December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: US government department for crime enforcement!
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Still, anonymous does make an astutely ironic observation, in humorous lifting of the customary FinCEN cloak: That the hydra-headed agency may be literally aim at financial *crimes* enforcement rather than enforcement of the laws against such deeds. Especially given the participating renegade agencies who seem to absolve themselves of these laws. Perhaps anonymous is right, they are a band of outlaws, daring to overtly flaunt it, expecting no opposition from the gullible cowed.

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Movie Suitcases
by A Player To Be Named Later 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone notice that there is a nuclear suitcase movie being released within a couple of weeks of the NSA shill Russian general's book about the same? So, does everybody now have it firm in their mind that this is a real threat that we will need to take firm action on the minute that Freeh & Company announce the nuclear suitcase crisis? Mail the last of your civil and human rights to your Congressman today. Tell him or her to forward them to President Freeh before leaving for the internment camps. A Player To Be Named Later

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Re: [FRED] Anonymity and Integrity
by anonymous＠wmono.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[note: i'm not the original 'anonymous user' in this thread] >If the message was not of any particular import to anyone, integrity >would not be a very big issue, but suppose you took quotes out of >context and cleverly tried to construct a picture of the other person >as not being reputable. People who read the message might believe that >what you said was true, or at least had a grain of truth to it. That >sort of message lacks integrity, and the reason it lacks integrity is >because it has anonymity, not just because it's false and misleading. I, for one, pay very little attention to the author of any given message on this list, and messages stand on their own merit. I take everything I read (here and elsewhere) with a grain of salt, and pay close attention to factual references if they are supplied to I can do my own investigating and draw my own conclusions, if the topic piques my interest. An anonymous posting has exactly the same 'integrity quotient' as any first-time poster; the reader has no historical perspective on the author, and the message should be accepted or discarded on its own merits, not by a blind "he's usually clueful" or "who the heck is this?" attitude. [erm.. I'm not attacking anyone here, just spewing some thoughts I haven't bothered to express yet..] (...) >Example: I have two (N) pseudonyms that put forth different points of >view specifically directed to create different kinds of credence to >different audiences. If the audiences knew that both (several) of the >pseudonyms were in fact the same person, they would have very different >beliefs about the individual given the combined picture than they might >get from any one of the pictures. [Obligatory _Ender's Game_ reference grudgingly suppressed] This happens in 'real life' all the time. I hide the details of my geeky job from my Friday-night friends, and don't bring up my recreational pharmaceutical use with my business associates. Either group would have different feelings about me if they had a 'combined picture' of my lifestyle. >It's not only the True Name that's at issue. It's the association of a Personally, I find the quest for employment of any True Name scheme hogwash, simply because of the multifaceted nature of human existence (see above), where pseudonimity (virtual or social) is a part of everyday life. True Names are logically almost impossible anyway. What base criteria would a government, company, or other organization use to assign and make use of a True Name? Driver's license? (fake) .. DNA fingerprint? (cloning) .. any attempt to pin /me/ down to a single facet of existence is doomed to failure, given how adept the bad guys are at keeping ahead of the good guys. >set of messages and historical information with a source. For example, >if we knew you were a KGB agent working in the disinformation and >economic espionage branches, we might evaluate your postings differently >than if we knew you were a high-school student from Deluth whose father >taught her a lot about cryptography when she was young. We all have hidden agendas; personally, until I reach godlike status (btw, anyone have any spare eye of newt laying around?) I'll have to be content with judging most things I read with a healthy dose of cynicism, and squeeze what 'truth' I can out of it. I've been surprised too many times by hidden goals and 'double agents' to put much stock in /anything/ sent down my pipe. There's also an argument that the most prolific pseudonyms and 'real' account-holders have Something They Want Us To Believe and should be trusted no further than they can be thrown .. analogous, in my book, to politicians .. perhaps the anonymous are the /only/ entities we can trust... -- Oinker - anonymous today in case any of you are my clients :P

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Re: Win95 password caching
by llurch＠networking.stanford.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(A copy of this message has also been posted to the following newsgroups: csu.windows95, comp.os.ms-windows.win95.misc,comp.os.ms-windows.win95.setup,comp.security.misc,alt.security,comp.os.ms-windows.networking.misc,comp.os.ms-windows.networking.windows,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.admin.networking) [A little more context and Message-ID added from the original post; cross-posted to nt.admin because it will affect some of you, followups out] In article <4791l0$4n14(a)holly.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>, unicorn(a)holly.ACNS.ColoState.EDU (Scott McCormack) wrote: > In article <478rbq$o31(a)yuma.ACNS.ColoState.EDU>, > Jim Carlson (jimc(a)cnr.colostate.edu) wrote: > : Does anyone know how to stop Win95 from caching the windows password? > : We are thinking of using Win95 as the client for a student lab and > : need to find a way to stop it from caching passwords. As it is, when > : you log into a machine for the first time it creates a .pwl file in > : your windows directory for each person who logs into windows. This > : is not acceptible for a lab situation. > : > : I can turn this off in WfWG by placing the line "passwordcachine=no" > : in the system.ini under [NETWORK], but this does not work in Win95. > : > : I am running MS networking in Win95, so when you first log into, > : windows it asks you to log into the MS Network. It then comes up with > : a second box asking you to enter your Win95 password. You can enter > : a blank password (""), but it still creates a .pwl file and places a > : line in win.ini. > > Change the password for the login (or when you first login) to a blank > line (ie don't enter a password) and you'll never see that login prompt > again. :) This was not the question. He wants to prevent local Windows passwords from being created for network-only users. This is a serious security issue, because if a user enters her real network password for the Windows password, and someone else later picks up the .PWL files, which are not encrypted in a particularly secure way, then someone can get unauthorized access to the network as the previous user(s). We believe we have found answers in the Registry and in POLEDIT. We've also turned up another related security bug. When it's confirmed, we'll post. In the mean time, you can read the last couple messages archived at gopher://quixote.stanford.edu/1m/win95netbugs. -rich llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu moderator of the win95netbugs list http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/win95netbugs/faq.html

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[cipher-request@itd.nrl.navy.mil: Electronic CIPHER, Issue 10, November 1, 1995, Postcard edition]
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please pardon the forward -- but y'all might be interested in this newsletter... ============================================================================== Date: Wed, 1 Nov 95 10:02:51 EST From: <cipher-request(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> Reply-To: <cipher-request(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> To: <cipherdist(a)itd.nrl.navy.mil> Subject: Electronic CIPHER, Issue 10, November 1, 1995, Postcard edition Dear Cipher Postcard subscriber, The next issue of Cipher (EI#10, dated November 1, 1995) is now available for downloading from the anonymous FTP site or from the Archive on the Cipher Home Page. This message includes only the table of contents and retrieval instructions. I will update the Web pages as soon as I can. Regards, --Carl ==================================================================== _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ ==================================================================== Newsletter of the IEEE Computer Society's TC on Security and Privacy Electronic Issue 10 November 1, 1995 Carl Landwehr, Editor Hilarie Orman, Assoc. Editor ==================================================================== Contents: [1550 lines total] Letter from the Editor Security and Privacy News Briefs: o S&P '96 deadline approaches o LISTWATCH: WWW-Security -- by Mary Ellen Zurko o US Navy ship's computers penetrated during JWID '95 o US medical records confidentiality act (S.1360) introduced o Microsoft security: printer/network flaws/fixes; application-level object reuse problem o Netscape security: bucks for break-ins o Separation (micro)kernel from IBM? o European Commission to propose cryptography policy o FIRST to re-form as nonprofit o RSA pushes for firewall security standard Articles and Conference Reports: o NISS notes: o IFIP WG11.3 Conference on Database Security; summary by David Spooner Calls for Papers: Many! Reader's guide to recent security and privacy literature o Conference Papers o Journal and Newsletter articles Calendar Who's Where: recent address changes New Reports available via FTP and WWW Interesting Links DSL subscription offer How to join the TC on Security and Privacy Publications for sale TC officers Information for Subscribers and Contributors ____________________________________________________________________ Retrieval instructions: There is an archive that includes each copy distributed so far, in ascii, in files you can download at URL http://www.itd.nrl.navy.mil/ITD/5540/ieee/cipher/cipher-archive.html There is also an anonymous FTP server that contains the same files. To access the archive via anonymous FTP: 1. ftp www.itd.nrl.navy.mil 2. At prompt for ID, enter "anonymous" 3. At prompt for password, enter your actual, full e-mail address 4. Once you are logged in, change to the Cipher Directory: cd pub/cipher 5. Now you can request any of the files containing Cipher issues in ascii. Issues are named in the form: EI#N.9506 where N is the number of the issue desired and 9506 captures the year and month it first appeared. =======end of Electronic Cipher Issue #10, 1 November 1995================

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NAMBLA
by Boat1688＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How do I get some of these pics of boys in swimsuits?

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Re: US government department for crime enforcement!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:40 PM 11/1/95, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: >It's come to my attention that the US government has a group >called the 'Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes >Enforcement Network' in Vienna, Virginia. > >I know that burocrats like to keep themselves busy, but even >I didn't think they would go so far as to enforce crimes to >keep the law enforcement people busy. > >What a curious way to spend the taxpayers money. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN, is well known to readers of this list. If you grep for it in my Cyphernomicon FAQ, you should find references in several places. I first learned of it in 1990, and have followed it as best I can since. Not too much has been published about it. It's an interagency working group, with participation by Treasury, State, FBI, CIA, IRS, Justice, etc. A good overview of it was in an early issue of "Wired," and is likely available at the HotWired Web site. FinCEN's Web page is: http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/fincen/fincen.html --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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New Mixmaster Remailer
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the official announcement for the Ecafe Mixmaster Remailer that has been running on ecafe.org for testing purposes for the last few weeks. The address to send to is mixmaster(a)remail.ecafe.org, message reordering is enabled with a poolsize currently set to two (which may be increased when we get more traffic), and the key is attached. The remailer is physically located in the UK. For more information, check out the Web page at http://www.ecafe.org/~remail/ Mark Here is the public key for Ecafe Remailer =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= ecafe-mix mixmaster(a)remail.ecafe.org fff0d827161069a26ca44dead777c9ec 2.0.1 -----Begin Mix Key----- fff0d827161069a26ca44dead777c9ec 258 AATgcIZ9GIj6VEZ2UmDO9BGmGVY5tZHVQp+2rChG 0E+lcD8lrHlWGwc/ea9Ycj8z2HGdWZl5ptXqfabf YenIyO7YRr7teAzAAFmkBuwgBGUcpJUvIOjWlXBo OGnku0AQYqOBDZSfknT+dAP01N82qDN13E6dUhEW /0hdDNVghmsy2wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAQAB -----End Mix Key-----

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CBW_boo
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-2-95. W$Japer: "Chemical and Biological Warfare Unmasked." For the first time in more than 25 years, the U.S. may be waking up to the seriousness of CBW. This high-level awakening is long overdue and reflected in a sudden increase in CBW sensor development research and counter- proliferation programs. Still, these steps blithely disregards 25 years of revolutionary advances in the biological and chemical sciences and the potential products of the Russian program. There is no allowance for "nonmilitary" CBW applications. Yet the most troublesome developments in the Russian CBW program are agents designed for covert use against diplomats, politicians and business executives. Also absent is serious attention to terrorist motivations and options. CBW_boo (9 kb)

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LAF_las
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For we CIA-corn peckers: Wash Rag today hangs out Page Oner on the billions wasted on armaments based on flawed data by the CIA. It has pointers on how the spooks chew the raw spew and hawk oysters upstairs. Two, NYPaper chickenshits editorially on the same, clucks affirmation of Deutch and US Congress under-oversight. Three, contrarily, NYP's Maureen Dowd ridicules the CIA macho history of acceptable wickedness in the public interest, and hoots at Deutch's "mensch" complicity, saying that laughable agencies don't survive godawfully wicked Washington. Cackling right on, Mo. LAF_las

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