December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: XSPLIT problem
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'll look into this... Basically I cut this code out of WNSTORM where it works correctly. Since I wrote this very quickly, you can tell I did minimal debugging on it... argv[2][0] should be '-' argv[2][1] should be 'R' argv[2][2] should be 'F' argv[2][3] should be ':' argv[2][4]... should be the random file. Try it without the '-' infront of RF: and see if it makes a difference. Meanwhile I'll check this out...

1 0

NYET, coercion, and censorship
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Nathan Zook writes to complain that his "NYET" proposal hasn't attracted the character of criticism he'd hoped for. He explains that he's a "pro-electronic privacy religious rightist". He is using the words 'pro-electronic privacy' in a way that is new to me; I have a hard time attaching them to a person who wants to regulate the policies and recordkeeping of every sysadmin in America, who wants to make disclosure of name (which I assume means "real name", or "birth-certificate-name", or "drivers'-license-name", or whatever) and age mandatory for *every* user of an online system, who wants to criminalize false disclosure of the above, and criminalize attempts to "tamper" with the above system. Don't ever let anyone tell you that only left-wing folks are interested in getting their regulatory little fingers into every last corner of human existence, or that all right-wing folks have great respect for individual property rights and personal freedom. In addition to its regulatory burden on sysops and adult users, the proposal seems likely to eliminate all access for people under 18 whose parents aren't involved enough in their lives to want to sign onto every BBS their child is interested in. This may not be a particularly onerous burden for kids with involved and understanding parents - but kids whose parents are either disintersted or actively hostile to computer/modem use aren't likely to get far. These are the kids I think most likely to benefit from the sort of intellectual breadth and depth (ha ha, ok, so it's better than TV, at least) available on the Net. > I believe that such a system would protect the full free > expression currently enjoyed by the net, while reaffirming > parental responsibility in the upbringing of their children. I'm not sure that the burdens created are justified by simply "reaffirming parental responsibility". You'll have to come up with a much more compelling interest before you'll convince me. (And, hopefully, before your statutes would pass Constitutional muster.) The goal of "beating ourselves up to save the police some work" doesn't get all that far with me, either. Perhaps we should just go ahead and adopt Clipper, too - the legislated alternatives might be worse. (Not.) > frivolous. Porno charges would then be MUCH more difficult to > press, since a jury could be told that specific steps were > being taken to prevent access to minors. This seems like the sort of thing individual sysadmins should be able to assess themselves - whether the risk of prosecution was more burdensome than taking steps to avoid it. Shouldn't rational human beings be able to make their own choices about risk avoidance? > attempts to censor the net. Remember, we already have had a > censor for TV, movies, and radio. It is not really a question > of _if_ but _who_ and at _what level_ will this censoring take > place. But we have not had a censor for books, personal letters, newspapers, art, nor telephone calls. It *is* a question of whether censorship will take place - and I'm not ready to concede that it will. Your proposal burdens the privacy, property, and policy of sysadmins, adult users, and non-adult users. It does so to ostensibly "reaffirm parental responsibility", protect sysadmins from prosecution, and to adopt a submissive posture in the hopes that our benevolent master the State won't take away more freedom than we've humbly offered up as a sacrifice. Even if it does all that you say it will, it'll just trade one sort of sysadmin legal threat (failure to appropriately censor material) for another (failure to comply with identification/registration/user access regulation). As a sysadmin I'm much more scared of the latter. A cost/benefit analysis from my perspective says the proposal loses. I do think there's some real merit to the suggestion folks have made that you *start your own system* and do your own censorship, excising the naughty bits that nice kids shouldn't see. At least here in Oregon, there are plenty of folks who seem ready to poke their own kids' eyes out rather than let them see two men holding hands - I think there'd be a real market here for "sanitized Usenet". Look at Tragedy - people keep signing up for the fucking thing, and a Netcom account costs only a wee bit more. Yow. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLjib/33YhjZY3fMNAQFCGQP+OVMkPRT4f6pwxSunuEwUj88hsL+PC+Ui 2Z90xM8pFimIF43NRa8oPPSAZdsE2owsSj88eTevlbMB3Qs21w1oquXKt0n0shUw ib/qEPUVibXAP1si7tJ8FPwoxPy2pkfUbkmaAwDDoOj72wn8wQ4HQm4Sz6qu5OXr 42URv1wg+ZI= =oZT4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

who cypherpunks
by Justin Lister 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

who cypherpunks lists info cypherpunks end -- +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | ____ ___ | Justin Lister ruf(a)cs.uow.edu.au | | | \\ /\ __\ | Center for Computer Security Research | | | |) / \_/ / |_ | Dept. Computer Science voice: 61-42-214-330 | | | _ \\ /| _/ | University of Wollongong fax: 61-42-214-329 | | |_/ \/ \_/ |_| (tm) | Computer Security a utopian dream... | | | LiNuX - the only justification for using iNTeL | +---------------------+--------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Anonymous code name allocated.
by daemon＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You have sent a message using the anonymous contact service. You have been allocated the code name an118216. You can be reached anonymously using the address an118216(a)anon.penet.fi. If you want to use a nickname, please send a message to nick(a)anon.penet.fi, with a Subject: field containing your nickname. For instructions, send a message to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Folks, we GOTTA do something about this... Nathan

1 0

Re: The penet compromise
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- How many of us have suffered from this attack? I just recieved a message indicating an annon ID had been created for this account. The account I acctualy have an anon ID for has not been affected as far as I know. Since this account, and not the other, is used for posting to Cypherpunks I suspect that the attacker is using a list of recent posters (I did post from the other account to this group in the distant past). Is there any remidy we can use? I gather there is no way to invalidate an anonymous ID. I guess I will just assign a password and not annon mail from this account. :( Has Julf been contacted about this? My anon ID from this attack is: an118079(a)anon.penet.fi I will not be using this ID, and will have it revoked ASAP. Anything from that account is not from me. Check the signature. Let me know if it is used. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLji/11Vkk3dax7hlAQEIKAP+MHP7BJPfaOBOmo3XGEuNSG2vzKd0pwXb 1KIYgj6GML274x12DIy3LFCldnqVl9dxqY7FDxGqHXtnGE7HiBzJ/sCuMomDcrep IGE9hYgx33NKHh5/ZjSeCU3LlFfsg5dO1T5uAj++WnY3UD6Nih1bJ5jFr8PY0fsZ TVRKSP4xk/s= =0duW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

1 0

Re: Microsoft, Master-Keys, and DMS
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry writes: > As I've noted, according to a reliable source, Microsoft is a vendor > of software for DMS, so although its not part of the products Merriman > is mentioning, there are key escrow features in some software being > delivered by Microsoft. I've heard on the net that the Defense Messaging System (DMS) will be using Tessera cards, but I really don't understand how they could use a key-escrow* system for classified data, which is what the DMS is designed to carry. After all, that would mean that the classified data would be accessible to people without a direct need to know, which is non-kosher. At minimum, the master key for each card would have to be classified at the maximum level the card is authorized for (non-surprising), and the Key Generating Bureau's Family keys would have to be classified at the maximum level *any* cards using it are authorized for (or different family keys for each level, I suppose, which has the added benefit of making different-level cards non-interoperable.) But making that data classified means that classified data needs to be stored on the card, which either means handling it as classified material (awkward), or putting *lots* of trust in the chip's tamperproofnesss (doubtful). Alternatively, there may be some way to get Tessera cards to do Skipjack encryption without sending the wiretap block at the beginning of the conversation, either by simply not doing it, or by superencrypting that block for transmission (which is the classic Clipperphone hack known since the beginning.) Bill

1 0

Re: Denning and Walker on SKE and International Escrow
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > International Cryptography Institute 1994: Global Challenges > > Presented by > > The National Intellectual Property Law Institute > > > >The International Cryptography Institute will focus on problems and > >challenges associated with the use of cryptography within nations and > >for international communications. The Institute will address such [Denning/Walker/Freeh agenda deleted] Out of curiousity, does anyone know if this "Institute" was pre-existing, or if it was put together for the purpose of having a good academic-sounding name for a whitewash conference? [I suppose this could be compared to pseudospoofing.....] Bill

1 0

Re: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Aron Freed What is the difference if a big company subjects its employees to a key-escrow system or if the government does it with the people. If you think about it, the government could coerce the company into reading through information being passed back and forth.... ................................................. With a private company, you can negotiate with the owners, or leave. With the government, you have no choice. If the governors decide to coerce a company into complicity with surveillance over internal correspondence, it can do this anyway by other means - that is, it can get access over any material it deems necessary for "legitimate law enforcement needs", even hard-copy files. The desire for absolute control isn't limited to governments, and it doesn't originate in the institution, but in the psychology of the beholder. Blanc

2 1

Re: No SKE in Daytona and other goodies
by tcmay＠localhost.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

" that one guy" wrote: >1) I've got Daytona running on a machine right next to me. It doesn't >feature any type of key escrow. Come to think of it, it doesn't >support data encryption. > >The version I have is build 683, which is supposed to be the >next-to-last, so it's unlikely MS will suddenly start adding new >stuff, especially since they're already late. Oh please! Just how many times am I supposed to repeat my point that I make no claims that any imminent release of Chicago or Daytona or System 7.2 is likely to have SKE included? I've pointed out that the TIS algorithm is only now being coded, but that the *general field* of key escrow seems to involve some behind-the-scenes manouverings which should give us all pause. Saying that "version 683" doesn't have SKE is beside the point. The real issue is just how all the work on SKE described in the Denning conference coming up in September (the full agenda is posted in the crypto newsgroups) is to be implemented if *not* by the OS and system software vendors. The Microsoft guy who wrote the long letter to me on the various issues involved, the tradeoffs, the export issue (apparently SKE will allow some products to be exported that would otherwise be illegal to export), etc., is clearly working on this key escrow business. Only time will tell if Microsoft has ever met with NIST/NSA on software key escrow...if they have, and pressures were put on MS to comply with the new scheme, then we'll all have reason to worry. If Microsoft has never met with NIST/NSA or Denning or TIS on this matter, and was only pursuing SKE research on its own initiative, without any incentives or threats from the government, then I will withdraw my speculations and cheer Microsoft on. (The same thing applies to Novell, Apple, etc. I'm not picking on Microsoft...I've just heard more substantive comments from them than from other companies.) I once again urge Microsoft to make this situation clearer. And I don't mean with a predictable, pro forma, "We have no intentions of including software key escrow at this time." Such corporatespeak comments are useless. We need to see a public debate on software key escrow, regardless of Microsoft's involvement one way or another. And we shouldn't wait until the press conference is held to announce the program! --Tim May .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

4 3

Re: NYET, coercion, and censorship
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The goal of wanting to allow one's kids to read the net without them being exposed to "adult material" that they're not old enough to deal with is not unreasonable, though I know people with a variety of attitudes toward that aspect of child-raising. One way to implement it is the heavy-duty authentication of adults vs kids, with the network infrastructure designed to authenticate everything so you can identify all posters, etc. Most of us are probably against that :-) (By the way, similar sorts of things have been proposed by the "get schools on the information highway" movement.) But there's another way to do it, taking an end-to-end approach, using PGP tools. Give all the kids who want to participate PGP keys, with a web-of-trust created for certifying a web of "good kids" (you can have the center of the web be the parents' organization, or your churches, or PTAs, or Kidsnet or whatever), and use tools that only allow them to receive PGP-signed messages - shouldn't be too hard to modify a web client, nntp server, or mail-wrapper to do it, and it doesn't force any structure on the rest of the net. You also have to modify the tools to sign messages they originate. Now, to make it possible for your kids to find enough screened material to be interesting, you'll have to organize a lot of people, but that's inherently part of the job. Alternatively, you can build gateways from "trusted" information sources; if Prodigy's censorship is adequate, gate in prodigy messages. If Clarinet news is something you consider reasonable, since it's almost all wire-service news, then gateway that into your net as well, if you can find a way to satisfy licensing. If you want to add "well-behaved adults", you can add them too, though you may want to leave your net tools flexible enough that they can also read the open network. That way, we can all coexist, and it puts the burden on the people who want special services, rather than having them force everyone else's tools and policies to change. It's also more honest, by pointing out to the users that they're getting a special pre-screened service, rather than implying that the rest of the world wanted a fully-controlled network. Bill

1 0