December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Federal motivation
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Martin Minow wrote: > EH: Why do the Fed's want access to plaintext? The motivation has > not been made clear. Policy goals are stated in technological terms, > not in policy terms. Perhaps we can elaborate on this. Judging from their actions, what they want is a full blown police state. They've seen the product, now they want one of their own. This is obvious to everybody on this list, but sometimes people are coy about it, probably in an effort to appear to be "legitimate". This transcends the issue of crypto, although the problem will be more manageable if the use of crypto remains legal. What we are seeing is the fight for survival of the institutions created during World War II. Their only purpose now is self promotion. This was universally recognized ten years ago when the Wall fell, but somehow the "peace dividend" never materialized and they got another trillion dollars out of us. We can look at Russia and see just how hard it is for a society to free itself of these sorts of institutions. How much of the Russian "Mafia" is composed of fragments of the KGB? This story can be read again and again throughout history. What is different in 1997 is that the technology of mass surveillance and population management is superior. What is at stake is whether we remain a free people or whether we end up with ear tags like cattle. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNBxsHZaWtjSmRH/5AQEcfAf/VGeyAVgrA7eztbu/4LtYb2dSYqAeTjjN ud0vDFUZNUHcBi+xyh9NwlkDmsbr8RGOytdpIddKKbYvHa0P0ik3PkGiGMS3MiW5 6mIKV5OU0xb5uOadvBmRGwynydg8IpnkdWljazOiGLE2chTMRoIVghSguApxBzlQ W9XLeB67xkNQHU9a0Plw0f0iBcGBML6yqNLNOGOehIm/LEV21k+OKlcW1aW0uksB TD5HkynJvaD65Exlrps4AZLp6R1SEQe0UhS86KMekeUARub3MkMxmD4XgznEnRj3 19vOahUygnnQoy2BaAVRg+4M//4EOwk7SGsQ/RbEGoSpdnFHrZDKdQ== =vQC6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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What really happend in DC
by Magus Mixmaster Anonymous Remailer Service 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Several people have asked me for the real story of what went on in Washington. Here it is. Some carpetbaggers (EFF, CDT, etc.) went to DC without having the first clue how the game is being played. Oblivious to the fact that Congress will not, can not, pass a pro-crypto bill, they found a few Congress people that either believed in the issue or at least thought they could milk it for publicity. Some bills were proposed and sent on their way. Meanwhile, the real players were laughing their butt off. Their project was right on track. Using a time honored mixture of incentivising and FUD, GAK was pushed upon industry. The real players know that banking will require strong crypto, so banking and financial transaction information are exempt from the export prohibition. This conveniently opens the most lucrative market segment of the worldwide crypto business to US companies, thereby reducing, if not eliminating, the business case for fighting export restrictions. If not eliminating because on the other end of the crypto spectrum, the export regs and GAK are irrelevant for all practical purposes. It simply doesn't matter for most people if their love letters are protected by 40 bits or by 128 bits. Nor will it matter if the crypto used has GAK or not. Unless they are into some _really_ kinky stuff. The market segment between is too small to make it economical for large businesses (the only one's with clout and the only ones about who's campaign contributions one should worry) to fight over this issue with a very determined government. With industry removed as an opponent (ignore for the moment the voices still originating from some industry spokespeople. They and their jobs will go away as their managers come to realize that said voices have a negative rate of return), only civil liberty groups are left. And as I mentioned earlier, those don't have any clue about the nature of the game at the national security (as in the very survival of governemt) level. The Four Horsemen can just ride right over them. With the bull worn and tired, all that is left to do is the coupe de grace. Since Congress has become aware that crypto is an issue and since many lawmakers know by now that there would be some law, the bills already in Congress were simply rewritten. No point in wasting time by introducing a new bill. Some may ask what the effect of all this will be. Simple: o The "reliable parties" that need strong crypto will have strong crypto. o Those that don't really need strong crypto won't have it. o The government has new and better surveillance and control capabilities. o The Cypherpunks attack on the State has been rebuffed, since the widespread use of strong crypto it requires won't occur. (Just to help those that will counter by saying that they'll still have a copy of PGP save some time: this is utterly irrelevant. The individual, or even a group of individuals can never be a danger to the State. Annoying perhaps, but not a danger to its existance. In fact, the occasional Cypherpunks with his copy of PGP provides a net benefit to the State. Just as the occasional terrorist or nutcase with a rifle does).

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Re: Real issue of crypto controls: security or taxation loss?
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:34 PM 9/14/97 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >On 13 Sep 97 at 12:16, Black Unicorn wrote: > > >> >To this, all I can find of enough magnitude to put them in such state >> >is that they just recently *truly* realized that crypto will, >> >infinitely more than to threaten the security of the state, >> >threaten their very existence by putting them outside of the money >> >loop. > >> Strongly disagree. > >> In fact, the forces driving the current legislation, FBI, DoD, are more >> concerned not with being unable to decrypt in realtime than they are about >> being unable to distinquish, en masse, the bad actors encrypted >> communications with the paranoid but harmless crypto user. If crypto gets >> widespread enough there is no way to filter one from the other any longer. > >Your last sentence means that they can read crypted text. They even >hinted at it recently. But then, why the proposed law? How does this follow? It's purely a traffic analysis problem. Has nothing to do with cryptanalysis. >Do they indulge in statistical efficiency or do they want 99.9999+% >efficiency at their "filtering"? I'd say if they "filter" only, say, >90% of all communications and an Oklahoma City plan passes by in the >10% remaining, it won't be good enough for them. So, why the law if >they already can decrypt? Can you reasonnably expect the vilains >to use the most easy-to-crack and/or GAKed schemes? I dont understand how this follows either. >> The "private currency and taxation loss" is not even on the radar screens. >> Oliver Ireland, of the fed, thinks its just silly to think that way. Also >> see Kendall Houghton, (Committee on State Taxation) remarks on the subject. >> The powers that be just roll their eyes at the "no more taxes" >> crypto-radical crowd. > >If you were in their shoes, what would you say to the public? Ever >heard about the game called Poker? Did Santa told you they would >never lie to you? Don't be silly. The crypto-radical bunch is not taken very seriously. I'm not saying they should be, but face fact. Your ego aside, you must realize that government just doesn't think that taxation is really threatened by digital bearer devices. They think its threatened by the jurisdictional questions. Period. >In the last few weeks, I've been thinking about the utility and >security risk of using PGP if it can be cracked easily. > >And then, I realized that my reaction was probably just what they >expected: FUD to have people limit by themselves their use of strong >crypto. Coupled with the cops saying that "of course, we can decode >them, but just a tad too slow to protect your childs...", I now >believe they just can't crack it. I've always believed they can't. >And with it, comes their crackdown on crypto users, their e-$ and >their crypted love letters. Believe me, e$ is not really on the map yet, and to the extent it is on the horizon the person who will bring it to their attention has not bothered to yet.

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Re: Real issue of crypto controls: security or taxation loss?
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:34 PM 9/14/97 -0500, jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >Do they indulge in statistical efficiency or do they want 99.9999+% >efficiency at their "filtering"? I'd say if they "filter" only, say, >90% of all communications and an Oklahoma City plan passes by in the >10% remaining, it won't be good enough for them. There are several fallacies in this paragraph. I'll address two of them. First, you assume that terrorist actions are bad for the State. That is incorrect. Terroism, unless widely supported by the population, is of great benefit to the State. It helps to speed the passing of restrictive legislation. If you doubt this, please do some research on the laws passed in response to Oklahoma City in the US and the relevant laws passed throughout the EU during the late seventies and early eighties. Second, you assume that it would become widely know that the incriminating message was missed by the monitors. This is also incorrect, unless the monitors themselves choose to reveal the fact to support their future requests for increased monitoring capablities. The lack of positive identification of all participants on the Internet is a displeasing hole to the surveillance state. Only an Internet driver license can help patch this hole. --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. DES is dead! Please join in breaking RC5-56. http://rc5.distributed.net/

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IRS tax reform y2k style
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gary North has been predicting apocalypse on the y2k subject for awhile. but he has a lot of data to back his claims. this talks about the IRS computers and predicts they're going to collapse. ------- Forwarded Message - - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Gary North's > REMNANT REVIEW >emailbonus: Matt. 6:33-34 >year2000(a)garynorth.com > > Preparing the Remnant for the far side of the crisis > >Vol. 24, No. 9 590 September 5, 1997 > > I am hereby lifting the copyright of this issue of > Remnant Review. This one I want you to send to your > friends, neighbors, boss, Congressman, and anyone > else who might want advance information on the end, > at long last, of the 16th Amendment: vetoed by Year > 2000 noncompliant computers. Photocopy it, print it, > whatever. Then visit my Web site for full documen- > tation (under "Government"): > >THE ULTIMATE TAX REFORM: JANUARY 1, 2000 > > What I am about to report will verify what I have been saying all >year. If this doesn't constitute proof, I don't know what can persuade >you. From this point on, anyone who tells you that the Millennium Bug >is not a big deal, or who says, "We'll just have to wait and see about y2k, >there's no need to hurry," simply doesn't know what he's talking about. >Ignore him. > > On August 21, I stumbled into the most amazing government >document I have ever seen. I had read a brief news story about a >company that had applied for a contract to work as a subcontractor for >the IRS in a restructuring of its computer systems. The IRS admitted to >Congress last January that its $4 billion, 11-year attempt to modernize >its computer systems had failed. Here was a follow-up story. So, I went >to the company's Web site to find more information. This led me on a >merry chase across the Web. > > Finally I landed on the IRS's page -- specifically, its page relating to >its PRIME project. There were pages of blue links to documents, each >one with a strange name or the name of a state. It was not clear to me at >first what I had discovered. So, I started clicking links. I found nothing >that I could understand, link after link: government bureaucratese. >Then I hit pay dirt: the mother lode, my friends -- what we have been >waiting for since 1913. Deliverance. Free at last, free at last! THE >IRS'S MAINFRAME COMPUTERS -- 63 OF THEM, PLUS >MICROCOMPUTERS -- ARE ON THE BRINK OF TOTAL >COLLAPSE. Yee-hah! > > This amazing admission appears in an innocuously titled document, >"Request for Comments (RFC) for Modernization Prime Systems >Integration Services Contractor" (May 15, 1997). The author is Arthur >Gross, Associate Commissioner of the IRS and Chief Information >Officer, i.e., the senior IRS computer honcho. It was Mr. Gross who >went before Congress in January to admit defeat. > > Mr. Gross now says that the IRS is no longer capable of operating its >own computer systems. The IRS has over 7,500 people involved in just >computer maintenance, with a budget a $1 billion a year (Appendix B. >p. 2), yet they can no longer handle the load. And so, says Mr. Gross, >some of them are going to get fired. You can imagine the continuing >morale problem that this announcement will cause! The IS (information >systems) division will be, as they say, DOWNSIZED. From now on, the >IRS must achieve the following: > > . . . shifting the focus of IS management to a > business orientation: servicing customers with > exponentially increasing technology needs, > implementing massive new technology applications > on schedule within budget while managing the > downsizing of the IS organization > (Appendix B. p. 2). > > Do you think that people slaving away in their cubicles, trying to fix >the Millennium Bug, will respond favorably to this notice? "Fix it, and >then you're out!" Mr. Gross knows better. So, with this amazing >document, he calls on private industry to come in and TAKE OVER >THE ENTIRE IRS COMPUTER DIVISION. This is what Mr. Gross >calls "a strategic partnership" (p. 1). The new partners will have to fix >the Millennium Bug. The IRS will give them exactly eight months, start >to finish: October 1, 1998 to the end of June, 1999. > > The IRS's Digital Augean Stables > > Perhaps you have had trouble on occasion getting information from >the IRS about your account. After reading this document, I now know >why. The information is held in what the IRS calls "Master Files" (p. >4). These files are held in the Martinsburg, West Virginia, computer. >This computer receives data sent in by 10 regional centers that use a >total of 60 separate mainframes. These mainframes do not talk to each >other. Or, as Mr. Gross puts it, they are part of "an extraordinarily >complex array of legacy and stand-alone modernized systems with >respect both to connectivity and inoperability between the mainframe >platforms and the plethora of distributed systems" (p. 4). This is >bureaucratese, but I do understand the word, INOPERABILITY. > > The tax data build up in the local mainframes for five business days. >Then they are uploaded to West Virginia. This may take up to 10 actual >days. Then the Martinsburg computer sends it all back to the regional >computers in the Service Centers. Then the information is made >available to the "Customer Service Representatives" (p. 5), i.e., local tax >collectors. The elapsed time may take two weeks. > > But . . . it turns out that the actual source payment documents are not >sent to the Master Files. Neither is "specific payment or tax >information." This information stays in what the IRS calls >STOVEPIPED SYSTEMS, meaning stand-alone data bases "which, for >the most part, are not integrated with either the Master Files or the >corporate on-line system, IDRS" (p. 5). Separate tax assessments for the >same person can appear in six separate systems, and these do not >communicate with each other (p. 5). "Further, each system generates >management reporting information which is not homogeneous, one with >the other . . ." (p. 7). To help us visualize this mess, and much larger >messes, the document includes charts. These charts are so complex that >my printer was unable to print out the 116-page document -- probably >not enough RAM. I had to get two other people involved to get one >readable copy. > > I have included one of these charts on the back page, just for fun. Go >ahead. Take a quick look. No need to get out your magnifying glass >just yet. Then comes the key admission: "These infrastructures are >largely not century date compliant . . ." (p. 11). The phrase "century >date compliant" is the government's phrase for Year 2000-compliant. In >other words, THE IRS'S COMPUTERS ARE GOING TO CRASH. >Now hear this: > > In addition to three computing centers, (Memphis, > Detroit and Martinsburg) the latter of which is a > fully operational tax processing center, the IRS > deploys a total of sixty mainframes in its ten > regional service centers. > > None of the mainframes are compliant, thereby > necessitating immediate actions ranging from > systems software upgrades to replacement (p. 9). > >It gets worse: > > A still greater and far reaching wave of work > in the form of the Century Date Project is > cascading over the diminishing workforce that > is already insufficient to keep pace with the > historical levels of workload. For the Internal > Revenue Service, the Century Date Project is > uniquely challenging, given the aged and non- > century compliant date legacy applications and > infrastructure as well as thousands of undocumented > applications systems developed by business personnel > in the IRS field operations which are resident on > distributed infrastructures but not as yet > inventoried (p. 13). > > Notice especially two key words: "undocumented" and "inventoried." >"Undocumented" means there is no code writer's manual. They either >lost it or they never had it. "Inventoried" means they know where all of >the code is installed. But it says: "not as yet inventoried." How much >code? Lots. > > The IS organization has inventoried and scheduled > for analysis and conversion, as required, the > approximately 62 million lines of computer code > comprising the IRS core business systems. With > respect to the business supported field > applications and infrastructures, however, we do > not know what we do not know. Until central field > systems and infrastructures are completed, the IRS > will be unable to analyze, plan, and schedule the > field system conversion (p. 13). > > I love this phrase: WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WE DO NOT >KNOW. This is surely not bureaucratese. Now, let's put all of this into >a clearer perspective. The Social Security Administration discovered its >y2k problem in 1989. In 1991, programmers began to work on >correcting the agency's 30 million lines of code. By mid-1996, they had >completed repairs on 6 million lines (CIO Magazine, Sept. 15, 1996.) >Got that? It took five years for them to fix 6 million lines. But the IRS >has 62 million lines THAT THEY KNOW ABOUT, but they don't know >about the rest. It's out there, but there is no inventory of it. > > Consider the fact that they have not completed their inventory. The >1996 "California White Paper," which is the y2k guide issued by the IS >division of the California state government's y2k repair project, says that >inventory constitutes 1% of the overall code repair project. Awareness >is 1%. So, after you get finished with inventory, YOU HAVE 98% OF >YOUR PROJECT AHEAD OF YOU. Meanwhile, the IRS has not yet >completed its inventory. > > The IRS has led the American welfare state into a trap. The Federal >government, like the U.S. economy, will be restructured in the year >2000. Most Americans will be in bankruptcy by 2001, but they will be >free. > > Meanwhile, the news media are all a-dither about the Clinton- >Congress accord on taxes, which will balance the budget in 2002. As >George Gobel used to say, "Suuuuuure it will." Who is going to collect >revenues in 2000? > > Please Help Get Us Out of This Mess! > > The next section of Mr. Gross's report I find truly unique. When was >the last time you read something like this in an agency's report on its >own capacity? (The next time will be the first.) > > THE CHALLENGE: THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS (IS) > ORGANIZATION LACKS SUFFICIENT TECHNICAL > MANAGEMENT CAPACITY TO SIMULTANEOUSLY > SUPPORT TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT, EFFECTUATE THE > CENTURY DATE CONVERSION AND MANAGE > MODERNIZATION (p. 13). > > This states the IRS's problem clearly: its computer systems are just >barely making it now, and the Year 2000 Problem will torpedo them. > > Mr. Gross then announces the IRS's solution: quit. The IRS has >now admitted that "tax administration is its core business" and it will >now "shift responsibility for systems development and integration >services to the private sector . . ." (p. 54). But first, it must find some >well-heeled partners. > > "The IRS has acknowledged that its expertise now and in the future >is tax administration." This means that "the IS organization must be >rebuilt to preserve the existing environment and partner with the private >sector to Modernize the IRS" (p. 13). I love it when someone capitalizes >"Modernize." Especially when it really means "officially bury." > > Then the coup de grace: "Any reasonable strategy to move forward, >therefore, would focus on managing the immediate crisis -- 'stay in >business' while building capacity to prepare for future Modernization" >(p. 14). Then comes part 2 of the report: > > The Next Eighteen Months: > Staying in Business and > Preparing for Modernization > > Mr. Gross knows that there is a deadline, and it isn't 2000. It's >months earlier. He has selected June, 1999. Most organizations have >selected December, 1998. This allows a year for testing. Mr. Gross is >more realistic. He knows late 1998 is too early. The IRS can't do it. (I >would say that late 2008 is too early. The IRS has tried to revamp its >computer system before.) > > . . . the IRS must undertake and complete major infrastructure >initiatives no later than June 1999, to minimally ensure century date >compliance for each of its existing mainframes and/or their successor >platforms. At the same time, the IRS must complete the inventory of its >field infrastructures as well as develop and exercise a century date >compliance plan for the conversion replacement and/or elimination of >those infrastructures. (p. 19). > > Then comes an astounding sentence. This sentence is astounding >because it begins with the word, IF. (Note: RFC stands for Request for >Comment.) > > IF THE INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS BECOMES >AVAILABLE, UPDATES WILL BE PROVIDED TO POTENTIAL >OFFERERS TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING RESPONSES TO THE >RFC. > > If...? IF...? He is warning all those private firms that he is inviting >in >to clean up the mess that they may not be given the code analysis. But >code analysis constitutes the crucial 15% of any Year 2000 repair job, >according to the California White Paper. Then, and only then, can code >revision begin. > > Meanwhile, the IRS system's code is collapsing even without y2k. >The programmers are not able to test all of the new code. Mr. Gross >calls this "Product Assurance." This division, he says, has "sunk to >staffing levels less than 30 percent of the minimum industry standard . . >. ." This makes it "one of the highest priorities within the IS >organization, given that, today, major tax systems are not subjected to >comprehensive testing prior to being migrated to production" (p. 15). In >short, Congress passes new tax code legislation, and the IRS >programmers implement these changes WITHOUT TESTING THE >NEW CODE. Now comes y2k. As he says, "the Century Date >Conversion will place an extraordinary additional burden on the Product >Assurance Program." I don't want to bore you, but when I find the most >amazing government document I've ever seen, I just can't stop. Neither >could Mr. Gross: > > Regrettably, the challenge is far more overarching: to modernize >functioning but aged legacy systems which have been nearly irreparably >overlaid by and interfaced with a tangle of stovepiped distributed >applications systems and networked infrastructures (p. 55). > > I'll summarize. The IRS has got bad code on 63 aging mainframe >systems, plus micros. It has lost some of the code manuals. It does not >know how much code it has. It must now move ("migrate") the data >from these y2k noncompliant computers -- data stored in legacy >programs that are not y2k compliant -- to new computers with new >programs. These computers must interact with each other, unlike >today's system. Bear in mind that some of this code -- I have seen >estimates as high as 30% -- is written in Assembler language, which is >not understood by most programmers today: perhaps 50,000 of them, >worldwide (Cory Hamasaki's estimate). Then everything must be tested, >side by side, old system vs. new system, on mainframe computers, before >anyone can trust anything. (This assumes that extra mainframes are >available, but they aren't.) Warning: > > Beyond the magnitude of the applications system migration, the >complexity and enormity of the date conversion that would be required >necessitates careful planning and risk mitigation strategies (e.g., parallel >processing). While the risks inherent in Phase III may be nearly >incalculable given the age of the systems, the absence of critical >documentation, dependency on Assembler Language Code (ALC) and >the inevitable turnover of IRS workforce supporting these systems, it is >essential to plan and execute the conversion of the Master Files and its >related suite of applications (p. 30). > > I'll say it's essential! The key question is: Is it possible? No. > > Can you believe this sentence? "The risks inherent in Phase III may >be nearly incalculable . . ." What does he mean, "may be"? They ARE. > > Meanwhile, Congress keeps changing the Internal Revenue Code. >This creates a programming nightmare: coding the new laws. So, how >big is this project? Here is how Mr. Gross describes it: "Modernization >is the single largest systems integration undertaking in world eclipsing >in breadth and depth any previous efforts of either the public or private >sector. Given the fluid nature of the Nation's Tax Laws, Modernization >is likely to be the most dynamic, creating even greater complexity and, >in turn, compounding the risks" (p. 54). Many, many risks. > > Two questions arise: (1) Who is going to fix it? (2) At what price? >The answer? He has no answer. All he knows is that this project is so >huge that NORMAL COMPETITIVE BIDDING WILL NOT WORK. >For this project, the IRS is not saying what its "partners" will be paid. >It's open for negotiation. > > You may be thinking: "Boondoggle." I'm thinking: "Legal liability >in 2000 larger than any company's board of directors would rationally >want to risk, unless they think Congress will pass a no-liability law in >2000." Here is Mr. Gross's description of the special arrangement. Pay >close attention to the words "competitive process." He bold faces them; I >do, too. > > Our challenge, therefore, is to FORGE A BUSINESS PLAN AND > PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP in accordance with federal > governmental procurement laws and regulations ABSENT THE > TRADITIONAL LEVEL OF DETAILED REQUIREMENTS > TYPICALLY ESTABLISHED AS THE BASIS OF THE > COMPETITIVE PROCESS (p. 60). > > He calls on businesses to create a "DETAILED SYSTEMS >DEVELOPMENT PLAN" (p. 60). He goes on: "In general, the IRS >seeks to create a business plan which: Shares risk with the private >sector; Incents [incents???!!!] the private sector to either share or >assume the 'front end' capital investment . . ." (p. 60). Read it again. >Yes, it really says that. THE IRS WANTS THE PRIVATE SECTOR >TO PUT UP MOST OR ALL OF THE MONEY TO FIX ITS ENTIRE >SYSTEM. > > This is why the minimum requirement for a company to make a bid >is $200 million in working capital. It has to have experience in >computers. It must be able to repair 5 million lines of code (p. 70). > > How complex is this job? The complexity is mind-boggling: a seven- >volume "Modernization Blueprint." To buy it on paper costs $465, or >you can get a copy on a free CD-ROM. Needless to say, I got the CD- >ROM. > > So, you think, at least the IRS is getting on top of this problem. >Suuuuure, it is. The contract award date is [let's hear a drum roll, >please]: October 1, 1998 (p. 73). How realistic is this? You may >remember Mr. Gross's deadline: June 1999. So, he expects these firms >to be able to fix 62 million lines of noncompliant code, if they can find >the missing code in the field offices, even though the IRS has lost the >documentation for some of this code, in an eight-month window of >productivity. Social Security isn't compliant after seven years of work >on less than half the IRS's number of lines of code. > > The IRS is facing a complete breakdown. Its staff can't fix the code. >The IRS wants private firms to pay for the upgrade and manage the >computer systems from now on. It does not know how much code it has. >It does not have manuals for all of the old code. It does not even know >how to pay the firms that get the contracts: either by "contractually >agreed upon fees" or "pursuant to measurable outcomes of the >implemented systems" (p. 61). It has called for very large and >experienced firms to submit comments by October 1, 1997. > > In short, the IRS does not know what it is doing, let alone what it has >to do. It only knows that it has to find a few suckers in private industry >to bear the costs of implementing a new, improved IRS computer system >and then assume responsibility for getting it Year 2000-compliant >between October 1, 1998 and the end of June 1999. ("There's one born >every minute.") Here are 12 companies that have expressed interest: >Anderson Consulting, Computer Sciences Corporation, EDS >Government Services (EDS is not itself y2k compliant), GTE >Government Systems, Hughes Information Technology Systems, IBM, >Litton PRC, Lockheed Martin Corporation, Northrup Grumman >Corporation, Ratheon E-Systems, Tracor Information Systems >Company, and TRW. The list is posted at: > >http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/irs/prime/interest.htm > > Conclusion > > It's all over but the shouting. The IRS is going bye-bye. >Accompanying it will be the political career of Mr. Gingrich and the >historical reputation of Mr. Clinton. Bill Clinton will be remembered as >the President on whose watch the Federal government shut down and >stayed shut down. First Mate Newt will try to avoid going down with >the ship of state, but he won't make it. And as for Al Gore . . . . Well, >maybe he can get a job herding cattle on the Texas ranch of his ex- >roommate at Harvard, Tommy Lee Jones. Think of it: not "Gore in >2000," but GORED IN 2000. Mr. Information Highway will hit a dead >end. > > On June 30, 1999, the IRS will know that its computers are still >noncompliant. On the next day, July 1, fiscal year 2000 rolls over on >the Federal government's computers and on every state government's >computer that has not rolled over (and shut down) on a bi-annual basis >on July 1, 1998. Almost every state: about half a dozen will roll over on >October 1, 1999. > > In 1999, chaos will hit the financial markets, all over the world -- >assuming that this does not happen earlier, which I do not assume. The >public will know the truth in 1999: THE DEFAULT ON U.S. >GOVERNMENT DEBT IS AT HAND. The tax man won't be able to >collect in 2000. The tax man will be blind. Consider how many banks >and money market funds are filled with T-bills and T-bonds. Consider >how the government will operate with the IRS completely shut down. >Congress hasn't thought much about this. Neither has Bill Clinton. > > > > - - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNBxwqA1+em56DF4lAQGQSQf8CmdfnQ8VVaABHBc8sr+Ux//h/CFJLCB3 toMNaHcVKv9IC/awB/2V4UVv5pq2z6yRgR/2Xl3npJNR91OFJp1Kbg5Q79XKrmYs 73odoCPeGHvkzS8oPouuHQzvv1csz/t7cHFwl2xeE7PppbvaoGBkkzavxaQT+5MF ZJJ9MFQP71R9gdgIzRN1lvhFxYBiuBVfUWZ/Xm2663J56QjGPkscYbE++Ka1aWMy ZDvtbVgaUYZo9NM7nv1zD+b1YzUuOCo0R5Mw07wINnTaLSlw5doNDXDhKINZuFgi wHh0M7vOSM9pvOoJpYu75kB5anpEgSUQBST+YouaKrL8WHx5G3lHfg== =4ELb - - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: Jack Doolin <jackdoolin(a)earthlink.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Elliptic Curve library for visual basic
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.jim.com/jamesd/tools.htm An OLE extension to visual basic, providing elliptic curve cryptographic operations and true random numbers. This was written for my own purposes. I wrote it because visual basic is the by far the fastest way of creating a certain kind of program with a reasonably acceptable user interface. However I believe it will be generally useful to anyone who wishes to create a cryptographic program that manages a database, or who merely wants to get a cryptographic program with an attractive user interface up quickly. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Welcome to The New York Times on the Web
by verify＠nytimes.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for joining The New York Times on the Web community. Your subscriber ID is twatsrus Your e-mail address is cypherpunks(a)toad.com Please save this message for future reference. You can return to The New York Times on the Web by going to: http://www.nytimes.com/ As a new subscriber, you may want to visit the Help Center at: http://www.nytimes.com/subscribe/help/ Please DO NOT REPLY to this message. If you did not authorize this registration and wish to have it canceled please FORWARD this message to: cancel(a)nytimes.com

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Club Pix
by dtrende＠bw.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Digested version?
by Steve Mynott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a digested version of this list available? -- Steve Mynott, work: http://webmedia.com/ +44 171 317 1341 ---- strange: http://machine-elves.com/ mobile: 0956 265761 | \_|_\ pegwit v8 public key = \ |_|_| | cbecf90546ea12b28de9e6fdbb956ee8cf83bbcd63726a93643f44a474acdfb9 \|__\|

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Mandatory Voluntary Cencorship in OZ
by Apache 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

full text at: http://www.australian.aust.com/archive/15-Sep/n01.htm Howard moves to censor secrets By defence writer DON GREENLEES September 15: The Federal Government is renewing efforts to protect national defence and intelligence secrets under a revived system of media censorship. Cabinet's National Security Committee decided early this month to start talks with media executives on voluntary censorship and backed away from threats by the former government to impose $1 million ($US723,000) fines over publication of official secrets. But the Government will put the onus on the media to make voluntary censorship work or ultimately face legislation that would impose huge fines for disclosure of sensitive military and intelligence information. It comes almost two years after the Labor government reached an impasse with media executives over a proposal for a "voluntary" system backed by $1 million fines for a prohibited broadcast or publication. The move followed revelations by disaffected former Australian Secret Intelligence Service agents of spying operations and about the bugging by Australian intelligence of foreign embassies, including China's and Japan's. Senior sources said the six-member Cabinet security committee, chaired by John Howard, had decided to take a more conciliatory line than the former government by first trying a genuinely voluntary system to maximise the chances of winning media agreement.

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