December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NYT on MOD
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times January 26, 1995, p. C17 Books of the Times Kids or Conspirators: How Hackers Got Caught MASTERS OF DECEPTION The Gang That Ruled Cyberspace By Michelle Slatalla and Joshua Quittner 225 pages. HarperCollins Publishers. $23. By Chirstopher Lehmann-Haupt It's difficult to feel much besides amused admiration for the computer hackers spotlighted in "Masters of Deception: The Gang That Ruled Cyberspace," by Michelle Slatalla and Joshua Quittner, a married couple who are reporters for Newsday. After all, what mainly characterizes the gang of adolescents they write about is high intelligence, infinite resourcefulness and boundless curiosity. Among the Masters of Deception, as the gang is called, there is Paul Stira, nicknamed Scorpion, who as a child learned to program a computer even before he had his hands on one and went on to master the art of cracking computer-game copy-protection codes. Mark Abene, a k a Phiber Optik, was so driven to understand how machines work that he explored and mastered the most sophisticated of the telephone company's computers. Eli Landopoulos, or Acid Phreak, after helping lure Phiber Optik away from a rival cyberspace gang, Legion of Doom, was moved to write "The History of MOD" for other hackers to envy. And John Lee, or Corrupt, found computer hacking a better way to survive than running with a street gang. It is difficult for the reader of this book to look upon these and other members of the gang as criminals. Yet they were eventually charged by a New York grand jury with conspiring to "gain access to and control of computer systems in order to enhance their image and prestige among computer hackers," among other counts. And they ended up pleading guilty and serving jail terms, which they have completed. In telling their stories, Ms. Slatalla and Mr. Quittner have almost as hard a time finding a continuous thread as the Government did building a coherent case against the hackers. The authors begin by describing a crash of the AT&T long-distance system that occurred on Jan. 15 1990. The authors write of the gang's reaction to this crisis: "No self-re-specting computer hacker would ever destroy anything. No hacker would ever purposely hurt the phone system. Paul just wanted to look around. He just wanted to learn more. He'd know it if he'd done something bad. Wouldn't he?" The lively narrative then backtracks to tell how the hackers formed their gang the previous year. This sequence creates the impression that the gang will turn out to have caused the crash, an expectation that is buttressed by other evidence that Ms. Slatalla and Mr. Quittner describe. The boys crashed smaller systems they invaded, like the Learning Link, a collection of electronic bulletin boards for educators and librarians that is owned by Channel 13/WNET, New York City's public broadcasting television station. The gang left the message "Happy Thanksgiving you turkeys, from all of us at MOD," which prevented access to the bulletin board's files. As the authors write, "the Learning Link crash would become the pivotal event in the case that the Federal Government was slowly building against the boys in MOD." The process was slow because the investigators had to weigh the need for evidence against the risk of damage. As the authors write: "It was kind of like having a tarantula crawl up your leg. If you shook it off too fast, it would escape into the wall. But if you waited too long, you got bitten." But when, about half way through the book, the narrative arrives back at the AT&T crash of 1990, we learn that the failure was traced not to anything the hackers did but to what the author's describe as "a routine update of the AT&T software." True the gang did much that was wrong like creating and using unbillable telephone accounts, trespassing in cyberspace to make long-distance calls, looking up private information and using it to harass other hackers and stealing and selling other people's credit card numbers. In short, certain members crossed the line between hacking and cracking and thereby violated the hacker ethic, which holds, in the authors' words: "Thou shalt not destroy. It's O.K. to look around, but don't hurt anything. It's good enough just to be here." Yet the fact remains that the gang did not cause the AT&T crash. And the worst that was done appears to have happened at a remove from what Mr. Abene was responsible for and after Mr. Stira had more or less withdrawn from hacking. Yet these two received the stiffest sentences. Mr. Abene, the last to complete his sentence, was released in the fall of last year. So one has the impression that what mattered to the Government was less the mischief done than the potential for mischief. What the slightly jumbled narrative does capture effectively is the contrast between the manic glee of the hackers at the prospect of a vast new unexplored world to conquer, and the Government's nervous disapproval and understandable need to set limits on a mysterious new frontier. The authors try to present both points of view. They don't reveal where their sympathies lie until the last line of their book. Here, after describing the meeting of a hackers' club as "the milling clumps of boys" who "are the picture of entropy, of disorganization, of isolated growing pains and undeveloped social skill," they write with tongue in cheek as their concluding paragraph: "This is the conspiracy." End

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An article on Windows (in)security
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Begin Forwarded Message ---------- >From: first(a)individual.com (An Information Service of INDIVIDUAL Inc.) (by >way of [Some initial stuff seems missing, sorry.] > ``No.'' > > And so it went. Once the security configuration is established and the >security profiles are put in a database-like protected file system, >accessing that data to get a full view of the security policy implementation >is near impossible. An administrator must retrieve individually each piece >of data stored in the security database, then manually collate and compile >it into a usable form. > > In a large operation, the security administrator will build a security >database by virtue of the number of objects and characteristics assigned to >each object during configuration. But Windows NT offers little way to access >and manipulate that database for analysis, rapid reconfiguration or global >views. It appears, and Microsoft engineers agree, someone will have to build >a utility program to take advantage of the security database via the maze of >APIs available to third-party developers. > > Kevin Phaup, program manager lead of Microsoft's Business Systems >Division, put the best spin he could on this first major Windows NT >shortcoming. ``Pull the data into a database and then massage it,'' he said. >``We have a new product - System Management Server from the Back Office >Suite - that could help.'' > > I agree, but why would I want to buy a brand-new operating system that >needs help out of the box? > > What's more, the third-party database solution for security administration >is a hopeless short-term patch. To be truly effective, it needs a much >tighter integration with Windows NT's APIs to permit not only systemic >analysis, but also systemic security changes based on selected criteria. > > If administrators want to change the access rights of every user so they >can log on at 7 a.m. instead of 8 a.m., they cannot do it with Windows NT >3.5. They might be able to do it with a third-party product or with Windows >NT 4.0. > > ``If someone builds an administration product like that, they'll make a >lot of money,'' Phaup says. > > A WEEKEND'S WORK Windows NT has other security problems, as well. For >example, it does not have data cryptography, which is essential to make sure >a network is reasonably secure from eavesdropping and integrity breaches. >Microsoft, which knows encryption technology, easily could have included the >appropriate algorithms in software to make Windows NT more secure. > > Microsoft's Phaup agrees it would have been simple to add encryption to >Windows NT. ``The hooks are all there,'' he said. > > But Windows NT does not need cryptography for C2 certification. And >perhaps even more telling, Microsoft cannot export cryptography outside the >U.S. due to export control laws that prohibit it from doing so without >licensing. Of course, the company could have made two versions of Windows >NT: one with crytography for domestic use and one without cryptography for >export. > > According to Phaup, Microsoft was reluctant to do so for two reasons. >``Security is way down on the list of corporate concerns and desires and >wants in an OS. It's in the top 20, but not the top 3,'' he says. ``And the >testing cycle would have been a double killer.'' > > Windows NT's last major shortcoming lays in the omission of a feature that >most security experts consider virtually indispensable: boot control. > > In the DOS/Windows world, third-party PC security is reasonably attempted >by forcing users to boot from the C drive and making them log on with IDs >and passwords. However, if a bootable DOS diskette is inserted in the A >drive, the PC will boot without a logon, and the A:> will appear. > > But if the user attempts to log over to the C drive, the system will come >back with a message such as: Invalid drive specification. Security experts >recognize this as an inexpensive technique that will keep out casual >intruders and nontechnical types. > > One way to mandate boot control is with a hardware or firmware addition to >the PC in the form of an add-on card. The hardware boot process is >interrupted, and then even access to the A drive can be restricted until the >actual logon process through the legal boot drive has been successfully >completed. > > In Windows NT, boot control does not even exist as an option. Again, this >suggests that Microsoft's security effort was driven by C2 certification, >not by security itself. > > In its defense, there is a lot to like about Windows NT and the plethora >of functionality it offers from the application standpoint. But Windows NT >sorely lacks in security, so much so that it almost would be safer not to >use any security. > > Windows NT must evolve quickly to garner a spot in the secure operating >system arsenal or somehow steal market share from the likes of Novell. It >just is not there yet. But Microsoft's Phaup left me with one closing >thought. ``Have you talked to the Cairo [Windows 95.5] guys yet?'' > > 2Schwartau is an independent consultant, writer and lecturer on network >security topics. He can be reached at Interpact, Inc. at (813) 393-6600, or >via electronic mail at P00506(a)psilink.com. > >[01-23-95 at 15:10 EST, Copyright 1995, Network World, File: x0123303.8dn]

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MixMaster remailer source
by kevin＠elvis.wicat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little while back when the "remailer crisis" discussion was in full swing, L. McCarthy recommended the Mixmaster remailer as being the most modern. After several days of hunting, I have utterly failed to turn up the source to this remailer. Can anyone provide me a pointer? On a slightly related note, is there a validation suite for PGP? The MIT distribution does not include OS/2 binaries, unfortunately, but I have managed to get a clean build. It seems to work, but I simply don't know enough about PGP to be sure that it really is a fully working verson. Kevin At Intel, quality is job 0.999731.

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Privacy of Voice Mail?
by jmueller＠gac.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From 1/24/95 Edupage Forwarded message: > > HOW PRIVATE IS VOICE MAIL? > A lawsuit filed by a former McDonald's employee whose private voice mail > messages to his paramour were recorded and played for his wife may > determine the question of whether voice mail boxes are granted the same > confidentiality protections as live telephone calls or postal mail. The > ACLU argues that electronic eavesdropping should be avoided, but the U.S. > Chamber of Commerce takes the stance that businesses have the right to > ensure their electronic equipment is used for legitimate purposes. > (Times-Picayune 1/23/95 A3) > Comments? -- Joel Mueller - "Here lies one whose name is writ in water." -Keats Check my .plan for my PGP Public Key. PGP encrypted mail is very welcome! This must be Thursday. I never could get the hang of Thursdays. -Dent

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No more unix holy war !
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From James Donald Jan 26, 95 07:14:19 pm +0800 [...] > A: This is not the proper place for such arguments. Right, so why do you persist in sending them here ? > B: The statement is so flagrantly silly that the > proper response is ridicule, not an answer. Right, so why did you answer (and to the list, no less) ? [...] > [Childish insults, abuse, and flame bait deleted] If that were true, this thread would be long dead. [...] > Note that although this flame has nothing to do with cypherpunks Right, so why are you sending it to the cypherpunks list ? >From jamesd(a)com.informix.com Jan 26, 95 08:05:46 pm +0800 > To summarize this thread, and I hope end it. This was (briefly) promising. >From jamesd(a)com.informix.com Jan 26, 95 09:00:03 pm +0800 > I am writing this under sun's unix imitation of Microsoft's [...] If you hoped to end the thread, why continue it like this less than an hour later ? >From jamesd(a)com.informix.com Jan 26, 95 09:05:10 pm +0800 > And did I mention that "make" used to treat a tab as semanticly [...] > Oh yes, I did mention that. > Well I guess I will mention it again. Why ? What about ending the thread ? >From jamesd(a)com.informix.com Jan 26, 95 09:12:31 pm +0800 > And did I mention that in DOS you can type > rename *.txt *.asc [...] 3 more messages in 13 minutes, and you said you hoped this thread would end ? >From jamesd(a)com.informix.com Jan 26, 95 09:38:35 pm +0800 > And did I mention that in DOS you can type: > dir filename /s [...] > You are spared. I will not mention "curses". Why not spare us entirely by not sending all this mail which "has nothing to do with cypherpunks" as you said ? "Yes, James, you're absolutely right. I prostrate myself before your magnificence." Will you be quiet about this now ? What do we need to do to make you hush up ? -L. Futplex McCarthy

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Re: Reordering, not Latency (Was: Re: Remailer)
by Andrew Lowenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Adam Shostack says: > > It may be that the FBI has a couple of Suns handling the whole > > remailer network right now. Perry Metzger replies: > If they are doing that, they are violating the ECPA. They are > allowed to monitor only those things they have a warrant to monitor > (with, of course, all those lovely National Security exceptions). > This is not to say that it isn't being done, but it can't be used > in court. Is this even technically possible? That is, wholesale monitoring of disparate portions of the net from a single access point. Given the distributed and dynamic properties of the Net this would seem impossible. To monitor the entire remailer network an attacker would have to setup packet sniffers upstream from each and every portion of the Net that contained a remailer, wouldn't they? I suppose an extremely resourceful attacker could monitor traffic at crucial points (i.e. transcontinental feeds, points on the NFSnet, CIX, etc...), but there are so many private connections linking networks that it would be very difficult indeed to sniff out every bit of remailer traffic. Is having every bit of remailer traffic necessary for traffic analysis? Or would having a good percentage of it be sufficient? andrew

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Internet Mailing lists book
by Arsen Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found a 1993 version of this book (is there a 94 or 95?) it unfortunatly lacks the cypherpunks list. >8-( =============================================================================== | + ^ + || ' . . . . . . . Ray (Arsen) Arachelian || | \|/ || . . . ' . ' . : . . rarachel(a)photon.poly.edu || |<--+-->||. . . |' '| .' . . ... ___ sunder(a)intercom.com || | /|\ || . . \___/ . . . : .... __[R] || | + v + || . oOOo /o.O\ oOOo :. : .. |A| "And bugs to kill before I sleep"|| =========/---vvvv-------VVVV------------|I|----------------------------------/ / . : . ' : ' |D| This signature pannel is / / The Next Bug to kill(tm) --- now open. / /___________________________________________________________________/ GCS d++(---)(-) H s+++/++ !g !p !au a- w-(+) (!v | v) C+++++ Coherent++++ L+ 3 C+ V+ P? E- N++ K- W W--- M++ V-- po- Y+++ t:[tos+, tng--, ds9+] 5 !j !R G? tv+ b+++ D+ B--- e+(- | *) u--- h+++ f+(++) r++ n+(---) x**(++)

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Remote command execution PGP script
by Steven Greenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About a year and a half ago one of the Perl wizards on this list posted a script which would alllow you to mail a PGP-encrypted script to an account and (if the signature checked out) execute the script on the remote system. This would be extremely useful to me right now. Anybody have a copy of that script so that I don't have to reinvent the wheel? Thanks, Steve

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pgp content type RFC
by Andrew Lowenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone please provide me with the number of the MIME PGP content-type RFC? thanks! andrew

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Re: CERT statement
by Marc Horowitz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> What we need to concentrate on is secure systems that are not vulnerable >> to IP spoofing, as opposed to firewalls. You're exactly right. However, getting people to deploy real security systems is nearly impossible. My company sells a kerberos system, and although everyone is saying they want security, nobody really understands what this means, and as soon as we tell them that it actually involves effort, they become far less interested. Even though I've seen companies get hosed because of lame security, the people who matter aren't willing to commit. I'm hoping that as firewalls begin to fall, that the CERT will stop recommending half-assed solutions. We'll have to wait and see. Marc

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