December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Why use plastic for remailers and DH?
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Angus Patterson writes: > why would anybody want to use something as completely traceable as a > credit card to pay for a remailer or a data haven? Apart from what Russ Nelson observed, safety in numbers is potentially great. If, say, 15% of the net.populace does it, then it won't be terribly interesting to know that some particular person has done it. I suppose a transition period would be helpful, in which credit card-financed bandwidth is increased with a load of low security traffic. -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxOAC2f7YYibNzjpAQHFxAP9EphOcjL96QDuuJQ7eFLv/I3Ci0K6NkMI tg9bUODYUMVqHs/2dTm8YhxNgOmx90uDb9MPx+EDDrtFZDAT9AIs8GQf1OdsyPrh Hg9PDIB4jT+JMfY3zqERePW+0Ac5TWoxQto0uQH8lRRWvNcp0R7N/sdYOwIRRTK8 o5BGm0wyJHg= =qt2F - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxOBOyoZzwIn1bdtAQHAXAF+Jcfrh9xhfx7MlS6oK5Cfu4E96P+rOuGW Xto/oQG7HcqAbl2adr0zyMQnfh4alDgk =FtZw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Getting on the list
by John Draper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, I've been trying to get back on the Cypherpunks list now for over 3 weeks. IS anyone out there on the list that has the power to get me added. I tried the usual request to cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com, but haven't been sucessful. Who is maintaining the list these days? Does it still exist? And why haven't any of my requests been hohored? thats honored... Thanx John D.

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Re: How do I know if its encrypted?
by daleh＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You wrote: > > My question is how do I know it is encrypted? > >Calculate an entropy measure of some sort. Entropy is a measure of >disributional skew. Maximum entropy means minimum skew. > >For human-readable text of any sort, the monogram entropy, i.e. the >entropy of individual characters, will _always_ be detectably less >than maximal. Encrypted text will always be near maximal. The two >are easy to distinguish. ASCII-armored encrypted text will always be >right at 6 bits per byte. > >For speed of implementation, you don't need even to look at much text. >You can get a statistically significant measure quite quickly from the >first couple of kilobytes. > >And since you're only really worried about detecting non-randomness, >you don't even need to calculate the exact entropy but rather an >approximation of it. This approximation can be done with entirely >fixed point arithmetic, if you're a bit clever about it. > >A practical system would cut out a notch at 6/8 for ASCII armor, which >would make approximation techniques a bit tricky. More practical is >just to detect ASCII armor with a regular expression recognizer and >de-armor it before the entropy check. > >Eric > > Won't work! You can always embed an encrypted message in what 'looks' like plaintext. A trivial example: Encrypt a message with a caesar cypher, then build a story where the first char of each word maps to each subsequent char from the encrypted text. At the cost of expanding the size of the message by a factor of 5 to 10 you've hidden the encrypted message in what looks like a letter to your mother (or a news story in the NY Times, etc.) This is old technique. Dale H.

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Re: January meeting with
by david.lloyd-jones＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

LE+> The following is a message from my lawyer, Phil Dubois. He posted it +> to alt.security.pgp, and I thought I should post it here as well. The +> message is signed with his key. +> +> --Philip Zimmermann +> LE+The aforementioned signed message from PKZ's lawyer message failed +signature check on my system, apparently because it contained a very +long text line which, somewhere along the way, was chopped into two +lines before it arrived in my mailbox. LE+The two lines as they appeared in my message (which failed signature +test) are: Well, there it is. Phil goes free. -dlj. david.lloyd-jones(a)canrem.com * 1st 1.11 #3818 * Gingrich, n. abbrev. : "giving to the rich".

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Re: Storm Signals
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Sam Kaplin writes: > Todd Masco writes: > > 1: Somebody's roommate (a Green Beret) has been called back into > > 6 months of active service. He was not told where he'd be. > > Perhaps Bosnia? I doubt it. The only sort of Bosnian engagement that might make sense would involve a fairly conspicuous effort with a large number of troops. I can't see what a few thousand Green Berets could accomplish there. Frankly, I'm quite puzzled by these signs. I can't think of any country that seems due for a quick invasion by the USG, but the increase in granularity of the GPS information suggests an operation of greater magnitude than just a strike against terrorists, drug cartels etc. Is it time for Bay of Pigs II already ? ;) -L. Futplex McCarthy - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLxOY7Gf7YYibNzjpAQF7nwP+KUk7o1bpM76wmGrzv+KZIgi8kby1XHIj 4FzXLLZGLC8bVGGniv1NkLR76XH6HeLfWpaJu4LeCCBE6RbsgUD+bqEQeTdijpVg OJzOWM/Rt6/vTJT+/yiVpFBbPDgG1sXvy4SlQX0wSATNzjbdNHxoorory1fOmjRi 6RF2tHYFbTM= =Yk81 - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBLxOZ9ioZzwIn1bdtAQFF/QGAiqkCeSwdxCMlF0AeO6jOJkaxKQ4EAe68 +AYM/slciv3rbqrkw6nRf19LM7AmXBsG =lDeV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Microsoft TrueName(tm)
by strick -- henry strickland 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

brat(a)apple.com found this somewhere.... strick Microsoft Clarifies Trademark Policies REDMOND, Washington--January 4, 1995--In response to customer inquiries, Microsoft today clarified the naming policy for Bob(tm), its new software product designed for computer beginners. Contrary to rumors, Microsoft will not demand that all persons formerly named "Bob" immediately select new first names. "I don't know where these rumors come from," commented Steve Balmer, Microsoft Executive Vice President for Worldwide Sales and Support. "It's ridiculous to think Microsoft would force people outside the computer industry to change their names. We won't, and our licensing policies for people within the industry will be so reasonable that the Justice Department could never question them." Balmer said employees of other computer companies will be given the opportunity to select new names, and will also be offered a licensing option allowing them to continue using their former names at very low cost. The new licensing program, called Microsoft TrueName(tm), offers persons who want to continue being known by the name Bob the option of doing so, with the payment of a small monthly licensing fee and upon signing a release form promising never to use OpenDoc. As an added bonus, Bob name licensees will also be authorized to display the Windows 95 logo on their bodies. Persons choosing not to license the Bob name will be given a 60-day grace period during which they can select another related name. "We're being very lenient in our enforcement of the Bob trademark," said Bill Newkom, Microsoft's Senior Vice President of Law and Corporate Affairs. "People are still free to call themselves Robert, Robby, or even Rob. Bobby however is derivative of Microsoft's trademark and obviously can't be allowed." Microsoft also announced today that Bob(tm) Harbold, its Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, has become the first Microsoft TrueName licensee and will have the Windows 95 logo tattooed to his forehead.

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credit card purchases
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saw it there. Thought you might like it here... Cheers, Bob Hettinga >From: peace(a)BIX.com >Date: Wed, 11 Jan 1995 00:26:50 -0500 (EST) >Original-From: peace(a)BIX.com >Subject: credit card purchases >To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com >X-Cosy-To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com > > PGCHARGE > >This is a call for interested parties to participate in the alpha >test of an internet ordering program that will be offered to any >customer free of charge to create orders that should be >acceptable to any commercial establishment. > >This is a Windows program designed to generate secure charge card >orders over the internet. The payment mechanism is not the >critical component for this system, that critical component is >the use, by the purchaser, of the merchant's public key, for the >protection of sensitive data, including simple correspondence. > >Two paradigms from the commercial word, EDI and email were >selected for the implementation. Email operates in a store and >forward mode that has some security advantages over web or >network layer security. That advantage comes directly from the >fixed nature of the email message itself. Once it has been >created and signed by the keyholder, it cannot successfully be >altered by any other person. It is also possible for the message >to be encrypted at the point where it is created. Hiding the >contents of the message from anyone other than the intended >recipient. > >EDI has already achieved a great deal of acceptance in the >commercial world. This application is a natural use of the >existing ANSI X12 structures for issuing a purchase order. Any >merchant that is currently using X12 structures should be able to >purchase a single user ViaCrypt PGP license and be in business >accepting secure credit card orders over the internet. > >PGCHARGE does not add any security features by itself, but rather >facilitates security by building an EDI transaction for a >recipient selected from a PGP public keyring. This information >is then passed to PGP to be secured. PGCHARGE then waits for PGP >to complete, adds the appropriate email headers and invokes a >mailer program. > >This program can be downloaded from ftp.csn.org as >mpj/public/pgcharge.zip. Comments can be sent to peace(a)bix.com. > ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: CBS/C.Chung Plan Hit Job on Internet? (fwd)
by Brad Parsons 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 10 Jan 95 21:02:06 PST From: Greg Bailey <greg(a)minerva.com> Subject: Re: CBS/C.Chung Plan Hit Job on Internet? Non sequitur, I think, Helen. The above reads like a lame lemma of the Gun Control theorem and is based on the same fallacious premises. Information is not intrinsically harmful. People are. Information and other means need not be controlled. People must control themselves. If the people in a society cannot control their temptations to do evil with whatever means are available to them, the society cannot be called civilized by any reasonable criteria. Making information available is not a crime. Blowing people up is a crime, and those who do it should pay pay pay. Any discipline worth studying gives its students the means to do good as well as evil, and at least in theory the more they know the greater their potential to act in either direction. Throughout history damn fools have tried to limit the scope of evil by limiting information. All it has demonstrated is that by doing so one can hamstring constructive activity while accomplishing nearly zero against evil due to its tenacity. It is my opinion that the most evil thing anyone can advocate is the limiting of information, especially since in many cases those who propose to do the limiting do not even faintly understand the info themselves. It is also my opinion that to resist any efforts to limit availability of information is *not* to bury one's head under the sand. Not at all. All the theory aside, any elementary school kid who pays attention and knows how to read can easily acquire the art of making gunpowder. At least this was true in the fifties when I was at that age, and being boys my friends and I of course spent many a happy hour out in secluded fields blowing things up in various ways. This sort of thing is basic information that anyone brighter than a rock can come by. Connie Chung displays an astounding level of ignorance by suggesting that high technology has much of anything to do with the phenomenon she reports upon. Instead she should be asking why kids now feel they should blow up people and property instead of old castaway junk. *That* is the story, not the Internet, not Encyclopaedia Britannica ... quoting from this year's edition, by the way, from our kids' book case: gunpowder ... The first such mixture was black powder, which consists of a mixture of saltpetre (potassium nitrate), sulfur, and charcoal. When prepared in roughly the correct proportions (75 percent saltpetre, 14 percent charcoal, and 11 percent sulfur), it burns rapidly when ignited and produces ... Because the burning of black powder is a surface phenomenon, a fine granulation burns faster than a coarse one ... [more straightforward practical information follows] I wonder if Connie reads the encyclopedia. I wonder if she even has one? Grins... Greg Bailey | ATHENA Programming, Inc | 503-621-3215 | ---------------- | 24680 NW Dixie Mtn Road | fax 621-3954 | greg(a)minerva.com | Hillsboro, OR 97124 US |

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privacy digest
by an158409＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am extremely sympathetic to the anti-abortion cause but the kind of abuse described in this item is unnerving. Although illegal and reprehensible, it is one thing for a government official, because of some strong conviction, to violate the law. It is completely another to violate it for money. Men, if they were men, who did this should have their privacies cut off. Subject: Computer Privacy Digest V6#003 Computer Privacy Digest Sat, 07 Jan 95 Volume 6 : Issue: 003 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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MBONE broadcasts next week
by Jonathan Corbet 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The USENIX folks plan to broadcast (well..err...multicast) a number of talks from next week's conference over the MBONE. Details are still unavailable, but Evi has posted the following interesting list of folks: ---- Wednesday, January 18: Bruce Schneier, Counterpane Systems Cryptography Brad Chen, Harvard Univ Operating System Measurement Thursday, January 19: John Ousterhout, Sun Microsystems TCL for Internet Agents Bill Janssen, Xerox PARC ILU/CORBA Inter-Language Unification Nathaniel Borenstein, 1st Virtual Holdings Internet Information Commerce David Chaum, Digicash b.v. Cash on the Internet Friday, January 20: Hal Varian, Univ of Michigan Economics of the Internet Pavel Curtis, Xerox PARC The Internet at the Turn of the Millennium: How You'll Use It and Who You'll Meet There ---- The keynote will be Mark Weiser of Xerox PARC talking about their "ubiquitious computing" scheme, which has its own set of privacy implications... Details as I get them. jon Jonathan Corbet National Center for Atmospheric Research, Atmospheric Technology Division corbet(a)stout.atd.ucar.edu http://www.atd.ucar.edu/rdp/jmc.html

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