December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Revoking Old Lost Keys
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack <adam(a)lighthouse.homeport.org> wrote: I wrote: > | PGP should give a warning when the key passes the expiration date. It > | should not prevent you from using it, but should remind you that the > | key is rather old, and that the owner may have moved, etc. [..] > Expire should mean expire, i.e., no longer valid, useful or > useable. If you want to have a 'depreciated after' and an expire > date, that might be useful, but it seems more like feeping creaturitis > to me. It adds bulk to every key, when a better solution would be to > have keys automatically deprecitated some time before they are due to > expire. The reason I think a warning option is good (really, 1 bit bit flag for warn rather than kill... that's "bulk" to every key?) is so that if for whatever reason the key is used (say I am unable to get a newer key for you but really need to send you a private message) I have something to use... and you, if you choose to hold onto old keys, can decrypt it. If not, the sender was warned. > Also, the ability to extend the life of a key is fraught with > danger. The longer a key is around, the more likely it is to become > comprimised. The user might not be aware that the key is comprimised. > Better to have an unchangeable date. (On a more technical level, > allowing users to change the expiry date on a key means that the key's > expiry date is not signed by the signatories, and an opponent who > comprimised a key could simply change the expiry date on that key and > send it to the servers, so that it would continue to be used, and your > opponent could continue to read all your communications.) > > Adam > > -- > "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." > -Hume > > > --- "Mutant" Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> Send a blank message with the subject "send pgp-key" (not in quotes) for a copy of my PGP key.

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No Subject
by jc123＠arn.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could you send me some information about crypto stuff.

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Re: NSA says strong crypto to china??
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim, On 01 07 96 you say: ...the crypto anarchy notions we talk about makes collection of taxes increasingly problematic. You also say: Today, and especially with strong crypto and all the develop- ing methods we talk about, how will the Ruler know what to tax? You conclude: ...I believe that this issue [collection of taxes] is one of the motivations to restrict the use of strong crypto and to make transactions monitorable. In 02 96 Internet World, science fiction writer Vernor Vinge is interviewed: Suddenly [about 1984] people realized that if a 100 million people each had computers that were one-tenth of one percent as smart as the government's computers, they had much less to fear about government. Now we've entered an era where the government understands this. One the one hand, police forces are legitimately [?] frightened; law enforcement could become much more difficult. But at the same time --with some new laws and technology-- police powers could be much greater than before.... You've heard of ubiquitous computing, but how about UBIQUITOUS LAW ENFORCEMENT? Developing that line of thought, Vinge says: ...the old Clipper chip proposal recommended that GOVERNMENT LOGIC be present in certain communications equipment. For the future I think this aspect of Clipper was as significant as the crypto issues. What would it be like if a certain amount of GOVERNMENT LOGIC were mandated in the design of every host in a country? And Vinge concludes: WE COULD HAVE REAL-TIME TAXATION. and ...very fine-grain CONTROL would be possible. Capitalization in the above excerpts is mine. The whole interview is worth reading. Its title is: Reality & Fiction. It starts at page 82. Jeff Ubois asked the questions. Every HOST in a country? As Larry Ellison says in 12 26 95 / 01 02 96 Computerworld 41: The ideal operating system arrives across a network when you turn your computer on. The GOVERNMENT LOGIC arrives too... Cordially, Jim

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RE: Revoking Old Lost Keys
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:47 AM 1/6/96 -0000, Frank O'Dwyer wrote: >On Saturday, January 06, 1996 09:18, Timothy C. May[SMTP:tcmay@got.net] wrote: >>At 7:07 AM 1/6/96, Bruce Baugh wrote: >>>I'd like to bring up a problem I haven't seen addressed much yet, and which >>>I think is going to come up with increasing frequency as PGP use spreads. >>> >>>The problem is this: how can one spread the word that an old key is no >>>longer to be used when one no longer has the pass phrase, and cannot >>>therefore create a revocation certificate? >> >>Basically, you are screwed. Any revocation you attempt will not be trusted, >>as we will suspect the new "you" to be an attacker, perhaps an agent of the >>NSA or the Illuminati. In the view that "you are your key," the old you no >>longer exists. > >This is true, but the "old you" can be resurrected if you can get enough >people to believe your new key using any out-of-band means available >to you. You can also put a comment in your new key's uid explaining the >problem and how to verify the new key. You will find it very hard to use this >new key for a while, though, during the transition period. Many people will take >the existence of two keys with the same uid as suspicious in itself, since it at >least indicates some kind of attack (even if only a denial of service attack). There are times when you want multiple keys with the same ID. I have two key sizes becuase one is an older key. I keep it around for use with people who are using versions that do not support the larger keys. (I have run into this once from a sometimes user of PGP. He finally upgraded.) To aleviate the suspicion, I have the two keys sign each other. >This is really a usability flaw with current PGP. Only if you use the name to refer to the key and not the hex ID. (I found out the hard way that some front ends use either the last key created or whatever they feel like for signing keys and/or signing messages. I am still trying to straighten out some of the weird results of that.) Fortunatly, some programs will use the hex ID to refer to the key so there is no confusion. >The PGP formats do allow for a 'revocation' certificate, but PGP doesn't >implement it (yet, I guess). In any case, it's not really strong enough, >since what it says is "I retract all my previous statements that this key is >related to this user". This'd mean that you'd have to visit everyone who'd ever >signed your key and get them to issue this retraction. What would be needed >for this problem is either an "anti-certificate" ("This key does not belong to this >user"), or else some convention. For example, if two _trusted_ keys are found for the >same uid, the most recent one could be chosen, and the earlier one be purged >from keyservers, etc. This may be possible with current PGP. I haven't tried it, >but since I have some keys which have fallen into disuse, I will need to do so >sometime.). Revocations are supported, but they require the passphrase. (I have a number of revokations on my keyring from various folks.) The problem here is occasions where you have forgotten the passphrase. (I have an old keyring that I need to go and revoke all of the old keys on it. I have not used them in a year or two. I doubt if they are even on the keyserver...) Eventually there will be a way of revoking keys in the circumstance. Something similar to a notary (or a combination of notaries) who can vouch and say "hey, this guy really did lose his keys". Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ "Governments are potholes on the Information Superhighway." - Not TCMay

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Re: Mixmaster On A $20 Floppy?
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The second paragraph of this post seems to address a different issue than the first. The problem of correlations between a certain sender sending and a certain receiver receiving, is well known and understood. The best defense against this (as a sender) is to send messages into the remailer network with a period equal to or less than the the time required for a message with your typical chain length to pass through the remailer net. If these are sent at random intervals, then your real mail will blend with the cover traffic, and mail from you will correlate with all message receipts by all message recipients. The second paragraph seems to deal with the issue of being known as an anonymous remailer or regular remailer user. I am not sure exactly what the concern with that is. -Lance At 11:56 PM 1/5/96, Futplex wrote: >The "ultimate" traffic analysis problem, as others have observed, is >the correlation between messages sent by A and received by B via the overall >network. Hence the utility of a Dining Cryptographers' Net, PipeNet, etc. in >which the apparent bandwidth variation between any two points is eliminated. >A and B are effectively folded into the network. > >I suppose that a site that escapes detection as a Mixmaster will throw off >the correlation stats (i.e. because a message from that site to B won't be >identified as a remailed message). But such sites are elusive objects I >think. On the one hand, the site can't endure for long, or else its >throughput traffic will likely give it away as an anonymizer (i.e. it gets >lots of mail from the Mix network, and sends out similar amounts of mail to >all sorts of people and the network). On the other hand, it had better last, >or else it will look suspicious as a transient account receiving mail from >the Mix network, sending a few messages, and quickly vanishing. > >Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com> >"Dammit Jim, I'm a doctor, not a bricklayer!" > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMO9nDfPzr81BVjMVAQF1YQgAo08ndnu7Lcok3O12hCYz57j+PClp8ulk LRRGGejhTNerums+FInio2IUQK3YvWLsIUj+UkZZkYPGAV292AsKnQROzBAYZ2kd V8MdVUqolZQfFzR7VYS2n+6ARlplff0E+58X2NDHgw25welmg7Id/xJmjiIwHI8J U6eGUw0BhMKrQuXCv4NpUsYGC2ux2abOs+Y2f4pjzSSyJhLuAXJbzlr0eRYWPOj7 AU2AAs/l4xTGbErYc2F5D9pfTJe6sMkUCseIyVpsoLUMsg24LItlDOUq1feT2ppq X1LJQRu05ERt3LIhjB5JHFClxecQyw31JDZV8E2H19mawK1LIkgKNA== =MU1s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: please stop the Mitnick stuff
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:16 1/6/96, John Young wrote: > Also, crypto-related: The fact that Shimomura's supposedly > secret files were not protected by encryption or other > security is what causes Littman and others to think there > was a sting (perhaps with TLA help) rather than foolish > vanity of the security wizard. [I do belive this has CP relevance.] Of course it was a set-up. Mitnick got into Shimomura's computer by impersonating the IP address of one of Shimomura's machines. The router should have never let packets in from outside that have an IP address that is supposed to be inside. That a 'security expert' would overlook such a blatant and well publicized hole in his _own_ router is inconceivable. Shimomura was trying to get someone to break into his system. If the bait was specifically for Mitnick, we may never know. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: CelBomb
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Post, Jan 6, 1996. By Uri Dan from Jerusalem Palestinian police said Ayash [The Engineer] was killed north of Gaza City when he answered a call on a cell phone rigged with two ounces of explosives. Israeli sources said the phone had been secretly traded for Ayash's real phone -- and the explosion was triggered by remote control once it was determined he was on the line. ---------- No brand name given, however, another source writes that Mot runs the IL cel net. So use that neat audio-vox wire on MicroTAC Elites only with paid-up Shin Bet dues, absent TS-immunization.

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Re: phone calls from hell
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:15 PM 1/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >SNS News Service "Exploding Phone" >January 7, 1996..15 Teves 5756..Number 850..Update from Israel >It is now being reported that the cellular phone that killed him was >detonated by a remote control. The son of Ayyash's landlord, identified >as Ikrimeh Hamad, was expected to have handed Ayyash the phone >earlier in the day. Some reports state that his whereabouts are >unknown but other reports stated that he is now hiding-out in Israel. >>>27 Heathway Court * London England * NW3 7TS * 44-181-458-6510 >Fax: 44-181-455-8701 > Copyright, Shomron News Service, 1996 > >*** > >Comment by bd: > >I suppose this phone was prepared especially for Ayyash, but the >imagination wanders. Imagine a world in which *every* cellphone >(or other net-connected computer or ....) had a little explosive built >in. For that matter, the case itself could be constructed of a plastic >explosive. > >Sure would make it easy to get rid of unwanted citizens. >Just match the voice pattern on the cellphone or confirm the password >issuing from the computer, send the special signal down the line and >*BOOM*, one less nuisance for the state. Sorta gives new meaning to the term "_Terminate_ and Stay Resident" program, doesn't it?!? (Or "end of file.")

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Re: NSA says strong crypto to China?
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Logically, it seems the best thing for the NSA to do (given the political character of the group) is to send strong-but-not-that-strong crypto out. In other words, they would want the various offically-USA recognized "dissidents" (as opposed to officially-USA recognized "terrorists") to have crypto strong enough so that the various defined-as-repressive governments cannot decrypt it while not-strong-enough to prevent NASA from reading it. -- -- tallpaul -- Any political analysis that fits on a bumper sticker is wrong.

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Domains, InterNIC, and PGP (and physical locations of hosts, to boot)
by Michael Handler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The InterNIC (the company responsible for registering .COM, .EDU, .ORG, and .NET domains) has had a great deal of trouble lately, with people submitting malicious CHANGE DOMAIN requests (change admin or technical contact, point root nameserver entries to rival ISPs, etc). In response, the InterNIC has created "the Guardian project" which delineates who has access and authorization to change data in the InterNIC's record. Not much new cpunk relevance, but much of what has been discussed here is very applicable to this project (digital signatures, common access to databases, etc). I'm not completely pleased with their implementation, but it will do for now. They _do_ support PGP as an access controller within the Guardian project, and they have purchased a copy from ViaCrypt for this purpose. A good thing, says I. Check out their proposal: ftp://rs.internic.net/policy/internic/internic-gen-1.txt ObGPS/cpunk/physical-location-of-machines: A recent IETF proposal would create a new DNS record that encoded the physical location of a machine, encoded in latitude and longitude. This would solve the problem MIT has had in distributing PGP, i.e. where exactly is unix5.netaxs.com? However, there's nothing to stop you from adding records that say your machines are at the latitude and longitude of, say, Fort Meade... ;-) ftp://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1876.txt Again, I'm not too sure of the viability of this proposal. Not on effectiveness of proving true location -- it is more geared toward "visual 3-D packet tracing" -- but simply because I have _no_ fricking idea where our machines are (in terms of lat and long) to any degree of accuracy. ("They're somewhere in PA." Brilliant, you can find that out via WHOIS.) The document suggests using GPS to locate your true location, but I'll be damned if my boss is going to spend $1,000 just so I can have more DNS entries to maintain... -- Michael Handler <grendel(a)netaxs.com> <URL:http://www.netaxs.com/~grendel> "Hours of frustration punctuated by moments of sheer terror."

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