December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Israeli authorities censor book, confiscate copies (fwd)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 17:20:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Israeli authorities censor book, confiscate copies [Shame on the Israeli government. I suspect this would be an interesting case for web-based mirroring. --Declan] --- TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) - A Tel Aviv court on Thursday temporarily banned the sale of a book about a missing Israeli submarine after state prosecutors claimed it endangered national security. Hundreds of copies of the book were ordered off bookstore shelves. Author Michael Eldar said police searched his house and confiscated several copies of the book as well as other documents. [...] The case is unusual because the manuscript had been approved, as required of all security-related material, by Israel's military censor. [...] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 11:49:20 0200 From: "Eviather H. Ben-Zedeff" <evi(a)research.haifa.ac.il> To: declan(a)well.com Subject: Israeli authorities endangering freedom of the press hi, I am a journalism teacher and an editor in Israel. A friend of mine, Captain Mike Eldar, Israeli Navy (Ret) asked me 18 months ago to edit an autobiography and a book he wrote. During 1997, both books were published and suppressed by the Israeli military. Please, help us to fight brutal censorship in Israel. Support freedom even in this remote part of the Middle East. Eviathar H. Ben-Zedeff Department of Communication Haifa University Mt Carmel, Haifa, Israel <evi(a)research.haifa.ac.il>

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Re: Are there enough FBI agents to handle Digital Telephony?????
by ethridge＠Onramp.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In addition to the large quantity they want, they also want to be able to deliver the conversation from a mobile suspect to mobile agents who are following the suspect. So even if you use a digital set with "voice privacy" activated that government car behind you might still be listening to you. The FBI's "requirements" present an entertaining set of logistical problems. Simply equipping the switches to handle the extra capacity, especially during busy hour, is problematic. allen

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Re: Java & Netscape security [NOISE]
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 21 Nov 1995, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: > Hmm... If it looks remotely like marketing, it'd better carry the usual > disclaimers that past returns are no indication of future returns etc. :) > > >In the first case, the poster is not commenting about anything to do with > >their work, -- it really is just one man's opinion -- while in the second > >they are actually commenting upon something their employer is selling. What I'm trying to say is that if someome posts from watson.ibm.com, and IF they are talking about OS/2, we will not accept that they are not speaking independantly of the knowledge they have garnered from watson. It just doesn't work that way. In the same way, someone who writes from Netscape.com or AT&T, or Sun and tries to disclaim that they are speaking for the company, when they step out as an employee of a company is deluding themselves. When in the press have you seen a reporter claim as a source, an "unnamed Senator"? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E. P.P.S. I just sent email to Steve Bellovin from AT&T. I thought I'd settle the question once and for all, as to whether he IS reading this mailing list or not.

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Subscription sites for CDR...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 11:44:24 -0700 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: New Computer Security Act > (Toad.com address changed to algebra.com. Hugh Daniel confirmed to me that > about 130 subscribers are still using the toad.com address. And he > confirmed that none of them are getting the traffic sent to the "real" > Cypherpunks lists, those at algebra.com, cyberpass.net, and ssz.com. I > again urge folks to get with the program. Toad.com is going to vanish > someday, at least as any kind of distribution site for CP traffic.) There is also cypherpunks-e(a)htp.org now... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks.
by ahupp＠primenet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Tue, 21 Nov 1995 02:10:02 +0100 >From: Tatu Ylonen <ylo(a)cs.hut.fi> >To: ahupp(a)primenet.com >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Subject: Re: NSA, ITAR, NCSA and plug-in hooks. > >> PKZIP allows encryption (other's ?). How about a hook to that? > >PKZIP "encryption" is self-deception. A program for cracking it, >PKCRACK, is widely available on the internet. See e.g. >ftp.funet.fi:/pub/crypt/analysis. > >[For information about internationally available cryptographic >software, see http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto.] > > Tatu Ylonen <ylo(a)cs.hut.fi> PKCRACK uses a dictionary attack. Anyway, my point was that you could use PKZIP's encryption as an excuse for passing a password.

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towards a theory of reputation
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Many of the topics discussed on this list are economic in nature. Unfortunately cypherpunks haven't attracted the attention of professional economists who might be willing to apply their analytic tools to these issues. Reputation is one of these issues that is especially important. I'm not an economist, so I hope these ramblings do not discourage real economists from tackling reputation as a serious research project. The first step toward a theory of reputation is defining what reputation is. The definition should correspond closely enough to our common sense notion of reputation so that our intuitions about it are not completely useless. I think a good definition is this: Alice's reputation of Bob is her expectation of the results of future interactions with Bob. If these interactions are mainly economic in nature, then we can represent Alice's reputation of Bob by a graph with the horizontal axis labeled price and the vertical axis labeled expected utility. A point (x,y) on the graph means that Alice expects to get y utils in a business transaction where she pays Bob x dollars. Given this definition, it is natural to say the Bob's reputation is the set of all other people's reputations of Bob. A reputation system consists of a set of entities, each of whom has a reputation and a method by which he changes his reputation of others. I believe the most important question for a theory of reputation to answer is what is a good method (reputation algorithm) by which a person changes his reputation of others. A good reputation algorithm must serve his self-interest; it must not be (too) costly to evaluate; its results must be stable; a reputation system where most people use the algorithm must be stable (i.e., the reputation system must be an evolutionarily stable system). In a reputation based market, each entity's reputation has three values. First is the present value of expected future profits, given the reputation (let's call it the operating value). Note that the entity's reputation allows him to make positive economic profits, because it makes him a price-maker to some extent. Second is the profit he could make if he threw away his reputation by cheating all of his customers (throw-away value). Third is the expected cost of recreating an equivalent reputation if he threw away his current one (replacement cost). Now it is clear that if a reputation's throw-away value ever exceeds its operating value or replacement cost, its owner will, in self-interest, throw away his reputation by cheating his customers. In a stable reputation system, this should happen very infrequently. This property may be difficult to achieve, however, because only the reputation's owner knows what its values are, and they may fluctuate widely. For example the operating value may suddenly decrease when his competitor announces a major price cut, or the replacement cost may suddenly decrease when he succeeds subverting a respected reputation agency. One way to answer some of these questions may be to create a model of a reputation system with a simple reputation algorithm and a simplified market, and determine by analysis or simulation whether it has the desirable properties. I hope someone who has an economist friend can persuade him to do this. Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLI9Ujl0sXKgdnV5AQECCQQAiHq+s3PfsEOJmk0ng9aETQwHVe5EvrA0 +0wimcO2IGf+Bix8J/bLtAlW2eEcXM90pMvBgv+Q4jTkvI5RvGyuMf5cvOgj6rTz wj9aCqoltjHm/l1dfoWWCn4VSIU8OAJ6wKN/HRANQ5B56TPOgEkS2EDSM2C3w4m9 BgwcG5rBeA8= =taTA -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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On crypto -- "The Grand Compromise is Coming"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim wasn't entirely correct in June. McKain-Kerrey isn't the most extreme, reprehensible bill: That honor goes to the Oxley amendment and the SAFE version that Intelligence approved. (They would ban the manufacture, distribution of non-backdoored crypto.) This is the danger of entrusting our civil liberties to legislatures, which are inherently anti-civil libertarian. No new legislation is better than bad new legislation. Something close to McCain-Kerrey could well emerge as the "Grand Compromise." -Declan ------- Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 20:52:55 -0400 To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Subject: FC: On crypto -- "The Grand Compromise is Coming" [A House international relations subcommittee this afternoon approved Rep. Goodlatte's SAFE bill by a 14-1 vote, with some amendments. Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.) voted against it on "national security" grounds. Details to follow. --Declan] ***************** Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 12:33:38 -0700 To: cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: The Grand Compromise is Coming At 11:43 AM -0700 6/24/97, Declan McCullagh wrote: >Yeah, I'm going to the markup later this afternoon. I ran into Goodlatte in >the Capitol this morning; he seemed cautiously optimistic. > The terrible, terrible S.909 McCain-Kerrey bill is probably a negotiating card in the coming Grand Compromise. When even editorial writers for the Establishment Papers are against it, when industry is against it so vocally, it won't pass the full Congress. But it will have served its purpose. It will make many groups _satisfied_ to reach "a compromise we can all live with." The various cyber-rights [sic] groups will probably trumpet this as a victory, as "the best we could get." Somewhere between SAFE, a bad bill, and McCain-Kerrey, a reprehensible bill, lies the Grand Compromise. I reject it all. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." ***************** From: Eric Murray <ericm(a)lne.com> Subject: Re: The Grand Compromise is Coming To: tcmay(a)got.net Date: Tue, 24 Jun 1997 14:02:11 -0700 (PDT) Cc: cypherpunks(a)Algebra.COM Tim May writes: > > The terrible, terrible S.909 McCain-Kerrey bill is probably a negotiating > card in the coming Grand Compromise. Yes. The tactic will be to use S.909 in negotiation to represent a 'fair' government-oriented solution. Then 'compromise' with a 'balanced' deal which includes all that the government really wants, with a few of the more onerous bits taken out of S.909 as 'compromise'. As Declan notes, Congress is driven to compromise. The government side can propose ever more draconian laws in order to engineer the 'compromise' to whatever it wants. On the other side, we are stuck, because we have been asking for things that we really want, not bargaining chips. Even if we were to ask for bargaining chips that are more than we really want, how much further than completely free crypto can you go? The government wins any game of compromise because it can push its side as far as it wants, then demand that we meet halfway. > It will make many groups _satisfied_ to reach "a compromise we can all live > with." The various cyber-rights [sic] groups will probably trumpet this as > a victory, as "the best we could get." They will make it out as a victory ("send us more money") but in reality it'll just be a little less of a defeat. The rejectionist stance has the presumption that, if unwatched, the government will pass a law so onerous that the people will rise up in protest. Unfortunately I don't think Americans will rise up in protest over _anything_ any more. Certainly not over basic freedoms. -- Eric Murray ericm(a)lne.com Network security and encryption consulting. PGP keyid:E03F65E5

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"The Right To Privacy" by Caroline Kennedy, et. al.
by Erik E. Fair 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In an EPIC Alert on 10:46 10/23/95, Dave Banisar wrote: >"The Right to Privacy," November 9. Authors Caroline Kennedy and Ellen >Alderman discuss their new book on privacy. Lizner Auditorium, George >Washington University, Washington, DC. Contact 202/357-3030. Did anyone here go to this event, or has read the book yet? There is a review of it in TIME magazine at this URL: http://pathfinder.com/@@iEPVLuF5EgMAQChZ/time/magazine/domestic/1995/951106/ publishing.html thanks, Erik Fair

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Re: ALERT: On Monday, call Congress to stop Big Brother amendment!
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan McCullagh wrote, citing an industry lobbyist: >The answer: "I don't think compromise is the right word. But we need to >give something to law enforcement." ...................................................... They could be given the idea that it would be of practical use to us Citizen-Units if they would help us to help ourselves. Of course, they want to be the knights who slay the fire-eating dragons, who consummate all the power and the glory, amen.

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Re: Virus attacks on PGP
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:34 11/21/95 -0500, SINCLAIR DOUGLAS N wrote: >> Certainly having PGP run from a CDROM or other read-only device would be a >> big help. Even better would be to have all the privileged code also run >> from a read-only device. > >Seeing as PGP is quite small the simplest and cheapest read-only device >would be a write-protected floppy disk. But do remember that your copy of PGP could be infected as it is loaded from the disk. You really need to protect your privileged code too. Bill

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