December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Day 2, nist GAK meeting
by pfarrell＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Date: Fri, 8 Sep 1995 09:32:43 -0400 (EDT) From: "Pat Farrell" <pfarrell(a)127.0.0.1> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Cc: BCc: Subject: Day 2 NIST meeting notes X-NUPop-Charset: IBM 8-Bit Thursday's GAK Export meeting started with reports from the prior afternoon's breakout meetings. I reported on the session I was in, saying what I posted to the list yesterday (about National Semi's product, etc.) The other breakout groups reported their problems with the criteria, again asking that #9 be dropped, longer, keys, etc. The presentation for Group "A" was different. It was a speach. It asked that the process be stopped to let industry develop market-driven solutions. It was greeted by applause from the vendors and privacy advocates, with no reaction from the government representatives. Randy Williams of Commerce, and Dan Cook of State, described the current export approval process. Lots of talk of jurisdictions and types of liscenses. I quickly got lost in the jargon. The moderator wisecracked that the official language of the session was English. You couldn't tell from some of the exchanges. They were questioned on import restrictions. Both Williams and Cook said that there are no import restrictions into the US. They also pointed out that Treasury, not State or Commerce, has jurisdiction over imports. An engineer from Compaq asked a question: He said that his company buys liscenses to software, and bundles it as "value added" to their systems. They are interested in bundling in security features. He asked if his computers would then be subject to export restrictions. The answer was yes. He asked if he could purchase security software overseas and import it. The answer was again yes. He asked if he could install that software on his computers, again yes. And export the computers, NO. They didn't even seem to think that this was illogical. So Commerce, State, and the rest of the government are activly encouraging the development of competing software industries in Israel, Germany and other counrties. I hate to think what they'd do if they tried to hurt US industry. And interesting tidbit came up after the session. In an offline conversation, the topic of "personal use export" came up. A reliable source said that revised regulations are being developed, and will, be avaialble soon. I explicitly asked if this meant "PGP on a notebook computer" and was told, Yes, that will be allowed; with the usual rules that it can't be for export, you can't be attempting to sell it, etc. Personal use, carry out and carry back. The "source" was asked if they had read Matt Blaze's personal use disaster story. The name didn't ring a bell, but the story was well know and considered a nightmare. Penny Brummitt of NSA was to talk about Clipper's key escrow agents, but called in sick. I didn't catch the name of the replacement. He talked about Clipper's process, not as an example of what will be required for GAK agents, but as an "existance proof" that some agents can be found. The essence was that Clipper escrow facilities are strong, and staffed with people cleared to the "Secret" level. They also tosed out the phrase "US Person" in regard to the corporate entity that is responsible for the contract. Geoff Greiveldinger, of the US Department of Justice, gave a frequently inaudible recounting of the evils of strong encryption in the war on D, P, & T, and also corrupt mayors. He was very personable. He also sounded like a fascist. Throughout the meeting, all sides tried to have a civil discussion, even though we disagreed. It was impossible to stay civil through his drivel. Ruby Ridge and Furman had been unmentionable up until his speach. Mr. Greiveldinger said that acceptable escrow agents will be in the US. This caused considerable concern among vendors trying to sell in the International market. Dan Weitzer of CDT (the EFF spinoff) gave a short, rousing speach. It was a call to arms. He said that since NIS&T was ignoring the consistant input from industry to stop this silly and stupid GAK, that we need to immediately contact our congresscritters. Ken Mendelsen [sic?] of TIS gave a great speach. He suggested that the critera for escrow agents be the same as the form to export tanks and other munitions. Then he showed the one page form used by State. He argued that legislative solutions to the escrow agent approval process will take too long and kill the effort. I'll try to get copies of his presentation. F.W. Gerbracht, Jr a VP Merril Lynch, represented the Securities Industry Association. He said that they are willing to work with the government, but they need long keys, strong ciphers, and international escrow agents. He used the phrase "unlimited algorithms and keyspace" as a requirement. They also need buy in from their regulators, and presented a long list of SEC, CFT, NYSE, NASDealers, and 50 state regulators, all who have to sign off. Nanette DiTosto of Bankers Trust gave a short, to the point presentation. She said that BT has a commercial key escrow service, but that was not what she wanted to get accross. She said that multinational banks demand strong encryption and non-US escrow agents. And that they would settle for nothing less. A speaker from VTW gave a nice presentation. VTW is something like voter's telecommunications watch. They have a mailing list, at listproc(a)vtw.org. He said that escrow was doomed to failure. That there is no middle ground. I'll try to get his slides too. Jack Wack of TECSEC gave a pitch for his shrinkwrapped product. He said it is exportable now, they've jumped through all the hoops. He also gave a great crack from his son. It want roughly like: "Dad, if you own the data before you encrypt it, how come the government says you don't own it after you encrypt it?" It brought down the house. (if someone has a more accurate quote, please let me have a copy). Professor Hoffman of George Washington gave a great speach. He listed the Al Gore to Maria Cantwell letter's criteria, as a matrix. He then filled in the matrix with the Export GAK's criteria. It was painfully obvious that the NIST/NSA propsal didn't come close. He recommended that they focus closly on the Gore criteria, and come up with an approach that meets all the the criteria. While I planned on staying for the remainder of the meeting, a crisis came up at my day job. I can't say I was looking forward to more, a day and a half was enough for me, and I wasn't the only person leaving early. Attendance was down visibly Thursday relative to the first day Pat -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBMFBGEbCsmOInW9opAQEfQgP+P/P0MRGe3EOElzM0UPQy+xce0XGe3wex gfQdTrGWhL+FbYt/7taj6jgtcRg9zih1yQ3W+kN/VUXY9J4I1b6dw+j0sb6MkCjT pShnflDI5OPQmmUq9KZlmy50u2yXuBqfWSdXd9NypjDsh7XDrWIqvqIcuT1cc/di quNZ3u7aymw= =oJC7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- p.s. please let me know if this one's pgp sig is better than yesterday's Pat Farrell grad student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Infor. Systems and Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer

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Cylink Withdraws Claims in RSA v, PGP
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

VM has pointed out that RSA put a letter on its Web site yesterday from Caro-Kann withdrawing its claims in the RSA v. PGP suit. The letter is a GIF file, and VM has made a transcript of it and provided commentary on the case and what is now in the offing: http://jya.com/rsavpgp-ckc.htm

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Re: ON OFF-TOPIC
by Arve Kjoelen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 7 Sep 1995 yihchun(a)saul3.u.washington.edu wrote: > > Poor you, the only major political party to come out with a pro crypto > > statement is a socialist party. >I think the libertarian position is inherently pro-crypto. >Besides, the French are socialist, and well, as far as crypto goes... Wrong! First of all, Jacques Chiraq (French President) and the majority of the French parliament are conservatives. Secondly, a statement like "the French are Socialist" is a (untrue) generalization. You are probably thinking of Francois Mitterand ("socialist"), who became French President in the 80's, and the first French Socialist President ever. Chiraq, by the way, is the genius behind the recommencement of Nuclear testing in French Polynesia "Test them in France if there's no risk of radioactive leakage" -Arve Kjoelen Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville

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Jimmy Upton's T-shirt (NIST's 9/6-7/95 meetings)
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The meetings included break-out groups, each of which had a moderator (mine was from NSA -- were they all?) and each of which had a recorder who would then report to the entire assembled group. Jimmy was a recorder once -- one of the last to report on the second day. Nearly every person speaking from industry started his remarks with the same disclaimer: My comments on these criteria should not be taken as an endorsement of the concept of key escrow Jimmy Upton, rather than start his report with that disclaimer, suggested that perhaps we should have T-shirts made for conference attendees stating: "My comments on these criteria...." The crowd broke up in laughter and applause. Speaking of applause -- the assembled audience was relatively passive through most of the presentation -- but whenever someone expressed opposition to the whole concept of GAK, the entire auditorium applauded. Specifically -- I was sitting near the civil liberties group (ACLU, EPIC, VTW, ...) and they applauded but it came from all over the auditorium. There were some who didn't -- the gov't folks, a few industry folks, .... - Carl P.S. I've put a few additions on my home page, in response to this meeting. +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme/home.html | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +----------------------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison -+

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Re: Feasibility of censoring and jamming pronography and racism in informatics
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 09:54 PM 8/29/97 +0200, Ulf Möller wrote about: >A European parliament study evaluating `Feasibility of censoring and >jamming pronography and racism in informatics': ... >7.1.2 It is concluded that available technology does no and is > not likely to provide any satisfactory means for > automatically classifying such material. Such judgements > will therefore have to be made by humans. The perfect kind? (One wonders what sort of humans would be drawn to such a job, and which humans will choose or be forced to pay them?) ... > - it can not be absolutely guaranteed that Internet > anonymity services can not be used to frustrate > detection of offenders in certain circumstances. Ahh, the double-negatives of understatement. ... >7.2.9 It is concluded that only implementation of the most > intrusive surveillance technology could be exspected to > impact heavily upon abuse of the Internet on committed > offenders (because of their ready access to strong > encryption and covert communication technologies). To > enable this policy scenario, it would be necessary for > access providers to constrain the equipment used by > subscribers to access the Internet to be such that: > > - no content could be removed; > > - all content and processing could be subject to > automatic and manual surveillance. Achtung, information-Juden! >7.2.10 The technical and economic feasibility of the necessary > technology is evidenced by the emergence, with purely > commercial motivations, of technical systems which privde > the basic facilities required to implement the necessary > measures. It is notes that this coincidental emergence of > such systems may raise siginificant privacy issues > outside of the scope of this study. The economics of > manual surveillance, however, can not be assessed. How 'bout "tax-and-spend"? That's an assessment. ... > Detecting offenders > >7.2.13 If access providers and service providers maintain > proper subscriber authentication systems and system > management environments, offending actions at the site to > which the subscriber authenticates can be traced to the > offender. Detection of offenders committing offences 'at > a distance' (ie a subscriber in a country committing an > offence in another), however, would require: > > - access and service providers to take steps to ensure > subscriber identity information is carried in their > transmissions; > > - monitoring of services provided on the Internet to > prevent subscribers misusing anonymity services to > remove such information. This kind of monitoring, were it actually possible to implement, would mean the effective end of anonymity services. Thankfully, it is presently merely a statist pipe dream. >7.2.14 Whilst a variety of means exist to attach identity > information, detection of anonymity services is not > straightforward. However, monitoring such services would > be exspected to limit the number available for overt, eg > to transmit offensive material to innocent parties, > offensive use. Translation: "Shut as many of 'em down as possible." >7.2.15 Legally, handling offences detected through voluntary > authentication would be relatively straightforward as the > offending subscriber would be resident in the country > where the offence was committed. However, offences can > only be detected through forced identification, ie those > committed 'at a distance', would currently be subject to > extradition arrangements and it is not clear that new > opportunities for prosecution would arise in practice. Oh boy - "opportunities for prosecution," WHEEE! > Meanwhile, it may be that the social implications of > forced and general identification of Internet subscribers > would leave subscribers open to a variety of forms of > intrusion on privacy and discrimination. Oh, but "we" can trust Craig Livingstone, Louis Freeh, Aldrich Ames, and the rest of the spies, can't "we." Why am I feeling so worried these days, anyway? JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQEPAwUBNAdktTUhsGSn1j2pAQGolQfPYfomnbZzYDGugsixCOrwWPB4L50VMwzS 8EUnjgJ1f62zMkRjYBZyO62qzYaiVru6mktSsGl6qJnnMXophPnpc9hVMyOHdq1X lWJDG0IRj7/0fffpvk9RKw+DJlFvbI1oKk9b2hCyTnTBgpJeTi4vK3x3zjq2bB3c R0fagEb2/M700q5KZdG4GkctAwYBGJtTs3MooVCVD++HikTTHyITOhFCUBnQmZKP haWyHi7kT9HeHfkd708eXEHSxQLcv5l/Slpbi3wZr0YrcwbzlicTHip1eGGU2Nrq 3mJvf04bMBBWtyEa9jQb+1hUfPzQDVzu/Y/xVBPE/1D9jQ== =EZTV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cryptography Global Challenges
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

International Cryptography Institute 1995 Global Challenges Thursday-Friday September 21-22, 1995 Presented by The National Intellectual Property Law Institute 1815 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 202-842-4800 Fax: (202) 296-4098 President James P. Chandler Emeritus Professor of Law _______________________________________________________ The International Cryptography Institute will address the cryptography challenges associated with meeting the information protection needs of users and the law enforcement and national security needs of nations. Topics to be covered include national and international cryptography policies and regulations, international requirements and approaches, commercial cryptography, privacy and trust, key escrow encryption, busines requirements, law enforcement requirements, and the use of cryptography with electronic payments. _______________________________________________________ Keynote Speaker FBI Director Louis J. Freeh _______________________________________________________ Program September 21, 1995 8:30-9:00 Welcome and Opening Remarks James Chandler, President, National Intellectual Property Law Institute Dorothy E. Denning, Chair of Program David Kahn, Visiting Historian, National Security Agency, U. S. 9:00-9:40 Cryptography in Business M. Blake Greenlee, U.S. 9:40-10:20 Commercial Use of Cryptography Nick Mansfield, Shell International, The Netherlands 10:20-10:50 Break 10:50-11:20 Computer Industry Position on Privacy and Trust in an Information Society Yves Le Roux, Digital Equipment Corporation, France 11:20-12:00 The International Cryptography Experiment and Worldwide Cryptographic Products Survey David Balenson, Trusted Information Systems, Inc., U.S. 12:00-12:30 Export Controls on Encryption Software Ira Rubenstein, Microsoft Corp., U.S. 12:30-2:00 Lunch with Keynote Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 2:00-3:00 Cryptography and the Information Society: Recent Developments in the European Union David J. Gould, Cabinet Office, UK 3:00-3:30 Encryption Policy and Technology in Japan Mitsuru Iwamura, The Bank of Japan, Japan 3:30-3:50 Break 3:50-4:30 Towards an Australian Policy on Encryption Peter Ford, Attomey General's Department, Australia 4:30-5:00 New National Encryption Policies and Regulations in Russia Anatoly Ledbeder, LAN Crypto Ltd., Russia 5:00-6:00 International Regulation of Cryptography: An Update James Chandler, National Intellectual Property Law Institute, US. 5:30-6:30 Reception _______________________________________________________ September 22 8:30-9:20 U.S. Government Cryptography Policy Michael R. Nelson, Office of Science and Technology Policy, US. Ronald D. Lee, National Security Agency, US. 9:20-10:10 Law Enforcement Requirements for Encryption William E. Baugh, Jr., Edward L. Allen, Michael D. Gilmore, Federal Bureau of Investigation, US. 10:10-10:40 Break 10:40-11:20 Intemational Key Escrow Encryption Dorothy E. Denning, Georgetown University, US. 11:20-12:00 Transnational Key Escrow Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Villanova University School of Law, US. 12:00-1:30 Lunch 1:30-3:00 Commercial and International Key Escrow Stewart A. Baker, Steptoe & Johnson, US., moderator Stephen T. Walker, Trusted Information Systerns, Inc, US. Frank Sudia, Bankers Trust Company, US. Carmi Gressel and Itai Dror Fortress U & T Ltd., Israel 3:00-3:20 Break 3:20-4:00 Billing and Paying Over the Internet Dan Schutzer, Citibank, US. _______________________________________________________ Faculty Faculty Chair Dr Dorothy Denning Mr. Edward L. Allen Supervisory Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. Stewart Abercrombie Baker Partner Steptoe & Johnson Mr. David Balenson Senior Computer Scientist Trusted Information Systems, Inc. Mr. Wllliam E. Baugh, Jr. Assistant Director, Information Resources Division Dr. Ernest F. Brickell Vice President Bankers Trust Electronic Commerce c/o Sandia National Labs Applied Math Dept. Prof. James Chandler President National Intellectual Property Law Institute Dr. Dorothy E. Denning Professor Computer Science Department Georgetown University Mr. Peter Ford First Assistant Secretary, Security Division Attorney General's Department Australia Mr. Louis J. Freeh, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Mr. Michael D. Gilmore Supervisory Special Agent Federal Bureau of Investigation Engineering Research Facility Mr. David J. Gould Under Secretary of State Overseas and Defence Secretariat Cabinet Office, London Mr. M. Blake Greenlee M. Blake Greenlee Associates. Ltd. Dr. Carmi Gressel Engineering Manager Fortress U & T, Ltd. Israel Mr. David Kahn Visiting Historian National Security Agency, and author, "The Codebreakers" Dr. Anotoly Lebedev President LAN Crypto, Ltd. Russia Mr. Mitsuru Iwamura Chief Manager Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies The Bank of Japan Mr. Ronald D. Lee General Counsel National Security Agency Mr. Yves Le Roux Central Engineering, Security Program Digital Equipment Corp. France Mr. Nick Mansfield Shell International Petroleum Mattschappij B.V. The Hague The Netherlands Mr. Michael R. Nelson Special Assistant, Information Technology White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Old Executive Office Building. Washington DC 20506 Mr. Henry H. Perritt, Jr. Professor of Law Villanova University School of Law Villanova, PA 19085 Mr. Ira Rubinstein Senior Corporate Attorney Microsoft Corp Redmond, WA 98052 Dr. Dan Schutzer Vice President Citibank Dr. Frank Sudia Vice President BT Electronics Commerce Bankers Trust Co., New York Mr. Stephen T. Walker President Trusted Information Systems, Inc. _______________________________________________________ Location and Fees ICI '95 will be held at the National Intellectual Property Law Institute, 1815 Pennsylvania Ave., Washington, DC, third floor. Registration is $695 before September 1 and $795 thereafter ($395/495 for U.S. Government). Payment includes all conference materials, two lunches, and a cocktail reception. Cancellations Fees: All registration is subject to a $50 fee. Tuition will not be refunded if notice of cancellation is received after September 1. 1995, but a substitute attendee may be sent. Postmarks will not be considered in determining timeliness of receipt. Hotel Accommodations: A limited block of rooms has been reserved at the Wyndam Bristol. However, registrants must make their own hotel reservations and indicate that they are attending the International Cryptography Institute 1995. Room reservations may be made by calling or writing the Wyndam Bristol Hotel, 2430 Pennsylvania Ave.. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 955-6000. CLE Credit: CLE credit in mandatory states will be applied for as requested. _______________________________________________________ Course Registration Form Name: Organization: Address: Phone: Fee: General US. Gov't Before 9/1/95 $695 $395 After 9/1/95 $795 $495 Payment (check one) Check payable to The National Intellectual Property Law Institute _______ Master Card ________VISA Card # Expiration Date: Signature: Registration by Fax: 800-304-MIND Phone: 800-301-MIND 202-296 4098 202-842-48000 Mail Registration with payment to: The National Intellectual Property Law Institute 1815 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20006 _______________________________________________________

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Darren Reed: Re: NSA and the Internet.
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded from com-priv. Anyone out there have information they can use to confirm or deny any of this? .pm ------- Forwarded Message From: Darren Reed <avalon(a)coombs.anu.edu.au> Subject: Re: NSA and the Internet. To: com-priv(a)lists.psi.com Date: Fri, 8 Sep 1995 17:36:11 +1000 (EST) Now that I've got it next to me... > I was reading a journal recently which mentioned the NSA were taking > an active role in monitoring the network at key points, such as FIX > East and West and MAE East and West. Can anyone comment on this (if > they're allows :) ? [...] To name some more names mentioned as being NAPs under surveillance: Pennsauken, NJ (Sprint); Chicago (AmeriTech/Bell Comms. Research); San Francisco, CA (Pacific Bell); CIX, CA (San Jose); SWAB, North Virginia (Bell Atlantic). There is a rather worrying quote in the article about NASA capturing data for the NSA. The column closes with a comparison to a case where the NSA was almost prosecuted by the US Justice Dept. in the '70s for anti-Vietnam War group surveillence. The article appeared in "Computer Fraud & Security", June 1995. American editor is: Charles Cresson Wood information Integrity Investments Sausalito, CA, USA The article in question, titled "Puzzle Palaze Conducting Internet Surveillance" is by Wayne Madsen of Virginia. No Internet E-mail address listed for either of the American contriubtors mentioned above. darren ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Patel decision page 3 handled
by landon_dyer＠wayfarer.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'nuff said

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No Subject
by Ford Prefect 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NY Times, Sept 8, 1995. Intel Wins Contract to Develop World's Fastest Supercomputer By Lawrence M. Fisher San Francisco, Sept. 7 -- The Intel Corporation said today that it had won a a contract from the Department of Energy to develop what it called the world's fastest supercomputer. The machine, to be built at an estimated cost of $45 million, would use 9,000 of Intel's forthcoming P6 microprocessors linked in a configuration known as massively parallel. In recent years, massively parallel computers using thousands of relatively inexpensive off-the-shelf chips have stolen the performance lead from traditional supercomputers like those made famous by Cray Research Inc., which use far fewer, but far more powerful processors. Intel said its new supercomputer would be the first to achieve the goal of calculating more than a trillion floating-point operations a second, known as a teraflop. The machine, to be kept at Sandia National Laboratories In Albuquerque, N.M., would be used by Department of Energy scientists to study a variety of complex problems, foremost among them nuclear weapons safety. "President Clinton is committed to ending underground nuclear testing," Victor Reis, Assistant Secretary for Energy Programs, said in a statement. "Computer simulation will be a principal means for insuring the safety, reliability and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. We are embarking on a 10-year program to advance the state of high performance computing to meet national security objectives," he said. ... ------

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Re: Darren Reed: Re: NSA and the Internet.
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I stopped reading com-priv a year+ ago. One of the "gadflies" back then (name escapes me -- one of the journalists, I think, but not Gordon Cook) said that at least the NJ NAP was moved at the last minute. He had proof of that. I don't remember that he had proof that it was moved at NSA request, although that was his claim. /r$

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