December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Junk E-Mail - Part 3
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, An 11 21 95 Reuter Information Service newsstory, headed Computer illiterates offered new way onto Internet [OR: Junk mail wants to meet computer illiterate for safe sale] reports: Matsushita Electric Industrial Co said on Tuesday it had developed a way of accessing the Internet using the fam- iliar telephone and fax machine.... With the Matsushita system, users can obtain an index via a facsimile machine and choose Internet subjects they are interested in by keying in numbers on their tele- phones.... The telephone and fax are connected to server comput- ers.... Information coming back arrives as ordinary sound over the telephone handset or as printed text off the facsimile. AT&T was offering an index of newsstories in a series of ads in the Wall Street Journal a couple of years ago. You faxed the code numbers of the stories you wanted to read to AT&T; and AT&T faxed back the stories. FIRST RULE OF JUNK MAIL If you can sell it to the elite, you can sell it to the masses. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The NandO News website URL is: http://www.nando.net The newsstory's dateline: TOKYO (Nov 21, 1995 - 08:18 EST) Its online filename: info735_8.html

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ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update -- 11/22/95
by ACLUNATL＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------------------------------------------------------------- November 22, 1995 ACLU CYBER-LIBERTIES UPDATE A bi-weekly e-zine on cyber-liberties cases and controversies at the state and federal level. ---------------------------------------------------------------- IN THIS ISSUE: * New York Civil Liberties Union Opposes Discipline of Cornell Students for Offensive Online Speech * Seattle Negotiates New Franchise Agreement with Cable Network to Offer Internet Access; ACLU of Washington Gives Testimony on Privacy Implications * Watch Out for Cyber-Liberties Infringements in Counter-Terrorism Legislation; House May Consider Bill in Early December * Update and ACTION ALERT on Federal Online Indecency Legislation * Online Discussion Groups on Electronic Access Issues ---------------------------------------------------------------- STATE PAGE (Legislation/Agency/Court Cases) ---------------------------------------------------------------- * New York Civil Liberties Union Opposes Discipline of Cornell Students for Offensive Online Speech The latest controversy over appropriate use of the Internet at universities erupted last week after four Cornell students made a list of "75 reasons why women should not have freedom of speech" and the list got loose on the Internet. Responding to e-mail and phone complaints about the message, Cornell considered disciplinary action against the students. The NYCLU wrote a letter to Cornell on Thursday, November 16th, urging Cornell not to proceed with disciplinary action. The letter said, "Freedom of expression, especially in the academic forum, is designed to encourage truth-seeking by protecting the challenge and response of intellectual discourse. . . . It is understandable that university officials should be concerned about the increase in the use of sexist language. . . . However, no matter how troubling or offensive the message is, the administration of Cornell University should not depart from principles of freedom of expression when addressing the issues surrounding this dispute." The letter went on to note that "the marketplace theory of free expression appears to be in full swing as the wrong-minded e-mail message has apparently already provoked thousands of angry messages' both to Cornell and to the particular four students." On Thursday afternoon, Cornell announced that it would not pursue any disciplinary action against the students. For a copy of the letter that NYCLU sent to Cornell, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "NYCLU Letter to Cornell" in the subject line. For more information, contact Beth Haroules, Staff Attorney, NYCLU, at 212-382-0557. ---------------------------------------------------------------- * Seattle Negotiates New Franchise Agreement with Cable Network to Offer Internet Access; ACLU of Washington Testifies at Hearing on Privacy Implications Cities across the country are beginning to renegotiate franchise agreements with cable networks who want to get into the Internet access business. Civil libertarians must work to ensure that strong privacy protections are included in these agreements. The City of Seattle is currently negotiating a new franchise agreement with TCI of Seattle, Inc., and the ACLU of Washington urged the city to include provisions to protect consumer privacy. In a letter dated November 9th, ACLU-W said that "franchisees should be prohibited from collecting any data on individual use of the cable network, including Internet access, except that data minimally needed for billing purposes. . . . [T]he franchisee should be precluded from collecting information about which other Internet sites are accessed through the cable network, which newsgroups are read, which real-time interactive forums are participated in, or any other information that could be used to compile a data profile of the subscriber." The letter also urged the city to require technological protections, like encryption, to guard against unauthorized tapping. For a copy of the letter, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "cable franchise agreement" in the subject line. For more information, contact Doug Klunder, ACLU-W Information Technology Committee, dougk(a)eskimo.com. ---------------------------------------------------------------- FEDERAL PAGE (Congress/Agency/Court Cases) ---------------------------------------------------------------- * Watch Out for Cyber-Liberties Infringements in Counter-Terrorism Legislation; House May Consider Bill in Early December The House of Representatives is scheduled to debate a broad counter-terrorism bill in early December. (The Senate passed a similar bill in June 1995.) While the counter-terrorism bill contains many unconstitutional provisions, the net community should be particularly alert to the following: 1. The pending House counter-terrorism bill contains a funding mechanism for vastly expanded wiretap capabilities for federal law enforcement (authorized by the Digital Telephony law passed by Congress last year). The FBI's scheme would give government an unprecedented ability to intrude on privacy through increased wiretaps. The net community should oppose this and any other funding scheme for the FBI's wiretap proposal. (See our 11/8 issue of the Cyber-Liberties Update for an ACLU statement and action alert on the federal wiretap proposal.) 2. The version of counter-terrorism legislation already passed by the Senate contains a revised Feinstein Amendment, which makes it a felony "to distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in part, the manufacture of explosive materials, if the person intends, or knows that such explosive materials or information will likely be used for" criminal purposes. While the legislation applies to all media, it grew out of Senator Feinstein's vilification of the Internet at the Senate's May 11th counter-terrorism hearings. The House version of counter-terrorism legislation does not currently contain language like the Feinstein Amendment, but the online community should stand ready to oppose any effort to include such unconstitutional provisions in the final House bill. For a copy of the ACLU's letter to the Senate in opposition to the original Feinstein Amendment, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "Feinstein Amendment" in the subject line. For further information on the ACLU's opposition to counter-terrorism legislation (which would also expand the FBI's powers in electronic surveillance and other areas), visit the ACLU's Constitution Hall on America Online, at keyword ACLU. ---------------------------------------------------------------- * Update and ACTION ALERT on Federal Online Indecency Legislation The Conference Committee on the telecommunications bill is currently considering whether to remove provisions that would make "indecency" and other speech a crime in cyberspace. The Christian Coalition and other anti-free-speech groups continue to heavily lobby the Conferees to make the new speech crimes even stricter than the Exon Amendment. To counter this backlash, the online community must overwhelm the Conference Committee with a loud and clear message -- that parental empowerment tools and not big government censorship are the only effective means to address children's access to online content. While the Conference Committee is home for Thanksgiving, we urge you to call the Conferees in your state. To find a list of the home office phone numbers for the Conferees, see the current ACTION ALERT at http://www.vtw.org/ The ACLU continues to prepare for a constitutional challenge to the online censorship provisions if they become law. Please contact Ann Beeson, beeson(a)aclu.org, if your organization is interested in being a plaintiff in this ground-breaking litigation that will define First Amendment rights in cyberspace. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Online Discussion Groups on Electronic Access Issues ---------------------------------------------------------------- The following discussion groups are actively debating government information and access issues: GOVPUB -- issues related to publishing local and state government information online Subscribe: listserv(a)vm1.nodak.edu Message: subscribe govpub GOVACCESS -- citizen access to government information Subscribe: majordomo(a)well.dom Message: subscribe govaccess PUBPOL-D -- substantive discussion of public policy issues Subscribe: listserv(a)vm1.spcs.umn.edu Message: subscribe pubpol-d [your name] COMMUNET -- issues related to community and civic networks Subscribe: listserv(a)uvmvm.uvm.edu Message: subscribe communet [your name] ---------------------------------------------------------------- ONLINE RESOURCES FROM THE ACLU NATIONAL OFFICE ---------------------------------------------------------------- Stay tuned for news on the ACLU's world wide web site, under construction at http://www.aclu.org. America Online users should check out our live chats, auditorium events, *very* active message boards, and complete news on civil liberties, at keyword ACLU. ---------------------------------------------------------------- ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update Editor: Ann Beeson (beeson(a)aclu.org) American Civil Liberties Union National Office 132 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 To subscribe to the ACLU Cyber-Liberties Update, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "subscribe Cyber-Liberties Update" in the subject line of your message. To terminate your subscription, send a message to infoaclu(a)aclu.org with "unsubscribe Cyber-Liberties Update" in the subject line. For general information about the ACLU, write to infoaclu(a)aclu.org. ----------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: "The Right To Privacy" by Caroline Kennedy, et. al.
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've heard a couple of media interviews (CNBC Equal Time, and NPR Talk of the Nation). It sounds like a good collection of issues and scare stories. Experienced people on this list might learn a few things to round out the overall picture, but it's probably best for the general public. I hope it does real well.

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Pedophiles use encoding devices to make secret use of Internet
by Weld Pond 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Story in Nando Times http://www2.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/info/info429_4.html Weld Pond - weld(a)l0pht.com - http://www.l0pht.com/ L 0 p h t H e a v y I n d u s t r i e s Technical archives for the people - Bio/Electro/Crypto/Radio

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Re: Are there enough FBI agents to handle Digital Telephony?????
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:05 PM 11/21/95, Peter Wayner wrote: >Has anyone ever done the math on the FBI's new wire tapping >proposals and determined whether they'll have enough agents to >do all of the listening? Doesn't a court ordered wire tap >require that people listen in and screen the recordings. Does >this have to be in real time? I can't remember, but I think >there is a fairly onerous evidentiary chain required to use this >technology. ... The manpower shortage can be solved by moving the listening step offshore, perhaps to one of the Carribbean islands that processes credit card slips. Even cheaper would be to subcontract out the listening to the relatively impoverished, but well-educated and English-trained, former Soviet bloc nations. For example, Romania or Bulgaria, or even Russia. They may still have the old listening infrastructure in place, although I hear that Stasi headquarters in the former DDR is now an acupuncture clinic. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Bitbux could eliminate some domestic currencies?
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Mon, 13 Nov 1995 17:35:39 -0500 From: Dave Farber <farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu> Subject: IP: cybercash! Holy Mackeral, Andy! To: interesting-people(a)eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) >From a letter in [My dog, I mean my software, ate this part of the msg -- gnu] "Sir, Prof Alec Chrystal ... argues that because cash is unimportant, its replacement by smart cards will have little impact. However, cash is virtually the only kind of money issued by government (in the UK, more than 99 per cent). If a government cannot issue cash because e-money facilitates the use of another country's currency for domestic transactions, it will lose virtually all its seignorage. The government will have to issue some =A323 billion extra gilts and then pay about =A32 billion every year in= extra interest. "Moreover, cash circulates much more quickly than bank deposits (it has a high velocity-adjusted weight). Cash was used for almost 15 billion retail transactions in the UK in 1993, versus 4 billion for all other methods. So the currency in which retail transactions is priced is in practice determined by the denomination of cash. E-money would threaten this dominance, allowing people to stop using domestic currency completely (other than for paying taxes). "The importance of e-money replacing cash is greater than possible effects on exchange rates. Rather, it might make certain currencies to all intents and purposes disappear." Giles Keating head of global economics CS First Boston London, UK

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Re: ecash protocol: Part 1
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From what I gathered from Doug's posts a little while back, the _client_ >stuff is perfectly fine; only the _bank_ stuff is Chaum-patented. > This is exactly backwards. Also, it is entirely possible that they have structured the protocol to make sure that both sides have to practice some element of Digicash intellectual property. What I said was "it is possible to create an anonymous digital cash system where the bank does not infringe and the client can optionally infringe or not infringe (sacrificing anonymity)." (See: http://www.communities.com/paper/agnostic.html)

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Re: crypto for porno users
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> a) "no one on the net knows you're a dog" implies that police can > pose as a fellow porn producer or consumer and get away with it > more easily. > > b) strong crypto for communications between porn users encourages > them to speak more freely. When one of the two is a police officer > in disguise, that encourages the other (the suspect) to reveal more, > making the investigation proceed more quickly. Knowing that the > crypto is strong enough to keep government eavesdroppers out, the > sender is given a false sense of security -- is distracted from > thinking about the trustworthiness of the receiver while thinking > about the security of the channel itself. A common way to get around prostitution sting operations is to ask the lady to expose sensitive portions of her anatomy to prove her sincerity before the would-be customer commits to any transactions; this sort of thing is also becoming commonplace on the net for pornography or pirated software, too. Would-be trafficers often ask a prospective recipient for a small chunk of fresh files in advance, before passing back anything serious .. partially out of suspicion, mostly out of greed, but to the same end. A law enforcement team would be stepping onto shaky ground if they were forced to transfer illegal images/etc to a suspected trafficer before getting evidence from him. Entrapment is an ugly concept. >3. Encryption of porn would work against the kind of porn distribution > found on the alt.binary.pictures.erotic... newsgroups. Encryption > requires that recipients be identified. Not at all .. a porn distributor could generate a key pair, use part A to encode the images, and dessiminate part B thru a variety of outlets - publicly posted, sold, passed thru an informal network of like-minded netizens... >4. Personal file encryption encourages individuals dealing with porn to > encrypt and keep personal diaries which might contain evidence. > Since PGP is subject to brute force passphrase attacks, this gives > an attack which will open *some* of these diaries. Without the > encryption, the suspect is less likely to keep the diary in the > first place. This isn't a guaranteed opening into all such > diaries. There is no such guarantee possible. Rather, this > suggests that strong crypto has a chance to maximize the effective > "take" by LE forces. I would argue the exact opposite - strong crypto would tend to minimize the effective take, since there's no guarantee that /anything/ on a perp's system will be in the clear. I'll let someone else with a better background pound on the 'brute force' section. -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: ecash protocol: Part 1
by Mark Twain Ecash Support 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I know ecash has some proxy support > but I'm not sure how it works. There are SOCKS proxies and http proxies, > and I don't know which it uses. I used a logging httpd proxy to derive > the data for the SSL challenges I did this past summer. It might be > interesting to post the binary data from some ecash transactions. The Ecash firewall support works by sending the messages as multipart MIME messages. The browser is then set to hand the application/ecash message the Ecash front end. > I wonder if it would be legal to write shop software which sent such a > payment request, took the resulting coins, and deposited them in the bank > (if we could figure out all the protocols necessary). IANAL. What would you hope to gain from creating such a piece of software? --Lucky at -- Mark Twain Ecash Support <mailto:support@marktwain.com> <http://www.marktwain.com/ecash.html>

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How to order Applied Crypto direct from Bruce Schneier
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several people have asked for this. You might want to email him to ask if the offer is still open, since this was a while back. From: Bruce Schneier <schneier(a)winternet.com> Subject: Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition: Ordering Information Date: Sun, 17 Sep 1995 18:09:34 -0500 (CDT) The SECOND EDITION of APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY is coming in November. This is a major rewrite: 50% more words, 7 more chapters, and over 1600 references. Not only did I make corrections to the first edition and add developments since it was published, but I also included topics left out of the first edition. (See table of contents--attached.) The second edition has lots of new algorithms (including GOST, Blowfish, RC4, and A5), more information on the Clipper Chip and key escrow, dozens of new protocols, more information on how PGP works, detailed information on key management and modes of operation, and new source code. The second edition will be published in paperback and hardcover. Right now I am making both available at a 15% discount. ***************************************************************** ORDER FORM Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition (Hardcover): $70 * .85 = $59.00 Applied Cryptography, 2nd Edition (Softcover): $50 * .85 = $42.00 Shipping: Air (U.S.): $5 per book Surface (U.S.): $3 per book Canada/Mexico: $7 per book Everywhere else: $9 per book Send to: Counterpane Systems, 101 E Minnehaha Parkway, Minneapolis, MN 55419 I need payment by check, in U.S. funds drawn on a U.S. bank. Or a postal money order. Sorry, no credit cards. ***************************************************************** APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY, SECOND EDITION Table of Contents ((Sections in all capitals are either new or substantially rewritten.)) Forward by Whitfield Diffie Preface Chapter 1: Foundations Terminology; STEGANOGRAPHY; Substitution Ciphers and Transposition Ciphers; Simple XOR; One-Time Pads; Computer Algorithms; Large Numbers Part I: Cryptographic Protocols Chapter 2: Protocol Building Blocks Introduction to Protocols; Communications using Symmetric Cryptography; One-Way Functions; One-Way Hash Functions; Communications using Public-Key Cryptography; Digital Signatures; Digital Signatures with Encryption; Random and Pseudo-Random Sequence Generation Chapter 3: Basic Protocols Key Exchange; Authentication; AUTHENTICATION AND KEY EXCHANGE; FORMAL ANALYSIS OF AUTHENTICATION AND KEY-EXCHANGE PROTOCOLS; Multiple-Key Public-Key Cryptography; Secret Splitting; Secret Sharing; Cryptographic Protection of Databases Chapter 4: Intermediate Protocols Timestamping Services; Subliminal Channel; Undeniable Digital Signatures; DESIGNATED CONFIRMER SIGNATURES; PROXY SIGNATURES; Group Signatures; Fail-Stop Digital Signatures; Computing with Encrypted Data; Bit Commitment; Fair Coin Flips; Mental Poker; ONE-WAY ACCUMULATORS; All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets; KEY ESCROW Chapter 5: Advanced Protocols ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS; Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Identity; Blind Signatures; IDENTITY-BASED PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY; Oblivious Transfer; OBLIVIOUS SIGNATURES; Simultaneous Contract Signing; Digital Certified Mail; Simultaneous Exchange of Secrets Chapter 6: Esoteric Protocols SECURE ELECTIONS; Secure Multiparty Computation; Anonymous Message Broadcast; DIGITAL CASH Part II: Cryptographic Techniques Chapter 7: Key Length SYMMETRIC KEY LENGTH; PUBLIC-KEY KEY LENGTH; COMPARING SYMMETRIC AND PUBLIC-KEY KEY LENGTH; BIRTHDAY ATTACKS AGAINST ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS; How Long Should a Key Be?; Caveat Emptor Chapter 8: Key Management Generating Keys; NONLINEAR KEYSPACES; Transferring Keys; Verifying Keys; Using Keys; UPDATING KEYS; Storing Keys; Backup Keys; Compromised Keys; Lifetime of Keys; Destroying Keys; Public-Key Key Management Chapter 9: Algorithm Types and Modes Electronic Codebook Mode; Block Replay; Cipher Block Chaining Mode; Stream Ciphers; Self-Synchronizing Stream Ciphers; Cipher-Feedback Mode; Synchronous Stream Ciphers; Output-Feedback Mode; Counter Mode; Other Block-Cipher Modes; CHOOSING A CIPHER MODE; INTERLEAVING; Block Ciphers vs. Stream Ciphers Chapter 10: Using Algorithms Choosing an Algorithm; Public-Key Cryptography vs. Symmetric Cryptography; Encrypting Communications Channels; ENCRYPTING DATA FOR STORAGE; Hardware Encryption vs. Software Encryption; COMPRESSION, ENCODING, AND ENCRYPTION; DETECTING ENCRYPTION; HIDING CIPHERTEXT IN CIPHERTEXT; DESTROYING INFORMATION Part III: Cryptographic Algorithms Chapter 11: Mathematical Background Information Theory; Complexity Theory; NUMBER THEORY; FACTORING; Prime Number Generation; Discrete Logarithms in a Finite Field Chapter 12: Data Encryption Standard Background; Description of DES; Security of DES; DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS; THE REAL DESIGN CRITERIA; DES VARIANTS; HOW SECURE IS DES TODAY? Chapter 13: Other Block Algorithms Lucifer; Madryga; Newdes; Feal-N; Redoc; LOKI; Khufu and Khafre; RC2; Idea; Mmb; CA-1.1; SKIPJACK Chapter 14: Still Other Block Algorithms GOST; CAST; BLOWFISH; SAFER K-64; 3-WAY; CRAB; SXAL8/MBAL; RC5; OTHER BLOCK ALGORITHMS; THEORY OF BLOCK CIPHER DESIGN; USING ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS; CHOOSING A BLOCK ALGORITHM Chapter 15: Combining Block Algorithms DOUBLE ENCRYPTION; TRIPLE ENCRYPTION; DOUBLING THE BLOCK LENGTH; OTHER MULTIPLE ENCRYPTION SCHEMES; CDMF KEY SHORTENING; WHITENING; CASCADING MULTIPLE BLOCK ALGORITHMS; COMBINING MULTIPLE BLOCK ALGORITHMS Chapter 16: Pseudo-Random-Sequence Generators and Stream Ciphers Linear Congruential Generators; Linear Feedback Shift Registers; LFSRs in Software; DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF STREAM CIPHERS; Stream Ciphers using LFSRs; A5; HUGHES XPD/KPD; NANOTEQ; RAMBUTAN; ADDITIVE GENERATORS; GIFFORD; ALGORITHM M; PKZIP Chapter 17: Other Stream Ciphers and Real Random-Sequence Generators RC4; SEAL; WAKE; FEEDBACK WITH CARRY SHIFT REGISTERS; STREAM CIPHERS USING FCSRS; NONLINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTERS; Other Stream Ciphers; System-Theoretic Approach to Stream Cipher Design; Complexity-Theoretic Approach to Stream Cipher Design; Other Approaches to Stream Cipher Design; CASCADING MULTIPLE STREAM CIPHERS; CHOOSING A STREAM CIPHER; GENERATING MULTIPLE STREAMS FROM A SINGLE PSEUDO- RANDOM SEQUENCE GENERATOR; REAL RANDOM-SEQUENCE GENERATORS Chapter 18: One-Way Hash Functions Background; Snefru; N-HASH; MD4; MD5; MD2; Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA); RIPE-MD; Haval; Other One-Way Hash Functions; ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTIONS USING SYMMETRIC BLOCK ALGORITHMS; Using Public-key Algorithms; CHOOSING A ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION; MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES Chapter 19: Public-Key Algorithms Background; Knapsack Algorithms; RSA; Pohlig-Hellman; Rabin; ElGamal; McEliece; Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems; LUC; FINITE AUTOMATON PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEMS Chapter 20: Public-Key Digital Signature Algorithms Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA); DSA VARIANTS; GOST DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM; DISCRETE LOGARITHM SIGNATURE SCHEMES; Ong-Schnorr-Shamir; Esign; Cellular Automata; Other Public-Key Algorithms Chapter 21: Identification Schemes Feige-Fiat-Shamir; Guillou-Quisquater; Schnorr; CONVERTING IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES TO SIGNATURE SCHEMES Chapter 22: Key-Exchange Algorithms DIFFIE-HELLMAN; STATION-TO-STATION PROTOCOL; Shamir's Three- Pass Protocol; COMSET; Encrypted Key Exchange; FORTIFIED KEY NEGOTIATION; Conference Key Distribution and Secret Broadcasting Chapter 23: Special Algorithms for Protocols Multiple-Key Public-Key Cryptography; Secret Sharing Algorithms; Subliminal Channel; Undeniable Digital Signatures; DESIGNATED CONFIRMER SIGNATURES; Computing with Encrypted Data; Fair Coin Flips; ONE-WAY ACCUMULATORS; All- or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets; FAIR AND FAILSAFE CRYPTOSYSTEMS; Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge; Blind Signatures; Oblivious Transfer; Secure Multiparty Computation; Probabilistic Encryption; Quantum Cryptography Part IV: The Real World Chapter 24: Example Implementations IBM Secret-Key Management Protocol; Mitrenet; ISDN; STU-III; Kerberos; KryptoKnight; SESAME; IBM COMMON CRYPTOGRAPHIC ARCHITECTURE; ISO Authentication Framework; Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM); Message Security Protocol; PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY (PGP); SMART CARDS; PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY STANDARDS; UNIVERSAL ELECTRONIC PAYMENT SYSTEM; CLIPPER; CAPSTONE; AT&T MODEL 3600 TELEPHONE SECURITY DEVICE Chapter 25: Politics NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; National Computer Security Center; National Institute of Standards and Technology; RSA Data Security, Inc.; PUBLIC KEY PARTNERS; International Association for Cryptologic Research; RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation; CONDITIONAL ACCESS FOR EUROPE; ISO/IEC 9979; PROFESSIONAL, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND INDUSTRY GROUPS; Sci.Crypt; CYPHERPUNKS; Patents; U.S. EXPORT RULES; FOREIGN IMPORT AND EXPORT OF CRYPTOGRAPHY; Legal Issues AFTERWARD BY MATT BLAZE Source Code DES; LOKI91; IDEA; GOST; BLOWFISH; 3-WAY; RC5; A5; SEAL; WAKE References

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