December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Elm and premail (long)
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have just finished integrating premail 0.30 with Elm on jpunix.com. Since there have been some questions about how to do this type of thing, I thought I'd give a blow-by-blow description of what I did and the pro's, con's and alternatives to what I did. 1) I installed premail as a wedge to the sendmail daemon. In other words, per Raph Levin's instructions in his README file, I renamed sendmail to something else and then renamed premail to sendmail and have it pointing to the renamed sendmail. I realize this requires system admin privs and is a big step to take, but I have testing premail working as the sendmail program with great success and at this point I have no qualms about premail/sendmail being one in the same. 2) I created the ~/.premailrc file in my home directory per Raph's README file. There is an option at the bottom to create aliases and that is what I did at first. Then, I discovered that the alias database created by Elm is compatible with premail!! 3) I edited ~/.elm/aliases.text to make changes similar to the following: The alias raph = Levin; Raph = raph(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu to raph = Levin; Raph = raph@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu^key=raph@cs.berkeley.edu Elm doesn't seem to mind this new alias structure and premail parses it just fine! I could have added a ^chain=3 also, but I decided that I may not want to email Raph through a set of remailers every time. I decided I would add the extra header during message creation. More on this later. What this does is that from now on, whenever I send email to Raph, it will automatically be encrypted with his public key with no further intervention on my part! When I want to chain the message through some remailers, I just take the H)eaders option from the Elm pre-send menu and add a header line: Chain: 3 This causes the message to be chaine through three random remailers before it gets to Raph. I also added two addition Perl scripts to Elm to help in the creation of encrypted messages for people NOT in my alias file, signing messages, and reading PGP encrypted messages that are not MIME compliant. These scripts are mailpgp and morepgp. These Perl scripts were published with version 2.3 of PGP but work fine with 2.4 and up. In Elm, I went to the options menu and replaced the default editor with mailpgp as well as the visual editor. I also replaced the default builtin+ display parameter with morepgp. These two Perl scripts are listed at the end of this message. The mailpgp script will allow you to encrypt and sign messages right before they are sent. The morepgp script will decrypt/verify incoming messages on the fly. The really nice benefit of these scripts is that you can reply to cleartext version of PGP encrypted messages. With the combination of these Perl scripts, Elm (or Pine for that matter) can be turned into an encrypted mail handler with a minimum of fuss. morepgp: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # -*- Perl -*- # written by jason steiner, jsteiner(a)anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu, Jan 1993 # # if you use or make improvements to this program i would appreciate # copies of your modifications & your PGP public key. # # Modified by Greg Spencer, greg(a)graphics.cornell.edu, May 1994 # Mostly just cleaned up things and added stuff like automatic # addition and detection (and ignoring) of keys to be added to keyring, # and signal catching, as well as environment variable control of # most site-specific stuff. # # Must set the following environment variable: # # PGPCOMMAND set to the pgp decryption command # # PAGER set to the desired pager command # # NOTE that this program NEVER writes sensitive data to a disk file. # it will only slurp it into memory, so if you have a HUGE file, you might # have problems. # setup some variables ($pgpcommand = $ENV{'PGPCOMMAND'}) || ($pgpcommand = "/usr/local/bin/pgp"); # just used for tmpfile names... ($logname = $ENV{'LOGNAME'}) || ($logname = "nobody"); # ($pager = $ENV{'PAGER'}) || ($pager="/usr/local/bin/less -i -n -s -S -c -M"); ($pager = $ENV{'PAGER'}) || ($pager="/usr/bin/more -c"); $|=1; $topgp = 0; $tokey = 0; $pgpused = 0; ($tmpdir = $ENV{'TMPDIR'}) || ($tmpdir = "/tmp"); #temporary file name $tmpfile = "${tmpdir}/.pgp1.$logname.$$"; $tmpfile2 = "${tmpdir}/.pgp2.$logname.$$"; # trap signals so we do not leave # garbage around sub catcher { local ($sig) = @_; print "Caught a SIG$sig -- exiting\n"; close (TMPFILE); close (OUTPUT); close (PAGER); unlink ($tmpfile); unlink ($tmpfile2); } $SIG{'INT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'QUIT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'HUP'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'KILL'} = 'catcher'; # make sure nobody can read stuff umask 077; # prepare a data area @tmpdata = (); @newkeys = (); while (<>) { if (!$topgp && m/^-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $topgp = 1; $pgpused = 1; unlink ($tmpfile); open (TMPFILE, ">$tmpfile") || (unlink ($tmpfile) && die "Cannot open $tmpfile for output.\n"); } if (!$topgp) { push(@tmpdata, $_); } if ((!$tokey) && (m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { $contains_keys = 1; $tokey = 1; } if ($tokey) { push (@newkeys, $_); if (m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $tokey = 0; } } if ($topgp) { print TMPFILE $_; # OK to write this to a file -- it is encrypted! if (m/^-----END PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $topgp = 0; close TMPFILE; open (CLEAR, "$pgpcommand -f < $tmpfile |") || (unlink($tmpfile) && die "Cannot open pipe to PGP.\n"); $blocktype = $_; $blocktype =~s/^-----END (PGP .*)-----/$1/; $blocktype =~s/PGP MESSAGE/DECRYPTED MESSAGE/; $blocktype =~s/PGP SIGNATURE/SIGNED MESSAGE/; chop ($blocktype); push (@tmpdata, "-----BEGIN $blocktype-----\n"); while (<CLEAR>) { push (@tmpdata, $_); if ((!$tokey) && (m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { $contains_keys = 1; $tokey = 1; } if ($tokey) { push (@newkeys, $_); if (m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $tokey = 0; } } } close CLEAR; print STDERR "\n"; unlink ($tmpfile); push (@tmpdata, "-----END $blocktype-----\n"); } } } select (STDIN); $|=1; select (STDERR); $|=1; select (STDOUT); $|=1; # This handles things if we found keys that need # adding to our keyring # note that we are only writing the KEYS to the file. if ($contains_keys) { print STDERR "PGP Keys found, attempting to add...\n"; open (TMPFILE2, ">$tmpfile2"); foreach $_ (@newkeys) { print TMPFILE2; } close (TMPFILE2); # strange things happen if we do not # read/write directly from /dev/tty (perl bug??) system ("$pgpcommand -ka $tmpfile2 >/dev/tty </dev/tty 2>&1"); unlink ($tmpfile2); # get rid of it asap $pgpused = 1; } # copy the contents of @tmpdata to the pager we want to use. open (PAGER, "|$pager") || (unlink ($tmpfile1) && die "Cannot open pipe to $pager.\n"); # do "press any key to continue" # only if we had some output from PGP # (like a verified signature) # again with the /dev/tty thing (weird!) if ($pgpused) { $q=''; open (TTY, "</dev/tty") || (unlink ($tmpfile1) && die "Couldn't open /dev/tty\n"); select(TTY); $| = 1; print STDERR "Press any key to continue...\n"; $q = getc (TTY); select (STDIN); } # output the decoded thing to the pager foreach $_ (@tmpdata) { print PAGER; } @tmpdata = (); close OUTPUT; close PAGER; # cleanup unlink ($tmpfile); mailpgp: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # -*- Perl -*- # written by jason steiner, jsteiner(a)anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu, Jan 1993 # # if you use or make improvements to this program i would appreciate # copies of your modifications & your PGP public key. # # Modified by Greg Spencer, greg(a)graphics.cornell.edu, May 1994 # Mostly just cleaned up things and added stuff like automatic # addition and detection (and ignoring) of keys to be added to keyring, # and signal catching, as well as environment variable control of # most site-specific stuff. # # Must set the following environment variables: # # EDITOR or VISUAL set to editor of choice # # PGPCOMMAND set to the pgp decryption command # # PGPID or SIGNATURE set to the id you wish to # have used for your pgp signatures, etc. # # PREFIX set to the forwarded message prefix that you use # # setup some variables ($visual = $ENV{'EDITOR'}) || ($visual = $ENV{'VISUAL'}) || ($visual = 'pico'); ($pgpcommand = $ENV{'PGPCOMMAND'}) || ($pgpcommand = "/usr/local/bin/pgp"); #($myname = $ENV{'PGPID'}) || ($myname = $ENV{'SIGNATURE'}); ($prefix = $ENV{'PREFIX'}) || ($prefix = "> "); $topgp = 0; $blanks = 0; $paragraphs = 1; $blankcompress = 1; $name=@ARGV[$#ARGV]; #temporary file names $rplyfile = "$name.rply"; $pgpfile = "$name.pgp"; $ascfile = "$name.asc"; $clrfile = "$name.clr"; # trap signals so we don't leave # (possibly sensitive!) garbage around sub catcher { local($sig) = @_; print "Caught a SIG$sig -- exiting\n"; close (OUTPUT); close (PGPFILE); close (CLEAR); close (INPUT); unlink ("$pgpfile"); unlink ("$rplyfile"); unlink ("$clrfile"); unlink ("$ascfile"); } $SIG{'INT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'QUIT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'HUP'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'KILL'} = 'catcher'; # parse the input file to see if we're replying to an encrypted message # user may need to type in pass phrase to decode umask (077); open (INPUT, "<$name"); open (OUTPUT, ">$rplyfile") || die "Cannot open $rplyfile for output.\n"; while (<INPUT>) { # make sure to allow printing of key blocks if (!$topgp && (!m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ || m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { if (m/^$prefix*$/) { if ($paragraphs) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT "\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT; } } elsif (m/^[ \t\r]*$/) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT; } } else { print OUTPUT; if ($. == 1 && !m/^$prefix/) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } else { $blanks = 0; } } } # make sure to skip key blocks because we already did 'em in morepgp if (!$topgp && m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ && !m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/ ) { $topgp = 1; unlink ($pgpfile); open (PGPFILE, ">$pgpfile") || die "Cannot open $pgpfile for output.\n"; } if ($topgp) { $_ =~ s/^$prefix//; print PGPFILE $_; # make sure to skip key blocks because we already did 'em in morepgp if (m/^-----END PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $blocktype = $_; $blocktype =~ s/^-----END (PGP .*)-----/$1/; $blocktype =~ s/PGP MESSAGE/DECRYPTED MESSAGE/; $blocktype =~ s/PGP SIGNATURE/SIGNED MESSAGE/; chop ($blocktype); $topgp = 0; close (PGPFILE); system ("$pgpcommand $pgpfile -o $clrfile > /dev/tty 2>&1"); open (CLEAR, "<$clrfile") || die "Cannot open $clrfile for input.\n"; print OUTPUT "$prefix-----BEGIN $blocktype-----\n> \n"; $blanks = 0; while (<CLEAR>) { if (m/^[ \t\r]*$/) { if ($paragraphs) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT "\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT "$prefix\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT "$prefix"; print OUTPUT; $blanks = 0; } } close (CLEAR); unlink ($clrfile); unlink ($pgpfile); print OUTPUT "$prefix-----END $blocktype-----\n\n"; } } } close OUTPUT; close INPUT; unlink ($name); rename ("$rplyfile", "$name"); system ($visual, @ARGV); while (!$q) { print "\nSign this message? [Y]: "; $q = <STDIN>; $q =~ s/[ \t\n]//g; $q = substr ($q, 0, 1); if (($q eq 'Y') || ($q eq 'y') || ($q eq '')) { push (@opts, '-st', '+clearsig=on'); $q = "y"; } elsif (($q ne 'N') && ($q ne 'n')) { $q = ''; } } # note that it is the default to NOT encrypt, # simply because not everyone has PGP (unfortunately :-) $q=''; while (!$q) { print "Encrypt this message? [N]: "; $q = <STDIN>; $q =~ s/[ \t\n]//g; $q = substr ($q, 0, 1); if (($q eq 'Y') || ($q eq 'y')) { push (@opts, '-e'); $q = "y"; } elsif (($q eq 'N') || ($q eq 'n') || ($q eq '')) { $q = "n"; } else { $q = ''; } } if (@opts) { if ($q eq 'y') { print "Enter receipients, each on a separate line, terminate with EOF or a single `.':\n"; { print "> "; if ($_ = <STDIN>) { chop; last if ("$_" eq '.'); push (@receipients, "$_"); redo; } last; } } system ($pgpcommand, '-a', @opts, "$name", @receipients); if ($? == 0) { unlink ($name); rename ("$ascfile", "$name"); } } - -- John A. Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)jpunix.com WWW - http://jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. Finger remailer(a)jpunix.com for remailer help. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtvwZ1OTpEThrthvAQFwlAP+MxX6olbMempfh6UYdTDGruTngH+WgRsa BacTB86oNIjlllDfZB55KJyuUs5dpP+gRRDW4BZTK6zyNuzy3tv5iErQnvDiV/Tn PjSKmJJFs7HnC88aC830eQ+ojGaXzZCE2IbaTm/a7R6SU9nLc/KnJYY5pMHjdVx+ uN0xwmRrBYw= =SUyb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Security Services
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The Australian, Tue 29th November: Secret Service Files Lost in Blaze, by Cameron Steward (Foreign Affairs Writer) "Hundreds of top-secret documents relevant to the Federal Government's inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service were destroyed by a fire that swept through the ASIS headquarters in Canberra at the weekend." "The fire has erased highly sensitive ASIS files and archives that detailed the activities and operations of the troubled spy agency over the past decade." "The blaze is a big blow to the Government's inquiry into accountability and management of ASIS because it destroyed many of the records needed to adequately assess the organisation's performance." "But despite the suspicious timing of the accident, the Government does not believe it was arson and says that the blaze appears to have been sparked by an electrical fault." "'I can confirm that the fire broke out at 2am on Saturday morning on the fourth floor of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Building,' a DFAT spokeswoman said." "'The damage appears to have been fairly extensive and is believed to have been caused by an electrical fault.'" "Sources yesterday said the area damaged by the blzae was far greater than was originally revealed by the authorities, with the initial damage estimate of about $200,000 ballooning to at least $1 million." "The fourth floor of the DFAT building has housed ASIS for years." "One intelligence source said last night that it was 'highly coincidental' for ASIS to experience such a fire in the midst of a Government inquiry into its operations." "It was rumored yesterday that the fire also destroyed thousands of files that the service was alleged to have kept on Australian citizens." "Two former ASIS officers alleged in March that the organisation illegally held files on thousands of Australian citizens, despite the fact that it is not part of its role involving gaining foreign intelligence." "The former agents also claimed ASIS has bribed politicans in Malaysia and had helped British Intelligence obtain confidential information that harmed Australia's interests." (Small note here which was not in the article: the ASIS jargon for MI6 is 'head office'. Many of the officers were trained by MI6.) "The allegations by the former officers prompted the Government to conduct an inquiry into the control and accountability of the organisation." "The inquiry, headed by former NSW Supreme Court judge Mr Gordon Samuels, is also examining the 'protection of ASIS intelligence sources and methods' as well as the 'resolution of grievances and complaints relating to ASIS." "The inquiry has been in progress for several months. It is still taking evidence and is due to report to the Government early in the New Year." This article was transcribed without permission from the paper, for the purposes of research and study as defined in the "fair use" provisions of the Copyright act. ------- Yet another depressing but compelling reminder that our privacy has as many enemies within the Government as without. BTW, this was the same TLA which I mentioned some weeks ago in connection with the bungled raid on the Sheraton Wentworth Hotel. Ian. #include <std.disclaimer>

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Mandatory sigs
by Mark Rogaski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I would have to agree w/ not REQUIRING digsigs, but flagging posts w/out them. I guess that's my write in. doc -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBLtv1T3sYwuXlZ+UZAQGXvgL/c21Yws0KUdzea12xExOszs1ZUuVUOKJX O7QtKbX96mZsh6lDUH+QS4uoNetqYdwwmbvW9PWcCkyksbzmjJpQOWzXwaDTw87S duLvkPNd+obUHUrawzUU+d0TNl/kXQIr =5DO0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Mandatory message signing
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:59 PM 11/29/94, L. McCarthy wrote: >Hold the phone ! As I understand the law, only one party to a telephone >call has to be aware of the recording for it to be perfectly legal. Someone >not party to the call can't do it, but any one of the people talking can do >it. I believe it varies from state to state, but this is indeed the norm. >handle authentication like this. Ideally, some people would get together >with Brent Chapman and incorporate authentication of signed messages in a >future release of Majordomo. I'd love to volunteer for a project like this >but I don't believe I can spare the time. Why stop at authenticating signed messages? I'd like to see some mailing list software that would send mail out to you encrypted if you want (sure, the list is probably public, but you might not want people knowing you subscribe. If list traffic was encrypted, and you routed it through Ghio's remailer-alias doohickey, the fact that you subscribe could be kept completely hidden), and would require authentication on a message to change your address, or to change your public key (which would also be possible). And would have config parameters such that the list operator could make it only accept signed submissions, or even only accept submissions encrypted to the list. [not that I'm advocating this on the cypherpunks list, but it might be good on other lists, especially private ones]. And Ideally, I'd even like the list to be able to mail to you through the remailer-net, by prepending your encrypted address block, and sending to a remailer. Although the existence of Ghio's forementioned doohickey (what is that service being called?) makes that somewhat superflous. I was planning on writing such a beast myself, and might still get around to it eventually. The problem is that I'm unlikely to write something from scratch as robust as the current list server software (I'm not interested in writing good list software, just in implementing the crypto), and I'm not really skilled enough to understand the majordomo code enough to modify it. But I might try, one of these days.

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Mandatory sig workaround
by cactus＠bb.hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So what's the big deal? Eric sets the list to slow down unsigned posts and somebody else sets up a remailer that generates a key for each post, signs it, and forwards it. Similar workarounds abound for every twist and turn in the policy until the policy is dead or the rules are too restrictive (IE, only "human-approved" key signatures are accepted). A fun game, certainly (I'll play!), but hardly a productive way to spend time. It always happens that when hacker A tries to enforce an arbitrary rule on other hackers, hacker B will find an automatic workaround. -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller

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Re: PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by shawn leas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Where can I get this software? Looks kinda cool. BTW... I like the idea of spurring on some pgp usage. It's a good idea. I would not object to having to sign messages. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtwEkqZRyOzqm29xAQEoKgQAywzBTW92lYiDEFQPVfmWxHg3hYnKDN70 c3gRSNjqO6VcJguXhVBHHjA3/ZBpWybys9deML/2FONUwrm50+MKotifo+7wpKnk E6LIrnuzuJdmlMTACR6Qx3FXVpnuQmuDz2jRybxDST+Iob5jItwt2SsZkSuFscDN vdxQHa26VAs= =BmiN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Sign-or-delay
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Eric Hughes writes > I am still considering the "sign-or-delay" proposal for the toad.com > server, that is, sign your articles to the list or they'll be delayed > and eventually rejected. Well, it's easy to require people to include PGP signatures. However, for some people, it's difficult to do signatures in a secure and also convenient fashion across a mix of mailers; Tim's netcom+Mac example, or anyone using an insecure system. My laptop where I get my work-related mail really can't handle the volume of mail I get from cypherpunks; I'm using it as a terminal to talk to a netblazer to telnet to a Sun where I still have an account several gateways away, on which I haven't been root for over a year... Sure, I forward some of the interesting mail to the not-very-diskful laptop, and could wait for it to arrive and PGP-sign my replies, which will delay my articles anyway. On the other hand, if I sign them here, half of AT&T could probably grab the passphrase with a sniffer, so it's not something I'd trust my real keys to. Similarly, I wouldn't put real keys on netcom or other mass service provider. On the other hand, how carefully were you planning to make your system check signatures - does toad.com have the spare cycles to validate them all, or are you really going for syntax only? Thanks; Bill -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 3.2beta AjtHiSiSnOtAsIgNaaTuretHiSiSnOtAsIgNaaTuretHiSiSnOtAsIgNaaTurexZ ITsBoGustHiSiSnOtAsIgNaaTuretHiSiSnOtAsIgNaaTuretHiSiSnOtAsIgfoo ReAlLyTrUsTmetHiSiSnOtAsIgNaaTureLouisFreehWasHeretHiSiSnOtAsIgN tAsIgNaaT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Fighting Censorship at Canadian Universities
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Used to be that Universities were bastions of free thought and discussion. Guess not nowadays, if this E-Mail to me earlier today is any indication: - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- - From kyleh(a)cs.mun.ca Wed Nov 30 01:01:19 1994 Date: Wed, 30 Nov 1994 00:47:41 -0330 From: Kyle Douglas Hearfield <kyleh(a)cs.mun.ca> Subject: interested in PGP To: werewolf(a)io.org Mark, I am a Student at Memorial University of Newfoundland, and I have recently been censored and had my postings to newsgroups aborted. I received a message from our system administrator that the messages(of a political nature) were not appropriate. I was wondering if I could use PGP to get past them? I have read some about PGP, but I am still kind of in the dark as to how it works and what it can do. Any info you could provide me would be much appreciated. Thanks in advance, - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Maybe he was posting some stuff that contravened university policy...shrug. But with the recent events at McGill University in Montreal, I'm prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt. The first step was to provide him with the instructions to the the xs4all remailer. If he figures that is what he needs (more importantly....if he isn't scared off!) then I'll give him the list of the other remailers and mail him a copy of PGP. Who knows? Maybe all he needs is anon.penet.fi :> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtwbn6+YbMzawbu5AQHFUwP8CbzooBrhWKVHRaRIBn55ha3mYWIO62lZ 6D09DJvc9YAnwxbSVcE1X8MjNuR9XbRRrJfQMI8lnSWt8pr13FsI8cjHQqjzS9yk HXMYSKy7mdnerHaZSTK0RZdFrRHST6a5qVdNw4ffZsjO4WM/02nN/u9n5ywgsu4C dbCQlp9EMPQ= =mnSN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Is Pr0duct Cypher still around?
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Having posted that massive spam asking Pr0duct Cypher for some information, it occurs to me to ask if he has been heard from lately. Has anyone seen anything from him lately? -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Encrypted mail welcome. Home page http://nately.ucsd.edu/~loki/ Home of "chain" the remailer chaining script. For anon remailer info, mail remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu Subject: remailer-help "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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We are ALL guests (except Eric)
by skaplin＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- With the recent furor over the possibility of mandatory key signing on this list, I think we all are forgetting something. We are all guests here. Eric is our host. I've seen proposals for voting on the issue, I've seen posts saying "I'm not going to do it, wah wah wah." This list is analogous to Eric's home. We are his guests. If a host asks his guests to do something he or she has two choices, do it or leave. If someone walked into my house and I asked them to do something and they said: "Lets vote on it," they would be out the door quicker than a 'toon on a banana peel. Eric has been a gentleman about this. He is not asking those who do not wish to comply to leave. This is Eric's house and I think we need to play by his rules while we are here. One caveat for Eric though, hosts with stringent rules are usually very lonely. ============================================================================== A government is the only know vessel that leaks from the top. --James Reston-- ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard | outside a Roman brothel. PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | preferred. | Change is the only constant in the | Universe..."Four quarters, please." E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | Smile!! Big brother is watching. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtwymApnimeWAf3FAQGOkQQAgK6OrqyifMk3aICiLdtjHWILxUyAyTWx HyEXgfNdo3VXKALOCpON3sbtgiYlopFU9PyqQY4JGhievAfElEFOgUzfcOcNutKR vLeT73zsvYl0zJPk6TkKhBwLymykHcBq5VtM8qLFustkEOynlVNHanBZlCQEj1sC HKYfjJbX65E= =5hb+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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