December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: spooky URL
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nothing spooky about it. They are an audit-sevice for web pages that is sponsored. Anytime you access a page this tell them you were accessed. Love Always, Carol Anne ps. you can get an acct. there if you want it. > >while visiting http://www.mcs.com/~candyman/http/boom.html, I noticed that my Netscape's status line mentions an attempt to connect to: > >g1.internet-audit.com > >a little spooky... any ideas what is happening?? > > >I prefer e-mail. >reply (anonymously) to an197098(a)anon.penet.fi >reply (NON-anonymously) to na197098(a)anon.penet.fi > > > > > > > > >--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--****ATTENTION****--***ATTENTION*** >Your e-mail reply to this message WILL be *automatically* ANONYMIZED. >Please, report inappropriate use to abuse(a)anon.penet.fi >For information (incl. non-anon reply) write to help(a)anon.penet.fi >If you have any problems, address them to admin(a)anon.penet.fi > > -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Register
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Mar 95 at 22:46, Robert East wrote: > Register > > I'd like to sign up for email > > Bob You got it, Bub! Er, Bob.

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ETH_ic?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-27-95. NYPaper: "An Intel computer security expert runs afoul of the law. So much for the 'hacker ethic'?" Regardless of whether one sees Randal Schwartz as a white knight with questionable judgment or a computer criminal who deserves jail time, his tale contains valuable lessons for anyone who uses or manages a corporate computer system. On the Internet, computer programmers and systems administrators have debated whether Mr. Schwartz was a hero or a criminal. The on-line jury is divided. Most concluded that he was guilty of poor judgment, not criminal intent. Some say the case has killed the hacker ethic. "If I saw someone on the Internet with a security weakness, at this point I would be reluctant to act the Good Samaritan and report it," said Jeffrey Kegler, an independent software consultant in Sunnyvale Calif. "If I saw weakness in Intel's machine, I'd keep it to myself." ETH_ic? (7 kb)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reorder"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (robo syrinx c2) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Last update: Mon 27 Nov 95 6:46:42 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hroller hroller(a)c2.org +*#####---## 46:11 99.99% robo robo(a)c2.org + ####--*## 39:57 99.75% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com *+ 39:12 99.66% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com -- ---_.--. 6:36:54 99.37% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl +* **** *** 8:47 98.47% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*. *** *** 6:20 98.31% c2 remail(a)c2.org + ++++- +** 1:12:49 97.94% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org +* .-- # ### 46:27 97.81% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +* ** *** 17:41 97.50% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++ +++ +++ 39:47 97.23% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com +*#*# # *## :28 96.79% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ** *** *** 28:42 96.76% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu + * +* 3:02 96.68% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * *** ** 13:11 96.44% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * *** * * 8:55 95.93% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ------- -- 5:04:15 95.47% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---- -- -+ 6:23:22 95.06% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -- - -_ .- 11:42:46 95.01% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu * ## # # :29 90.69% rahul homer(a)rahul.net +* +** +*- 21:04 98.77% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net + +*+ 24:54 85.54% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de * +++ ++ 6:56:02 80.39% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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EXH_ume
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-27-95. NYPaper, Lead story: "U.S. Will Deploy Its Spy Satellites on Nature Mission. A Huge Environmental Study Gives a New Lease on Life to Intelligence Systems." The new program is directing spy satellites to study about 500 ecologically sensitive sites around the world. The data will be archived for future generations of scientists and will remain secret for now to conceal the abilities of the nation's reconnaissance systems. The monitoring effort is led by Medea, an avaricious group of about 60 scientists in academia and industry who advise the nation's intel clubhouses on the use of secret data to "study" the environment. The new reconnaissance effort is run for Medea by agony aunt NRO and is coordinated by dead-baby CIA. The program is very different from the related effort to mine old spy-satellite photos for environmental data, a wallet-rip the Clinton Administration recently began. So too, the program is different from recent intelligence gathering that studies natural phenomena for clues to ingenious tax milking. The Federation of American Scientists said the environmental reconnaissance was "potentially a watershed in the reform of intelligence," adding, "It reflects an expanding teat of national insecurity." EXH_ume (11 kb)

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Re: Virus attacks on PGP
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:40 11/26/95 -0800, Thomas E Zerucha wrote: >That woudl be interesting - even with the speaker "off" the power surge >causes clicking and other signs. Not to mention that the interrupt count >would start moving (of course the virus could replace the entire OS and >would only have to find 300K chunks to hide in). I looked at the memory usage on my 1meg Mac and 5meg is used for the system. I have no idea what it is all being used for. A lot can hide there. Bill Frantz

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[NOISE] Chi Sun Times SS# Sweepstakes
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Chicago Sun-Times is running a contest in which readers are asked to send in their social security numbers. Someone will win a cash prize after a random drawing. I can't figure out the angle on this. If they simply want to run a promotional contest, why are they asking for ssn's? If there's an ulterior motive, what is it? Are they going to sell the list? Would they have a use for it themselves? The frustrating thing is that there are probably many millions of Americans who will give away the keys to the store for next to nothing. The feds probably made a tactical error: instead of trying to force mandatory key escrow down our throats, they ought to have offered everyone who is willing to submit to voluntary escrow a chance to win a Chrysler Minivan. -- Alex Strasheim, alex(a)proust.suba.com

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Re: Elliptic curves, current status?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:48 PM 11/26/95, Wei Dai wrote: .... >The IEEE p1363 group's working draft on elliptic curve standard may help >you here. You can find it at ftp://ftp.rsa.com/pub/p1363/draft/ec.ps > >One reason for confusion about the speed of elliptic curve cryptosystems is >the small number of implementations. A paper in Crypto 95 claimed that >for doing key exchange, an elliptic curve algorithm takes about the same >time and has about the same level of security as DH with 512 bit modulus, >and that elliptic curve has a speed advantage if greater security is >desired. > >Wei Dai Thanks much! I will look at the paper.

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New Mixmaster
by John Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Lance's new Mixmaster 2.0.3 is also available on vishnu.alias.net via the normal methods. John Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)alpha.jpunix.com - PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Packet Radio - KG5RG(a)WA4IMZ.#SETX.TX.USA.NA WWW - http://www.jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMLo5iaghiWHnUu4JAQGTogf/XdW+U3MPg668h7oofd2IYkP4dQNv8m3r TUTKnmUuQP6JqJV2Y2QC9oF2A6VobNC7Q1EP3s6xbMIP8a20hMsvvJbWYRDfIBWH ydTBGMk8JZvDXHVlok5eVD99Krrl51pQskWjxBuZKJMTZSTL7TmJYxX+JHWFViAh qPOVOImZfyKlInra36EHO1M7bptMjc0pwEQQ6tOrnPbBzlUYLm/xWtWXyvXjH7QJ WxAiLHTS55Y3UMhTBoqMtOViWXOaW8nY14mzEnN2B2byoXMiSsDWGhpr0wWDJ5CC oYWQWZPyHB0H6T5MWNT95/GO7wxfxj3+nx1MyPKcjg8efShwWEOVfg== =d6hk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Cypherpunk Certification Authority (fwd)
by Rev. Ben 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sun, 26 Nov 1995, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >Is this another one of those LD tentacles? ;) > > Must that or a spoof of somekind... "She" didn't sign it, and "she" claims > to have issued a signature... Methinks some of us need to read up on undeniable interactive signature systems. Ben. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Auto-signed with Bryce's Auto-PGP v1.0beta3 iQB1AwUBMLn/J75ALmeTVXAJAQGL5QL9HE+t0zKGVni03w4DvV2W1lj1807eaNRp xD4IJcEUJ+JVk4lUJQ+zNvOf81FMPG+0QNq9tqOEDNqiG9vemD7B8C7et5PH0pFb ktOeAw5WywsnwSeRleId1ukBktDdZR4v =QueN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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