December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Detweiler blocking
by analyst＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I must admit to a certain amount of amazement to the almost universal consensus I have seen in this forum regarding censoring Detweiler's (or whomever's) Usenet postings. I believe in the remailer concept and I believe in fighting the authoritarian traceability standard that the Internet is designed around. As Xenon and others have mentioned, there are numerous ways for anyone to get around any kind of source-level filtering you might care to implement, and thus as remailer operators heading down this path, you will be put in the position of the proverbial dutch boy with a finger in the dike. The type of privacy that most of us as cypherpunks think is important and are trying to provide will necessarily leave us open to attacks such as Detweiler's. But I think privacy is more important than one more off-topic post in a random newsgroup. And if someone receives mail they don't like or don't appreciate--delete it! This medium of electronic communication is not nearly as dangerous as the current postal system, which allows you to send real mailbombs--and the postal system does NOT require return addresses. Who are these uptight schmucks writing to root and postmaster about Detweiler posts? Why on earth have they been allowed to get away with it! This is ridiculous. I think this is the battle that we must fight. The digital convergence is happening now, and unfortunately with the current authoritarian Internet model, Clipper/Capstone/Tesserae and all that nonsense--things arent't looking good for our side. Therefore, I think even more we have to stand on principle to fight this thing. (and yes, I fully intend to have my remailer running soon--I'm not just talking). Someone could send me mail now containing kiddy porn (most likely a postal inspector--they seem to be the only markey for the stuff) with no return address--should I write to the root(a)whitehouse.org as the ultimate arbiter since the postal service has delivered me this mail? If someone delivers mail through my remailer (which will ONLY support PGP encrypted mail) how am I responsible? Benjamin ---------------------------------------------------------------------- analyst(a)netcom.com mail pgp-public-keys(a)io.com for PGP key

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Re: Where to get Big Bro Stickers
by jim＠Tadpole.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Damn, I didn't send him anything yet, and I got a *lot* of stickers...

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Re: Big Brother PostScripts
by qwerty-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robert Hayden wrote, >[As a side note, I'm thinking of breaking into the lab some night and >putting these stickers on all of the workstations. Just thinking about >it, not actually going to do it :-)] How about payphones? No they aren't Clipper phones. But the point is to make people paranoid, and thus make them think about the issues. For soon it WILL be a Clipper phone. -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWJGIASzG6zrQn1RAQEglwP/UvzVBo9VDGZX62u3yqM76Pe1GP804HMa dZppBecPtH1ioClP2cR7InCTE8ORSxhPbWBsRDxtF05/ABpSwZogVZcvUzu+s6Lv 2nZtvZWpX18bCI1zdHnJyI4M9EhLLmGe3uoMP7gK8RxK7vVu4YwA6KD/FWgl3uhl jnnfBfvDrtQ= =4w6z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Key Server List Request
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a list of all of the currently operational PGP Keyservers available? If so, I'd appreciate a copy. Thanks in advance, -john.

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CERT/Whitehouse/Clipper link - smoking gun...
by farber＠central.cis.upenn.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Posted-Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 12:28:53 -0500 Path: netnews.upenn.edu!msuinfo!agate!howland.reston.ans.net!pipex!uknet!demon!an- teallach.com!gtoal Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk From: gtoal(a)an-teallach.com (Graham Toal) Subject: CERT/Whitehouse/Clipper link - smoking gun... X-Fax: +44 31 662 4678 X-Organisation: An Teallach Limited Date: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 16:48:15 +0000 Sender: usenet(a)demon.co.uk Lines: 55 Apparently-To: farber(a)pcpond.cis.upenn.edu By God, I knew there was something fishy about that latest CERT release (the one that referred to things that happened last November and didn't actually say anything new, but somehow managed to hit the *WORLD* press extensively within 24 hours)... Well, here's the smoking gun... >From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org> >Date: Thu, 3 Feb 94 21:14:40 EST >To: cert-advisory(a)cert.org >Subject: CERT Advisory - Ongoing Network Monitoring Attacks >Organization: Computer Emergency Response Team : 412-268-7090 >============================================================================= >CA-94:01 CERT Advisory > February 3, 1994 > Ongoing Network Monitoring Attacks Note the date. The next day, we see this Whitehouse release: :THE WHITE HOUSE CONTACT: 202 156-7035 :OFFlCE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY :EMBARGOED UNTIL 3 PM (EST) FRIDAY, February 4, 1994 :STATEMENT OF THE PRESS SECRETARY :Information Infrastructure. A digital signature standard will enable :individuals to transact business electronically rather than having to :exchange signed paper contracts. The Administration has determined :that such technology should not be subject to private royalty :payments, and it will be taking steps to ensure that royalties are not :required for use of a digital signature. Had digital signatures been in :widespread use, the recent security problems with the Internet :would have been avoided. Note the reference to 'recent security problems with the Internet'. This is obviously referring to the highly publicised stories in the press *that day* which were engendered by the CERT report. Yet the whitehouse press release was written days before - see the 'embargoed until Feb 4th' warning at the top. So the Whitehouse had *prior knowlege* of the CERT release, and the fact that it would get extensive press coverage. I say CERT actively collaborated with the Whitehouse on the pro-clipper propoganda front, and I challenge them to deny it in a simple unequivocal statement. G PS The statement is also false: digital signatures would have no effect on network sniffing attacks; but it's just more FUD to strengthen the Whitehouse hand in a release that was buried in a flood of releases that day on Clipper.

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Digital Money, Sandy, Mark
by Scott Beaudreau 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark's wrote: > Sandy writes: > >I would like to start a new thread. I want to know what the > >people on this list intend to do with cryptography in the "real > >world." > >... > >My interest is more than academic. I am one of the Cypherpunks > >involved in creating a digital bank. > >Sandy - > > In the real world there are already secret banks. There are already >forms of untraceable cash and forms of completely fungible money. These >techniques are very ancient and time honored. They are well understood. >Many of them have stood the test of time and have not been compromised by >various incarnations of police states. > >Given the existence of efficient, accessible, secret, and widely accepted >monetary exchange I can't really see the need for a digital bank from the >privacy side. I can't really see anyone who uses the current techniques >being interested in a new experimental form unless they are techno-junkies. >Nevertheless, please continue. Some of us are techno-junkies. I read Mark's reply to Sandy's post. I believe it was well thought. I was interested in knowing more though. Please tell me more about the secret banks that exist today. I would like to hear about the time honored techniques for cash funelling. I am sure that we all have some familarity with the different power groups that exist, and the games they play. Are these groups secure? Are their methods efficient, accessible, secret, and widely accepted? How can I use this old system if I chose to today? That would be my real interest. I think that digital banks are very needed. I think they are feasible. I even think that some power groups might start using them as opposed to the old ways (whatever those ways are!) There are many different kinds of digital money systems possible. I would suggest to Sandy that any work in the area defintely continue. The Net today is only an infant. We all know what is coming. There seems to be a real need for a secure economic system for it. Mark has very valid points about what other technologies are needed in the privacy arena. I completely agree with him that many other problems must be solved as well. I think Mark views crypto technology with a good perspective. There is much more than technology involved. I am including the rest of Mark's post: > It is already well known to privacy fanatics that you should not use > credit cards, debit cards, checks, atm cards, or other forms of electronic > money. All transactions are logged and are easily analyzed. > > Astute people cash their pay check at the employer's bank and pay cash for > everything. Admittedly, this is somewhat paranoid, but on the other hand it > is fun to defeat the monolithic database builders who want to make money off > of selling information that belongs to you. > > Cypherpunks must concentrate on solving problems that are true problems > now. Do not spend time creating a variant of an existing/workable/fun > solution. Email privacy was a true problem. Clear text on your pc's hard > drive was a true problem. > > Right now there is the well known problem of ethernet sniffers and the > trivial security breaches that can occur. A telnet/lat traffic encrypter > is needed badly by the Sun/Dec/HP world. Novell needs something badly as > well. > > Cellular phones desperately need something. The masses just have NO > IDEA how badly cellular needs something! Fax machines need a variant of > PGP. Pagers probably need it too. > > I think the larger issue that cypherpunks need to blue sky about is wether > they will be content with a role as grey-area political criminals underneath > the boot of an ever growing police state. Can crypto be more than a defensive > weapon? What would people be defending against? > > Crypto can do some things but it won't be the total solution. In the end > we need to strengthen the rights of the little guy and devise ways to dilute > any new state powers that are created by technology. Crypto is just one > compartment on our batman utility belt. > > People always argue that criminals would use these tools. I'm certain > of it. Strengthening the state's hand to fight criminals always screws the > little guy. The criminals all go to work for the state when its powerful > enough! We've seen this over and over. > --------- > I'd like a 250 Mhz 128 bit hybrid processor with 64 meg of 8 way interleaved > memory, a 10 megabyte per second i/o channel, two 3 gig hard disks, two dat > drives with compression, and a large diet coke. /**************************************************************************** Name: Scott Beaudreau Occupation: Undergrad in Computer Engineering at Texas A&M. Graduate 05/94! Signature: No signature. I am working on it, Dammit! Opinions: !(In my opinion, everybody agrees with me and I'm always right!) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAi1ZjXYAAAEEAKr/Z+hhR4svDYqZq2FG1tyBXthOne5aCHY9Ff2cbIOQDhni gNlu7B86ARjyHf0c2XufqzYga5hb5AMdxV1n0WkKCE46EKtRPsWH9fQRp+fQjv7y meLjXK3cDgO9WMaFG8xIv9zfR3u6GI7/WjNz8CF/qkZ4xi61xg6eIvS4JXE9AAUR tCpTY290dCBKLiBCZWF1ZHJlYXUgPHNqYjgxOTVAemV1cy50YW11LmVkdT4= =obz5 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- *****************************************************************************/

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Pen recorders and phone records
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have read that if the police want to know who a person communicates with on the telephone, they can arrange to have a "pen recorder" put on their phone line. This will record all phone numbers called from that line. Supposedly the legal barriers to this type of surveillance are much less than for a phone tap. I am confused about the necessity for this if the phone companies routinely record this information anyway. Is this just an archaic and obsolete terminology, and what really happens is that the phone company will give already-existing phone records to authorized officials? Thanks - Hal

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No Subject
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am remailing this using a fake address, by telnetting to port 25 of a remailer from Netcom. Here is how I did it and how anyone else could do it, including Larry Detweiler, who knew how to do this when I was still in my internet diapers: >qwerty: telnet soda.berkeley.edu 25 >Trying... >Connected to soda.berkeley.edu. >Escape character is '^]'. >220-soda.berkeley.edu Sendmail 8.6.5/PHILMAIL-1.10 ready at Wed, 16 Feb 1994 15:05:31 -0800 >220 ESMTP spoken here >EHLO mail.netcom.com >250-soda.berkeley.edu Hello mail.netcom.com, pleased to meet you >250-EXPN >250-SIZE >250 HELP >MAIL From:<L.D.e.t.w.e.i.l.e.r(a)netcom.com> >250 <L.D.e.t.w.e.i.l.e.r(a)netcom.com>... Sender ok >RCPT To:<hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu> >250 <hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu>... Recipient ok >DATA >354 Enter mail, end with "." on a line by itself >Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Here is an example of a damaging post, which is damaging in whatever volume it is sent out. For those of you who don't have a sense of humor: THIS IS A JOKE! This isn't real. There IS NOT an offer from Blacknet for such things (at least I don't THINK so)!! -----BEGIN FICTITIOUS DAMAGING POST EXAMPLE----- "Hello, Blacknet Enterprises here. We are looking for kiddie porn. Please use our encrypted remailer block to send us some and we will send you e-money, or make an anonymous deposit in your back account. Thank-you. Remember when you were 12 years old? That Suzy sure was cute! You wanted her then, and you want her now ;-) ! Don't lie; we're all kids at heart. Because at Blacknet: we love EVERYONE." -----END FICTITIOUS DAMAGING POST EXAMPLE----- Since Usenet will not be fully moderated in the next year or two, the only solution which will not backfire and make things worse, is moderated remailing. If someone can send me an AI program that would be able to block the above post, and further block efforts by the same abuser to alter said post to avoid your keyword search, such as changing "Blacknet" to "Black.Net" and "porn" to "pictures", then I will be very amazed. As I've already tried to point out, security starts with people, not technology. If I haven't made my point by now then I guess it's time to unsubscribe, shut down qwerty, and get on with what matters, which is getting PGP, Stealth-PGP, and a few sophisticated steganographs into people's hands. -=Xenon=-

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No Subject
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello everyone, I will pop out of the shadows for a moment to say that I have a fairly illuminating tutorial on ATM if anyone is interested. <Poof> Ophir dissappears in a somewhat murky cloud of smoke Ophir Ronen <a-ophirr(a)microsoft.com> KeyID 1024/54FF05 1994/02/16 Key fingerprint = EA BF 5C 85 F6 C3 A7 8E AA 48 2A AC B9 BC 4B D2 "So long and thanks for all the phish" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLWKhlo/5gSeVVP8FAQEo7AP+PwyOebCkIZM32aG1wyzpYdSkabLLy07E +4cyFlJzrQp+OGmctiMBOG7aZfuzOxscaGkXjsUY6GfhI5lZUhtVKkrv1nVyuImo J8Zoy85mV9bK4UriNZX5wOrVfQXwXfu8eF6JMmEhYe2dNOfik4C9feQEmusKZGBE ffRvIXiy24w= =k2Uk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Detweiler remailer abuse
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Matthew Ghio wrote, >It does work like the postal service. You don't have to put a return >address on the letter. You can put anything in the from line that you >want. You could put From: Anonymous Shithead and it would work. But, >like the postal service, it will get postmarked where you mail it from, >so it will show that it came from netcom.com. Ah, and what better way to get qwerty placed in all the other remailer's kill files? A remailer not part of a network isn't a happy remailer. I'm already too close to being labeled as some sort of renegade idiot to pull this anytime soon. The remailer police will pounce on me for this one, when I change my mind. It would be a lot funner than the level of "punk" I see out here. However, I think the real solution is moderated remailers. Then I'd have and excuse to charge $1 (yes, cheaper than the others :-) ) a pop, and it would add batching, which could be done in random order. However, sadly, I personally don't have the time to maintain such a system :-( . Ah, but I could hire someone to do it for me $-) ! Encryption would keep people's mail private, and Usenet is already public, and my bad memory would not constitute a "log" of who is getting e-mail. The remailer script could EVEN be set up to avoid my even seeing the addresses involved, were they private e-mail. -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWJmYgSzG6zrQn1RAQG3BgQAn9yos2C1C2sVu+tNxaZqjPhE9uWRAczC XIXc6SgzRtuRvCRH1l4uOdik3f8B/06n11+Q3BEWPtcKMGPR7aKyoAGKMLudZmR9 mQkeJlD5Of89gqcNSvoqRO3L5gVVaK7em4sS03TMi9I9qmAvxKfjl3d9lQdNfX9d 37eDGqOs11k= =CDsI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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