December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Remailer Abuse
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What lists did you post to?

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RC5 data, anyone?
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone got any plaintext/cyphertext/key data sets that I can use to test my RC5 implementation against? +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Andrew Brown Internet <asb(a)nexor.co.uk> Telephone +44 115 952 0585 | | PGP (2048/9611055D): 69 AA EF 72 80 7A 63 3A C0 1F 9F 66 64 02 4C 88 | +-------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Rumored CBS "hit" on internet coming
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be old news or it could be bogus but fyi anyway: >From parsons(a)bga.com Mon Jan 9 05:16:49 1995 >From: Brad Parsons <parsons(a)bga.com> >Subject: CBS/C.Chung Plan Hit Job on Internet? (fwd) >To: bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us > > >Brad, Could you forward this to the cypherpunks list? Thanks.--BJP > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Mon, 9 Jan 1995 03:48:01 -0600 (CST) >Subject: CBS/C.Chung Plan Hit Job on Internet? > >A friend tells me that CBS and Connie Chung plan a hit job on Internet >on the evening news today, 1/9/95. Apparently it may be in the context >of youths supposedly learning how to make bombs from online info. In >case I don't get to watch it, could somebody make it a point to watch >it and give us a summary of the report. Thanks. Reply, if you're inclined, via e-mail. I'm off the list until the Carol Ann stuff dies out. - Brad Dolan, bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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Re: revoked transactions/guerrilla fee remailers
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:15 PM 01/09/95, L. McCarthy wrote: >- - From what I've seen so far, accepting payment would seem to make anonymous >_operation_ of a remailer well nigh impossible. Anonymous operation with >revenue would require a corresponding level of anonymity in the transfer of >money. Until such time as conversion of funds from a net-liquid form to a >conventional form becomes unnecessary (or just commonplace ?), financial >traffic analysis can't adequately be thwarted. >All this bodes ill, IMHO, for the prospect of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla >remailers charging for service any time soon. There's just too much >infrastructure to which they'd need to be tied at the moment. Well, that's certainly true, for the reasons you gave. Right now, it's enough of a chore just to get non-anonymously run remailers charging for operation. And it's not easy to set up an effective guerilla remailer either. I think the set of tools and environments that make it possible to run a remailer anonymously and charge for it certainly aren't going to exist until the component problems of charging for a remailer at all and running a guerilla remailer at all are made easy. I think once both of those problems are dealt with, it won't be too dificult to deal with the combined problem of guerilla for-pay remailers. Or at least, exactly what things are neccesary to solve that combined problem will be obvious.

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positive publicity for anonymity
by nissim＠acs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just posted a proposal to alt.config for a new group alt.temping I'm hoping that temporary workers will use this as a forum to compare and contrast temp agencies, wage differences, 'permanent hire penalties' etc. There are about 4.4 million business service temps in the US. Wage differentials are noticeable - one egency will pay $2.00 more than another; this means $320/month to a temp worker. I expect temps to use anonymous posting capabilities to compare wage rates and company patterns *anonymously* because they may fear discrimination from their agencies. (I know I would) This seems like a very positive use of anonymity. Not only will millions of people on the bottom rung of office life be able to gain advantage by information, there are clear parallels to areas in the past of the left where unions and workers rights were seen as causes of first importance. In fact, the troubles involved in being temporary have been championed several times on television. This might make a good counterargument to 'teenagers and pipe bombs' If we say anonymity is a tool that helps up to 3-4% of the work force make intelligent choices and get paid more we may key into the left wing slant of the media. Treon Verdery (not posting from Adam's account this time!)

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AT&T produces video encryptor -- is it clipper based?
by perry＠imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just saw a story go by on the dow jones wire saying that AT&T had developed a "comprehensive security system for commercial information services". It is said to be an encryption system developed jointly by Bell Labs and VLSI, and its intedned for set-top boxes and "the internet". VLSI was one of the contractors on Clipper. Anyone know if this is an "escrowed" system? Anyone know any other details? Perry

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Re: intelligent discovery agents
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Visit Sang at http://www.inlink.com/users/sangria/homepage.html >Sang has more information on Robots, Spiders, Ants, and Worms >than any other computer person I have yet to link up with. I suspect your original respondent doesn't get around very much. Rummaging around the above URL gets you little more then http://web.nexor.co.uk/mac/doc/robots/robots.html Tracing down the above URL points you to You really want to get the WWW conference proceedings; try email to wwwf94(a)osf.org and also http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/SDG/IT94/Proceedings/Agents.html Ob-crypto: there is a Security.html (instead of Agents) but it's more commerce-oriented, except for the DCE Web paper.

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(fwd) Re: Racism on the Internet
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Xref: netcom.com alt.internet.services:40076 alt.internet.media-coverage:2932 Path: netcom.com!ix.netcom.com!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!uunet!nwnexus!news.halcyon.com!usenet From: mpdillon(a)halcyon.com (Michael Dillon) Newsgroups: alt.internet.services,alt.internet.media-coverage Subject: Re: Racism on the Internet Date: Wed, 28 Dec 1994 18:11:51 +0000 Organization: Memra Software Inc., Armstrong, B.C., Canada Lines: 36 Message-ID: <dfQ0lapDlT1B073yn(a)halcyon.com> References: <18570UODGFHLRSDHOUP(a)curvet.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: halcyon.com This is forwarded from can.infohighway. Note the quote from Rutkowski at the bottom. This info should be more generally know on the net. In article <18570UODGFHLRSDHOUP(a)curvet.com>, dshaw(a)curvet.com wrote: > > IN>ae763(a)FreeNet.Carleton.CA (Harvey Goldberg) writes: > > >I work for the Canadian Human Rights Commission. > >I am currently doing research on the use of the > >Internet for the propagation of hate material. > >The purpose of the research is to determine what > >measures could be considered to control the use > >of the Net for this type of purpose. > > >I would appreciate hearing from anyone who has > >any views, information or comments on this > >subject or who know of anywhere on the Internet > >where this matter is discussed. > > According to Tony Rutkowski, Executive Director of the Internet > Society, "The Internet from a regulatory standpoint falls into the > category of private value-added networks, and in most countries under > the treaty provisions of the ITU, as well as the GATT, these are > networks that are outside the purview of government. To the extent > that there is any kind of obligation by governments, it is to allow > such networks to exist on a competitive basis". <Internet World, > January 1995>. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Cool cats, brick bats, bad boys wearin' big hats Surf's up, my cup, floating, flying, rising up. Michael Dillon mpdillon(a)halcyon.com C-4 Powerhouse, RR #2 michael(a)junction.net

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Re: for-pay remailers and FV
by pstemari＠erinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:53 PM 1/9/95, Doug Barnes wrote: > ... Also, there is no reason on earth to take FV for payment under >such a scheme, if one wishes to preserve anonymity, and not have >to deal with the fraud/reversal factors. (The stamp issuer >would not know which blind-signed stamps were issued to the >turkey who reversed all his credit card transactions two months >after buying them -- see various threads on this vis-a-vis >using FV to buy blinded digital cash and why it won't work too >well.) > ... I don't see any reason to get FV involved, unless one were so lame >as to be unable to get signed up directly with the credit card >companies as a merchant -- a process of appropriate complexity >to indicate the posession of at least one (1) clue, which is prob. >desirable in someone who's going to be handling remailer finances MC/Visa require the reversibility of transactions as a condition of their merchant agreements. It's not something peculiar to FV. In fact, under certain conditions it is mandated by federal law. Escort services have a similar problem as far as non-returnability goes, but I don't know how they finesse their way around it. --Paul J. Ste. Marie pstemari(a)well.sf.ca.us, pstemari(a)erinet.com

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revoked transactions/guerrilla fee remailers
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Paul J. Ste. Marie writes: > MC/Visa require the reversibility of transactions as a condition of their > merchant agreements. It's not something peculiar to FV. In fact, under > certain conditions it is mandated by federal law. Escort services have a > similar problem as far as non-returnability goes, but I don't know how they > finesse their way around it. Two plausible tactics for escort services: [0] Price inflation: treat a revoked transaction rather like shoplifting, by passing the costs on to the customers; escort services are not cheap [1] Embarrassment: tip off family and employers of people who accept escorts, then decide not to pay for them; the perceived threat of publicity should keep plenty of folks in line There's not much that can be done to someone who uses an escort service once, revokes the transaction, and doesn't care who knows about it. How might this apply to remailing services ? Right now, with a fairly small customer base, I imagine price inflation would be impractical, but embarrassment might prove fairly effective. In the developed market we envision, presumably operators could get away with price inflation, but embarrassment would lose much of its potential sting. (I assume that once a critical mass of populace uses remailers, an announcement that Josie Worsham has used a remailer would elicit only yawns.) Do others see the resulting applicability of additional regulations to remailers as an issue in having them charge for service ? Within the category of fee-charging remailers, the distinction between non-profit and for-profit operations may be worth considering. I suppose that the IRS and analogous agencies would be inclined to ask questions about it, for starters. My threat model for the remailer bramble includes, at a minimum, a host of typical government agencies obligated to wrap everything in red tape. Look for anti- trust investigations to be launched against a price-fixing cartel of remailers. - - From what I've seen so far, accepting payment would seem to make anonymous _operation_ of a remailer well nigh impossible. Anonymous operation with revenue would require a corresponding level of anonymity in the transfer of money. Until such time as conversion of funds from a net-liquid form to a conventional form becomes unnecessary (or just commonplace ?), financial traffic analysis can't adequately be thwarted. All this bodes ill, IMHO, for the prospect of guerrilla or quasi-guerrilla remailers charging for service any time soon. There's just too much infrastructure to which they'd need to be tied at the moment. -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "The objective is for us to get those conversations whether they're by an alligator clip or ones and zeroes. Wherever they are, whatever they are, I need them." -FBI Dir. Freeh - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxHeC2f7YYibNzjpAQGhlQP/fkyvN0QqDkbLhgqecGUaeu3cbCstMd4y lgs/XzCeiXVt6EiQ8tmDVbq4G0QYTGntph/3knciJopGrH+Nu6LVmiqWNiRWFxm8 zJBRenCW2SN9nRixJiI4S2n0yQ//v9C7sOEfmu9SToQDYc+U1CBNSUhhJAveT1GN BD4WNFlm/WY= =VY8W - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxHfcSoZzwIn1bdtAQGyEAGAwKES86hkJ8GkLsYCr+vEAjH1/L2GdrCj jw0b83L7FHA99sUihIYe2zUUxr+Sqb2b =7Aai -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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