December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

away from my mail
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I will not be reading my mail for a while. Your mail concerning "Re: CFV: rec.knives" will be read when I'm back.

1 0

spam apology
by zinc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cpunks, sorry for my recent spam of the list due my inept testing of how procmail interacts with the vacation program. -pjf patrick finerty = zinc(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu = pfinerty(a)nyx.cs.du.edu U of Utah biochem grad student in the Bass lab - zinc fingers + dsRNA! ** FINGER zinc-pgp(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu for pgp public key - CRYPTO! zifi runs LINUX 1.2.11 -=-=-=WEB=-=-=-> http://zifi.genetics.utah.edu

1 0

Re: Digital Fingerprinting
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Many interesting points here...but I'll stick to just one: At 2:56 AM 9/11/95, Douglas Barnes wrote: > On the legal front, it's not clear what you can do to someone > even if you _can_ prove that the 100,000 pirate copies of Windows > 95 circulating in Amsterdam stemmed from his copy. Machines get > hacked, co-workers and family members often have free access to > machines running software -- it's not clear that media companies > _want_ to invoke the paranoia associated with potential responsibility > for millions of dollars in damages if someone makes an illegal copy > of one's software and the loaves and fishes ensue. [Imagine what > great revenge this would make for jealous co-workers, ex-wives, etc.] If a piece of mail addressed to me is found littering the highway, can I be convicted of littering? No, because the _provenance_ of that item of mail cannot be determined...it might have accidentally blown out of a trash truch delivering my mail to the dump, for example. Ditto for most schemes to serialize software. As Doug notes, the offending item might have been copied when I wasn't looking, copied by my girlfriend when I was away, or even copied at the factory or at the software store prior to my gaining control. Or copied after I discarded it. (Requiring owners of Microsoft Word to treat it like a state secret--more on state secrets in a minute--is impractical and unenforceable.) One thing serialization could do is to allow proof that a distributor had not acquired a particular copy/instance through normal channels. But it's usually obvious anyway when Joe's Really Cheap Warez has 200 copies of Microsoft Word, all with the same serial number. The "light signatures" scheme I've written about here could be used to authenticate the distribution media itself, though not the installed copies of course. (This would be like the Microsoft hologram, except in spades.) Since the technology for this is not available to home or business users, I don't see this as a viable approach. Another thing that could work to foil mass counterfeiters is to serialize the diskettes and include a hash of the serial number, as some lottery tickets now include. Counterfeiters could try two basic approaches: 1. Make up their own numbers. But they could not compute a valid hash, as they lacked the (presumably secret) knowledge to do so. With public key approaches, a customer could "authenticate" that at least Microsoft, say, must have generated the number. (This doesn't take care of multiple copies of the same serial number, which takes us to:) 2. Multiple copies of a single, valid serial number. Here, the counterfeiter directly copies both the serial number and its hash. (This approach doesn't work to counterfeit lottery tickets. The reason is left as an exercise for the reader.) One way I can think of to head this off is to have a registry of "taken" or "sold" numbers, in which serial numbers are deposited. A purchaser could consult this data base to see if the number on the package he is planning to buy is already registered. (There are complications about time delays, and so forth, but this would eventually limit multiple same number packages.) This discussion assumes that purchasers are interested in getting valid, non-counterfeit programs. Many are not, of course. Certain types of programs pretty much require support by the vendor, others don't. A standard discussion topic. I said I'd mention "state secrets" again. The usual example for making subtle modifications to documents to see who leaked it is the intelligence community, which gave us the term "barium" (because the changes look like barium in an x-ray diagnostic). In that case, the agencies can enforce their laws in a draconian way, sometimes merely by suspicion. And the workarounds we discuss, of DIFFing the files, are unlikely to be practical. ("Hey, Sid, can I borrow your copy of "Covert Operations in Bosnia" so I can DIFF it with my copy?") --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Re: spam apology
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>cpunks, > >sorry for my recent spam Look, the SPAM was hot, and there wasn't too much VELVEETA added other than the mail.cyperpunks category, so it tasted fairly good. It hadn't passed the expiration date, so all is forgiven. Love Always, Carol Anne ps Has anyone ever heard of alt.skullfuck.charles-eicher? Even Gloria Segal doesn't reap that much hatred. -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

1 0

Thought Police Make Bust
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WEIRDNUZ.492 (News of the Weird, July 11, 1997) by Chuck Shepherd * Brothers Geoffrey and Aaron Kuffner were arrested in New Orleans in June and charged with terrorism as the ones who had recently mailed or hand-delivered suspicious packages to local government and news media offices. The packages contained innocuous items (which nonetheless were frightening enough that two offices called for evacuations) and a four-page manifesto vowing that "Violent Acts of Consciousness Have Only Begun." According to police, the men's goal was to call attention to public ignorance of poetry and that among their demands was that all state inaugural speeches be written in iambic pentameter. Cypherpunks Action Project #323a: Post a message to the list in iambic pentameter. (That'll show 'em.) Cypherpunks Action Project #323b: Turn yourself into the police as a terrorist, for "Violent Acts of Subconsiousness." Take your Dream Diary with you, as proof. Cypherpunks Action Project #323c: Write your violent dreams in iambic pentameter. PentaMonger

1 0

draft key mgmt props
by A5113643667＠attpls.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Cypherpunks, Does anyone here feel like explaining the situation between the three key management proposals now at the internet draft stage? Peace

2 1

PGP in UK - snooped as unSTEALTHed?
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Received: by toad.com id AA16930; Sun, 10 Sep 95 02:10:05 PDT >From: anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com >Subject: PGP in UK >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I heard something rather disturbing the other day from someone I do >business with. I've been telling this company for 18 months or so >about the advantages of PGP and email rather than faxes, and they >finally tried it, liked it, and decided to use it a month or so ago. >Last week they got a visit from the Department of Trade of Industry >and MI5 (or is it MI6?) telling them to stop using PGP or they might >find difficulties getting export licences for their products in >future. The visitors wouldn't say how they knew this company had >been using it. PGP IS MARKED! Well, I just used MIT's PGP 2.6.2 with 3 different users' public keys to encrypt 3 different files. In all 3 files, the first 3 characters were the same (an umlauted A, then an i with an up arrow over it, and then a heart). This beginning 3 character string is apparently the infamous PGP RSA signature. The signature that says to spooks' programmed encryption sniffers - "HEY! I'M PGP - GIVE ME A LOOK!." When are the PGP designers and coders going to get serious and de- velope STEALTH PGP inside PGP itself!? I think that it would take the states at least many thousands of times the computing cycles to spot PGP encrypted files without the RSA signature. - IF it were practical to look for STEALTH PGP at all when snooping communications networks. So what, -that "only a few companies" will be discovered to be using PGP through the RSA signature!? Those few companies are the seeds for the vast numbers of companies that would follow them in using PGP over the Internet. The RSA signature is the flag that allows the spooks to easily net the bold first companies. The RSA signature is greatly impeding the spread of PGP use over the Internet. PGP MUST BE STEALTHED!! ENCRYPTION METHODS' "RANDOM" SIGNATURE PGP files are, of course, compressed to remove redundancy and thus make the method stronger. This, along with the algorithm, produces a "random" bit file. I believe that most files on the Internet are not compressed and thus would show order on statistical sniffing programs. Of the files that are compressed, by PKZIP for example, I believe they would probably have a compression string signature particular to that compression met- hod. Otherwise, compressed files show more randomness. I don't know if compressed programs show an order throughout the file. If they do, then, possibly, PGP could have a function added to it to duplicate this order. This suggests that PGP should also have a function that makes a phoney compression method signature. This would allow PGP'ed files to hide amoung compressed files on the Net. ----------- With the removal of the PGP RSA signature and the addition of phony compression signatures, PGP'ed files would travel the Net without draw- ing attention to themselves. This would greatly facilitate the growth of PGP traffic by organizations. MICROSOFT VERSUS BORLAND FOR COMPILING/ASSEMBLING PGP Oftentimes, Borland C and Assembler can be bought at prices that are a fraction of the price of Microsoft C and Assembler. This suggests that PGP should be programmed with Borland instead of with Microsoft. I think that this would be a step in making PGP a real peoples' encryption method. It is more practical for people to get Borland programming soft- ware than Microsoft programming software. This change from Microsoft to Borland might encourage a lot of experimentation and innovation by a lot of individual and small group programmers. >The person who told me about this also said something about a >Department of Trade & Industry paper which mentioned that the British >Government was going to insist on key escrow for encryption. I had >hoped to get a copy of this, but he can't find it at the moment. >I'll post the text when I get it if anyone's interested. >Anyone else in the UK heard anything about this? >- -- B. >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.6.i >iQEVAgUBMFGPfeHVHXeXphJJAQFJ0Af/Svh0ifULgpEuauSBPFreDDJoa/a1gcPe >ya3CjOde9kVuN0IkBHFubO18MrAO6WbwlhVa/X/pjG4vbSahonpzmgHHfkVW20Gh >qlhBwFLElTmOgspSjHJ74sYNUM2YZ+AKOyNwW4ix6woJ0WL0NP+cV8CZv4tdEH4l >EI3/FuoFccbkKMk7QYoRPOyj5FI4GiFxVsg1GFOU3r83bxfJDfU2yZdImEBx/Nlc >gteizqFTF/QiKckl6f5NzCBzaoIcMw0VLN8dAGLqzDycJtFqGdOPgvgSt1LwXKBs >+zJM5Z/laubYm5SiEPy4oVz9N3lT4EOzEtdMEoiSC6IiSDSaURkEAA== >=GiY0 >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- >-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >Version: 2.6.i >mQENAi8KzVoAAAEH/2gPfD2Xdw1nDAXtMH/F5iCMrwdXHXolEfOjRP59QP1Yodhb >L+NGSNls67+H1us5PP5EpHDbHRy66ExgRK7XdZ/2qz0SsbTG+R6pRIILmMfgd3Nj >M6uq1DehdxWPdp4PMC9LNrG2V9QrRGPgpHhr3iDfy+p6JTjW8XCYUXn5POt0wBs2 >n/vlowjLf9dVYwUKP58V9gokNsFlGcB08gEbxKa9Y2X7zB3BAlywPVdKVh+BOTCK >z1Sofx9Wup0MEXEDEESLDSq/634hzzVx6Kt54cZBbi5nAdPHWlGHZl5vU93A3jPE >fh59JXsCZmWKLXMjZtjcIJYkC4hC4dUdd5emEkkABRG0DEIuIERlIExhIFBheokB >FQIFEC8g7yzh1R13l6YSSQEBD+4H/ir8R4iw1tWLUuxz6etmV99OhMUYoI5lQnxz >9KARQf4eD3xHPoMw6tHLKOUR8xYS9i2RmkhJrPRzCfD5OKSOBEHuIQEt/+dcbCuw >0fxn9NrU7NjFWwWKQ+0jYikN3hfIWcPmGtyhQ0KSrGfUDo5+rJr5Cy4U6eOooepv >gYniecNNVAzQ2KDiWTOZ5zqG3zBAYj6uw8LHvBR1qol2YcJ4s02c4GdAZmzEq49s >nDBortKfWUAxZkESBt2tMx8gYq6b38evYJBLXOqEN5Lt/5zf0nG1u0BEWBLaCj55 >y8lh1KolVOu808tX9blOrjqwEB12vngjXzf7hHWohrGrrQVT2N4= >=5qEt >-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- THE UNITED STATES "FEDERAL" GOVERNMENT HAS NO LEGITIMACY. The United States "Federal" Government - We'll be even more American without it. PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

2 1

Re: Fate of Jews in America (fwd)
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:01 AM 9/3/97 -0700, Tim May wrote: > ... >(It is true that the vast majority of Cypherpunks are basically >libertarian, and hence are not keen on government programs to favor one >race or sex or group over another. Jesse Jackson calls this point of view >"racism." "Ending discrimination in favor of some races is racism," he >claims. Most list members would reject this.) > >Besides, in a society with strong crypto, how are you or any government >going to stop people from dealing with whomever they wish, on whatever >basis they wish? ... Another consideration is the government spin doctor. With the Oklahoma City federal Building Bombing, the government had a new bad guy. Everyone despised this bad guy because this bad guy had been responsible for the death of innocent children. This bad guy was the mostly Anglo-Saxon Militant Extreme Right-Wingers. By tying this group to the bombing, something that in many peoples opinion they did perfectly. They assured that people wouldn't associate with them, and would prosecute them for any little thing. They immediately tied these groups with gun ownership. They also tied these groups with white supremism. Now if you own a gun, you must be a racist and a militia member, if your white. If your black, you are already figured as a drug dealer, another bogeyman, so they had that base covered. By tying crypto into the same militia movement. Not hard since several posts refer to the second ammendment, (if you have to invoke the second ammendment, you are obviously a militia sypathesizer/member/co-conspirator.) Now that we are the first distributed dangerous militia, we must obviously all be racists because everyone knows that militia members are all racist, gun toting, wackos that run around the woods, shoot at cops and blow up buildings. Next stop, the distributed Ruby Ridge. Where every prominent member who does more than blow hot air will be rounded up, shot for looking funny, and passed off as enemies of the state. The rest of us will be left to blow hot air to give credence to their claims.

1 0

anyone got a cpunk URL for the UK munitions T?
by aba＠dcs.exeter.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the subject of the UK printing of the muntions T-shirt, I've got a problem, I would like to put a URL for how to obtain the T-shirts, and cypherpunk political material, anti ITAR, clipper etc, bu yet I can't very well put my URL: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ because that may possibly move within a year, maybe sooner, and T-shirts are so permanent :-( It seems like too good an opportunity to miss, as some people may get the thing nice publicity, and interest in the cypherpunks take on encryption, so it would be ideal to have an on-line reference on the shirt. So what I was thinking is it would be nice if someone with a permanent URL, could put a pointer to my URL, that could be updated later, as my URL moves? A cypherpunks page which has been and will be around for a *long time* with lots of info or pointers to info on ITAR, the evils of key escrow etc would be ideal. I don't need the WWW space for the actual info as such, just a pointer which can point to where-ever it is my URL moves to, and as most cpunks URLs seem to be in the US, it wouldn't be a v good idea to put my content on a US server anyway (arguably). Any offers? Also now I'm here, there were a few people on the list who ordered shirts from me, and the progress has been slow, if you want to see the reasons, and up-to-date state of progress, take a look at: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/uk-shirt.html I need to decide soon as to what URL to print, I was otherwise thinking of removing the URL, as my sys admin made some strange cryptic comment about me not having my URL after a while anyway (when I finish the course, pointed comment? who knows), and I thought it might not go down to well if I printed my URL on the T-shirt, at least if it's an indirect pointer I have the option to get alternate WWW space. I have decided to switch printers as the last guy seems to have vanished, no answers to messages on answer phone for > 1 week, and some shirt printers (like the new one I've chosen) offer to the whole job in a week, and people are getting impatient for their shirts. So I ideally need a commitment of a URL so that I can modify the design & send of to this new printers tonight. The main criteria, apart from a nice selection of links (I've got ITAR and cpunk links allready anyway) is that the URL pointing at my roving URL is going to stay there for a few years, at least. Adam

2 1

Re: anyone got a cpunk URL for the UK munitions T?
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My homepage has not got that many links, but it is fairly well known. I would be happy to set up a WWW page just for you. How about: http://obscura.com/~t-shirt/ This will be around for quite a while, since I am getting into the ISP biz, and obscura is my domain. At 1:05 AM 9/12/95, aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk wrote: >On the subject of the UK printing of the muntions T-shirt, I've got a >problem, I would like to put a URL for how to obtain the T-shirts, and >cypherpunk political material, anti ITAR, clipper etc, bu yet I can't >very well put my URL: > > http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ > >because that may possibly move within a year, maybe sooner, and >T-shirts are so permanent :-( > >It seems like too good an opportunity to miss, as some people may get >the thing nice publicity, and interest in the cypherpunks take on >encryption, so it would be ideal to have an on-line reference on the >shirt. > >So what I was thinking is it would be nice if someone with a permanent >URL, could put a pointer to my URL, that could be updated later, as my >URL moves? > >A cypherpunks page which has been and will be around for a *long time* >with lots of info or pointers to info on ITAR, the evils of key escrow >etc would be ideal. > >I don't need the WWW space for the actual info as such, just a pointer >which can point to where-ever it is my URL moves to, and as most >cpunks URLs seem to be in the US, it wouldn't be a v good idea to put >my content on a US server anyway (arguably). > >Any offers? > >Also now I'm here, there were a few people on the list who ordered >shirts from me, and the progress has been slow, if you want to see the >reasons, and up-to-date state of progress, take a look at: > > http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/uk-shirt.html > >I need to decide soon as to what URL to print, I was otherwise >thinking of removing the URL, as my sys admin made some strange >cryptic comment about me not having my URL after a while anyway (when >I finish the course, pointed comment? who knows), and I thought it >might not go down to well if I printed my URL on the T-shirt, at least >if it's an indirect pointer I have the option to get alternate WWW >space. > >I have decided to switch printers as the last guy seems to have >vanished, no answers to messages on answer phone for > 1 week, and >some shirt printers (like the new one I've chosen) offer to the whole >job in a week, and people are getting impatient for their shirts. So >I ideally need a commitment of a URL so that I can modify the design & >send of to this new printers tonight. > >The main criteria, apart from a nice selection of links (I've got ITAR >and cpunk links allready anyway) is that the URL pointing at my roving >URL is going to stay there for a few years, at least. > >Adam ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

1 0