December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

GEY_ser
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-27-95. W$Jug: A test of superfast cable modems at Boston College prove addictive to speed freak faculty and students downloading junk data in seconds not minutes and hours, thus accelerating mind-rupture. And, an editorial red flags the telecom billions giveaway; nags Republicans to shut the geyser and not-reg the I-Way. GEY_ser

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Crypto specialist wanted
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CSI's most recent _Computer Security Alert_ has a listing for: Cryptographic specialist for a San Diego based firm. Headhunter's address is: vfalcon(a)onramp.net (I know this is isn't jobs.misc, but traffic having been relatively light, I'm passing this on to others who may be interested in crypto, but aren't on CSI's mailing list. Now back to frequency hopping radios and Anti-Fred)

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DOS - MD5 - Thanks
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to everyone who offered help on the MD5 for DOS. Greg Broiles pointed me to the pgp source, which may do the trick. (There is MD5 module in pgp[?]) I will investigate. For everyone's info, didn't find a freestanding dos implementation, tho. My copy of Schneier didn't have the disk, so I don't know if it's there, either. -- PJP

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URL for cypherpunks
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am putting up some solutions to the Garage Door problem that was discussed here perhaps a year ago. I would like to refer to the cypherpunks by URL. Are there currently any appropriate URLs ?

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German government orders censorship of CompuServe -- a sign of things to come djf
by Dave Farber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted-Date: Wed, 27 Dec 1995 17:47:17 -0500 X-Sender: farber(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu Date: Wed, 27 Dec 1995 17:47:17 -0500 From: Dave Farber <farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu> Subject: IP: German government orders censorship of CompuServe -- a sign of things to come djf To: FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: William Giles Russ Robinson CompuServe Incorporated CompuServe Incorporated 614/ 538-4388 614/ 538-4274 COMPUSERVE(R) SUSPENDS ACCESS TO SPECIFIC INTERNET NEWSGROUPS COLUMBUS, Ohio, Dec. 28, 1995 -- During the past week, CompuServe Incorporated temporarily suspended access to more than 200 Internet newsgroups in response to a direct mandate from the prosecutor s office in Germany. Each of the newsgroups that was suspended was specifically identified to CompuServe by the German authorities as illegal under German criminal law. CompuServe did not select any groups or determine the nature of the newsgroups that have been impacted by this action. German government officials, as part of an investigation of illegal material on the Internet, ordered CompuServe to do what was necessary with respect to specified newsgroups in order to comply with German law. German authorities are investigating newsgroups and other Internet content that may contain child pornography, other pornographic material illegal for adults, as well as content that although not illegal for adults is of such an explicit nature that it is illegal for minors. While access has been suspended, CompuServe continues to work with German authorities to resolve this matter. CompuServe cannot alter the content on the Internet in any way and has only suspended access to the disputed newsgroups through CIS. The issues being investigated in Germany, like those being addressed across the industry, need to remain focused on the individuals and groups placing content on the Internet. CompuServe, as an access provider, is not responsible for the origination or nature of content on the Internet over which it has no creative or editorial control. The global market is vital to CompuServe. We currently have 500,000 members in Western Europe and anticipate doubling that number in the next year. As the leading global service, CompuServe must comply with the laws of the many countries in which we operate. However, laws in different countries are often in conflict, and this creates new challenges unique to the emerging online industry. CompuServe is investigating ways in which we can restrict user access to selected newsgroups by geographical location. >

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Only accepting e-mail from known parties
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Below is the original I failed to post to the group as a whole. Sorry about the temporal confusion that produced.] On Dec 25, 1995 14:53:19, 'Adam Shostack <adam(a)lighthouse.homeport.org>' wrote: > The basic problem is that (personal) spam is a social, not a >technical problem. If someone wants to annoy you via the internet, >they can do so. You can raise the cost of their annoying you, but you >need to be careful not to make it difficult to talk to you. > I agree in many ways. On a personal level, I am far more interested in the *social* are of this form of privacy. It is more a problem of the data-hermit than privacy. And in a society increasingly generating narcissistists, I see the problem getting worse. Negroponte of the MIT Media Lab can sing the praises of the personal e-newspaper with personal filters to cut out everything uninteresting while culling the world new feeds for desired information. I see this feeding into the narcissitism problem. E.G. Imagine two people who "feel" that members of the other gender are "only interested in one thing." Each wakes up in the morning and looks at their personal e-paper. She reads nothing of particularly nasty rapes, serial rapists at large, rapists who have been convicted, and rapists who an uncaring pro-male system has let out to rape again (i.e. been found not guilty). He reads nothing of particularly nasty robberies of men by women, serial robberies by prostitutes, female robbers who have been convicted, and robbers who an uncaring pro-female system has let out to rob again. Both believe that their custom filtered feeds are the *real* events going on in the world and are far more accurate than any non-customized news feed. I hope nobody takes this as a generic attack on the privacy issues that the list is devoted to. I am a great supporter of privacy and pro-privacy tek. But I see myself as a realist on privacy issues, not as a privacy-utopian or a privacy-dystopian. We live in a post-Faustian world. It is divided into two groups of people. First are those who understand the post-Faustian character and devote themselves to getting used to it and even having fun with the new opportunities while understanding that the new world also generates new problems (like furthering data-narcicism). Second are those classic-reactionary forces (from all parts of the political spectrum) who whine about how the post-Faustian world is personally unfair to them and how everybody in the world has a personal obligation to them to move the world back to its pre-Faustian origins. --tallpaul PS to Tim May: I understand your posts on material that is off-topic. I usually agree with your posts. But I see the issues I discussed above as far more on topic (even if highly mediated) than, say, the ongoing discourse on the differences between an Army Captain and a Navy Captain.

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Re: another anonymous poster helping to destroy our rights
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:25 PM 12/27/95, Jeff Barber wrote: >Fred Cohen writes: >> >> We just heard from another anonymous poster trying to destroy our rights >> to free speech. How long will the cypherpunks put up with this? > >As Tim May has explained over and over again, "the cypherpunks" do not >exist. Cypherpunks is a mailing list, not a society or club. >"The cypherpunks" as a group can do nothing about what gets posted to >this list except comment on it. Precisely. Some of the many advantages of having no centralized structure/leadership, and no formal rules/policies, are: -- less wrangling over leadership and rules (if you think we wrangle and fight too much, look at organizations that spend *all* of their time choosing leaders, having boardroom fights, setting policies, fighting, electioneering, etc...it makes our easily-filtered flame wars pale by comparison) -- no leaders means no one in a position of leadership to sue for the many "infractions" some of our list members commit (violations of export laws, posting of stolen code, libel, etc., all allegedly, of course) -- no centralized focus, save for the toad.com machine, which could be replaced quickly (or cypherpunks could become "alt.cypherpunks" and then truly have no center, not that I am advocating this, for various reasons). This lack of a point of pressure, a center, means opponents have nothing to jab at...they can't write threatening letters to the "Board of Directors" demanding that certain actions cease, etc. >Finally, it should be noted that the kind of messages you're posting >lately are eerily reminiscent of Detweiler's mental deterioration just >before he went off the deep end. In fact, the line "How long will the >cypherpunks put up with this?" may be an exact quote. Indeed. When I saw this "How long will the Cypherpunks put up with this?" I initially thought it was tongue in cheek. Apparently not. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Announcing a new alpha release of premail
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is to announce that premail version 0.42 is now available. It is a full alpha version of the new premail, containing all the features and functions planned for the production release. Features include: * Support for all cypherpunk remailers. * Support for Mixmaster remailers. * Encrypted and signed email, including both preparation and decoding. * Support for the emerging PGP/MIME standard. * Support for MOSS through TIS/MOSS 7.1. * Creation and management of alpha.c2.org style nyms. * More secure handling of sensitive "secrets". * Much improved automatic selection of remailer chains. * Clean handling of "cc:" field and other such interactions. * Numerous other features. For more information about premail, see the premail Web page at: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html If you are in the US or Canada, you can download premail now, from the premail Distribution Authorization Form: http://kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu/premail-form.html Please forward bug reports, comments, and suggestions to me, so that the beta release can be as solid as possible. Raph Levien

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Re: Employer Probing Precedents?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:51 PM 12/27/95, "Jason D. Livingood/WSC"@hks.net wrote: >To Whom It May Concern: > >I was curious as to where I might find some electronic freedom legal >precedents. If, for example, an employer was planning to probe file >systems on >PCs in the off-hours and employees began encrypting their hard drives, what >legal precedents would support the employees or would support the employer in >blocking the encryption? Think of it another way. I have a PC which is for the use of my employee. It is my computer. I am his employer. He runs the programs I authorize him to, or at least I trust him to run programs needed to do his job and not use my computer to run a numbers racket or to manage his drug business. Thus, I reserve the right to inspect my own computer as I wish. He is free to accept this condition, or of course to leave. There can be no valid or reasonable law which says that my computer, which he uses, is no longer accessible to me because his "electronic privacy" takes precedence over my property rights. Nor any valid or reasonable law which says I cannot restrict what encryption programs he uses on *my* computer. (There are several on this list who disparage what they call the "libertarian emphasis on property rights over human rights," or somesuch. Fact is, property rights are central to all human rights. In the case of my employee using my computer, the concept of "his" human rights makes little sense: there is no "democracy" in corporations, as we normally think of democracy. Nor is there any "right of free speech," and so on. You may not like this, but this is the way it is, and should be.) I can't cite case law about "employee privacy," not being a lawyer, but I know that companies routinely restrict the uses to which their computers are put (video games, gambling, accessing porn are some obvious examples) and employees have very little to say about it. Furthermore, companies may need to look at hard drives to see if pirated software which could expose them to millions of dollars in damages (and raids by the SPA cops). I may not _like_ the fact that my employer (if I had one) is rooting through my hard disk, but it is, after all, his computer, and his liability if I am using his computers for illegal or unprofessional purposes. The courts have granted certain types of employee privacy, about things like the contents of purses and briefcases (though both of these examples can and do face inspections, as I faced when I worked for Intel). And monitoring of phone conversations now has a set of rules associated with it. But employers can always restrict what kinds of programs can be run on their computers. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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New! Improved! CryptoLib 1.1 now available.
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Note: This is posted on behalf of Jack Lacy, whose news posting software is hopelessly broken; please direct responses to him at cryptolib(a)research.att.com. Jack spent the better part of the last two weeks getting a new release of CryptoLib out the door. This version, which should be stable for a while, fixes a few x86 problems, improves the interfaces to some of the functions, and now allows you to use your own random number generator to create key material. If you don't already have CryptoLib, be the first nerd on your block to get the new release. -matt] ======== Announcing CryptoLib - Release 1.1 12/21/95 Jack Lacy, AT&T Bell Labs CryptoLib is a portable and efficient library of primitives for building cryptographic applications. It runs under most versions of Unix as well as DOS, Windows and Windows-NT (and 95). We are pleased to make CryptoLib source code available without charge to researchers and developers in the US and Canada. (Because of export restrictions on cryptographic software, we are only able to make the software available within the US and Canada to US and Canadian citizens and US permanent residents.) CryptoLib is intended for research and experimental use, and is distributed without warranty or support. In particular, please note the following license conditions: * Copyright (c) 1995 by AT&T. * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software and in all copies of the supporting * documentation for such software. * * This software may be subject to export controls. * * NOTE: * Some of the algorithms in cryptolib may be covered by patents. * It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that any required * licenses are obtained. * * SOME PARTS OF CRYPTOLIB MAY BE RESTRICTED UNDER UNITED STATES EXPORT * REGULATIONS. * * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR AT&T MAKE ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE MERCHANTABILITY * OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. The attached describes the library and some timing results. To obtain source code send electronic mail to: cryptolib(a)research.att.com with a statement of the following form: "I am a U.S. or Canadian citizen or a legal permanent resident of the U.S. and am aware that some parts of CryptoLib may be restricted under United States Export regulations and may be covered under various US and/or foreign patents. I have read and understand the CryptoLib license." Name: Location: E-mail: Are you licensed to use the RSA patent? If yes, give name of licensed organization: =============================================================================== CryptoLib includes the following: arbitrary length bignums. bigmath package: bigAdd, bigSubtract, bigMultiply, bgiDivide, bigLeftShift, bigRightShift, bigAnd, bigOr, bigXor, bigCopy, Euclid's extended GCD, modular reduction and exponentiation crypto primitives DES and 3DES + modes Diffie-Hellman DSA (Signing and verification roughly equally efficient) El Gamal Rabin's scheme Random Number generation (PSEUDO and TRUE) MD[2,4,5] Prime generation RSA (provided only if you convince me that you have a license) SHA truerand (For Unix, NT and 95) quantization (Defense against Kocher's timing attack) quantized RSA, DSA and El Gamal private key operations. support functions asn1.c ioutils.c netIface.c Some timing information: All times assume 32X32 bit assembly of multiplication primitives. bigPow times (a^b mod c with a,b,c the same length) 512 bits 1024 bits -------- --------- bigPow 0.12s 0.72s Sparc II Brickell bigpow 0.43s 3.0s Sparc II with asm (gcc) 0.12s 0.78s Sparc 10 with asm 0.03s 0.17s Sparc 10 with asm (Brickell) 0.084s 0.45s SGI Indigo (150MHz) 0.109s 0.75s 100 MHz Pentium (gcc under DOS) Strong Prime Generation -- ProbTestAttempts = 5 100 primes generated in each test. Times below are: (total test time)/100 = avg. time per prime generated. Using Gordon's strong prime algorithm. 256 512 1024 Machine --- --- ---- ------- 2.8s 24.0s 5.11m Sparc II .45s 2.7s 77s 100 MHz pentium RSA Times (64 bit public exponent, message encrypted is full length) --------- 512 768 1024 bits machine --- --- --------- ------- encrypt 30ms 50ms 80ms sparc II decrypt 160ms 480ms 930ms encrypt 15ms 33ms 56ms 100 MHz Pentium (Under NT) decrypt 38ms 104ms 214ms DSA Times --------- 512 768 1024 bits machine --- --- --------- ------- sign 99ms 166ms 216ms sparc II (Brickell speedup) verify 156ms 316ms 416ms sign 21ms 38ms 49ms 100 MHz Pentium (Under NT) verify 27ms 43ms 71ms

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