December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

SEN_sor
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-4-95. NYPeeper: "The Rand Corporation salutes E-mail as the new foundation of democracy." Denise Caruso's column. Are we ready, as a society, for ubiquitous Government- mandated electronic communication? Not yet. E-mail today does not have the same constitutional free-speech and privacy protections already afforded the telephone and postal mail. In addition, free speech on the Net is far from assured. There are several bills pending in Congress right now that would severely restrict what people can say in either private or public forums on the Internet. Despite Rand's finding that virtual communities are powerful tools for democratic discourse, it will be difficult for communities to form under constant threat of censorship. "Java Backers Taking Aim At Microsoft's Dominance." A number of Silicon Valley companies plan announcements on Monday that together constitute an anti-Microsoft campaign. The most noteworthy: A plan by Sun and Netscape for a user-friendly version of the Java software technology for the Web. The strategies being announced this week represent opening skirmishes in what may be the next great standards battle in the industry. "Nearing the $500 Computer for Internet Use." Acorn is about to introduce a stripped-down machine for Net surfing that sells for about $900. By stripping it of its monitor and hard disk drive, and adding a high-speed modem, Acorn executives say they can hit a retail price less than $500. They plan to ship the Netsurfer by early next year, and are discussing licensing with Oracle and a number of American and Asian companies. SEN_sor (16 kb)

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Re: ANNOUNCEMENT: ALICE'S ADDRESS REVEALED.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 4 Dec 1995, Don M. Kitchen wrote: > Someone posing as Alice said: It wasn't anyone "posing" as Alice. It was the real banana. > > As I promised, I've now opened a channel so that anyone who wants to > > can send Alice de 'nonymous email. I can now be reached via > > an455120(a)anon.penet.fi. Mail sent to Alice de 'nonymous at that > > address will get to me, and I will do my best to reply to you as well, > > but I can't guarantee, anything. > > Laszlo Vecsey <master(a)internexus.net> said: > > > I don't think that was a smart thing to do. Your real email is now > > registered in some database in Finland - how difficult would it be to > > retrieve it? From what I remember organizations like Scientology had no Soory ... beg to differ ... my real email is not registered in some database in Finland. No offence, but you have no idea what I have registered in Finland. Whatever lies behind the anon address is simply something which is "reasonably" reliable. It could be a dummy account, or it could even be a chain of remailers and processes. Who knows?? Do you? How difficult would it be to retrieve it from Finland? I don't really know. It really hadn't crossed my mind. I thought that Julf might run a good outpost in Finland. And that he'd take reasonable efforts (i.e. not go down with the ship) to protect my privacy. He strikes me as reasonably reliable that way. > Not _nearly_ as hard as breaking/finding an appropriately encrypted key. Maybe, maybe not. It depends on a lot of things, now doesn't it? And breaking or finding an appropriately encrypted key, doesn't *quite* address the problem of people sending email to me without any hassle, does it?? I think that the ISP who hosts my remailer has already had to deal with a slew of mail over the "Alice" antics, and the spoofed posts. This way, if someone wants to take issue with something which they've read, the ISP can simply ask them to write the author. > I for one am not going to even bother with the penet address unless the > posts come from there. After all, it's a forgery anyway. The real Alice > already posted a PGP key. I wouldn't be reading this list if I were > going to fall over for a simple impersonation. Great that's your choice and your perogative. I don't see what on earth you'd have to say to me in any event. And before you go patting yourself on the back about impersonations, have a look at my last post to this list. The one under the subject of "Do the Right Thing." Right at the bottom of the post is my signature, and ... ta dah ... my penet address. What does that *logically* tell you?? Maybe that the author of that post, the long-winded one that criticizes Jim Clark for his stand on GAK and his short-sighted views will accept email via penet.fi at an455120(a)anon.penet.fi?? > Of course, if our impersonating, trusts-penet-not-PGP-coworkers-think- > of-everything-but-a-packet-sniffer Alice were to post from penet, > then everyone (including procmail ;) would have to believe his claims > of pseudo-identity. I trust penet to do one thing for me. I trust penet not to send me email that is larger than 1 Megabyte. And the reason I trust penet not to do that is that Julf's mailer won't handle it. His mailer will choke on it. That's it. If you think that I'm relying on Julf to protect me, then you are sadly mistaken. Many, many people already share in the secret of who Alice is. That's a fact. I'm not looking for anyone to keep my identity a "secret". I'm simply looking for some peace so that I can do some reading, some writing, and some "thinken". And Julf protects me from huge emails. That's it. And now, if anyone wants to establish a dialogue with me, they can. Or if they don't want to (like you) then that's not a problem for me either. My previous way of getting contacted (via postmaster(a)att.com or postmaster(a)netscape.com) didn't seem to be working well. The two companies weren't forwarding email to me. Never got anything from them forwarded. Now, not only AT&T and Netscape can talk with me, so can anyone else. And if they want to have some "secure" super-secret dialogue with me, then we can do that also. I've posted a partial protocol on how to do that already. Not one that's for super-dee-dooper secret stuff, but one that's Pretty OK. And it uses PGP for one part. > I must say, L.D. is really falling all over himself this time. Maybe > he's just trying to make people *think* he's a cryptobungler, so that he > can keep his other tentacles with whom he converses out of suspicion. Good Grief. Is it something they put in the water down wherever you're at?? I am not L.D ... oh, what is the point ... > Don > > Wishing Emacs had IMAP support cuz here comes mailcrypt Mailcrypt?? Emacs?? *Shudder* ... is it compatible with PGP 2.3? Alice de 'nonymous ... <an455120(a)anon.penet.fi> ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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GAK_hit
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-4-95. W$Jabber: "Microsoft Probe Spurs Subpoenas Tied to Internet. Antitrust Effort Appears Focused on Windows 95 Disabled Rival Software." The subpoenas indicate that Justice Department officials are focusing on whether Microsoft's Windows 95 and related Internet software improperly disable rival programs that let users access the Internet. Industry executives said the Justice Department has issued "civil investigative demands" to Netscape and CompuServe. The subpoena issued to Netscape may be of particular significance. In the estimate of Netscape and industry observers, roughly 80% of World Wide Web users, a population pegged at more than 17 million, use Netscape's software. Because of that presence, even if Netscape were alone in having its software disabled by Microsoft's new products, "I would say Netscape would have a cause of action and that the Justice Department would have a basis to investigate or bring an action," said Garret Rasmussen, an antitrust lawyer. GAK_hit (5 kb)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reorder"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo syrinx c2) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last update: Mon 4 Dec 95 6:47:39 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hroller hroller(a)c2.org ---########* 7:37 99.98% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl * *** ****** 7:13 99.59% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++++++++ 40:07 99.51% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com *##* #+*## 2:31 99.27% c2 remail(a)c2.org - +*****++- 48:01 99.14% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----.---. 7:39:43 98.95% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * *** *#** 5:22 98.88% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** ..-** 3:29:17 98.79% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net ****** *** 17:26 98.78% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com *- --+- + 1:52:55 98.67% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org # ## ## ### 7:56 98.58% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** * * 12:35 98.13% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net +*- + --+ 45:49 97.35% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +* *#* 3:38 96.35% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu # ### ## # :17 95.83% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com .-. ...- - 17:35:13 95.65% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** * * 5:12 95.51% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com .--.---.- 9:59:28 94.15% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +* **** +* 7:33 99.00% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi - -+ - - 10:45:41 82.20% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org - 2:06:09 81.59% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de ++ .--- 14:40:50 79.58% robo robo(a)c2.org --*#### # 14:09 69.63% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG B
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MEDIA RELEASE Contact: Simon Davies, Privacy International Davies(a)privint.demon.co.uk PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG BROTHER COMPANIES New report uncovers a massive international surveillance trade funded by the arms industry and led by the UK On Monday 4 December, Privacy International will publish Big Brother Incorporated, a 150 page report which investigates the global trade in repressive surveillance technologies. The report, to be published on several Web sites on the Internet, shows how technology companies in Europe and North America provide the surveillance infrastructure for the secret police and military authorities in such countries as China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Angola, Rwanda and Guatemala The reports primary concern is the flow of sophisticated computer-based technology from developed countries to developing countries - and particularly to non-democratic regimes. The report demonstrates how these companies have strengthened the lethal authority of the world's most dangerous regimes. The report lists the companies, their directors, products and exports. In each case, source material is meticulously cited. Privacy International is publishing the report in digital form in several sites on the Internet to ensure its accessability by interested parties anywhere in the world. Surveillance technologies are defined as technologies which can monitor, track and assess the movements, activities and communications of individuals. More than 80 British companies are involved, making the UK the world leader in this field. Other countries, in order of significance, are the United States, France, Israel, the Netherlands and Germany. _Big Brother Incorporated_ is the first investigation ever conducted into this trade. Privacy International intends to update the report from time to time using trade fair documents and leaked information from whistleblowers. The surveillance trade is almost indistinguishable from the arms trade. More than seventy per cent of companies manufacturing and exporting surveillance technology also export arms, chemical weapons, or military hardware. Surveillance is a crucial element for the maintenance of any non-democratic infrastructure, and is an important activity in the pursuit of intelligence and political control. Many countries in transition to democracy also rely heavily on surveillance to satisfy the demands of police and military. The technology described in the report makes possible mass surveillance of populations. In the past, regimes relied on targeted surveillance. Much of this technology is used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, student leaders, minorities, trade union leaders, and political opponents. It is also useful for monitoring larger sectors of the population. With this technology, the financial transactions, communications activity and geographic movements of millions of people can be captured, analysed and transmitted cheaply and efficiently. Western surveillance technology is providing invaluable support to military and totalitarian authorities throughout the world. One British computer firm provided the technological infrastructure to establish the South African automated Passbook system, upon which much of the functioning of the Apartheid regime British surveillance cameras were used in Tianamen Square against the pro-democracy demonstrators. In the 1980s, an Israeli company developed and exported the technology for the computerised death list used by the Guatemalan police. Two British companies routinely provide the Chinese authorities with bugging equipment and telephone tapping devices. Privacy International was formed in 1990 as a non-government, non-profit organisation. It brings together privacy experts, human rights advocates and technology experts in more than 40 countries, and works toward the goal of promoting privacy issues worldwide. The organisation acts as an impartial watchdog on surveillance activities by governments and corporations. For further information or interview, contact Simon Davies in London at davies(a)privint.demon.co.uk. The address of the web site is http://www.privacy.org/pi/reports/big_bro/ _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG BROTHER... _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)privacy.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Privacy International Washington Office * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.privacy.org/pi/ Washington, DC 20003 ------------------ RFC822 Header Follows ------------------ Received: by epic.org with SMTP;3 Dec 1995 23:09:13 -0500 Received: from epic.org (washofc.epic.org [204.91.138.50]) by svcs1.digex.net (8.6.12/8.6.12) with SMTP id XAA27478; Sun, 3 Dec 1995 23:07:51 -0500 Message-ID: <n1394090361.79608(a)epic.org> Date: 3 Dec 1995 23:07:03 -0500 From: "Dave Banisar" <banisar(a)epic.org> Subject: PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG B To: "pi" <pi(a)privacy.org> X-Mailer: Mail*Link SMTP-QM 3.0.2 _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: PRIVACY WATCHDOG OUTS BIG BROTHER... _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)privacy.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Privacy International Washington Office * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.privacy.org/pi/ Washington, DC 20003

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Re: Do the Right Thing
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com () on Mon, 4 Dec 1:42 AM >That authority now sits in other hands. In silicon. > >I doubt the President wants a market meltdown as we >start to move towards an election year. Body bags and >a bad economic front are a bad mix and could swing the >whole election with the dual near unsurmountable >election obstacles. > >Hopefully, god-willing, we won't face any tragedies. ----- Financial Times, Dec 4, 1995 US Marine chiefs trade places to experience tranche warfare Officers are preparing to do virtual battle in the Nymex oil pits [and wargame FinCide] By Laurie Morse A dozen US Marine Corps generals and colonels will today march on to the New York Mercantile Exchange trading floor and start matching wits with commodity futures traders. The traders often describe their fraught existence in the trading rings as virtual warfare, and the US military appears to agree. Keen to find ways of training officers to cope with the demands of high-tech 21st-century warfare, a group of Marine Corps top brass will venture into the Nymex crude oil pit in the World Trade Center after the regular market has closed. Assisted by a group of handpicked veteran commodity traders, the marines will plunge into a simulated session of futures trading that will include several market reversals and a barrage of oil-linked "news". Mr Gary Lapayover, the Nymex trader co-ordinating the event, says the trading session will allow the officers and traders to become acquainted on friendly turf, and give the Marines a glimpse of the multiple tasks and the speed -- that breakneck trading entails. Today's simulated trading will be followed tomorrow by a war games session. About 15 traders will follow the generals to an old officers' club on Governor's Island, off Manhattan, and test their skills in a computerised game designed by Gama Corp. a Virginia-based company that specialises in computer-generated battle scenarios. Later, the traders will tell the officers and their aides what they think of the battle experience. What do the Marines hope to learn from the commodities pits? "Our vision of what warfare will be in the 21st century is very different from what we've faced in the 20th," says Colonel Tom Harkins, director of operations at the Marines' war-fighting laboratory in Quantico, Virginia. In future, the Marines expect to be drawn into smaller conflicts of the type seen in Somalia and Bosnia. At the same time, warfare will become increasingly digitalised, calling for rapid decision-taking amid a barrage of information. "How does a commander make decisions on a digital battlefield?" asks Col Harkins. "Technology will increase the tempo of battle, and the influx of digital information will require skills in what you might call pattern analysis. This is what futures traders do. In this exercise we want to see how people who face these conditions every day deal with the stress, and get comfortable with the risks." During tomorrow's war games, traders will be confronted by an on-screen battle area laid out on a grid, with as many as 50 small teams of cyber-soldiers seeking the "enemy". Once "contact" is made, the teams will request firepower. Under pressure, "commanders" must decide how to deploy resources to the best strategic advantage, while limiting losses. For Mr Eric Bolling, an independent trader who has survived nine years in the Nymex energy pits, the Marines are being shrewd in seeking to cross laser-swords with battle-hardened heroes of the trading pits. Mr Bolling, a 33-year-old former minor league baseball player, has no military background, but sees a lot of parallels between trading, sport and the armed services. All three require high levels of self-motivation and decision-making ability. Some of the generals and colonels may be shown to be more suited to high-stress, high-stakes environments than others, he says. "You have to be able to prioritise and analyse a lot of information rapidly -- then initiate risk by making a decision; and, finally, manage that risk by having the discipline to manage the trade," says Mr Bolling. "A lot of people can't do that, and wash out of these markets. I don't think it's something that can be learned really -- it's a personality type." Mr Lapayover said he selected floor veterans like Mr Bolling to participate because he was looking for "survivors" people who have been successful traders over a number of years. "Military experience wasn't a factor. The Marines are looking for people that can help them understand the process." Mr Lapayover has also suggested that the top brass visit the "war rooms" of America's largest investment banks to observe Wall Street's fixed income and equities traders, and the strategies of high-stakes corporate raiders. The war games are part of a new programme directed by General Charles Krulak, commandant of the Marine Corps. "War games are not designed to give you a total solution, they are designed to give you insight" he says. "We're going to have our laboratory analysts with us, and they will be looking at improving the process." -----

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Re: Info on Netscape's key escrow position
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>James A. Donald wrote: >> I would like to hear Jim Clark say "GAK is bad". At 11:05 PM 12/3/95 -0800, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > I do believe that the company, Netscape, will take such a position > in the coming week. I will be greatly relieved when this happens. I would be even more relieved if Netscape were to take action to make it more difficult for the government to introduce GAK. > Did he take a position against GAK? He did both less than that and considerably more than that: Instead of trying to persuade us that he was against GAK, he sought to persuade the reader that the reader should be against GAK. He sought to make it difficult for both a future Microsoft and a future government to introduce GAK. He described GAK in accurate language, rather than euphemistic terms. He did not editorialize "GAK is bad" but any reasonable person reading his book, unfamiliar with crypto and the controversy, would conclude from the facts that he presented that GAK is a radical violation of the fourth amendment -- He described GAK in neutral, factually accurate language that doubtless deeply offended the folks at NSA. > I've been trying to use either GAK, or "mandatory key escrow" > to refer to the hated beast. "Mandatory key escrow" is still an oxymoronic euphemism. It is not escrow if the valuable item is held by someone who is party to the potential conflict, or subject to the power of someone who is party to the potential conflict. Even to those of us who know what the euphemism "mandatory key escrow" stands for, it still does not sound nearly as threatening and scary as "government access to keys". --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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[farber@central.cis.upenn.edu: IP: NSC Announce -- iPower home page/CryptoSampler announcement]
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a National Semiconductor press release... To order the CryptoSampler package in either configuration, call 1-800-272-9959 Ext# 631 between the hours of 7 AM and 7 PM Central Standard Time. To play CryptoSolver and for more information about the CryptoSampler program, see the iPower web site at http://www.ipsecure.com .

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No Privacy Right in the Americas ?
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, A 12 02 95 Bloomberg newsstory is headlined: Latin American nations will help U.S. combat money laundering The newsstory's datelined: BUENOS AIRES (Dec 2, 1995 - 16:38 EST) It reports: A communique issued after a two-day meeting of ministers and anti-drug officials from throughout the Americas said countries had agreed to...establish systems to identify transfers and deposits that could be linked to illegal activities. Please note: NOT transfers and deposits that are so linked but t & d's that COULD BE so linked, and seized ! Perhaps that's why US Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin exclaimed ...this conference was an enormous step forward. In particular, Countries in the region were encouraged to follow the U.S. lead in setting up organizations which use computerized technology to search data bases for suspicious transactions, said Rubin. Such organizations can be distant, official organizations or they can be neighborhood, job-creating, community-aware, entre- preneurial blessings. Anyway you like it ! One selling-point at the conference: Crime organizations such as the Yakuza in Japan, the Col- ombian drug cartels and the Italian mafia depend on money laundering to place their gains beyond the reach of the law. Rubin summed up the point: Profits that can't be spent aren't profits. He would have us believe he doesn't know where to shop. The illegals can spend profits on neighborhood troops, troops armed --one way or another-- by the world's most successful arms supplier. The advantage to that supplier? It keeps all 34 [minus 1] democratic governments in the region destabilized --amenable to penetration by money bags who know how to thrive in managed chaos-- ; and still dependent on arms from the "distant," official supplier. The advantage to the money bags? It diverts "profits that can't be spent" from directly competing with them. The advantage to the illegals? Neighborhood troops protect turf and provide inexpensive medical treatment for those with complaints. The advantage to the politicos? Low intensity warfare keeps government troops busy doing something besides staging coups. Managed chaos? Like the Buenos Aires conference which ...emerged from [Clinton's] Summit of the Americas held in Miami a year ago. Right to privacy? But of course. From scheming in Miami to "profits that can't be spent" coverup in Buenos Aires to "we don't do that anymore" death squads in any of the 34. "But I meant, for the people." "You mean you have a complaint?" Cordially, Jim NOTE. The Nando Times website URL is: http://www.nando.net The online filename of the above newsstory is: biz634_2.html

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Re: "Got a subpoena?"
by jimbell＠pacifier.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> >> Note that I am assuming the willingness of the phoneco to be UNCOOPERATIVE, at least according to "the spirit of the rules." They could still cooperate according to the LETTER of the law. > > It's in the phone company's best interest to be cooperative. >*but* in the case of, say, an internet privacy provider, it is in the >provider's best interest to be uncooperative. I would PREFER that I be able to legally obligate my service provider (and phone co) to provide only that level of cooperation which is actually, literally, legally required. I would like to be able to know that if my service is tapped in some way, I receive a letter de-certifying the previous state of non-tapped-ness that it possessed.

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