December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: ALERT: On Monday, call Congress to stop Big Brother amendment!
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 PM -0400 9/19/97, Carl Ellison wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > At 02:47 PM 9/18/97 -0400, you wrote: > >3. Say that you're calling to urge the Congressman to pass SAFE (HR695) > > without amendments. > > Does that mean Goodlatte's original bill, or the bill as amended already by > the National Security Subcommittee? > > I believe you should be more specific in your instructions -- suggesting > that people ask for the bill to be voted against unless it is exactly as it > was prior to the Natl Sec involvement. As each committee gets their hands on the bill, they do their own changes to versions and then they are all merged later before going to the floor. So, no, we're not asking people to urge passage of the SAFE bill with all the awful National Security amendments. It's a good suggestion, which we'll make clearer next time. -S

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Re: "Got a subpoena?"
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:50 AM 11/30/95 -0500, you wrote: >To use the most obvious example, different remailer operators turn >different levels of logging on. So one operator will say "Yes, I am >obligated to fully comply with your subpoena, officer. Here are the >full logs for the last six months." And another will say "Yes, I am >obligated to fully comply with your subpoena, officer. However, I >keep no logs at all of the mail sent through my remailer. Drag, huh?" Sounds like we need a version of Mixmaster for the logs... | Its Log! Its Log! Its big, its heavy, its erased| alano(a)teleport.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | <fnord> |

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Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 1 Dec 1995 04:40:23 -36000 > From: Matt Miszewski <crypto(a)midex.com> > Subject: Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow > To: sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> > Cc: Jeff Weinstein <jsw(a)netscape.com>, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, > jsw(a)tera.netscape.com > On Thu, 30 Nov 1995, sameer wrote: > > > Jeff: If Netscape comes out in favor of GAK, will you leave? > > (Wait until February, at least, of course..) You don't have to answer > > that to me, or the list, just think about it, and answer it for > > yourself. Do you think "anyone else" there would leave, as you say > > below that they don't want to go down history, etc... > > > > While this would go over well in the press if handled right please let > everyone remember that Jeff is a real person with bills to pay and food > to put on at least his own table. Now if someone out there with their > own business is willing to match his politics with his purse and offer > Jeff a job at the same level if he *decides* to leave in the midst of GAK > flak... If Jeff decided to leave, I don't think he'd have much trouble getting something else - I'd be surprised if he wasn't employed the next day. Of course, if Jeff's got any stock in Netscape, he'd be nuts to leave - unless he values his principles more than he values his stock. No insult intended.

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Add to List
by traye＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to be added to your mailing list for the cypherpunks. Thank you very much.

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Costs of Mandatory Key Recovery
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: fred(a)stilton.cisco.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 19 Sep 1997 07:54:35 -0700 To: ipsec(a)tis.com From: Fred Baker <fred(a)cisco.com> Subject: Costs of Mandatory Key Recovery Sender: owner-ipsec(a)ex.tis.com Precedence: bulk If you could email any hard numbers as to expected costs to Don Heath <heath(a)isoc.org>, it would be helpful. >>Date: Wed, 17 Sep 1997 10:55:55 -0400 >>From: Philip Webre <philipw.nrd(a)cbo.gov> >>To: heath(a)isoc.org >>Subject: Costs of Mandatory Key Recovery >>Content-Disposition: inline >> >>As I explained over the telephone, we are trying to estimate >>the private sector costs associated with mandatory key >>recovery in the US. Thursday the House Intelligence >>Committees passed an amended version of HR 695 that >>would mandate immediate key recovery in all encryption >>products sold, imported or distributed in the US after >>January 31, 2000. It further imposes this requirement >>on Internet service providers who provide encryption >>services when presented by a warrant from a duly authorized >>law enforcement official. >> >>We expect that within an organization like a corporate >>LAN, key recovery can be mandated in a straight forward >>manner. But since the relationship between an ISP >>and its client is more distant, very different mechanisms >>and cost structure would surface. I would be very >>interested in any information you could provide regarding >>the costs associated with such a mandate. >> >>Address: >>Philip Webre >>Congressional Budget Office >>Natural Resources and Commerce Division >>495 Ford House Office Bldg. >>Washington, D.C. 20515 >>Fax Number: 202-226-0207 >>Voice: 202-226-2940 >>Internet: Philipw(a)CBO.GOV > =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= "Planning is bringing the future into the present so that you can do something about it now." Alan Lakein --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Four Info Threats
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum35.html Forum, Number 35, July 1995 THE NEXT ENEMY Martin C. Libicki, National Defense University [Excerpts] The Cold War offered military planners considerable strategic clarity the threat was known, and the problem was generating a force structure of sufficient size and sophistication to counter it. Today's military threats are varied and, for the most part, well below the level that even a shrinking U.S. force can handle comfortably. Threats ten to twenty years out, however, must be taken seriously because of the long time required to complete a major systems acquisition; to develop, test, and institutionalize new doctrine; and to accomplish the organizational innovations necessary to use both effectively. Future threats may be divided into four categories: peers, bullies, terrorism, and chaos. ... Peers Few planners think it likely that the next twenty years will see a reemergence of a nation that can pose a challenge to U.S. military power as broadly as the Soviet Union did. However, at least two countries (Russia and China) could conceivably be peer adversaries at the strategic level of nuclear weapons, space, and information systems. ... Another avenue of future competition may be information warfare. Can or should the United States hold other nations' participation in the world economy at risk? The United States might be able to shut down another nation's banking system but not without risk of collateral damage to the global banking system. Can physical war be replaced by a survival contest among rival information systems under attack? Perhaps the United States should concentrate on developing defensive systems. The United States has the biggest stones, but also the most glass in its house. ... A world of peer strategic competition would drive the military in familiar directions towards: nuclear forces, satellites and other long-range warning systems; tactical ballistic missile defense systems (including for allies); perhaps strategic defense systems and space attack systems; air defense in general; information warfare and security; and robust command-and-control. Bullies If the circumstances and logic of the Bottom Up Review hold true for two more decades, U.S. armed forces will be sized and structured primarily to engage in two simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). The usual suspects in such MRCs (e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea) are presently unsophisticated rogue states that aspire to nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Conference participants believe that U.S. forces could cope with the challenges of future conventional warfare, even if force levels continue to diminish. However, two events would make the United States rethink its strategy nuclear weapons proliferation, and the sophisticated exploitation of world technology markets. ... Alternatively, an MRC opponent may be able to avoid going to the nuclear threshold by a strategy which uses smart munitions, commercial command-and-control, and a variety of surveillance technologies (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, third-party satellite surveillance) to exact damaging casualties on U.S. forces. ... Against a sophisticated regional foe, the United States might not want to use platforms at all but rely on a combination of stand-off attack forces, and information-based warfare assets (for giving targeting data to local coalition partners), coupled with special operations forces used for liaison and other tasks. Terrorism Largely because of the limited capability that classical military instruments have in coping with terrorism, conference participants kept returning to the threat that it may pose to U.S. national security. Incidents may range from the use of conventional explosives (e.g., what if the van in the World Trade Center explosion had been parked in a more vulnerable spot), to nuclear or chemical weapons, biological agents, and their analogue in cyberspace information warfare. Devices that can cause terror are getting easier to manufacture and transport and harder to detect. The equipment for replicating biological agents is inexpensive; the equipment for replicating computer agents is even cheaper. Many otherwise third-world Asian nations have very large computer-literate cohorts that make them potential information warfare powers. ... Chaos Over the next two decades, states will continue to fail. Some failures may create circumstances (e.g., refugees, malcontents, and environmental damage) which topple other states. To cope, the United States may need a robust capability to conduct peace and relief operations. ... A concentration on peace operations may also be a good reason to expand foreign military interactions. Improving interoperability with future coalition partners carries many advantages. Yet, above a certain technological level of integration, the risk of exposing information on U.S. capabilities to what may be temporary allies has to be carefully managed. If countering chaos were the primary mission of the U.S. armed forces, then they would have to become lighter and more mobile (because states often fail with little warning, and the United States usually responds only in extremis). The Army and Marine Corps would have larger roles, while the Navy and Air Force would focus on lift. As emergency operations become the norm, some functions assigned to reserve units may have to be shifted to active ones (e.g., to allow civil affairs assets to be used more frequently).

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Re: sooner or later
by David Downey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bill Stewart wrote: >>At 10:45 PM 9/18/97 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >>>Many of us believe that a crypto ban is inevitable. The only >>>question for us is whether it'll happen sooner or later. Seen in >>>this perspective, all that industry and civil liberties lobbies can >>>do is delay the ban. But is this necessarily a good thing? > >>Yes. Later is bad, but sooner is worse. First of all, "Soon" means >>"We lost already", while "Later" means "We haven't lost yet, even >>though it looks pretty much like we're going to lose later,... > The only way I see us losing is if we do not stand together. I do see that we will need to go underground ofr awhile, but when they see that they will always have a problem with us, they will eventually have to deal with us. That is unless they want to turn the US into a real life version of the movie Red Dawn! ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Applied Cryptography MPLS Book Release
by Charles Gimon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did I mention that Bruce Schneier and Ms. Cooper are charming hosts with an excellent caterer? Probably not, with all the Netscape/GAK hoo-hah going on. Well, if you'll excuse me for posting thanks a couple of days late, thanks for an excellent time. It was good to see some of the local folks in person again.

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McCain on the radio, 9/22
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sen. McCain is scheduled to be a guest on the Diane Rehm show, Monday 9/22 10:00-11:00, 88.5 (in DC) or 88.1 (in Balto). This show is carried elsewhere in the country, so I'm cc:ing cypherpunks. - Carl -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBNCKTuVQXJENzYr45AQGhgAP9EtpiDkBvUDp85cdvbX3dvQXSDBvbwte1 K0gGxWscycNWnTbrpSZVRZ/ud/rm4GY/oiUS5lZbebwfsvAejyihUPWKxK1FTaz9 dE3Zm9TLdn9hzZdK0X2PhUPsHCsymZtmVB+N5zrd1m7QAptM6vX+aOBHWAwWZBie lh8KTIV3TJk= =XizX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- +------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)cybercash.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |CyberCash, Inc. http://www.cybercash.com/ | |207 Grindall Street PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | |Baltimore MD 21230-4103 T:(410) 727-4288 F:(410)727-4293 | +------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: y2k as ideological opportunity.
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>[IRS collection mechanism collapses due to y2k problem] If such a thing actually happened, I strongly suspect they'd activate the contingency plan that was developed to maintain tax collection after nuclear war; a flat 20% sales tax, collected (I think) by surviving Post Office employees. Come to think of it, that might be better than what we have now.... Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

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