December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SSL search attack
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

D > > The odds can be improved somewhat by scaling the granularity of the D > >sweep to the size of the sweep. (Align larger chunks on large-chunk D > >boundaries, eliminating the chance of overlap with other large chunks.) D > D > Some kind of step (ie, round-down) function performed on the random (I More like deciding ahead of time that if you are going to take 1/n of the keyspace, you should take a chunk aligned on a 1/n boundary. That way, you don't have two people take chunks right next to each other, just missing the key, or take chunks that overlap each other massively, duplicating effort. If a random protocol were to be used, each person would roll up an appropriate starting spot, and then simply search sequentially thereafter, so that he would not double up on his =own= previous efforts. The point of scaling the starting point is basically the theory that says: "I will generate a random number of the form xxxxxx0000, because if I trust that a person has scanned any given number, I also trust that he has scanned the next FFFF keys, so it would be counterproductive for me to start anywhere not so aligned." And the number of 0s is based on my pathetic amount of computing power being estimated as 2**(-24) of the total effort. For those who made the Big Boys list, a few more zeros are in order. D > is searching an X segment area around where the dart hit. In order to D > get any kind of boundry, you have to scale the allowed segment blocks, by D > powers of two, for example, or something, so everyone knows where the D > borders are. Its a nice thought but I don't see that it's necessary. It should improve the odds just a bit. Instead of throwing darts at 2**40 targets, we are only throwing them at 2**24 small ones, and people with large darts to throw can worry about, say, 2**16 or even 2**12 targets to hit. * You always carry weapons, 'cause you always carry cash. -Glenn Frey. --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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Re: O.J. ObCrypto: Fuhrman's Folly Fans Fakery Fears...
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 23:50 8/30/95, MONTY HARDER wrote: >I recommend that anyone who will be using escrowed keys generate two >pairs: First, the signature key, including in the userid some kind of >[sig use] identifier (we should settle on a standard abbreviation for >this) follower by the encryption key. This way, when a person gets your >pubkeys, they get the encryption key =last=, which gets it searched >first whenever they PGP -e... something. > > Whatever arrangements are made for escrowing my encryption key, >=nobody= gets my signature key. If I am fired, quit, become brain >damaged or dead, my key can never be used by anyone to implicate me in >any criminal activity. > > > > Please don't mention to anyone the fact that my signature key can be >used to send me something that even the escrow agents can't read.... I do not think that PGP 2.x can easily (ie: Automatically) use one key for Signing and another for Encrypting a Message (it does both at the same time if you ask). If I "Clear Sign" a message and then Encrypt it, then I get the result but I'm not sure if doing the decrypt on such a message will automatically spot the signature and verify it (as would occur with a E+S pass). PGP3 is supposed to have the ability to have keysets that contain two keys for this purpose (ie: When you generate a key set you can ask it to generate separate Sign and Encrypt keys so that separate keys get used for each function).

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Re: PGP5i supports RSA keys?
by David Downey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>As PGP5i will be outside RSA's patent reach (i.e. the patent is only >valid within the US) will PGP5i support RSA keys? > Yes, PGP 5.0i does support the RSALIB. Even though you can generate RSALIB based keys, why do so when there is a newer and better algorythm supplied with the 5.0? Albiet it is nice to have the support as not everyone has converted over, I still prefer the newer one. 4096 bit keys are going to be rather hard to break in this lifetime. :-) ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: SSL search attack
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:33 8/31/95, Piete Brooks wrote: > I am against pre-fetching of the next chunk, as I believe it should not be > necessary (I'll review that after Hal3) and it tends to increase NOACKs I see nothing wrong with the concept of being allocated an initial chunk and having the scan software attempt to ACK it when 50% of it has been searched. A successful ACK would allow the releasing of a new chunk (in response) equal in size to the returned chunk. A failure of the Server to accept the ACK would trigger a retry at set intervals (such as 75% and 100% or 60/70/80/90/100%) until the Server responds. Thus the scanner is always in possession of a Full Sized Chuck to scan (so long as the Server accepts an ACK before the 100% done mark) and temporary failures will not stop the process of a scanner as currently happens. Note: All this does is alter the size of the initial chunk granted and allow the scanner to report partial progress and reset the scanned range back to the original chunk size (ie: The Scanner never has more than the designated assigned chunk size at any time - it just gets refreshed in pieces [thus allowing overlap of scanning with getting a new range to scan] in lieu of all at once [which has a failure to accept the ACK as a bottle neck in uninterrupted scanning]).

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cypherpunks lite?
by will＠thinkmedia.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone provide me with the address of cypherpunks lite? Thanks. -Will S. Johnston ______________________________________________________________________________ Opinion is a flitting thing, Real Time Media But Truth, outlasts the Sun-- Thinking Media Research If then we cannot own them both-- will(a)thinkmedia.com Possess the oldest one-- (408) 423-3720 -Emily Dickinson http://www.thinkmedia.com

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Missed a PGP version?
by David Downey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The version numbers of PGP floated from PGP 2.63i to PGP 5.0i. Did I miss a version or was this done to reflect the start of the break from the RSALIB algorythm? Also, does PGP 5.0 still support the MPLIB? Was it used in it's design? ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Hmmm.. (fwd)
by Bryan Strawser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a previous message, Jamie Rishaw said... This was from one of the discussion groups concerning InterNIC's operation of the whois services, registration services, etc. I found it quite interesting that they were logging this sort of information. Bryan > From owner-rs-talk(a)internic.net Fri Sep 1 00:47:14 1995 > Message-Id: <m0soE5J-001dv0C(a)sauron.multiverse.com> > From: jamie(a)sauron.multiverse.com (Jamie Rishaw) > Subject: Hmmm.. > To: rs-talk(a)internic.net > Date: Thu, 31 Aug 1995 14:11:28 -0400 (EDT) > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII > Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit > Content-Length: 343 > Sender: owner-rs-talk(a)internic.net > > What's this? > > melkor% whois seaway.com ~/nic > crt0: no /usr/lib/ld.so > > Could not open log file [/home/guest/guest/logs/whoisrv.log] > > > Does NIC log all the WHOIS requests? Why? > > > -- > jamie rishaw (jamie(a)multiverse.net) > > "Hey! Who took the cork off my lunch??!" > -- W. C. Fields > -- Bryan Strawser, Gondolin Technologies, Bloomington, IN USA Remember Waco feanor(a)gondolin.org Live free or die

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Karl Hess meeting - L.A. area
by J. Kent Hastings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice, and let me remind you, moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." -- Aristotle, and a Goldwater speechwriter, but not Karl Hess. Politically Barry's Boy, Karl was often credited with Goldwater's most famous line, but he denied it when interviewed. Karl did write books: Dear America, Community Technology, and Capitalism For Kids. --- T H E K A R L H E S S C L U B --- now in its second year of almost monthly dinners, presents The Perestroika Deception: The Phony "Collapse" of Communism September's speaker is William (Bill) McIlhany, who will speak on Conspiracy Theory of the Soviet collapse, and may answer some questions about the Chemical Bank Takeover of Chase Manhattan, if we ask real nice. The Karl Hess Club will meet Monday, September 18 at the Marie Callendar Restaurant in Marina Del Rey 4356 Lincoln Boulevard (at the 90 Fwy). The program is free of charge, but if you care to dine, $13.00 covers everything including tax and tip, with the exception of alcoholic beverages. Cocktails at 7pm, Dinner at 7:30pm, Speaker at 8:30pm. Dinner: $13.00 includes all you can eat buffet with Marie's Pot Roast. Vegetable, Salad Bar, Potato, Cornbread, Apple, Lemon and Pumpkin Pies plus (Soft) beverages included. Order alcoholic beverages on your own, cash & carry. No reservations are necessary, but for more information, you are welcome to contact Mike Everling at (213) 225-3405. In order to get to the restaurant, take the Marina (90) Freeway West until it ends at Lincoln Boulevard. Turn right at Lincoln and right again into the parking lot of the restaurant- it's just at the corner. Inside the restaurant, go upstairs to the meeting room. The program for October 16 is still in development. The venue will again be Marie Callendar in MDR, with the tentatively scheduled speaker to be Dr. John Hospers. Want to make sure you are on the Karl Hess Club mailing list? Leave a message at (310) 289-4126, e-mail at agorist003(a)aol.com, or write The Agorist Institute, 291 S. La Cienega Blvd., #749, Beverly Hills, CA 90211. Browse our Web page -- http://www.pinsight.com/~zeus/agorist/ For tax deduction, make donations payable to The Agorist Institute. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMEYh6zTxxI221vktAQFYDwP/chaMpCMb8kxpg2oo/AOi+ybiZFe5KQCY dJa8LKskqz6usBCuClhWfhvsyfwt5LOg3v9B8yRLiQR8kjHuUWNjkxY8WwsRUi3C NKGW33EeplPEg2Rpv/pxWYqNICfYQa6j9xAUVPSPZbJD9HrWM+sJ7uJGuLMY0p48 4u/vppPSyHU= =bvnM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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mediated capital spectacular enemy
by TheeInterNet＠hotmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thee InterNet is not a collection of machines, but a social relation among people, *mediated* by nothing. Thee InterNet is *capital* to such a degree of accumulation that it becomes a machine. Thee InterNet which eliminates all geographical distance reproduces distance internally as *spectacular* separation. InterNet theory is now the *enemy* of all InterNet ideology and knows it.

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FUHRMAN key escrow
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FUHRMAN key escrow Fuhrman seems to be a Godsend to us. He is helping to destroy the public's perceived legitimacy of state authority. If things keep moving the way they are, Fuhrman may join the names: John Crapper, Quisling, & Hooker. In which case, I propose the term, Fuhrman key escrow, to substitue for the term, mandatory state key escrow.

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