December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

More 40-bit RC4 nonsense
by raph＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- If I recall correctly, the first byte out of the RC4 stream has about a 40% chance of being the first byte of the key. Thus, if the 40-bit "secret" part of the key is the _beginning_ of the full 128-bit key, then the keyspace is effectively reduced by about seven bits, meaning that I would be able to crack a key on my PC in a couple of days or so. Of course, if the "clear" 88 bits went first, there would be no advantage whatsoever. The SSL document very carefully does not say how they combine the two key parts to form the 128-bit key. Does anyone know? Raph -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLu3cI/4BfQiT0bDNAQEToQQAtcy2v0sBd+g5GBrm+Pa1AykqS4tTctfu EYga7kPry4wvGmI7/HpD+SVVDQRcJe+O9CxH9cpvRgBRIBhyvsFXVBSTW0OTJgXb 1bYh5qerD5J/gXAs0XWIp0+Hj8GqeTIRkFTseU4MDcDfQ7tOSEFvul97iSNYIytX AMkmAEmMXxU= =S80T -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by kipp＠warp.mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412130729.XAA01473(a)jobe.shell.portal.com>, you write: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > It is nice to have a lot of people on the list from Netscape. > Here is a question about SSL relating to the use of certificates: > > + The issuer name must resolve to a name that is deemed > acceptable by the application using SSL. How the application > using SSL does this is outside the scope of this memo. > > What does Netscape actually do about this? If I want to make a server > which will interoperate with existing Netscape clients what kind of > certificate do I need, and what kind of name should be in there? > Thanks - > > Hal Finney > hfinney(a)shell.portal.com > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6 > > iQBVAwUBLu1NOxnMLJtOy9MBAQGItwIAr4eerI+FSmPpOIcwITepnXzcUUFkPwsK > +Rz2FC4Y6hV0HoDEt1JnpvCPVV5N74Jtc9xMmF8CcRlBybk25PkxVQ== > =LOql > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Because online directory services are not one of the extant solved problems on the Internet, Netscape uses a simple approach - a small set of "important issuer" certificates are compiled into the browser. A future release will support "key rings" ala PGP. This is all we had time for in this release... All you need to do is get your server certificate from one of several places, including: RSA (commercial CA or server CA) Netscape (not likely; we can't afford the liability) MCI (I don't know if they are selling this). So the short answer is: it's hard to do right now. In six months it should be a very different scenario. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Kipp E.B. Hickman Netscape Communications Corp. kipp(a)mcom.com http://www.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html

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re: BofA + Netscape
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> It seems that Perry and other are flaming Netscape for doing things > their own way. > Yes, Netscape have made a lot fuckups. But they are out there > bringing really cool crypto to the masses. > First guy on the block always does a lot of dumb fuckups. This is by far the most intelligent commentary I've read so far in this "NetScape" debate. Does anybody remember PGP 1.0? Released in the summer of 1991, using the Bass-O-Matic cipher... which was worthless. This list didn't come into existence until around the same time PGP 2.0 came out. Thus, nobody railed against the weaknesses of PGP like they are railing against NetScape. So maybe the first version of NetScape could use some enhancements. Just like PGP 1.0 did. Nobody would argue that based on the direction of PGP 1.0, the whole PGP project should be scrapped. Or would they? I think NetScape is doing overall good. Sure, improvements can be made. But SOMETHING is being accomplished.

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Re: IPSP and Netscape
by kipp＠warp.mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412130302.TAA00871(a)largo.remailer.net>, you write: > I've tried really hard to stay out of this, but this one is just too much. > > The question is about IPSP, the swIPe-like IP level security protocol. > > From: "Kipp E.B. Hickman" <kipp(a)warp.mcom.com> > > Name one router that speaks the secure protocols you are > documenting? Name one PPP based bridge that does? Show me, today, > what percentage of the Internet is covered by these standards? > > [ ... later ... ] > > My company's network hardware is typical. It is filled with > expensive devices that don't understand IPSP or IPNG. In fact, most > of the world is constructed this way. > > The protocol does IP-within-IP encapsulation, which means that every > single router deployed is able to carry the secured traffic. > > Now, this is not so egregious an error by itself (it is, but I'm being > polite), but coupled with the claims that SSL is better than anything > else out there, I see an argument from chauvinism rather than one from > knowledge. > > Since IPSP works at the IP level rather than at the TCP level there > are protocol stacks that have to change. This is not immediate. It > may be that IPSP is not the quickest or best way to link security, but > that is not the point I am making here. The original denial of IPSP's > potential utility was made in complete ignorance, ignorance so great > to lack even the most basic understanding of the subject at hand. > > I cannot trust abbreviated arguments from such a source. I can, > however, examine ones which are complete and well thought out and > demonstrate some understanding of tradeoffs. I'm sorry you are so upset. :-( IPSP was not in my vocabulary at the time of the first posting. Ignorance was briefly bliss :^) However, regardless of whether or not extant hardware is reusable, there is still the not so small matter of software. Software for PC's, MAC's and a host of UNIX machines before a workable secure network can be constructed. It is a good thing that IPSP requires only software to meet it's goals. This same property is true of SSL. Finally, I never said that "SSL is better than anything out there". I don't know who did. All I said is that "SSL is something", which isn't really saying much. SSL is A solution to A set of problems, namely privacy and authentication. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Kipp E.B. Hickman Netscape Communications Corp. kipp(a)mcom.com http://www.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html

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Re: the netscape/ssl controversy
by kipp＠warp.mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412131448.JAA07613(a)cutter.clas.ufl.edu>, you write: > have to get my two cents in: > > netscape has a proposal that secures the *transport* of files. pgp and > the like secure the actual files themselves. the question that will > have to be answered is "which method of security is more valuable to > the internet as a whole?" > > of course i have made up my mind, but i'll waste some space and share > those thoughts here. > > ...much elided... > > so while ssl may well be a wonderful protocol, it does not address the > problems that many cypherpunks see as being real. i think it would do > netscape good to listen to and consider the views of many on this > list, as they have many genuinely good ideas, even if they choose a > confrontational manner. My personal opinion is that using MIME encoded documents with embedded security information including digital signatures combined with SSL or other trasport layer security, will be a reasonable solution. Please check out: ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pem-sigenc-02.txt and ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pem-mime-07.txt --------------------------------------------------------------------- Kipp E.B. Hickman Netscape Communications Corp. kipp(a)mcom.com http://www.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html

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calling all cpunks on netcom
by srikar＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Just floating a trial balloon. Are you tired of the high traffic on the cypherpunks list and having to wade through a ton of mail every day? Any of you folks approaching your 5M limit from archiving too many messages? Well, I am and I don't really want to start paying for the extra memory. I was wondering if it might be worth petitioning the netcom sysadmins to start up a local newsgroup (eg. netcom.cpunks) that serves as an archive for the mailing list. That way one gets to use the abilities of <insert favourite threaded news browser here> to keep threads together and so forth. I'm sure there are enough netcom subscribers to warrant this. Another alternative might be to set up something along the lines of discuss at mit, which is a local collection of "meetings" on various topics that one can browse through and serves as a handy archiver too since it isn't flushed nearly as often as a Usenet queue. I believe this list is already archived in a discuss meeting at MIT. Just a thought. Pheedback? -S ---- Srikar "shrieks" Srinath srikar(a)netcom.com Hackito Ergo Sum ---- "Free your mind and your ass will follow." - George Clinton

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Re: More 40-bit RC4 nonsense
by kipp＠warp.mcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199412131742.JAA27330(a)netcom5.netcom.com>, you write: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > If I recall correctly, the first byte out of the RC4 stream has > about a 40% chance of being the first byte of the key. Thus, if the > 40-bit "secret" part of the key is the _beginning_ of the full 128-bit > key, then the keyspace is effectively reduced by about seven bits, > meaning that I would be able to crack a key on my PC in a couple of > days or so. > Of course, if the "clear" 88 bits went first, there would be no > advantage whatsoever. The SSL document very carefully does not say > how they combine the two key parts to form the 128-bit key. Does > anyone know? > > Raph > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6 > > iQCVAwUBLu3cI/4BfQiT0bDNAQEToQQAtcy2v0sBd+g5GBrm+Pa1AykqS4tTctfu > EYga7kPry4wvGmI7/HpD+SVVDQRcJe+O9CxH9cpvRgBRIBhyvsFXVBSTW0OTJgXb > 1bYh5qerD5J/gXAs0XWIp0+Hj8GqeTIRkFTseU4MDcDfQ7tOSEFvul97iSNYIytX > AMkmAEmMXxU= > =S80T > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- OOPS. This is a spec ommission. The clear key data (aka "salt") is combined with the secret portion as follows: The bytes of the salt are concatenated with the secret portion with the secret portion making up the least significant bytes of the concatenation. I will spec'ize the english... By the way, where did this 40% number come from? For some reason RSA never told me this... :^( --------------------------------------------------------------------- Kipp E.B. Hickman Netscape Communications Corp. kipp(a)mcom.com http://www.mcom.com/people/kipp/index.html

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Re: Clarification of my remarks about Netscape
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Please define a solution that is: > distributed > reliable > supports an unforgeable name to public-key mapping > standard > not-bulky > not-expensive Build a new API out of sockets and GSSAPI? ssl_t s = ssl_bind(char *hostname, int port, char *servername); ssl_status_t ssl_secure(ssl_t s, oid_t security_type, unsigned32 flags); etc... /r$

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Re: BofA+Netscape
by Johnathan Corgan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Is that the same Microsoft that brought us Edlin??? Wasn't edlin based on the Unix ed?

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Re: News->Mail & CMU's Andrew Message System
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> AMS is pretty strongly tied to AFS (now known as part of DCE) At some levels DCE's distributed file system (DFS) is "AFS version 5" (sic), but not really. The original intent was that DFS was AFS with the IPC replaed with secure DCE RPC, but there's a whole mess of protocol changes since then. They're different beasts. /r$

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