December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Oh to be a mouse in the corner...
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>PR 10/17 1720 ABA: TERRORISM EXPERTS TO SPEAK > >including former CIA Director William Colby, former FBI Director William >Sessions, and Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, whose state was the site of the >worst domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history. I thought the Civil War was the worst? DCF

1 0

[NOISE], period
by Steven Champeon - Imonics Development 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Wed Oct 18 20:55:59 1995 | Subject: Re: 50 attacks... [NOISE] | X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL22] | Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com | X-Status: | | Dr. Cohen wrote: | | Boy, you people just don't appreciate anything that has a little bit of | humor mixed with a little bit of reality. It's that 'little bit of reality' that concerns me. | 2 - I can't believe that you all think that aplets (a.k.a. downloadable | programs at the push of a button) will make you safe. The "we will only | run trusted applets and they will all be secure" attitude is 180 degrees | off base from my view. I think it is a misstatement to say that any of us believe that applets will "make us safe". I believe that applets, combined with the ability to configure your local browser such that it scans all incoming programs for security exceptions, combined with the ability to completely remove those classes which allow risky things to occur, combined with the opportunity to utilize these technologies within trusted channels (i.e., internal nets) in order to reduce load on our web servers, etc. is an enormous breakthrough. As such, we are taking our time to review the manner in which the classes are structured, the VM is structured, and the security mechanisms are enabled. This appears to be something which you refuse to do. | 3 - I would have figured at least one of you would have looked up the | chosen plaintext attack and told me why Netscape keys can't be gotten | at this way. I think there's an off change I could win a grand! Here you reveal more about the poverty of your motives than you could possibly imagine. | 4 - If you just keep quiet, I may be able to get $50K out of Netscape | for a few minutes of typing. If they can make a billion on hype, why | can't I make $50K? Because you haven't done your homework. | 8 - The first 50 flamers responding to this message get a free 1 Gigabyte | email message every day for the next week. Anonymous remailers included. Oh, I hope I'm still one of the first 50 (I doubt it). I'd love to see the expression on the face of whoever runs your system. "You sent a 1Gb mail message through our mailer?!?" Steve -- Steven Champeon (919) 469-7833 Technical Lead, schampeo(a)imonics.com Imonics Web Services webmaster(a)imonics.com

1 0

Re: 50 attacks... [NOISE]
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Boy, you people just don't appreciate anything that has a little bit of humor mixed with a little bit of reality. 1 - I can't believe that you failed to see any humor in the fifty ways to leave your Netscape posting. I would have thought some of you would have noticed that a substantial number of these methods would work with current W3 browsers! Do I really have to set up a URL to prove it to you? If I do, what good will it do me? 2 - I can't believe that you all think that aplets (a.k.a. downloadable programs at the push of a button) will make you safe. The "we will only run trusted applets and they will all be secure" attitude is 180 degrees off base from my view. 3 - I would have figured at least one of you would have looked up the chosen plaintext attack and told me why Netscape keys can't be gotten at this way. I think there's an off change I could win a grand! 4 - If you just keep quiet, I may be able to get $50K out of Netscape for a few minutes of typing. If they can make a billion on hype, why can't I make $50K? 5 - How much do you want to bet that within 12 months of my posting, at least 10 of the 50 listed items will have happened in one form or another? I got the same flaming 8 months ago when I mentioned that I thought syslog could be gotten at because of the way it was designed. I got piles of flames telling me to show code or stop smearing syslog. Three months later, a syslog attack appeared, and three months later, another one showed up. 6 - I think that it is the responsibility of the people who claim "security" to tell us what they mean by it and to demonstrate why we should believe them. You may disagree, but I didn't see any flames when I asked what they meant by secure only a few days ago. I also didn't see any answers. 7 - I got one assertion that the reason my earlier message was perceived as malicious was because I started with the word WRONG!!! It's probably correct that that's why I got flamed for it, so from now on, I want you all to design your mail filters to replace WRONG!!! in my postings with I respectfully disagree. 8 - The first 50 flamers responding to this message get a free 1 Gigabyte email message every day for the next week. Anonymous remailers included. -- -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

4 4

textbooks
by hallyn＠cs.hope.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PGP message

2 1

Java power
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At the recent cypherpunks meeting about Java, I was fairly skeptical of its power, especially its ability to do anything useful towards interesting cypherpunk projects. I've been thinking about it a bit more, and I believe I was overly pessimistic. My thinking problem was that I was envisioning Java as a replacement for ordinary HTTP server interaction (such as CGI scripts). I still believe that, absent HTTP server interaction, Java applets are quite limited. However, now that I've started thinking about systems that are built using a combination of Java and servers, the universe has expanded a lot. I'm still unclear about the exact security policy implemented by Java browsers, but this is my understanding: * No access to local files at all. * Can only access URLs on same server as applet came from. Actually, I'm pretty sure the latter is an oversimplification, that the applet can contact any socket as long as it is on the same IP host as the applet itself. However, since HTTP can do pretty much anything any other socket can, the only difference that makes is performance. Here's the "big insight" I had: the server can make up _both_ of these deficiencies, by acting as a file server and communications proxy. Essentially what this architecture does is shift the security burden from the client to the server. In this way, the applet can become "net complete," rather than merely Turing complete. I see one big drawback to this approach. Setting up a server like this is pretty expensive, and using it takes up precious resources. Not everyone has access to a fully scriptable server, which will limit a lot of people. One concern is the "parasitic" use of file system resources on the server. However, there may be a certain amount of security through obscurity that makes this ok. If all Java browsers enforce the policy of only allowing connections to the home host of the applet, then you won't be getting connections from other, parasitic applets. The remaining danger is rogue Java browsers, and non-Java applications that talk to the server, pretending to be Java applets. Some form of authentication could be used to reduce the impact of these attacks. I do see this kind of architecture used to supply services at, say, an organizational level. For example, the "scheduling" scenario could be implemented quite handily, including authentication of access to the schedules, and even distributed scheduling if the different servers are talking to each other. Another scenario which works is email, even including transparent encryption. This one is interesting to me, so I'll go into a little more detail. In this scenario, the server acts as a file server for keyrings (both public and secret) and mail spools. Here's a typical sequence of events for me getting my mail and replying to one message: 1. I call up the JavaMail web page, which is just a wrapper for the JavaMail applet. 2. The JavaMail applet starts with a forms-style login screen. I type my username. 3. The applet asks the server for my mail spool (given the username and perhaps also a password for authentication). 4. The applet displays my mail spool on the screen and lets me fiddle with it, scrolling through it, reading messages, etc. 5. Let's say one of those messages is encrypted with my public key. The applet, recognizing that fact, queries the server for my secret key, encrypted of course (with a symmetric cypher). 6. I type my password to the applet, which lets it decrypt the secret key. 7. Now, that it has my secret key, the applet can RSA-decrypt the encrypted mail and show it to me. 8. I want to reply to the message, so I hit 'r'. The applet gives me a window for typing my reply. When I'm done, I click "send". The applet queries the server for the recipient's public key. 9. When the applet gets the public key, it RSA-encrypts the message and sends it to the server for delivery. 10. When the mail has been delivered, the server notifies the applet of the fact. To me, this is an exciting scenario. Note that, as long as you trust the browser, this lets you read your mail from anywhere. I have no idea whether this scheme is practical. One temporary drawback is the speed of RSA operations. However, this will get fixed when there is native code generation or a bignum library, whichever comes first. Even before then, performance can still be good, using two techniques. First, implement a cache of decrypted session keys (also stored on the server in symmetrically encrypted form). Second, don't display a new email message until it's been decrypted. That way, the RSA operation affects only the latency of mail delivery, not the bandwidth of reading through messages. Of course, these techniques will also dramatically improve performance even for native code crypto. I can see people setting up servers like this for themselves. However, here's an idea on how to set these servers up "for profit." In return for providing file system and mail communications services, the server would expect clients to search keyspaces during idle cycles. When Java goes native code, the computing power thus tapped could be quite substantial. I'm interested to hear what people think about these proposals. Is this something that cypherpunks should be doing full steam ahead? Raph

2 2

Re: SciAm Bye-Byes Privacy
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Scientific American, November, 1995 > >Rights of Privacy > >Technology has its eyes on you > >But the search for personalization in a high-tech world >may create an uncomfortable situation in the global >village. Villages are safe places but not very private >ones. Mrs. Grundy, peering from behind her lace curtains, >did stop housebreakers. but she also tried to halt many >other things of which she disapproved. There are signs >that Grundyism is returning to Britain. For those who have neglected their education: 1798 Theater --- "Speed the Plough" by English playwright Thomas Morton, 34. "Be quiet, wull ye [says farmer Ashfield]. Always ding, dinging Dame Grundy into my ears-What will Mrs. Grundy say? What will Mrs. Grundy think?" DCF

1 0

Re: Netscape rewards are an insult [NOISE]
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff Weinstein wrote: >John Young wrote: >> >> Responding to msg by stripes(a)va.pubnix.com ("Josh M. Osborne") >> on Sun, 15 Oct 12:0 AM >> >> The PR of Bugs Bounty is the aim, as the quick-market-adapter >> Netscape Chair speechified in FR. >> >> Promoting the notion that hackers are earnestly attacking >> Netscape and reporting its bugs increases its credibility to >> the stock market porkers. Is that not why dear >> all-too-attentive Jeff has been assigned duty on this list, >> feeding peanuts to chimp hackers and champ newshacks? > > I have not been "assigned duty" on this list. I'm here of my >own free will. I want to keep up on whats going on in the >cypherpunk world, and sometimes tap the expertise of the list. >I'm not some corporate flack assigned here to "feed the chimps". >My personal feelings definitely lean toward unimpeded strong >crypto, personal privacy, freedom from govt. surveilence, etc., >and I was interested in this stuff at a personal level before >joining netscape, or working on security stuff. > > --Jeff So a reviewer stepped in and accused the rock star of having "sold out"... Does working as a programmer for a "major label" on a top-40 hit mean you're not true to your artistic roots any more? Or does "working within the system" permanently disqualify you from rebel/outcast status? OK, sorry, enough of the cliches. :-) Richard

1 0

Motherload of Crypto Site...
by frenchie＠magus.dgsys.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I hope that I'm providing some useful info here. I came accross this site in DDJ (Oct 95). A comprehensive amount of crypto stuff available. Crypto Stuff -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Admiration, n.: Our polite recognition of another's resemblance to ourselves. -- Ambrose Bierce, iQCVAgUBMIVvH7bmxeO+s+1xAQHS+AP+ImrrqcHfBi6OGOyu5tSAhNHrpkvPE9E5 qh3e8TsFfbyxq1UXgz73FEFfalhs3GeZOgye5DKp0/vsTQ+ZwQyizKX0XhM/MsNT zFnv7B2uOACljwqjiMCc6ZiNA25nXveA+TMIa1sZkhTMtwHzVFogE7X4S91F2gBg Til3urgFAWU= =C/CT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- =====================PGP Encrypted Mail Preferred======================== PGP Public Keys: 1024/BEB3ED71 & 2047/D9E1F2E9 on request. As soon as any man says of the affairs of the state " What does it matter to me? " the state may be given up for lost. J.J.Rousseau - The Social Contract GAT/E/O d++@>- H--- s: a29 C+++$ UL++++($) P+>+++ L++>++++ E W+++ N++ K- w---- O- M- V-- PS+ PE++ Y+ PGP+++ t 5+ X R* tv b++ DI++ D++ G++ e h+ r y++ [Geek Code v3.0] a.k.a [ root(a)magus.dgsys.com / vamagus(a)delphi.com] ==========================================================================

2 1

Re: responce to graphic encryption replies
by privsoft＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

find attached the document on PrivaSoft in txt format. Once again if you have any comments please call or E-mail me. Steve Orrin Mgr. Tech Services ************************************************* PrivaSoft TM * 1877 Springfield Ave PO BOX 600 * Maplewood NJ 07040-0600 * Tel. 201-378-8865 Fax. 201-762-3742 * Http://www.privasoft.com/privasoft * E-mail: privsoft(a)ix.netcom.com * ************************************************* How Secure Can PrivaSoft Be? Introduction PrivaSoft is a communication security product, and the user is entitled to know how secure it is. This document addresses the question of cryptographic strength of PrivaSoft. Export license regulations In some advanced countries, cryptographic products are categorized as "munitions" and their use, sale or exportation is controlled by local licensing regulations. PrivaSoft has obtained an export license from the governments of Israel and the USA. Licen ses in other countries are obtained in coordination with the local distributors. The typical policy is to limit the allowable cryptographic strength of commercial products to a level that is strong enough for commercial purposes. The basic intention of this regulation is to protect the state from abuse of too strong cryptographic products by terrorists and criminals. Some countries do not practice such law because it is viewed as a denial of freedom of expression. PrivaSoft willfully complies with the se regulations as it is a commercial product, and it is not intended for national security applications with its current key length which is the maximum legally allowable for commercial users. The cryptographic engine of PrivaSoft PrivaSoft uses a pseudo-random generator that is seeded by a 9 digit number uniformly normalized from the user's secret key. The engine is proprietary, designed according to the rules of modern cryptology to make the best use of the allowable key length. Like other dependable cryptographic engines, the structure of the encryption software can be disclosed without compromising the security of the user. However, the coding and specific parameters of the mechanism are considered a trade secret and will be disclosed for the purpose of cryptoanalytic validation when necessary and under an appropriate non-disclosure non-competition agreement. The use of default keys When secret keys or passwords are used by laymen, there is always a conflict between security and convenience: The user tends to use fixed, easily memorized keys again and again, while the cryptoanalyst only waits for an opportunity to see many messages encrypted by the same key. PrivaSoft, being a secure commercial product must live in peace with both - allow the user to use a repetitive, default key, and deny the cryptoanalyst the pleasure of having many messages encrypted by one key. This is done by using the pseudo-random "key extension" feature which is described in the PrivaSoft user's guide. The information contents a clear message If a cryptographic product is properly designed, then the almost only way to crack it is to try all possible keys. If the process is done by a computer, the "cracking"" software must be taught to tell the correct key from the wrong keys. This can only b e done if there are some properties of the decrypted message that are known a - priori. With the PrivaSoft analogue graphical encryption, and with the naturally noisy fax images, a significant portion of the page must be reconstructed, and a significant amount of mathematical correlation must be calculated between neighboring areas of the image, before the cracking software can tell whether the candidate key is wrong. This makes the cracking process much slower than in alphanumeric encryption of the tex t in a natural language. The 9 digit key, when applied to analogue, the graphical encryption is equivalent to a much longer key applied to alphanumeric encryption. The cryptographically oriented user can make it very much harder by some smart pre-proces sing of the image prior to its encryption. A simple example: For a short message, increasing the font size of the text by a factor of 10 will significantly increase the time required for breaking the encryption. Customized versions of PrivaSoft PrivaSoft is unique in being a one-stop product than can serve all types of modern correspondence, including E-mail, fax and paper printouts. Special applications that need and can obtain a license to use non-commercial cryptographic engines can be accom modated by special versions of PrivaSoft. The cryptographic engine can be customer-furnished and customer integrated, however - since in some areas the integration of this product with certain cryptographic engines may be considered "munitions", each cus tomized version of the product has to be licensed separately in accordance with the laws of the territory where it was created and used.

2 1

Re: REMINDER: SF Federal Building, Oct 20, 1015AM: Bernstein case
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:02 PM 10/19/95 -0400, Thomas Grant Edwards wrote: >Q: Will they allow CU-SeeMe in the courtroom? (over Metricom radio modem?) > >-Thomas > No cameras allowed in federal courtrooms. DCF

1 0