December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

bulk RC4 brute forcing
by lyalc＠ozemail.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some time ago, I wrote about testing multiple plain/cipher pairs against a key as a possible speed up for brute forcing 40 bit RC4 key cracking. I have finally done something about it, written some code, and run tests which I believe gives a about 6-8 times improvement over single key/plain/cipher testing against RC4-40 encryption. Basically: A single RC4 master "key schedule" is generated. This is copied to an master array of 126 RC4_keys (126 chosen due to segment boundary probs). Then each of 126 plain/cipher (P/C) pairs are tested for a match. Acquiring the plain/cipher pairs in real life is another question. If a match is found, the pair is marked 'found', and testing continues on the remaining unfound P/C pairs. This loops until all 126 plain/cipher/keys have been tested and found. 8 plaintext, 8 cipher bytes are used. Keys are 8 bytes, the last 5 of which are variable (40 bits). Test results : A test set of data was created by incrementing a key byte, and making a P/C pair. Then all keys bytes are set to 0, and testing commenced. Typically, a 486/33 with the above in 'C' code running on DOS achieves about 15000 tests per second. One extended test ran about 480 million tests in 7.5 hours and found 68% of the keys - approx 17,700/sec, averaging 5.6 million tests per found key. My reasoning follows thus: For 126 plain/cipher pairs, with "randomly" generated keys, one valid key/plain/cipher pairs 'should' be located in 2^33 key tries (126 is approx. 2^7) 15000 tests/sec across 126 P/C pairs is about 119 keys/second tested. at 119/second, 2^33 key tests will take 835 days. This should "guarantee" a key match is found. By contrast: The "bruterc4.c" code used by this forum earlier showed approximately 2200 key tests per second on my machine. Testing 2^40 keys at 2200/sec will take 5784 days to guarantee a key match (using 2^39, 2892 days). This is a 6.9(3.46) ratio, that finds a single key match. Finding all 126 keyswould should take approximately 293 years in "bulk" mode, or 1996 years in single mode (126x5784 days). The code is available, and will be posted here is desired (it is messy). Ideally, faster key/plain/cipher testing could be accomplished if a larger array of keys could be used. The Intel segment problem has prevented me for making larger arrays - I don't know how to turn these features in my compiler (yes - I am a beginner at coding, but the "huge" directive in Borland C did not seem to work, and I don't know why - yet). Tests on 31, 63 and 126 P/C pairs showed results of 10689, 13326 and 15689 tests/sec, respectively. This indicates array size has a direct relationship with test/sec. I invite others who can better manipulate statistics, or better exeprienced, to comment, refute, or otherwise contribute to this. lyal All mistakes in this message belong to me - you should not use them!

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Re: Info on Netscape's key escrow position
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I will join the chorus of criticism: From: Jeff Weinstein <jsw(a)netscape.com>, quoting Jim Clark: > I said that if we are to use this encryption technology in business, we must > have a better solution than to limit keylength or put keys in escrow. I don't understand this. What is the better solution? No other solution seems to be discussed by Clark. Most of his message is devoted to rationalizing the inevitable changeover to key escrow, which he just dismissed as unacceptable. > All > governments of the world have a valid concern about terrorism and other > activities of concern to the security of their nations. All of them will > continue to restrict our ability to provide products to their markets unless > we build in some mechanism that allows them to legally access > information that is in the interest of their national security. This isn't true! The US government (and I believe most other Western governments, France excepted) does not presently provide any restrictions on providing products to US citizens which have strong cryptography. There are serious constitutional questions about whether it could ever do so. Clark's message seems to be based on the assumption that legal restrictions on crypto are a fait accompli. Nothing could be further from the case. What makes me mad is that his messages seems to promote an attitude which could increase the likelihood of these kinds of restrictions. If people think the battle is already lost, they will be less likely to fight. IMO this is going to be a big, knockdown fight and the eventual outcome is far from certain. > A lot of ordinary citizens are rightly concerned about their own privacy. I > am one of them. I do not want the government to snoop on me, but in fact the > government, through the FBI, can now tap my phone without my knowing it by > simply getting sufficient evidence that I am conducting illegal activities, > then presenting this evidence to a court to get permission. I have no say in > the matter. Again Clark is preaching acquiescence. We have no say in the matter. Our phones can be tapped any time the FBI wants. What is the relevance of this to the issue of network communications privacy? Doesn't this again sound like a justification for giving up the battle before it is joined? Where is his righteous indignation? Where is the recognition that the right to tap communications is not granted by God but an accident of technology, one which can be taken away by technological progress as easily as it was granted? > If we as a company were to take the position that in no case will we allow > a government to get access to our encrypted messages, or refuse to allow > key escrow with our products, the governments of the world will quickly put > us out of business by outlawing the sale of our products in their countries. False! I can open a company today in this country and take exactly that position, and the US government will NOT put me out of business. What country is Clark living in? > The fundamental issue is how do we accommodate the requirements of governments, > while protecting our rights as citizens. As I wrote in another context, when a question is framed in terms of conflicts between the rights of governments and citizens, it is based on a totally misguided premise. There are no conflicts between the rights of governments and citizens in our country. The only rights are those of citizens. The real issue is the conflict between the rights of the citizens to privacy and freedom versus their right to security and safety. I think we all know what Ben Franklin had to say about that. > None of this represents the position of Netscape with respect to what we > will do. But if we do not come up with a solution to this problem that is > acceptable to each government, we will not be able to export our products, > except with a short key length (e.g. 40 bit keys), and that will not be > acceptable to corporate customers in other countries. They will create their > own solution, and we will not be able to sell to a larger world market. In > fact, we could even be ordered by our own government to establish a key > escrow system for its use inside the US. Again Clark attempts to anticipate the advent of a totalitarian style system of controls on access to cryptography in this country. Should we really base our policies on the assumption that this will actually happen? Will the American people stand by for such an unprecedented invasion of privacy? Some governments are capable of all kinds of evil restrictions on products. Is Netscape committed to building in provisions so that their software won't access sites owned by Jews, so they can sell in Arab countries? Obviously they will draw a line somewhere. I urge them to consider the moral issues involved in endorsing Big Brother GAK systems before accepting them as just another cost of doing business. > I chair an industry group called the "Global Internet Project", with members > from almost twenty companies, including companies from Asia and Europe. This > was the central issue we all agreed upon this morning, and we are putting > together a policy statement whose purpose is to educate lawmakers on the > importance of quick resolution of this matter. I am afraid that what the companies really want is global consistency. That way they can use one set of policies for all countries, and no one company can get a competitive advantage over others by producing stronger privacy protections, because they will be forbidden by law to do so. Whether the policies protect freedom and privacy or not is not really relevant from this view. If this is the way things develop, I predict that it will not be acceptable to the general public. Netscape more than anyone has seen how much pressure can be brought through a public perception of weak software security. Our own brute force key hacks as well as the RNG seed problems have well demonstrated that. Do you think the same thing won't happen, only far worse, if the government tries to force weak software down people's throats? I understand that Jeff has stated that Netscape is actually opposed to GAK. It would have been nicer to hear that from Jim Clark, in unequivocal terms. The overall tone of his message, as I have pointed out above, is one of accommodation and compromise with government restrictions on the rights of free citizens to communicate securely. He almost seems to think that free strong crypto is already illegal. I think he needs to take a good hard look around and remember that he is still a free citizen of the United States. My guess is that he has spent too much time in the company of law enforcement people. He had better start trying to understand the grass roots members of his market if he wants to continue to succeed. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Mr. Bubble II
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Tim May, 12/3/95, 2:22 PM : >My thesis is that both Netscape and Microsoft are in positions at this time >to either do the right thing (tm) or to help build in the tools for a >police state, an Orwellian surveillance state. Gee, Tim, this is *your* thesis? >Netscape, being the dominant browser company, and Microsoft, being the >dominant OS company, are in special positions to "build in Big Brother." >I'm not claiming they are, just that they are clearly in a position to make >it technologically more feasible to make non-GAK illegal. They both need to >carefully think about the role that's been "given" to them (whether by >fortune, hard work, or being in the right place at the right time) and do >what's right. And? >Strong words, perhaps, but the implications of mandatory key escrow are Not strong at all, actually. >quite clear. We debated these points for a long time during the Clipper >debate, and later when "Software Key Escrow" began to rear its head. I >won't repeat these arguments against GAK here, but will take this >opportunity to quote from a new book that actually quotes my words: [self-congratulations deleted] >It is important that such companies as Netscape and Microsoft fully >understand that crypto policy will largely determine civil liberties in >this country and other countries for a long time to come. And they must >understand that they can influence the direction. Bill Gates, after some >early waffling, seems to now fully understand the implications of GAK and >has written persuasively against it. Jim Clark does not seem to me have >thought about it as deeply, or perhaps has views of civil liberties which >are not at odds with mandatory key escrow, the "open door policy" mentioned >above. Like many entrepreneurs, he is an opportunist in every sense, good and bad. He has yet to advance -- "graduate" maybe -- beyond that point. NS's stance re GAK is a golden opportunity for Mr. Bubble either to graduate or to get popped: either patted on the back by Papa State or popped in the noggin. When "opportunity" is at stake, he's a shrewd maneuverer; but when pitting his integrity against federal charges is at stake, he's still a kid -- he doesn't see the opportunity in it. >And time is of the essence. Things move very fast. It is no longer the case >that a law is passed, then companies respond to the new legal regime with >their own policies and products. Companies, especially in high tech, are >"partners" from the start, as we saw with the Clipper development (where >AT&T had known about Clipper for years prior to the first public >announcement, and was cooperating in the development of it, not to mention >the other companies such as Mykotronx, VLSI Technology, etc., which were >involved in secret for years). Partner, schmartner: "partners" can be adversarial, and adversarial relations can become *very* adversarial. Here's the question: is the dog gonna wag the tail or vice versa? The USG has, as we all know, demonstrated its infinite capacity to knuckle under in the face of hardened opposition, whether announced or de facto. NS is in a privileged position to drag the LEA establishment onto the mat, with the whole of the American public watching. And it stands to gain from doing so, as do we all. But Mr. Bubble wants to be friends, wants to receive genteel toasts. With the kind of money Mr. Bubble stands to make -- whether from NS or from subsequent ventures -- he should be maybe just a bit tougher. If he's looking for models, names like Carnegie and and Bismarck come to mind. (Note that their progeny *still* have money, not 2 years later but *generations* later.) >It is only sheer speculation on our part (some of us, at least) that >negotiations about GAK have been going on with the major software >companies. Jim Clark, for example, learned what he knows about key escrow >_someplace_, and it probably wasn't from our list or from articles he'd >read. I'm betting, but could of course be wrong, that he and other folks at >Netscape (and I mustn't leave out Microsoft, Sun, SGI, Apple, etc.) have >been briefed on key escrow and that various negotiations are already >underway. This would match how things were done with Clipper, and would >explain Clark's voiced support for the need for GAK. On the contrary, it is sheer speculation that negotiations about GAK *haven't* been going on. This shit doesn't happen by magic. >I hope Jeff W. and Jim C. can have some _long_ chats. The stakes are too >high for product decisions to be made without full awareness of the >implications. The statements from Jim Clark do tend to imply a kind of >defeatism, and even Jeff's comments seemed laden with qualifications about >"only if the government requires us to." As Hal Finney noted in his post, >it's as if the Netscape people are preparing for the inevitable. Maybe it's >not an indication that GAK is being considered within Netscape, but maybe >it is. After all, one rarely hears "only if we have to" qualifications on >things that are truly from out in left field. Yes. >And what Netscape agrees to put in future releases of its browsers or its >servers could have dramatic effects on the whole climate. Yes. [social darwinism deleated] >Should Netscape play ball with the NSA or refuse to cooperate? I'm not >suggesting that Netscape "break the law." Actually, there are *no* laws at >present about GAK or about the use of strong crypto within the U.S., and >most of us want to keep it that way. Thus, Jim Clark and Netscape could >strongly lobby for keeping things the way they are, and could even say "If >foreign governments demand GAK, let them build it in themselves--we will >not produce the software to run a police state." NS should implement strong crypto, make it publicly available by FTP and in a box, and see how the USG responds. The public is on its side. >And if export laws demand GAK in exported products, Netscape should "do the >right thing" and have two versions. It may add to their costs a little, but >it's better than building in the machinery for a GAK law to later be >passed. Yes. >(Explain something to me. I have never, ever understood why it is a concern >of the U.S. government that we help build in GAK for foreign governments, >that we make sure that products intended for export to France or Syria have >GAK that allows those governments to read the traffic of their citizens. >And if the concern is that exported versions of software must be readable >to the _United States_, then this is a non-starter in terms of sales in >many or even most foreign countries! I'm sure France will welcome with open >arms a version of Netscape that allows the NSA to read the traffic of >French citizens. Oh, by the way, what legal jurisdictions will be involved >in obtaining the escrowed keys of foreigners? The answers are both clear >and murky, if you catch my drift.) Because it isn't interested in freedom, here or anywhere else. It is interested in a "controlled burn" distribution of stability and instability. Its willingness to do business with its "enemies" has been amply demonstrated. But your drift is clear, and it is right. >If the U.S. insists on GAK _within the U.S._, as many of us fear is the >long-term danger, then all bets are off anyway. But I would hope that >Netscape does nothing to make it _easier_ to make this the case! On the contrary: That's when bets are on. That's when *you* -- and all of us -- might have to start putting our money and our homes in Corralitos on the line. That's when Black Unicorn will upload the papers he claims to have, when I will start wrapping PGP-encrypted mail in pretty-looking wrappers. That's when we'll have no one but ourselves to blame. Not even Netscape. >A viable thing for Netscape to do is to announce forthrightly that it will >separate the issue of export from what it sells in the U.S., that there >will be NO GAK included in any U.S.-sold packages. The quest for an "all >world" version, freely exportable, should not take precedence over the >civil liberties issues. And I predict that any slight losses in market >share or slight increases in product cost will be _less_ than the effects >Netscape will see if their product comes to be associated with "Big Brother >Inside." Yes. But NS should act first, explain second. If NS wants money, that's how to get it. >Enough for now. Yes. Hieronymous. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMMIHhr3g0mNE55u1AQFI3QH/Y32u8ASp61MPjkaeQJJly7qwQ5BuGNYx XndZMAPBVXJjOr4Mx5BieouM5GG5WgBc1fMTTRrnAJtSHQO3dgwwBQ== =WCJS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sixth Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please redistribute widely **************************************** The Sixth Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy will take place at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on March 27-30, 1996. CFP96 is hosted by MIT and by the World Wide Web Consortium. Since its inception in 1991, the series of CFP conferences has brought together experts and advocates from the fields of computer science, law, business, public policy, law enforcement, government, and many other areas to explore how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom and privacy. Registration for CFP96 will open on December 8. Conference attendance will be limited. Due to the enormous public interest in CFP issues over the past year, we encourage you to register early. SPECIAL NOTE TO STUDENTS: There are a limited number of places available at a special student rate. These will be allotted on a first-come first-served basis, so register as soon as possible. Events planned for this year's conference include: - Federal prosecutors square off against civil-liberties lawyers in a Supreme Court test of the "Cryptography Control Act of 1996", which criminalizes non-escrowed encryption. - Authors Pat Cadigan, Tom Maddox, Bruce Sterling, and Vernor Vinge divine the future of privacy. - College administrators, students, lawyers, and journalists role-play scenarios that plumb the limits of on-line expression on campus networks. - Panels on international issues in privacy and encryption; on the struggle to control controversial content on the Internet; on tensions between copyright of digital information and freedom of expression; on threats posed by electronic money to law enforcement, privacy, and freedom; on mass communication versus mass media. You can register for CFP96, starting December 8, by US Mail, by fax, or via the World Wide Web. For more information, see the CFP96 Web page at http://web.mit.edu/cfp96 or send a blank email message to cfp96-info(a)mit.edu

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a foot here, a foot there -- pretty soon your mouth is *really* full (was: Re:Netscape, Corporations, and GAK Support)
by Dave Del Torto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:36 AM 11/30/95, Timothy C. May wrote: >It's possible that Jim Clark--whose quotations I have not yet seen denied >by Netscape--is merely naive on matters of mandated key escrow. It's >possible that he hasn't given it much thought. I watched him in acquisition mode once upon a time and I rather doubt this: I imagine that he's giving this considerable thought (he has the time while counting stacks of shares on his bed every night ;), watching this space and letting the "petty officers" navigate through this reef for now. His statements so far indicate nothing more to me than that he's just playing his cards very close for now so as not to alienate anyone: this is what a captain should be expected to do when the waters are potentially this "dangerous." Why would/should he chop the Feds off at the knees until he knows exactly which way _their_ smoke blows? They're still trying to figure out what the hell we're up to, and if we can manage to stay ahead of their lumbering giants (Freeh, et alia), it'll pretty much stay that way for a long time. Anyway, no policy statements coming from Netscape NOW can be a reliable indicator of where they're going to be -- even in a year -- on crypto policy or on the internal development. All we're seeing for the forseeable future is trial balloons and other strategic positioning. I bet Jim's read the Book of Five Rings... > It's also possible that he >sincerely is supportive of plans for Big Brother to have an "escrowed" copy >of our conversations, diaries, travel plans, etc. Jim may "appear" a tad "hawkish," but he's no dope. Look, a 70% share, even with momentum behind it, can slim down mighty fast with bad choices and lots of fast dogs at his heels and he knows it. Let me put it this way: "the higher they sell, the faster they drop." Tim, you're absolutely right that speaking out NOW (and directly at him) is the surest way for him and others to have data on which to base their future decisions. If there are other solutions for modules Netscape intends to provide (like...NS2.0's Mail module + GAK vs a c-neutral Eudora with an optional MOSS translation plug-in), then he'll lose market share proportional to how much we scream about it in public (I'm doing daily vocal exercises, just in case ;). If he makes enough bad choices, like throwing his full weight behind GAK and other atrocities, he'll end up like DigiCash *would* if they kept/keep the bank protocol hidden. I just refuse to believe he hates his work that much. At the worst, I see a special "gaak" version for the Feds, but I sure as hell wouldn't buy it (and I bought my copy of Netscape). It would be nice to hear from him here directly, though. One can only tolerate so much pussyfooting around before one becomes snippy. dave ________________________________________________________________ "I prefer a _real_ whorehouse to The Theatre." --Dorothy Parker

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Re: Jim Clark, "Mr. Bubble"
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alex Strasheim: > > 1 Make illegal software available by FTP > > 2 Explain it's doing so because ITAR is bullshit > > 3 Face the gov't down in the press and in the courts > > Go for it. We're behind you 100%. If I were worth billions, if I were the sparkle on the high-tech bubble, if I had a Major hand in engineering crucial protocols, if my company were so young that it hadn't yet had time to bog down in business as usual, I think I probably would. That's a lot of Big talk and a lot of Ifs, ain't it? But that's how it goes: I doubt he -- or anyone else -- would give as much to my LDF as I gave to his (chump change, but more than I could afford). Clark should ask himself what Rabbi Akiva put best: If not me, who? If not now, when? I do my small part, in my small way; he can do his big part, in his big way. One thing scares the spooks more than what they oppose: publicity. Hieronymous -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBVAwUBMMINNr3g0mNE55u1AQFnDgH/UJgFGAW9njKTnm7FgJHMQa1J8VONag0v 5JupJbYMISWYHMZ0KbC8ts6GV9jqD7xYg9dWEHhWbFg3SHJ0CFVt6w== =Zza/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FW: websurfer 4.6 (fwd)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:56 AM 12/2/95 -0500, Michael Froomkin wrote: >so much for compatibility....guess I'm sticking with netscape for now. Websurfer is intolerably buggy. The latest Mosaic seems pretty good to me. > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: your mail
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 11:32 PM 12/2/95 -0800, sameer wrote: > I hate to repeat myself, but sometimes people don't listen. >http://www.c2.org/apachessl/ > This Web page fails to explain what Apache-SSL actually is, what it is good for, and why people should use it. Looks like the page was constructed by the same marketing experts as Central Point Software employed before it went under. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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ANNOUNCEMENT: ALICE'S ADDRESS REVEALED.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As I promised, I've now opened a channel so that anyone who wants to can send Alice de 'nonymous email. I can now be reached via an455120(a)anon.penet.fi. Mail sent to Alice de 'nonymous at that address will get to me, and I will do my best to reply to you as well, but I can't guarantee, anything. And before I get attacked for wasting bandwidth, I've got a deal to make it all worthwhile. A temporary break from GAK talk ... a pointer to a truly HOT website. Here's just a small sample of what you'll find there: :| ELIMINATING LIMBO :| :| "So the pope eliminated Limbo, did you hear?" she says :| "What?" :| "You know the pope, right, well he eliminated Limbo..." :| "When?" :| "I don't know, a while ago." :| "Well that means we're fucked..." :| "You got it." :| "What's Limbo for?"asks Jessica :| "That's where all the people that were around before they had the :| chance to get the word of christ get to go...and unbaptized babies :| that die early..." :| :| "It's not as good as Heaven, but it beats the hell out of the other :| options." :| "How can he just eliminate it like that?" :| "Cause he's the pope..." Check all of this out and MORE at the SCARED SACRED site. You'll be able to read the pope's "LETTER TO ALL THE WOMEN OF THE WORLD". :| "What he wrote a letter to all the women of the world? Man, his direct :| mail expenses must be huge!" :| "Yeah the people in the Vatican are just freaking out..." But you have to be running NETSCAPE. (1.1....NOT 2.0....OR IT JUST WON'T WORK...) Point your Navigators to http://www.banffcentre.ab.ca/ and then choose the --> Media & Visual Arts Page <-- and then from there the --> Artists Web, <-- and then just look for --> VELCRO RIPPER. <-- BE CAREFUL THOUGH IF YOU ARE PRONE TO EPILEPTIC ATTACKS!!!! IF YOU ARE, CHOOSE THE DIRECT ENTRANCE AND ENTER THERE!! YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED!!! Alice de 'nonymous ... <an455120(a)anon.penet.fi> ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: Do the Right Thing
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:22 PM 12/3/95 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Netscape, being the dominant browser company, and Microsoft, being the >dominant OS company, are in special positions to "build in Big Brother." Bill Gates, after some ducking, weaving, and equivocating, has said that GAK is a violation of our right to privacy. Jim Clark has said that GAK is the government benevolently protecting our privacy. I hope to see a "clarification" of Clark's position soon, and I am far from happy with the "clarification" provided by Jeff. > Netscape is becoming the yellow corn of the Web, and an obvious > "choke point" for the NSA and its sisters to mandate crypto policies. > Hence, the role of non-yellow-corn alternatives...) I recommend Mosaic, much improved in its latest release, and, unlike Netscape, standards compliant. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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