December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

DejaNews all over again--a URL for Usenet Searching
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I usually avoid passing on URLs of interesting sites, in the name of conserving bandwidth (*), but this one really has me jazzed: http://dejanews.com/ It allows searching of Usenet archives (a few months' worth, from what I can see). This was pointed out to me on the Cyberia list, by Eugene Volokh, who wrote: " Check out http://dejanews.com/ -- truly a remarkable service. They index a huge number of Internet news groups, and let you search through them for any word or words you want. " Want to know what people are saying about some new book? About some political topic? Most importantly, about you behind your back? Check it out! Lots of fun, and a bit scary." A good way for newcomers to find out what's been written on some topic that interests them, or to see who's writing what. (I checked out the index for: "Blacknet," "Chaum," and a bunch of other things...the possibilities are endless, and I suspect this will be the URL I go to more often than any other.) --Tim May (* Perhaps someday we might ask people what their favorite URLs are. We've done polls on books, so why not URLs?) Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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re:using PGP only for digital signatures
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:12 PM 11/4/95 -0500, James Black <black(a)eng.usf.edu> wrote: >Hello, > I am in a discussion (during the week) with a system administrator >about seeing if we can just make PGP publically available to everyone, >but now the discussion seems to be to just allow PGP to do digital >signatures, and I don't think that is the best choice, then. They are >not against PGP being used, but there are legal issues as to whether they >can offer it to everyone, as some students are international students, >and are not allowed to use the version for the US, or so I have been >informed, so now I need to see if we can have the international version, >so these students can use it. :( > Is there any good programs (for the Unix, SunOS) that just does digital >signature encryption? What they are trying to do is make certain that no >one can send a message to anyone, claim to be in the faculty, and cause >problems that way. My position is just a student programmer, but I am >trying to learn as much as I can, to answer questions and deal with problems. Yeah, there's RIPEM-SIG, which is approved for export so you can even give it to your non-Yankee students, and it's compatible with the RIPEM secure email stuff. So your US students, and anyone else who wants to download the software from England, can send secure email, and everybody can check the signatures. I'm not sure if RIPEM-SIG has caught up with the features in the latest versions of RIPEM, which include an X.509 variant on Web of Trust. Somebody else has brought up the insecurity of using security software on multi-user machines, where the system administrator or anybody who cracks root can steal your passphrases and even replace the trustable software with trojan-horse versions; your students will be safer if they only trust stuff running on PCs from software they've verified themselves. But you can at least do signature-checking safely on a multi-user machine if the software is protected adequately. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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DejaNews all over again--a URL for Usenet Searching (fwd)
by Charles Gimon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > > I usually avoid passing on URLs of interesting sites, in the name of > conserving bandwidth (*), but this one really has me jazzed: > > http://dejanews.com/ > > It allows searching of Usenet archives (a few months' worth, from what I > can see). > > > " Want to know what people are saying about some new book? About > some political topic? Most importantly, about you behind your back? > Check it out! Lots of fun, and a bit scary." > Or to paraphrase Huey Long, "Every Man a Kibo".

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GAK criteria
by cme＠acm.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/

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toolkits?
by Stephen Whitaker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

OK folks, nobody seems to have any ideas how to keep our little state of Vermont from falling prey to mediocrity in the internet. I thought with so many highly opinionated people I would at least get a few good or at least entertaining suggestions. How about a different angle. Can anyone aid in building capacity among a few sincere watchdog types to really learn how to map, trace and test the net here as it grows? What constitutes a basic toolkit for trace route, sniff for promiscuous mode, all the other tools to map whats happening to net traffic in a little state of 1/2 million people? What are the sources of traffic information? With there not even a single DS-3 in the state yet carrying IP it seems we just might have a prayer of doing it right, whatever that is. What would it look like if secure communications and anonomynity were designed in from the start? Is this what Sameer is doing in Bezerkeley? What machines are considered minimum requirements to use these tools? What are the essential reference works? -sw

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RE: using pgp to make an otp
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- > While in theory the output of PGP would be ``random'' enough for a > one-time pad, you need to take into account that there is ``header'' > information in a PGP message. This info in the first several bytes > indicates which key was used, how big the message is, whether the > receiving PGP should save the decrypted file, etc. This part is not > very random at all. i understand the non-random portions of the pgp output, which is why i specified in my origional message that the 1st 20 or so lines would find their way to the bit bucket. > The weakness in this method is that the ``key'' to the OTP is composed > of the PGP encryption key and the plaintext used to generate the > pad. Both would have to be fairly well protected to prevent a bad > guy from either a) generating his own copy of the OTP by obtaining > the key and plaintext or b) forcing you to use a known OTP by munging > your copy of the key or plaintext. i'm confused here. how would the 'key' to the otp be related to my pgp encryption key? if i strip off all the identifying information that pgp uses to recognise how to decrypt a message, and destroy the 'clean' copy of the file(s) that eventually became part of my otp, how could the resulting output be tied to my key? if it could, then pgp is less secure than i give it credit for being. if your objection is based on the fact that my public key is a known entity, , this can easily be bypassed by creating a brand new key from a freshly unzipped copy of pgp. use that key to create the otp, then destroying the key(s) used to create it. > This technique does have its uses. For instance, if you use DES you > can ``seed'' it with a value, then by re-encrypting the output of DES > repeatedly you can generate an essentially random sequence of > values. This can be used as a OTP for a stream cypher. isn't this essentially what i'm doing? if it is necessary, i can do this...(assuming a virgin key) 1. create a cyphertext of a file. 2. strip the indentifying lines. 3. create a new cyphertext from the resulting file. 4. repeat until paranoia level < comfort zone. my point here is that _if_ pgp output is random enough, i wouldn't need hardware. even i, with my extremely limited programming skills could create a .cmd file or program that could be used as imput for a stream cypher. imo, for crypto to be useful, it has to be easy. i'm trying to find a way to do this that can be implemented anywhere.

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forging headers
by tien＠well.sf.ca.us 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So I got this message. How would someone identify the sender of this message? I'm writing an article on anonymity, with some discussion of remailers, and want to argue that forging already permits people to raise the costs of tracing significantly, anonymous remailers or no. Lee >From: freeh(a)fbi.gov >Date: Tue, 24 Oct 95 16:07:08 -0400 >Apparently-To: tien(a)well.sf.ca.us >X-UIDL: 814570964.056 > >> How difficult is it to forge headers? How difficult is it to trace a >> message to the actual sender if the header is forged? > >Not very difficult at all (to forge, that is). This is a quick and dirty >example that should be somewhat traceable. If you want pointers on how to >trace it, post the whole thing, including headers, to cypherpunks. > >Louis > >

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it could be worse
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

``According to the former head of Romania's secret police, Ion Mihai Pacepa, there had been ten million microphones in a country of twenty-three million people. That would mean that nearly everyone had been listened to and then blackmailed into listening and reporting on others. A maze of psychic tunnels led from one person to another.'' [Andrei Codrescu, "The Hole In The Flag", pp. 21-22]

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Re: toolkits?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:41 AM 11/7/95, Stephen Whitaker wrote: >OK folks, nobody seems to have any ideas how to keep our little state of >Vermont from falling prey to mediocrity in the internet. I thought with so >many highly opinionated people I would at least get a few good or at least >entertaining suggestions. You may have gotten no responses because it generally is not up to a state government to ensure that "mediocrity" in the Internet is avoided (though I'm not sure what is meant by "mediocrity." If it is security and anonymity, this is definitely the state government's responsibility, or even area of interest.) >just might have a prayer of doing it right, whatever that is. What would it >look like if secure communications and anonomynity were designed in from the >start? Is this what Sameer is doing in Bezerkeley? > >What machines are considered minimum requirements to use these tools? What >are the essential reference works? "Security and anonymity" are not matters for government to ensure. Imagine two Vermont residents, Bob of Burlington and Rhonda of Rutland. The wish to communicate securely, and perhaps anonymously. Alas, the state legislature in Montpelier is oblivious to their concerns, not even answering their e-mail. What, oh what, are they to do? Not to worry, as what Vermont does is irrelevant. Bob of Burlington can encrypt his messages to Rhonda of Rutland and send them in any number of ways. Compuserve, AOL, and (probably) Netcom will have local access points. Happily, Rhonda of Rutland and Bob of Burlington (not their real names) can communicate secretly, securely, and anonymously. I urge you, Stephen, to read up on encryption and the benefits contained therein. Looking to your state capital to secure your communications is a lose. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Timed-release crypto and information economics
by shields＠tembel.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 1. Method In 1993, Timothy C. May posted a message to this list <URL:http://www.hks.net/cpunks/cpunks-0/1460.html> with some thoughts on time-release crypto. I think his system is too complex. Here I present a cleaner model, and show how it can be used in several real-life ways. In the May proposal, when you have a message to be encrypted, you encrypt it with a session key, optionally split that key with an n-of-m scheme, and then send the key into a network of escrow agents, which are instructed to hold the message for a given period of time. You then hold onto the encrypted message, though you need not keep it secret. Conceptually, you have encrypted a message and then remailed the key to yourself in such a way that it will take X length of time to arrive. I have a simpler, public-key plan. When you want to keep a message secret until date X, you ask your favorite crypto house to generate a key pair and hold the secret key until date X. You then encrypt your message with the public key, and again hold onto the encrypted message. N-of-m trust management can be implemented by secret-sharing your message and encrypting each with a key generated by a different crypto house. This method is clean, fully anonymous, and nearly stateless. 2. Economics I've worked out a payment model for both the public and secret key, which I think can be used for any sort of information in an information economy not based on (increasingly unenforceable) intellectual property laws. In this model, the creator of information charges enough to recover his costs (call this price, the price available to the first buyers, the "primary cost"). It is then possible for resellers to purchase it and try to make a profit through multiple sales at a lower price. If the reseller is hoarding the information, another one can step in, pay the same initial rate, and try to do better. This model seperates marketing of information from producing it, and gives an easy way to profit from doing either. Of course, it's possible to conflate them into a information creator that sells directly to end-users. Once you abstract this you'll notice that (a) it's much like existing models for those who create information for hire, such as writers and programmers who sign over copyright but could recreate the work; and (b) it can be applied to many less extreme scenarios, such as where the reseller makes the product available but under a restrictive licence. I think this is the basic fabric of an information economy. Applying it to the selling of timed-release pairs, the primary cost of the public key is some nominal charge, and the primary cost of the secret key is the amount required to judge whether or not it should be released -- a trivial amount for time-based release but something more for event-based release. (A corollary is that you might pay the judging fee for a secret key, and receive instead a certificate saying that it cannot yet be released.) 3. Applications * Bonds: You deliver $1000 in ecash to the issuer. In returns it gives you a unique certificate redeemable for $1100, encrypted such that it may not be decrypted until the maturity date. You also get a certificate saying that your encrypted bond is a bond, so that you may demonstrate fraud if you find something else once you decrypt it at maturity. Essentially this is the same as creating a private corporate ecash bank. Coupon bonds are a trivial extension. * Retirement plans, cryonics funds, and wills: You encrypt your assets or your will in a custom event-based key, and archive it with your executor. * Idea futures: You have a pair of key pairs generated, one for encrypting YES coupons, and the other for NO coupons. Now anyone can generate and sell their own coupons, consisting of $1 in ecash encrypted with a YES or NO event-release key, again with a certificate of authenticity to verify fraud. * Bonding: You pay $1001 for a reputable institution to give you a $1000 bond encrypted in the event-release key based on your breech of contract, and its complementary negative key, and send you and the other party each one bond. If you default on your contract, the injured party can ask the crypto house to release the default key; if you do not, you can ask the crypto house to release the other key. 4. Cypherpunks write code I'll let everyone tear into this for a few days, and then I'll put up a server for timed-release key generation, charging maybe c$1. I'd like to then enhance it to be capable of issuing bonds and loans denominated in c$. (I like the cyberbucks trial because it's officially play money, so there aren't any regulatory burdens.) This should be interesting. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJ6jgeyjYMb1RsVfAQHKPAP8CF8HAN3dPa0QaJ3knDuv5gKd2yIUE57G icK5flsVOHcmq2+y3LkB8uCWBT1IxyoWv9I2u1yQbujYtttjgparCoCeErXk7uPe h7yY/eZzx3wgIrGxMEGePZftwoA2aGfyO+wDy/5lPZ0yWxLpoLr67RfpWbutqinf bmn6xeL64lg= =iXOF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Shields.

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