(a)att.com or postmaster(a)netscape.com) didn't seem to be working well. The two companies weren't forwarding email to me. Never got anything from them forwarded. Now, not only AT&T and Netscape can talk with me, so can anyone else. And if they want to have some "secure" super-secret dialogue with me, then we can do that also. I've posted a partial protocol on how to do that already. Not one that's for super-dee-dooper secret stuff, but one that's Pretty OK. And it uses PGP for one part. > I must say, L.D. is really falling all over himself this time. Maybe > he's just trying to make people *think* he's a cryptobungler, so that he > can keep his other tentacles with whom he converses out of suspicion. Good Grief. Is it something they put in the water down wherever you're at?? I am not L.D ... oh, what is the point ... > Don > > Wishing Emacs had IMAP support cuz here comes mailcrypt Mailcrypt?? Emacs?? *Shudder* ... is it compatible with PGP 2.3? Alice de 'nonymous ... <an455120(a)anon.penet.fi> ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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GAK_hit
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-4-95. W$Jabber: "Microsoft Probe Spurs Subpoenas Tied to Internet. Antitrust Effort Appears Focused on Windows 95 Disabled Rival Software." The subpoenas indicate that Justice Department officials are focusing on whether Microsoft's Windows 95 and related Internet software improperly disable rival programs that let users access the Internet. Industry executives said the Justice Department has issued "civil investigative demands" to Netscape and CompuServe. The subpoena issued to Netscape may be of particular significance. In the estimate of Netscape and industry observers, roughly 80% of World Wide Web users, a population pegged at more than 17 million, use Netscape's software. Because of that presence, even if Netscape were alone in having its software disabled by Microsoft's new products, "I would say Netscape would have a cause of action and that the Justice Department would have a basis to investigate or bring an action," said Garret Rasmussen, an antitrust lawyer. GAK_hit (5 kb)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reorder"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo syrinx c2) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last update: Mon 4 Dec 95 6:47:39 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hroller hroller(a)c2.org ---########* 7:37 99.98% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl * *** ****** 7:13 99.59% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++++++++ 40:07 99.51% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *##* #+*## 2:31 99.27% c2 remail(a)c2.org - +*****++- 48:01 99.14% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----.---. 7:39:43 98.95% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * *** *#** 5:22 98.88% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** ..-** 3:29:17 98.79% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ****** *** 17:26 98.78% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com *- --+- + 1:52:55 98.67% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org # ## ## ### 7:56 98.58% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** * * 12:35 98.13% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net +*- + --+ 45:49 97.35% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +* *#* 3:38 96.35% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu # ### ## # :17 95.83% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com .-. ...- - 17:35:13 95.65% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** * * 5:12 95.51% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .--.---.- 9:59:28 94.15% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +* **** +* 7:33 99.00% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi - -+ - - 10:45:41 82.20% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org - 2:06:09 81.59% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de ++ .--- 14:40:50 79.58% robo robo(a)c2.org --*#### # 14:09 69.63% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow
by JR＠ROCK.CNB.UAM.ES 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net> wrote >On Fri, 1 Dec 1995 JR(a)ns.cnb.uam.es wrote: > >> From: SMTP%"tcmay(a)got.net" 1-DEC-1995 12:26:55.99 > ... > >You need to think real hard about how likely foreign customers on a scale >as large as the U.S. government are going to be attracted to a product >that forfeits its keys to the U.S. government. Consider this problem >again in light of all the hand waving about the U.S. intelligence >agencies and industrial espionage/intelligence. I do, and I reckon most people, at this level now, worry more about how nice pages look than their security. Mostly because there is comparatively little interest yet. That's the whole issue: a company that is aware of that and wants to be the first at occupying the market will give security a second priority level -as most users do-. Look e.g. at any OS and how secure it is... I'm not defending Netscape, I argue about the reasons that drive the market and most companies -Netscape among them-. > >Let's put this example in a more personal context, with you as the >netscape guru. In fact, let us carry that assumption along, as really >I'm talking to the netscape insiders to begin with. Please, not that I have no liaison to Netscape. But I don't like all this broohaha about whether this or that guy is evil because s/he does/ doesn't hold with some principles/ends. If one wants to be effective, one needs to understand the other side's point of view, so as to be able to develop coherent strategies that work. Independently of what *my* personal convictions are -which I have never stated-, you can't forget that not everybody holds to your same ethics or needs to. ... > >Your faith in Joe Random vastly exceeds mine. So it seems. Anyway, that's the only resource we have. If Joe Random doesn't care, then it doesn't matter too much what you or me can say. Nor would it be correct that we imposed our view to the majority of Joes. ... >Your information cost is lower by a factor of 100 or more. Putting the >burden on our shoulders, and then couching it in terms of the cypherpunks >being negative, when indeed we are merely pointing out to whoever will >listen that a spineless money decision has been made, is the center of >hyprocracy. It sickens me. Again, I'm not Netscape. So, don't tell *me*. If it sickens you the position of anyone, I'm sorry. It may sicken me too, but I don't think that only will change how things are (sic). ... >As does this psycho-babble trash. It may be trash. But it works. Sorry if you don't like it, but that's how humans are. >So when pinto's explode, I might as well just advertize hondas as a >'better value' and not mention the rather glaring fault in the competing >product? Well, that -as I said- may depend on where you are. In some countries you could sue them, but you could not *say* they are bad. Odd, isn't it? But so it is. >I might add, few cypherpunks (to their great credit) sell their >software. We are interested in the software being the strongest, and >best quality. > So do I. And that's what I suggested: better alternatives. If there are some, then market forces will drive everything to our side. Just by making people angry we won't gain much. .. >You mean to realize that Netscape could care less about the 'educated' >consumer who is displeased with the decision, and instead is following >that large nose which sniffs the waifting scent of green? Exactly. If you realize that, you know what the problem is. If you assume any company has to be bounded by any cypherpunkish ideas, which in addition hurt their business, then you are not addressing the real problem. ... >Either support GAK or do not. Don't give us horseshit about how you >think we are being too hard on Netscape because we are educated >consumers, and because we realize that GAK crypto is not the best product it >could be. Sorry man, but as soon as Democracy comes in, elites go out the window. It's the domain of the common man. If the common man doesn't hold with the opinions of the educated man, then the educated man has nothing to do. >It is as much our right to gripe and moan about the spineless decision as >it is for you to make it. To tell us to ignore it is hypocritical in the >extreme. If your product is so superior, why the hell should you care >about a few cypherpunks moaning about this or that? Aren't we members of You can gripe or moan or do as you wish. So do I, and I chose to express my opinion that educating the common man is more effective. And once more: it's not my product. I have nothing to do with Netscape. All I want is energies derived into effective courses. >Take your emotional censorship elsewhere. And while your at it, try >making a superior product to please us, rather than some high-school >textbook psycho-babble about saying only nice things to the other >children in the sandbox. I fear it is you who's becoming emotional and censoring. I didn't tell anybody to take his/her opinions anywhere else. I'm only exposing what my opinion is on how cryptography should be promoted and what is the -in my humble opinion- best course of action. As for "children in the sandbox"... it also seems I have some more respect for those "Joe Random"s than you do. And even if they are so, I prefer to take them into adulthood rather than keeping crypto priesthood to myself and pontificing them what they should do relying on me. jr

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PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG B
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MEDIA RELEASE Contact: Simon Davies, Privacy International Davies(a)privint.demon.co.uk PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG BROTHER COMPANIES New report uncovers a massive international surveillance trade funded by the arms industry and led by the UK On Monday 4 December, Privacy International will publish Big Brother Incorporated, a 150 page report which investigates the global trade in repressive surveillance technologies. The report, to be published on several Web sites on the Internet, shows how technology companies in Europe and North America provide the surveillance infrastructure for the secret police and military authorities in such countries as China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Angola, Rwanda and Guatemala The reports primary concern is the flow of sophisticated computer-based technology from developed countries to developing countries - and particularly to non-democratic regimes. The report demonstrates how these companies have strengthened the lethal authority of the world's most dangerous regimes. The report lists the companies, their directors, products and exports. In each case, source material is meticulously cited. Privacy International is publishing the report in digital form in several sites on the Internet to ensure its accessability by interested parties anywhere in the world. Surveillance technologies are defined as technologies which can monitor, track and assess the movements, activities and communications of individuals. More than 80 British companies are involved, making the UK the world leader in this field. Other countries, in order of significance, are the United States, France, Israel, the Netherlands and Germany. _Big Brother Incorporated_ is the first investigation ever conducted into this trade. Privacy International intends to update the report from time to time using trade fair documents and leaked information from whistleblowers. The surveillance trade is almost indistinguishable from the arms trade. More than seventy per cent of companies manufacturing and exporting surveillance technology also export arms, chemical weapons, or military hardware. Surveillance is a crucial element for the maintenance of any non-democratic infrastructure, and is an important activity in the pursuit of intelligence and political control. Many countries in transition to democracy also rely heavily on surveillance to satisfy the demands of police and military. The technology described in the report makes possible mass surveillance of populations. In the past, regimes relied on targeted surveillance. Much of this technology is used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, student leaders, minorities, trade union leaders, and political opponents. It is also useful for monitoring larger sectors of the population. With this technology, the financial transactions, communications activity and geographic movements of millions of people can be captured, analysed and transmitted cheaply and efficiently. Western surveillance technology is providing invaluable support to military and totalitarian authorities throughout the world. One British computer firm provided the technological infrastructure to establish the South African automated Passbook system, upon which much of the functioning of the Apartheid regime British surveillance cameras were used in Tianamen Square against the pro-democracy demonstrators. In the 1980s, an Israeli company developed and exported the technology for the computerised death list used by the Guatemalan police. Two British companies routinely provide the Chinese authorities with bugging equipment and telephone tapping devices. Privacy International was formed in 1990 as a non-government, non-profit organisation. It brings together privacy experts, human rights advocates and technology experts in more than 40 countries, and works toward the goal of promoting privacy issues worldwide. The organisation acts as an impartial watchdog on surveillance activities by governments and corporations. For further information or interview, contact Simon Davies in London at davies(a)privint.demon.co.uk. The address of the web site is http://www.privacy.org/pi/reports/big_bro/ _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG BROTHER... _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)privacy.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Privacy International Washington Office * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.privacy.org/pi/ Washington, DC 20003 ------------------ RFC822 Header Follows ------------------ Received: by epic.org with SMTP;3 Dec 1995 23:09:13 -0500 Received: from epic.org (washofc.epic.org [204.91.138.50]) by svcs1.digex.net (8.6.12/8.6.12) with SMTP id XAA27478; Sun, 3 Dec 1995 23:07:51 -0500 Message-ID: <n1394090361.79608(a)epic.org> Date: 3 Dec 1995 23:07:03 -0500 From: "Dave Banisar" <banisar(a)epic.org> Subject: PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG B To: "pi" <pi(a)privacy.org> X-Mailer: Mail*Link SMTP-QM 3.0.2 _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG BROTHER... _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)privacy.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Privacy International Washington Office * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.privacy.org/pi/ Washington, DC 20003

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Re: Do the Right Thing
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com () on Mon, 4 Dec 1:42 AM >That authority now sits in other hands. In silicon. > >I doubt the President wants a market meltdown as we >start to move towards an election year. Body bags and >a bad economic front are a bad mix and could swing the >whole election with the dual near unsurmountable >election obstacles. > >Hopefully, god-willing, we won't face any tragedies. ----- Financial Times, Dec 4, 1995 US Marine chiefs trade places to experience tranche warfare Officers are preparing to do virtual battle in the Nymex oil pits [and wargame FinCide] By Laurie Morse A dozen US Marine Corps generals and colonels will today march on to the New York Mercantile Exchange trading floor and start matching wits with commodity futures traders. The traders often describe their fraught existence in the trading rings as virtual warfare, and the US military appears to agree. Keen to find ways of training officers to cope with the demands of high-tech 21st-century warfare, a group of Marine Corps top brass will venture into the Nymex crude oil pit in the World Trade Center after the regular market has closed. Assisted by a group of handpicked veteran commodity traders, the marines will plunge into a simulated session of futures trading that will include several market reversals and a barrage of oil-linked "news". Mr Gary Lapayover, the Nymex trader co-ordinating the event, says the trading session will allow the officers and traders to become acquainted on friendly turf, and give the Marines a glimpse of the multiple tasks and the speed -- that breakneck trading entails. Today's simulated trading will be followed tomorrow by a war games session. About 15 traders will follow the generals to an old officers' club on Governor's Island, off Manhattan, and test their skills in a computerised game designed by Gama Corp. a Virginia-based company that specialises in computer-generated battle scenarios. Later, the traders will tell the officers and their aides what they think of the battle experience. What do the Marines hope to learn from the commodities pits? "Our vision of what warfare will be in the 21st century is very different from what we've faced in the 20th," says Colonel Tom Harkins, director of operations at the Marines' war-fighting laboratory in Quantico, Virginia. In future, the Marines expect to be drawn into smaller conflicts of the type seen in Somalia and Bosnia. At the same time, warfare will become increasingly digitalised, calling for rapid decision-taking amid a barrage of information. "How does a commander make decisions on a digital battlefield?" asks Col Harkins. "Technology will increase the tempo of battle, and the influx of digital information will require skills in what you might call pattern analysis. This is what futures traders do. In this exercise we want to see how people who face these conditions every day deal with the stress, and get comfortable with the risks." During tomorrow's war games, traders will be confronted by an on-screen battle area laid out on a grid, with as many as 50 small teams of cyber-soldiers seeking the "enemy". Once "contact" is made, the teams will request firepower. Under pressure, "commanders" must decide how to deploy resources to the best strategic advantage, while limiting losses. For Mr Eric Bolling, an independent trader who has survived nine years in the Nymex energy pits, the Marines are being shrewd in seeking to cross laser-swords with battle-hardened heroes of the trading pits. Mr Bolling, a 33-year-old former minor league baseball player, has no military background, but sees a lot of parallels between trading, sport and the armed services. All three require high levels of self-motivation and decision-making ability. Some of the generals and colonels may be shown to be more suited to high-stress, high-stakes environments than others, he says. "You have to be able to prioritise and analyse a lot of information rapidly -- then initiate risk by making a decision; and, finally, manage that risk by having the discipline to manage the trade," says Mr Bolling. "A lot of people can't do that, and wash out of these markets. I don't think it's something that can be learned really -- it's a personality type." Mr Lapayover said he selected floor veterans like Mr Bolling to participate because he was looking for "survivors" people who have been successful traders over a number of years. "Military experience wasn't a factor. The Marines are looking for people that can help them understand the process." Mr Lapayover has also suggested that the top brass visit the "war rooms" of America's largest investment banks to observe Wall Street's fixed income and equities traders, and the strategies of high-stakes corporate raiders. The war games are part of a new programme directed by General Charles Krulak, commandant of the Marine Corps. "War games are not designed to give you a total solution, they are designed to give you insight" he says. "We're going to have our laboratory analysts with us, and they will be looking at improving the process." -----

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Re: Info on Netscape's key escrow position
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>James A. Donald wrote: >> I would like to hear Jim Clark say "GAK is bad". At 11:05 PM 12/3/95 -0800, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > I do believe that the company, Netscape, will take such a position > in the coming week. I will be greatly relieved when this happens. I would be even more relieved if Netscape were to take action to make it more difficult for the government to introduce GAK. > Did he take a position against GAK? He did both less than that and considerably more than that: Instead of trying to persuade us that he was against GAK, he sought to persuade the reader that the reader should be against GAK. He sought to make it difficult for both a future Microsoft and a future government to introduce GAK. He described GAK in accurate language, rather than euphemistic terms. He did not editorialize "GAK is bad" but any reasonable person reading his book, unfamiliar with crypto and the controversy, would conclude from the facts that he presented that GAK is a radical violation of the fourth amendment -- He described GAK in neutral, factually accurate language that doubtless deeply offended the folks at NSA. > I've been trying to use either GAK, or "mandatory key escrow" > to refer to the hated beast. "Mandatory key escrow" is still an oxymoronic euphemism. It is not escrow if the valuable item is held by someone who is party to the potential conflict, or subject to the power of someone who is party to the potential conflict. Even to those of us who know what the euphemism "mandatory key escrow" stands for, it still does not sound nearly as threatening and scary as "government access to keys". --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: GAK_hit
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:25 AM 12/4/95 -0500, John Young wrote: > 12-4-95. W$Jabber: > > "Microsoft Probe Spurs Subpoenas Tied to Internet. > Antitrust Effort Appears Focused on Windows 95 Disabled > Rival Software." > The subpoena issued to Netscape may be of particular > significance. In the estimate of Netscape and industry > observers, I regularly use netscape on windows 95, and I conclude that this subpoena is pure, 100% harassment. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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