December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[NOISE] Screening of Unauthorized Access
by stevenw＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saw this in the net. I know nothing about the movie personally. Perhaps someone on the list can comment? >Unauthorized Access, the documentary on the computer hacker underground from >an insiders point of view is screening in San Francisco!!! > >What the critics say: > >"Unauthorized Access lets you see and hear from those people that big >corporations and the government are so afraid of..." - The Seattle Stranger > >"If you want to know what a hacker really is, this is a must" - EXE Magazine > >"To see the hacking world from the Inside, try watching Unauthorized Access... >it shows hackers as they see themselves without the media's usual hype..." - >The New Scientist > >"As a cultural piece, it's what we've been waiting for. Many of us have long >suspected that modern-day hackers have a unique and rich culture. >Unauthorized Acess is something we can point to to prove it." - 2600 - The >Hacker Quarterly > >"Annaliza Savage has made a fascinating documentary about the sick world of >criminal hacking..." Mich Kabay - NCSA > >"It's a kafka-esque expose of the computer underground, a must see for all >security experts. This made me want to go out and become a cop." - Cult of >the Dead Cow > >Question and Answer session after the screening.... > >Unauthorized Access is screening at: >Artists Television Access in San Francisco >Thursday, December 21, 1995 - 8:30 pm >922 Valencia Street (at 21st) SF, CA 94110 >(415) 824 3890 > >For more info on Unauthorized Access http://bianca.com/bump/ua/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Steven Weller | "The Internet, of course, is more | than just a place to find pictures | of people having sex with dogs." stevenw(a)best.com | -- Time Magazine, 3 July 1995

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Re: BosniaLINK
by Gary Howland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ Irrelevant crap deleted ] Don't post irrelevant stuff here. I've noticed an awful lot of crap posted from the replay remailer to this group over the last few months. Wish I could figure out who this jerk is. Gary - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMNSQ+CoZzwIn1bdtAQHrHQF8DyOXYfMYV5czKkMXDqJtMYWaReg1IYiX QSG801r5LE3hMDa7ooSrQH6LwgDwPAYs =r8dB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Is ths legal?.. (fwd)
by Robert 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sun, 17 Dec 1995 10:18:50 -0500 (EST) Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> writes: > > On Sun, 17 Dec 1995, Jay Holovacs wrote: > > Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) (18 U.S.C. ss 2510 > > et seq.). "It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an > > operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee, or agent of a > > provider of wire *or electronic* communication service, whose > > facilities are used in the trans-mission of a wire communication, > I disagree. Instead it implies that interception and administrative > review of content will be tolerated where it is "a necessary > incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the > rights or property of the provider of that service." Note that it > will be the provider who makes the definition in the ex ante application. > Even worse, the protection that is given is for "a provider of wire > communication service to the public." I also disagree because I would interpret it as "It shall not be unlawful...to intercept, disclose or use that communication...except by utilizing *service observing* or *random monitoring*." That indicates to me that specific monitoring is fine, but random monitoring must be used for quality control. And how do you become specific without being random? QC could be whatever the providers deem it to be, the public be damned. "..anything not specifically allowed is expressly forbidden..." RDHeffren(a)gnn.com RobertH677(a)aol.com id=0x95AA98CD

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Re: Political Cleanup program
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:04 PM 12/17/95 -0800, Detweiler wrote: > >JB: >>Politics is traditionally corrupt, it appears, because donors to politicians >>and political campaigns expect a quid pro quo for their donations. Various >>unsatisfactory solutions include campaign spending limits, etc. > >I have an unusual view that I've never seen elsewhere: the problem with >our government is not that money or PACs are involved, but that the system >does not handle or resolve the conflicts between them very well. in other >words, in contrary to the current view that all PACs are evil, I think the >problem is not that we have PACs, but that our current system does not >balance their demands in some sensible manner. the system is >susceptible to corruption. it is conceivable however that there would be >a system that involves money and politics but still avoids corruption. Here's a question I have never heard anyone else ask (or answer!). "What is the purpose of a PAC? To be more specific, a PAC simply seems to be a funnel through which individual donations flow; why do we need a PAC? Is it to keep records of "who's naughty and nice"? Any contribution that can be made by a PAC could just as easily be made by one individual. >>It occurs to me that it would be a major advance if a system could be set up >>that would "blind" campaign donations as to their source: The donor could >>be satisfied that his donation gets to the candidate or cause, but the >>candidate couldn't know who actually paid the money (and the donor would be >>unable to prove that he made a donation, for example). Admittedly there are >>a lot of details that need to be worked out, but if this could be >>accomplished it would change politics as we know it. > >what you describe would allow anonymous bribes. Which, I suggest, is better than a non-anonymous bribe. > the giver could always "always"? Are you sure about that? >identify his cash donation "out of band" to the receiver. It is exactly this that the system I'd propose would prevent. I realize that you may not be able to imagine such a system, but that doesn't mean that such a system could be designed. (Before 1975, most of us would not have been able to imagine public-key encryption, for example.) A giver could CLAIM to make any sort of donation at all; but if the system were properly designed he could simply be lying to the officeholder. > moreover, other observers >would not be aware of the relationship. Not IMMEDIATELY, perhaps, but eventually the books could be opened, perhaps as much as years later. (Let's say, 3 months before the end of the term of the politician. And the amounts donated could withheld, with only the total donated reported every 3 months or so. (And perhaps only to 1 or 2 significant digits of accuracy.) For example, a Senator will be told on January 1, 1996, that up until that point he's received "about" $1.4 million dollars of donations. He would not be able to link these donations with any particular claim. Somebody could claim to have given him "$2000" of donation, which wouldn't even show up to the accuracy of the amount told the politician. Further techniques could be used to disguise the rate of giving. >why do you think this would be an improvement? Easy. It would remove much of the reason for a politician to treat one citizen differently from another citizen. >to the contrary our current system works hard to require >the disclosure of who donated what to a candidate, so the candidate's potential >hidden agendas and ulterior motives can be revealed. seems reasonable to >me. _EVENTUAL_ public disclosure of such information is not inconsistent with my idea. >you are probably barking up the wrong tree here on cypherpunks, however, >because most of the key "insiders" here are convinced that democracy is >a proven failure, and that in fact government is invariably corrupt and >oppressive, no matter what the implementation. the "solutions" advocated >here are chiefly withdrawal and subterfuge. I don't disagree with that assessment. However, that does not mean that I don't want to make life as difficult for the politicians as possible until they are swinging from a rope. >needless to say I disagree with this. I wonder if some day someone will >invent a "killer app" that doubles as a political governing system. >it seems to me politics is one of the last most intractable areas of >human interaction when many others have been harmonized and systematized >by the information revolution. I suspect it will eventually succumb to >technological ingenuity as well. the end result would be a government >that is not perfect, but is at least as good as the population that >drives it, and no worse. (in contrast today we seem to have a government >that is no better than the least common denominator). > > >JB, I have to wonder however how your ideas about campaign reform tie into >your prior advocation "Prior"? It's not "prior." I haven't changed my previous position one bit. > of political assinations as a legitimate form of >citizen power. have you given up on the idea of murdering politicians as >a means of political reform? Not "political reform." Political ELIMINATION. I want to eliminate the entire concept of a heirarchial government. > or are you now just coupling that idea with >campaign reform to put some new bells and whistles on >your overall ideological package? I repeat my previous statement. I'm happy to see them squirm before they are led to the gallows. Making life as difficult as possible for them is my goal. Using technology to disable their normal methods of corruption would be an excellent start.

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Re: Political Cleanup program
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, I don't consider these two ideas mutually exclusive. As I pointed out to Detweiler (under his alias "Nuri") I'm happy to see the politicians tortured before they are killed. At 02:48 PM 12/17/95 -0800, you wrote: >Good ideas, but you're getting soft. I liked the death lotto much better. > > Mike > >> Politics is traditionally corrupt, it appears, because donors to politicians >> and political campaigns expect a quid pro quo for their donations. Various >> unsatisfactory solutions include campaign spending limits, etc. >> >> It occurs to me that it would be a major advance if a system could be set up >> that would "blind" campaign donations as to their source: The donor could >> be satisfied that his donation gets to the candidate or cause, but the >> candidate couldn't know who actually paid the money (and the donor would be >> unable to prove that he made a donation, for example). Admittedly there are >> a lot of details that need to be worked out, but if this could be >> accomplished it would change politics as we know it. > >

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Re: Encrypted telnet...
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 15 Dec 95 12:48:41 CST, you wrote: An alternative to writing an entirely new proggie might be to write an add-on DLL for Windoze telnet clients that support add-ons... EWAN comes to mind here. >I am looking for an encrypted telnet (or rlogin/etc) package >that supports a Windoze client. >It looks like all the normal ones that I can find >(SSH, SRA telnet, SSLtelnet, etc) are just under Unixoids. >Don't get me wrong - I would prefer to use Unix, but I am >headed off to locations, where I know all I'll have access to >is Windows, with a PPP stack to some ISP. >I'ld write it myself, - pasteing different packages together, >but I need it working in a day or two. Can anyone help me here? >Thanks, >Dan >------------------------------------------------------------------ >Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems >droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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IETF draft on data protection via crypto API
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A Revised Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Common Authentication Technology Working Group of the IETF. Title : Independent Data Unit Protection Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (IDUP-GSS-API) Author(s) : C. Adams Filename : draft-ietf-cat-idup-gss-03.txt Pages : 35 Date : 12/14/1995 The IDUP-GSS-API extends the GSS-API [RFC-1508] for applications requiring protection of a generic data unit (such as a file or message) in a way which is independent of the protection of any other data unit and independent of any concurrent contact with designated "receivers" of the data unit. Thus, it is suitable for applications such as secure electronic mail where data needs to be protected without any on-line connection with the intended recipient(s) of that data. Subsequent to being protected, the data unit can be transferred to the recipient(s) - or to an archive - perhaps to be processed ("unprotected") only days or years later. Internet-Drafts are available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-ietf-cat-idup-gss-03.txt". A URL for the Internet-Draft is: ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-idup-gss-03.txt Internet-Drafts directories are located at: o Africa Address: ftp.is.co.za (196.4.160.8) o Europe Address: nic.nordu.net (192.36.148.17) Address: ftp.nis.garr.it (192.12.192.10) o Pacific Rim Address: munnari.oz.au (128.250.1.21) o US East Coast Address: ds.internic.net (198.49.45.10) o US West Coast Address: ftp.isi.edu (128.9.0.32) Internet-Drafts are also available by mail. Send a message to: mailserv(a)ds.internic.net. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-ietf-cat-idup-gss-03.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ds.internic.net can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e., documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. For questions, please mail to Internet-Drafts(a)cnri.reston.va.us.

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Re: Political Cleanup program
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:35 PM 12/17/95 -0800, you wrote: >Here's a question I have never heard anyone else ask (or answer!). "What is >the purpose of a PAC? > >To be more specific, a PAC simply seems to be a funnel through which >individual donations flow; why do we need a PAC? Is it to keep records of >"who's naughty and nice"? Any contribution that can be made by a PAC could >just as easily be made by one individual. PACs are to politics what mutual funds are to investing - that is, a mechanism for investors to diversify their holdings, and to allow for the managers of those holdings to use their expert/specialized knowledge to achieve better returns (at the cost of some frictional skimmings-off) than individuals would on their own. But I'm not sure what this has to do with C-punks any longer. -- "The anchored mind screwed into me by the psycho- | Greg Broiles lubricious thrust of heaven is the one that thinks | gbroiles(a)netbox.com every temptation, every desire, every inhibition." | -- Antonin Artaud |

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Re: Campaign Finance Reform
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:43 PM 12/17/95 PST, you wrote: >On December 17th you wrote: > >>To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >>From: jim bell <jimbell(a)pacifier.com> >>Subject: Political Cleanup program >> >>Politics is traditionally corrupt, it appears, because donors to politicians >>and political campaigns expect a quid pro quo for their donations. Various >>unsatisfactory solutions include campaign spending limits, etc. >> >>It occurs to me that it would be a major advance if a system could be set up >>that would "blind" campaign donations as to their source: The donor could >>be satisfied that his donation gets to the candidate or cause, but the >>candidate couldn't know who actually paid the money (and the donor would be >>unable to prove that he made a donation, for example). Admittedly there are >>a lot of details that need to be worked out, but if this could be >>accomplished it would change politics as we know it. > >If you'll give it some more thought, Jim, you'll see that it has a loophole >in it you could drive a semi through. There is no way to keep a donor from >passing the word to the recipient. No matter how you work out the details, >it's impossible to keep the information from passing. It could never work. It is absolutely true that you couldn't stop a person from communicating claims of a donation to a politician. But what you COULD do is to ensure that the donor couldn't PROVE that he made such a donation. In other words, _I_ could claim that I gave $1K to Senator Sludgepump (a lie) and the good senator would have no idea that I wasn't telling the truth. The people who REALLY made such donations would be helpless. >Consider a more radical, and possibly workable, solution to the thorny issue >of campaign finance. If we go back to the root of the problem, it seems >clear that it is the high cost of a campaign. If a typical campaign were to >cost a tenth or a twentieth of what it presently costs, we'd have gone a >long way towards ameliorating the situation. How to do it? Simply ban all >paid political spot ads - TV, radio, newspaper - all of them. Write it so >that there's damned little wiggle room - a candidate can use lawn signs, but >not billboards. They can use personal appearances, but not commercials. >They can spend all the gas money they want running around their state or >district, but not a dime for media spots. > Well, I have an even better and cheaper solution to the problem of government and politics. At an average of $20,000 per Congressman, we could clean up Washington for $10 million dollars.

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Re: What ever happened to... Cray Comp/NSA co-development
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Anitro" speculated about the fate and capabilities of the CCC PIM (processor-in-memory) machine. A friend of mine was working on it, and it would have been a screaming machine, no doubt about it. He said that the Cray mostly acted like a really fast network for the processor chips. As "Anitro" said, the PIM chips were made by a dedicated NSA company, Supercomputer Research Center, in Bowie MD. But, it was nowhere near finished when the company finally went down, and the team was completely disbanded. My friend was talking about going to the auction when the parts of the various machines were going to be sold, I don't know if he did so. He suspected that the various pieces would end up going back east to the Fort Meade area. Still, it is such an odd machine that you would probably have to transfer the staff to finish it, and that didn't happen. In any case, while it was fast (1/2 million 1-bit processors, perhaps as low as 1 nanosecond (1 GHz) cycle time), it was not fast enough to brute force reasonably strong ciphers. It's really no joke that it would take a computer with picosecond clocks the size of the earth more than the age of the universe to brute force IDEA, for instance. It would have made a great DES cracker, though; my back-of-the-envelope calculation has it cracking one key every .75 days on the average. thad -- Thaddeus Beier email: thad(a)hammerhead.com Technology Development vox: 408) 286-3376 Hammerhead Productions fax: 408) 292-2244

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