December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

LESM - Link Encrypted Session Manager (3rd try)
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I tried to distribute LESM to the cypherpunks mailing list twice, and neither of them made it to the nntp.hks.com list archive (my laster posts HAVE). What is going on here? This is a second repost. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I finished hacking Matt's ESM to do link encryption yesterday, but for some reason the mail I sent to cypherpunks didn't get echoed back to me, so I'm sending this again. To install: get ESM and RSAREF, make sure you can compile ESM, then replace the esm.c with my hacked version and recompile. To use: same as ESM, but there's an extra option "-b bandwidth", the default is 100 cps. I've attached the modified esm.c here since it doesn't include any crypto code. To get ESM, write to cfs(a)research.att.com and state the following: - you are in the US or Canada, and - you are a US or Canadian citizen or legal permanent resident, and - You've read and understand the license and export conditions. RSAREF is in ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/ Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzqTtTl0sXKgdnV5AQEmbgP8CRxE+RCGsDXwwShWhZKGytSywyWZ8RXB RPBHZmk6UgdpCR2VVo8wXjcPuEv4SHp9ZjhFTq53JZ/s3YcV5FxF33/ivSlh1Ra4 P8GSYnoEaIJoFrJyagukbBUaY6zWCx0PcnsLoVArCxujwRYwfrQvHdiNx13z7bJh OSEhhoE9djg= =PY8P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- Enclosure number 1 ---------------- /* * LESM - Link Encrypted Session Manager * v0.6a.01 * Wei Dai * 2/8/1995 * * This program is a quick and dirty hack of: */ /* * ESM - Encrypted Session Manager * v0.6a * matt blaze * January 1995 */ /* * The author of this software is Matt Blaze. * Copyright (c) 1995 by AT&T. * Permission to use, copy, and modify this software without fee * is hereby granted, provided that this entire notice is included in * all copies of any software which is or includes a copy or * modification of this software and in all copies of the supporting * documentation for such software. * * This software is subject to United States export controls. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS BEING PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTY. IN PARTICULAR, NEITHER THE AUTHORS NOR AT&T MAKE ANY * REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THE MERCHANTABILITY * OF THIS SOFTWARE OR ITS FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE. */ /* * Some of this file was stolen from the BSD "script" program, which * is covered under the following notice: * * Copyright (c) 1980 Regents of the University of California. * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * This product includes software developed by the University of * California, Berkeley and its contributors. * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef lint char copyright1[] = "@(#) Copyright (c) 1980 Regents of the University of California.\n\ All rights reserved.\n"; char copyright2[] = "@(#) Copyright (c) 1995 AT&T\nAll rights reserved.\n"; #endif /* not lint */ #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <termios.h> #ifndef SUN #include <sys/ioctl.h> #endif #include <sys/time.h> #include <sys/file.h> #include <sys/signal.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include "global.h" #include "rsaref.h" #include "esm.h" char *shell; int master; int slave; int subchild; int escape=036; /* ^^ */ int ciphstate=0; int ciphbyte=0; int keyed=0; struct termios tt; struct winsize win; int lb; int l; char line[] = "/dev/ptyXX"; int aflg; #define REMOTE 0 #define LOCAL 1 #define CALC 2 int mode=LOCAL; int paranoid=0; #define SL_START 0 #define SL_GOT1 1 #define SL_GOT2 2 #define SL_GOT3 3 #define SL_GOT4 4 #define SL_KEYING 5 #define SL_CRYPT 6 int sloutstate=SL_START; char *cmd=NULL; #define TRANS 0 #define CMDWAIT 1 #define CIPHER 2 #define KEYWAIT 3 #define IV0 0 #define IV1 1 #define IV2 2 #define IV3 3 #define C0 4 #define C1 5 int state=TRANS; int cstate=IV0; FILE *fpmaster; struct timeval tvPause={0,10000}; struct timeval tvNoPause={0,0}; unsigned char filler = (unsigned char) 31; #define bwrite(fp,buf,len) (fwrite(buf,len,1,fp)) main(argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int ch, result; void finish(); char *getenv(); fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "e:b:splrci")) != EOF) switch((char)ch) { case 'e': cmd=optarg; break; case 'b': tvPause.tv_usec=(long)1000000/atol(optarg); break; case 'i': case 's': case 'p': paranoid=1; case 'r': mode=REMOTE; break; case 'l': mode=LOCAL; break; case 'c': mode=CALC; break; case '?': default: fprintf(stderr, "usage: lesm [-rlc] [-b bandwidth] [-e program\n"); exit(1); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if ((shell=getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = "/bin/sh"; getmaster(); (void) signal(SIGCHLD, finish); subchild = fork(); if (subchild < 0) { perror("fork"); fail(); } if (subchild==0) doshell(); else { /* main loop */ printf("LESM v0.6a.01, hacked by Wei Dai from ESM v0.6a - encrypted session manager\n"); printf(" by Matt Blaze, AT&T Bell Labs, January 1995\n"); randinit(); cipherinit(); switch (mode) { case REMOTE: if (paranoid) printf("remote server ready\n"); else printf("remote server ready; ctl-^ to escape\n"); break; case LOCAL: printf("local layer ready (run 'lesm -s' on remote)\n"); break; default: /* not yet */ printf("lesm ready\n"); } rawtty(); fpmaster=fdopen(master,"w"); if (fpmaster == NULL) done(); if (paranoid) startsession(); while(1) { FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(0,&fds); tv=tvNoPause; result=select (FD_SETSIZE,&fds,NULL,NULL,&tv); if (result==1) doinput(); if (mode==LOCAL && sloutstate==SL_CRYPT && result==0) doslavein(filler); if (result<0) break; FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(master,&fds); tv=tvNoPause; result=select (FD_SETSIZE,&fds,NULL,NULL,&tv); if (result==1) dooutput(); if (mode==REMOTE && state==CIPHER && result==0) domasterout(filler); if (result<0) break; } done(); } } doinput() { int cc; int i; static unsigned char ibuf[512]; if ((cc = read(0, ibuf, 512)) > 0) { switch (mode) { case REMOTE: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) domasterin(ibuf[i]); break; case LOCAL: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) doslavein(ibuf[i]); break; default: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) bwrite(fpmaster,&ibuf[i],1); break; } fflush(fpmaster); fflush(stdout); } else done(); } doslavein(ibuf) unsigned char ibuf; { int c; static int count=0; struct timeval tv; switch (sloutstate) { case SL_CRYPT: if (ibuf==escape) { bwrite(stdout,">>",2); fflush(stdout); if (slescape()) { printf("q\r\nEntering CLEARTEXT mode\r\n"); bwrite(fpmaster,"PPPPPPPPPPPPPPPP",16); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; } c=cfb8_encrypt(ibuf); if (!(++count % 8)) bwrite(fpmaster,"!",1); sendhex(fpmaster,c); tv=tvPause; select (FD_SETSIZE,NULL,NULL,NULL,&tv); break; default: bwrite(fpmaster,&ibuf,1); break; } } slescape() { char buf; int c; int escaped=0; while (read(0,&buf,1)>0) { if (escaped) { escaped=0; bwrite(fpmaster,&buf,1); continue; } if (buf==escape) { c=cfb8_encrypt(buf); sendhex(fpmaster,c); return 0; } bwrite(stdout,&buf,1); fflush(stdout); if (buf=='\\') { mode=escaped; continue; } if (buf=='\r') return 0; if (buf=='C') { return 1; } printf("\r\nType one of the following:\r\n"); printf(" \\[char] to send char as cleartext\r\n"); printf(" ctrl-^ to send escape character\r\n"); printf(" 'C' to return to CLEARTEXT session\r\n"); printf(" <enter> to return to encrypted session\r\n"); } return 1; /* should never happen */ } domasterin(ibuf) unsigned char ibuf; { int c; char ch; static int bad=0; switch (state) { case TRANS: if (ibuf != escape) bwrite(fpmaster, &ibuf, 1); else { state=CMDWAIT; bwrite(stdout,">>",2); cstate=IV0; } break; case CMDWAIT: if (ibuf == escape) { bwrite(fpmaster, &ibuf, 1); state=TRANS; } else switch (ibuf) { case '\r': case '\n': bwrite(stdout,"\r\n",2); state=TRANS; break; case 's': case 'S': startsession(LONG); break; case 'Q': done(); break; default: printf("Type 's' to start encrypted session\r\n"); printf(" 'Q' to terminate remote session\r\n"); printf(" ctrl-^ to send escape character\r\n"); printf(" <enter> to return to session\r\n"); break; } break; case CIPHER: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef!",ibuf)!=NULL) { bad=0; if ((c = cipherout(ibuf)) >= 0) { ch=c; if (ch!=filler) bwrite(fpmaster,&ch,1); } } else if (bad++ > 16) { delkey(); bwrite(stdout,"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",16); if (paranoid) done(); state=TRANS; } else ciphstate=0; break; case KEYWAIT: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef:",ibuf)!=NULL) { masterkeyin(ibuf); } else { delkey(); bwrite(stdout,"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",16); if (paranoid) done(); state=TRANS; } break; } } int pubstat=0; int pubpos=0; unsigned char pubbyte=0; int pksize = -1; startsession() { static unsigned char buf[5] = {0177, '~', 0177, '~', 'L'}; static unsigned char colon=':'; int i; pklen=dhparams[LONG].primeLen; printf("Starting remote side of %d bit key exchange.\r\n",pklen*8); if (createdh(LONG) < 0) return -1; bwrite(stdout,buf,5); for (i=0; i<pklen; i++) sendhex(stdout,ourpub[i]); bwrite(stdout,&colon,1); pksize=LONG; pubstat=0; pubpos=0; pubbyte=0; state=KEYWAIT; return 0; } sltranspub(len) { static unsigned char colon=':'; int i; printf("\r\nStarting local key exchange.\r\n"); for (i=0; i<len; i++) sendhex(fpmaster,ourpub[i]); bwrite(fpmaster,&colon,1); printf("entering ENCRYPTED mode; type ctrl-^ to escape\r\n"); } masterkeyin(c) char c; { int bits; if (c==':') { if (pubpos!=(pklen+2)) /* +2 for trailing checkword */ goto abort; if (mcalckeys(pksize)<0) /* also verifies */ goto abort; ciphstate=0; state=CIPHER; return; } else if (pubpos<MAXPUBKEY) { bits=atoh(c); if (bits<0) goto abort; if (pubstat) { pubbyte |= bits; otherpub[pubpos]=pubbyte; pubpos++; } else { pubbyte = bits<<4; } pubstat = 1-pubstat; return; } abort: bwrite(stdout,"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX",16); if (paranoid) done(); state=TRANS; } int mcalckeys(len) int len; { int i; if (dhagree(len)<0) /* sets up session keys */ return -1; for (i=0; i<8; i++) { ivin[i]=0; ivout[i]=0xff; } if (cfb8_decrypt(otherpub[pklen]) || cfb8_decrypt(otherpub[pklen+1])) return -1; return 0; } int slcalckeys(len) int len; { int i; if (dhagree(len)<0) /* sets up session keys */ return -1; for (i=0; i<8; i++) { ivout[i]=0; ivin[i]=0xff; } ourpub[pklen]=cfb8_encrypt(0); ourpub[pklen+1]=cfb8_encrypt(0); return 0; } initslkey(param) int param; { if ((param<0) || (param>2)) return -1; pklen=dhparams[param].primeLen; pksize=param; pubstat=0; pubpos=0; pubbyte=0; } slkeyin(c) char c; { int bits; if (c==':') { if (pubpos!=pklen) goto abort; if (createdh(pksize)<0) goto abort; if (slcalckeys(pksize)<0) goto abort; sltranspub(pklen+2); ciphstate=0; sloutstate=SL_CRYPT; return; } else if (pubpos<MAXPUBKEY){ bits=atoh(c); if (bits<0) goto abort; if (pubstat) { pubbyte |= bits; otherpub[pubpos]=pubbyte; pubpos++; } else { pubbyte = bits<<4; } pubstat = 1-pubstat; return; } abort: bwrite(stdout,"X",1); state=SL_START; } int cipherout(ch) char ch; { int bits; if (ch=='!') { ciphstate=0; return -1; } bits=atoh(ch); if (ciphstate) { ciphbyte |= bits; ciphstate=0; return(cfb8_decrypt(ciphbyte)); } else { ciphbyte = bits<<4; ciphstate=1; return -1; } } int ciphercalcin(ch) unsigned char ch; { static unsigned char iv[8]; static unsigned int cbuf; int c; int i; c = atoh(ch); switch (cstate) { case IV0: for(i=0; i<8; i++) iv[i]=0; cbuf = (c&0xf)<<4; cstate=IV1; return '.'; case IV1: cbuf = cbuf | (c&0xf); iv[7]=cbuf; cstate=IV2; return '.'; case IV2: cbuf = (c&0xf)<<4; cstate=IV3; return '.'; case IV3: cbuf = cbuf | (c&0xf); iv[6]=cbuf; cstate=C0; return '.'; case C0: cbuf = (c&0xf)<<4; cstate=C1; return '.'; case C1: cbuf = cbuf | c&0xf; c=cfb8_decrypt(cbuf); cstate=C0; if (isprint(c)) { bwrite(fpmaster,&c,1); return '_'; } else { return '?'; } default: return '?'; } } #include <sys/wait.h> void finish() { union wait status; register int pid; register int die = 0; while ((pid = wait3((int *)&status, WNOHANG, 0)) > 0) if (pid == subchild) die = 1; if (die) done(); } dooutput() { register int cc; int i; unsigned char obuf[512]; if ((cc = read(master, obuf, 512)) > 0) { switch (mode) { case REMOTE: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) domasterout(obuf[i]); break; case LOCAL: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) doslaveout(obuf[i]); break; default: for (i=0; i<cc; i++) bwrite(stdout, &obuf[i], 1); break; } fflush(fpmaster); fflush(stdout); } else done(); } domasterout(obuf) unsigned char obuf; { int c; static int count=0; struct timeval tv; switch (state) { case CIPHER: c=cfb8_encrypt(obuf); if (!(++count % 8)) bwrite(stdout,"!",1); sendhex(stdout,c); tv=tvPause; select (FD_SETSIZE,NULL,NULL,NULL,&tv); break; case TRANS: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); break; default: /* throw away since i/o screws up keying */ break; } } doslaveout(obuf) unsigned char obuf; { static int bad=0; int c; char ch; switch (sloutstate) { case SL_START: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); if (obuf==0177) sloutstate=SL_GOT1; break; case SL_GOT1: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); if (obuf=='~') sloutstate=SL_GOT2; else sloutstate=SL_START; break; case SL_GOT2: if (obuf==0177) sloutstate=SL_GOT3; else { bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; case SL_GOT3: if (obuf=='~') sloutstate=SL_GOT4; else { bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; case SL_GOT4: /* key size indicator */ bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); if (obuf=='S') { initslkey(SHORT); sloutstate=SL_KEYING; } else if (obuf=='M') { initslkey(MEDIUM); sloutstate=SL_KEYING; } else if (obuf=='L') { initslkey(LONG); sloutstate=SL_KEYING; } else sloutstate=SL_START; break; case SL_KEYING: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef:",obuf) != NULL) { slkeyin(obuf); } else { bwrite(stdout,"U",1); sloutstate=SL_START; } break; case SL_CRYPT: if (strchr("0123456789abcdef!",obuf) != NULL) { bad=0; if ((c = cipherout(obuf))>=0) { ch=c; if (ch!=filler) bwrite(stdout,&ch,1); } } else if (bad++ > 8) { fprintf(stderr,"\r\nEncrypted session terminated -"); fprintf(stderr,"\r\npress enter for CLEARTEXT mode: "); waitenter(); delkey(); sloutstate=SL_START; } else ciphstate=0; break; default: bwrite(stdout, &obuf, 1); break; } } doshell() { int t; /*** t = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR); if (t >= 0) { (void) ioctl(t, TIOCNOTTY, (char *)0); (void) close(t); } ***/ getslave(); (void) close(master); (void) dup2(slave, 0); (void) dup2(slave, 1); (void) dup2(slave, 2); (void) close(slave); if (cmd==NULL) execl(shell, "sh", "-i", 0); else system(cmd); perror(shell); fail(); } rawtty() { struct termios sbuf; sbuf = tt; sbuf.c_iflag &= ~(INLCR|IGNCR|ICRNL|IXON); sbuf.c_oflag &= ~OPOST; sbuf.c_lflag &= ~(ICANON|ISIG|ECHO); sbuf.c_cc[VMIN] = 1; sbuf.c_cc[VTIME] = 0; (void) tcsetattr(0, TCSAFLUSH, &sbuf); } cookedtty() { (void) tcsetattr(0, TCSAFLUSH, &tt); } fail() { (void) kill(0, SIGTERM); done(); } done() { cookedtty(); switch (mode) { case REMOTE: if (state==CIPHER) printf("XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX\n"); printf("lesm remote "); break; case LOCAL: printf("lesm local "); break; } printf("done\n"); exit(0); } getmaster() { char *pty, *bank, *cp; struct stat stb; pty = &line[strlen("/dev/ptyp")]; for (bank = "pqrstuvwxyz"; *bank; bank++) { line[strlen("/dev/pty")] = *bank; *pty = '0'; if (stat(line, &stb) < 0) break; for (cp = "0123456789abcdef"; *cp; cp++) { *pty = *cp; master = open(line, O_RDWR); if (master >= 0) { char *tp = &line[strlen("/dev/")]; int ok; /* verify slave side is usable */ *tp = 't'; ok = access(line, R_OK|W_OK) == 0; *tp = 'p'; if (ok) { (void) tcgetattr(0, &tt); (void) ioctl(0, TIOCGWINSZ, (char *)&win); return; } (void) close(master); } } } fprintf(stderr, "Out of pty's\n"); fail(); } getslave() { line[strlen("/dev/")] = 't'; slave = open(line, O_RDWR); if (slave < 0) { perror(line); fail(); } (void) tcsetattr(slave, TCSAFLUSH, &tt); (void) ioctl(slave, TIOCSWINSZ, (char *)&win); (void) setsid(); (void) ioctl(slave, TIOCSCTTY, 0); } waitenter() { unsigned char b; do { read(0,&b,1); } while (b!='\r'); printf("\r\n"); } sendhex(fp,c) FILE *fp; unsigned int c; { static char buf[16]; sprintf(buf,"%02x",c); bwrite(fp,buf,2); }

1 0

Senate Version of HR666 (fwd)
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is still *theoretically* possible to stop the legislative revocation of the 4th amendment, if you believe we have a representative government. Brad D. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: 9 Feb 1995 11:14:58 U From: Cooley Stephen <cooley_stephen(a)space.honeywell.com> To: UWSA <uwsa(a)shell.portal.com>, baron_mark_a(a)smtpmm.space.honeywell.com, Bostock#m#_Craig_W.FL40-P02(a)smtpmm.space.honeywell.com, Kidd_Lee.FL51-P03(a)smtpmm.space.honeywell.com Subject: Senate Version of HR666 S54 - the Senate version of HR666 subverts the 4th Amendment! I called Sen Mack's (R-FL) DC office this morning for info on S54. This bill has been submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee for consideration. Hearings for S3-The "New" Crime bill, are scheduled for Fed 15th. The new crime bill also has a Exclusionary Evidence section too. I have appended this section after S54 below. No hearings for S54 are scheduled as of yet. The aid I talked to didn't know if any hearings on S54 would even occur before it is passed onto the floor for a vote. The committe could mark up the bill and pass it on without hearings. Please pass this info onto other groups and reflectors. We have to get the word out on this bill. S54 modifies the requirements of the 4th amendment to ".....if the search or seizure was undertaken in an objectively reasonable belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment." Given the court rulings allowing traffic stops and searches due to an officer's descretion, "probably cause", S54 hammers another nail into the 4th Amendment coffin. Call your Senators and let them know your thoughts on this bill. There is no time to waste. FILE s54.is S 54 IS 104th CONGRESS 1st Session To amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary rule. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES January 4, 1995 Mr. Thurmond introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary A BILL To amend title 18 to limit the application of the exclusionary rule. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the `Exclusionary Rule Limitation Act of 1995'. Sec. 2. (a) Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding the following two sections: `Sec. 3508. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule `Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or seizure was in violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, if the search or seizure was undertaken in an objectively reasonable belief that it was in conformity with the fourth amendment. A showing that evidence was obtained pursuant to and within the scope of a warrant constitutes prima facie evidence of such a reasonable belief, unless the warrant was obtained through intentional and material misrepresentation. `Sec. 3509. General limitation of the exclusionary rule `Except as specifically provided by statute or rule of procedure, evidence which is otherwise admissible shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the evidence was obtained in violation of a statute or rule of procedure, or of a regulation issued pursuant thereto.'. (b) The table of sections of chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof: `3508. Limitation of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. `3509. General limitation of the exclusionary rule. Exclusionary Evidence section in the new crime bill S3: SEC. 507. ADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN EVIDENCE. `Sec. 3502A. Admissibility of evidence obtained by search or seizure `(a) Evidence Obtained by Objectively Reasonable Search or Seizure: Evidence obtained as a result of a search or seizure that is otherwise admissible in a Federal criminal proceeding shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that the search or seizure was in violation of the fourth amendment to the Constitution. `(b) Evidence Not Excludable by Statute or Rule: Evidence shall not be excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States on the ground that it was obtained in violation of a statute, an administrative rule, or a rule of court procedure unless exclusion is expressly authorized by statute or by a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to chapter 131 of title 28. `(c) Rule of Construction: This section shall not be construed to require or authorize the exclusion of evidence in any proceeding.'. (2) Technical amendment: The chapter analysis for chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item for section 3502 the following new item: `3502A. Admissibility of evidence obtained by search or seizure.'. (c) Illegal Search and Seizure: (1) In general: Title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 171, the following new chapter:

1 0

My pgp emacs code in ftp://ftp.markv.com/pub/jpp/pgpelisp/*
by jpp＠markv.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been hacking yet another emacs to pgp interface for some time now. I am happy with the current state of affairs, and am releasing it for general consumption. It supports automatic decrypting, signing, signature checks and interfaces nicely with rmail.el and sendmail.el. Also it includes a set of remailer functions which parse the ping reports from Raph Levien <raph(a)CS.Berkeley.EDU> and give you a simple interface to chaining a bunch of remailers together. The code is liscense free; use it, sell it, hack it up, export it, claim it is yours, I don't care. Feel free. (How could I stop you any way? I suspect that number theory, and complexity theory *are* the real natural rights.) My code is in ftp://ftp.markv.com/pub/jpp/pgpelisp/* It is not yet very well packaged. Read 2b.emacs. I still want to clean up the remailer stuff a little before I spend time packaging. (C-C commands, reply block building, and estimates of a chain's reliability, (support for ghio and julf {pseudo, ano}nyms?)) Unfortuneately my net connection, and means of support here at markv will likely soon be gone :(... This may be the last chance I have to distribute or work on this code for a while. If the code impreses you with my ability to hack, you might want to make me a job offer :) Or point me to jobs. OTOH, if my ability to hack doesn't impress you, please be quiet until I do get another job :). j'

1 0

No Subject
by jltocher＠CCGATE.HAC.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From Edupage: ONLINE SPYING While you're connected to your favorite Web page, it's also connected to you, and could be copying all sorts of information off your hard drive, say industry experts. In fact, it happened last year when Central Point Software used registration software developed by Pipeline Communications, and inadvertently also gathered descriptions of the users' systems -- the type of microprocessor, the version of DOS and Windows, the type of display and mouse, and the amount of free space available on the hard drive. Customers squawked, and Central Point had Pipeline change the software. However, Pipeline reports that at least one of its clients is using the scanning feature now -- but only after getting the owner's permission. The lesson? "If you can't trust it, don't connect to it." (Forbes 2/13/95 p.186) John L. Tocher THE CITY-a bounded infinity. A labyrinth where JLTocher(a)ccgate.HAC.com you are never lost. Your private map where every PGP: CE 72 1A 11 07 47 35 block bears exactly the same number. Even if you 35 9A C1 DE EA 64 21 BC 94 lose your way, you cannot go wrong. --Kobo Abe

1 0

NYT on HR666
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Katherine Seelye writes on Page One today about House passage of the new Search and Seizure bill. It covers a parallel revision of appeals of the death penalty. And notes on abusive BATF. For email copy send blank message to <jya(a)pipeline.com> with subject: 666_zap

1 0

Re: skronk
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kipp E.B. Hickman says: > Har! Besides the certificate problems, are there other problems with > PEM that have prevented its adoption? Its kind of ugly, too. The new PEM-MIME stuff should do much better, but its no longer really PEM per se. Look at the drafts if you are interested. > > I don't really blame you much. I mean TIPEM handles all the X.509 > > stuff just fine and PGP can't get out even the simplest of libraries, > > or even a partial library. > > Our implementation supports this X.509 stuff as well. We don't have a > DUA yet though... Just so you know, Kipp, there is no real support for X.500 directories over the internet, and there never will be. No one likes the things outside of fogeys in MIS departments who program in Cobol. Certificates as currently envisioned by the IETF are probably going to be stored in the DNS. .pm

1 0

PEM
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Har! Besides the certificate problems, are there other problems with > PEM that have prevented its adoption? That's it. PEM "blew it" by relying on Internet-wide X.500/X.509 deployments. They're now looking at self-signed certificates as a transition aide to work around the adoption problems, particular in face of the pressure brought by the success of PGP. /r$

1 0

Re: Remailer Encryption Module
by cactus＠seabsd.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.3.89.9502090612.E21224-0100000(a)lia.bga.com>, Nathan Zook <nzook(a)bga.com> wrote: >As I've considered this problem, I've arrived at essentially the same >conclusion. We need an RSA-IDEA package that does something very close to >Mixmaster. I'm a-hackin' as fast as I can! Seriously, this is exactly what I had in mind when I started out on the Hastur Crypto Toolkit. Data formats will be parameterized, with parameters for well-known systems like PGP included with at least minimal auto-selection support. See the Hastur Status thread for the one real problem that isn't just a SMOP: key management. - -- Todd Masco | "No matter how peculiar the medium or incongruous the scale, cactus(a)hks.net | the instinct to build persists." - Joy Of Cooking Cactus' Homepage - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLzpvqSoZzwIn1bdtAQG2+AGA2mP0eRIcgMKBAaeeMPr2Ik/mTN1SZ5y8 9MA8dM11fOvKah/EJRMwaTZ2RGuE/bv6 =r9eh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

So, what's it all about?
by Eric Merth 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I went to a UNIX trade show yesterday, and the main speaker was a security type. He talked about "the cypherpunks" among other things. He said you are really scary and dangerous and ... But of course he had to also project this adress (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) on the screen. So are you really scary and dangerous? What are the cypherpunks? Just curious, -EWM

4 3

RE: a new way to do anonymity
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes wrote: > Now here's an important detail that needs to get done right. Is the > forwarding for fixed length packets, variable length packets, or > streams? Is this decision global or local? What are the latency and > aggregatation effects? How important are these for different classes > of data? (telnet v. voice, e.g.) I'm not sure I understand the first question. My idea was originally based on link encrypted streams. How can forwarding variable length packets help untracibility? Wouldn't an attacker just have to match up the sizes of incoming and outgoing packets? Forwarding fixed length packets, on the other hands, just makes the system a remailer-net (so you'll have to do mixing, etc.). What am I misunderstanding here? > I'd suggest just getting something running first, to get some > prototyping experience. I just finished hacking ESM to do link encryption. (see my other post) Now if someone is willing to run a MUD type program and hook LESM up with it, then we'd have the first prototype of a pipe-net. Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzrFzzl0sXKgdnV5AQFfOAP7BpGWmo7FLK02a10NVTfgLEeheBosazzz 0TbFs2dwhtL4IRtY6To25e7MN2cz4X+qKJOleWy6uGbUowygHKbd1uiHOS9DNRmx /fKeyIlGd/Ogv6hSpiL/JDd0vx7vVx9Ho1CIy+oAFq4v8Kwd0sqQenqqvhBdoEfA zmVUpc+82nU= =3mfe -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- E-mail: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> URL: "http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai" =================== Exponential Increase of Complexity =================== --> singularity --> atoms --> macromolecules --> biological evolution --> central nervous systems --> symbolic communication --> homo sapiens --> digital computers --> internetworking --> close-coupled automation --> broadband brain-to-net connections --> artificial intelligence --> distributed consciousness --> group minds --> ? ? ?

1 0