December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: licence plates seen
by mdbomber＠w6yx.stanford.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> >> Another one on a car I've seen many times is >> >> >> >> 68 ASCII >As Tim May pointed out, the letter D if 68d is read and the letter 'h' if >68h is read. Its a joke. > >Get it? h if its read in hex, and D if its read in Decimal. I knew it probably was a joke of some kind, but I didn't get it. Thanks for enlightening me. :-) Internet: mdbomber(a)w6yx.stanford.edu Matt Bartley GPS: 33 49' 117 48' PGP keys on finger and servers

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CU Crypto Session Sat
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- If old Sam gets his butt in gear, I should have a tape of the crypto session in Boulder yesterday to transcribe. Here's a brief report of the doings. Dr. Dorthy Denning of Georgetown University presented the escrowed encryption proposal. She was talking Boy Scouts and telephones, teaching kindergarten. Escrowed encryption was heinously soft peddled by Denning. The ramifications of escrowed encryption privacy violations by the intelligence communities was avoided during the initial presentation. She assured everyone that the FBI, with probable cause, would get a court order for the escrowed keys from NIST and DoJ. Rebutting was Phil Zimmerman, who was applauded when introduced as being under criminal investigation. Phil talked civil liberties, and some of the uses PGP was finding in countries not nearly as free from gov't intrusion as the United States. Phil brought up the point that intelligence agencies do not play by the same rules as the DoJ and FBI. Ken Klingenstein, CU director of comp. networking services, brought up the most interesting news to me. His perception of the DoD people he was in contact with was that they considered the escrowed encryption quagmire an NSA problem and were providing Klingenstein with helpful information. Denning had been nervous through out her presentation and response to the rebuttals of Phil and Ken. Again she avoided the issue of intelligence community intrusion, focusing on organized crime. I spoke to Denning briefly after the session. Eli Nixon, an investigator for the Zimmerman defense, and I proposed legalization for the drug problem. Denning sugested that organized crime would move into new territory in such an event. Slavery. (I found that rather anti-climactic after her dramatic measured pause for effect). Denning mentioned terrorists. I rebutted with satellite surviellance. I pointed out that we could read a poker hand via computer enhancement. This visibly shook her. Escrowed encryption is completely unnecessary, and she had no rebuttal for this. My information on satellite resolution came from a physicist who worked at JPL. I shook Dr. Denning's hand and wished her luck. She either reads everything I post, or was briefed beforehand. She was quite familiar with me. She couldn't believe I would discuss classified information on satellite resolution in casual conversation. The USAF hand in attendance was as smooth as sandpaper as well. As soon as I mentioned SDI, he shot over to evesdrop on the conversation I was having with Eli Nixon, et al. All and all, a fun time in Boulder. e -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbtGUl/ScHuGXWgVAQHlkAQAwl7sAz32H/zNxDUsPsy+LLEvGUCVScXY Zwr1oGpBqNYPVzDve46CvsissDpTH08MmQelfc+zwmdCjRP6sVzgNILhlsyLihTB Qfjh48sj40ESZnbJtj81k11SSaIBJJpDvlVsEWn4RDiP5aDgRnCKQ8hGxUZmGcCG q6dWYoH3DCc= =nGJZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Re: The un-BBS (minor corrections)
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Timothy C. May spake: > > > Gad, I see I made several mistakes in one paragraph: > > > I support Mike's belief that some sort of Internet II is needed. It'll > > be hard to duplicate the spectacular sense of the Internet, and almost > > certainly happen because of "planning." > > A better version: > > I support Mike Ingle's belief that some sort of Internet II is needed. > It'll be hard to duplicate the spectacular *succeess* of the Internet, > and almost *not* certainly happen because of "planning." > > One of my dreams is to be running/a-part-of my own backbone.. but not a backbone in the current hierarchal organization, but more of a web. . . each site connected to about 3-4 other sites (relatively local.. maybe in neighboring regions of the country) with highspeed links, and decentralized.. The net may be decentralized, but not decentralized enough. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbtSbHi7eNFdXppdAQFKwgP/UWkK8eaeY4IudsG/IDr6BfpOUoN6w/5z hzcWea6ro/rUowZDhrn2/npoai4MJqsiiwT6ZX7Ibz3I2UJP5gYgT6qjLa6dpBBf 0XtCZEBSK/Qi+RMU0iUyK7Yu23LZlSA5wLZ1ZPboZhC530+d8Yg+O7MUb1+0ZaDF ddOmEwBBRt4= =ltT8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The un-BBS
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Uh, Tim, I just tried out Prodigy. The only "net" access is via email. Saying that Prodigy is on the internet is analagous to saying that fidonet is. (I don't know if I'll say whether or not you've been the victim of false advertising, or whether Prodigy has done this). Phil

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taming the wild pgp
by hh＠cicada.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i'm having a problem with pgp. i want to use it in my remailer to decrypt incoming encrypted remail requests. the problem is this: someone could send in a keyfile instead of an encrypted text. according to the pgp manual, If you want to specify a particular key ring file name, but want to see all the keys in it, try this alternative approach: pgp keyfile With no command options specified, PGP lists all the keys in keyfile.pgp, and also attempts to add them to your key ring if they are not already on your key ring. this is bad because that's also the command used to decrypt a file. how can i make sure that the only thing pgp will attempt to do is decrypt a file, and it will never take keys from the input file and add them to any keyring? e

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interesting post...
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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the hh remailer (remailer@soda)
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i have added a feature to my remailer allowing a secure path to and from the remailer, for both posting (mailing) and replies. this code will be made available soon, so hopefully people will start running more of these remailers. this is excerpted from the instructions. have fun. ------- = Encrypted remail requests Like most of the traditional cypherpunks remailers, this remailer allows encrypted remail requests. To use this feature, create a file that looks like this: :: Anon-Post-To: rec.fish Subject: fillet of fish I like trout fillet... Then encrypt this file with the remailer's public key. remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu's key is: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQBNAi27mNAAAAECAONCUi/9jdl0SXGhOhT4Vvgl9uOYLgbOjU5kMXEkpFQriCYC hWfNuhH8zESs9DFTMHCXUsXYrkkm/bHdhGheaHUABRO0LlRvbW15IHRoZSBUb3Vy aXN0IDxyZW1haWxlckBzb2RhLmJlcmtlbGV5LmVkdT4= =aoJM -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Then, send your message to remailer@soda, like this: To: remailer@soda Subject: this line is ignored :: Encrypted: PGP [your encrypted file here] The remailer will decrypt it and post it to the appropriate group. This feature also works with Anon-Send-To:. = Encrypted response This feature provides a level of security beyond that of almost any other remailer which is capable of response to anonymous messages. To use this feature, first choose a passphrase. This phrase will be used to encrypt messages sent back to you. The encryption will be single-key (IDEA) encryption, not PGP's normal public-private key encryption. The reason for this is that public key encryption is actually uneccessary in this use, and single-key encryption with this protocol does not require a database (such as anon.penet.fi's database mapping aliases onto addresses) increasing the security of anonymous users. To use this feature, create a file like this, where your-pass-phrase is the phrase you have selected: :: Anon-Post-To: rec.fish Subject: fillet of sole User-Key: your-pass-phrase I like it when they cook fish like this... Then, encrypt this file with the remailer's public key, and send it in as above. When a user responds to your post (or mail), his response will be encrypted with your-pass-phrase. You can read his response by saving it to a file and using PGP on it. PGP will ask you for a passphrase; enter yours, and you will see his response to your post (or mail). This feature allows both your posts, and the responses to your posts, to be securely encrypted, protecting your privacy in both directions. = Traffic Analysis This remailer is designed to ensure that mail does not go out in the order it is received in, to make it more difficult to link a sender to a recipient by looking at mail logs. This means that there will be some random delay in your mail and your postings.

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taming the wild pgp
by vkisosza＠acs.ucalgary.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While I can't say that I know a darn thing about pgp, try (from the documentation) pgp ciphertextfile [-o plaintextfile]

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Remailer Musings
by edgar＠spectrx.sbay.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Philippe Nave posted: The recent posting by Scott Collins about his remailer and the copyright incident illustrates several problems with the remailer system as I see it. In my mind, then, the solution to these problems requires remailers that leave *no trace* of message origins, including the address of the remailer itself. If this is not possible, then I for one will employ other means for anonymous communication. No matter what the remailer operator does, the node he sends remailed msgs -to- is going to add a net header revealing where the msg came - -from-, so absolute untraceability seems impossible. But there are some things we could do to make tracing more difficult. Although we can't effect the net headers added -after- we forward a msg, we could certainly add a chain of fictitious net headers to the msg -before- we forward it (after removing the real net headers which is done already) which would indicate a false location for the remailer, leaving the real remailer node appearing as only an intermediate net node. The last fictitious node could be a UUCP account which always calls you to exchange mail, so all the info in your UUCP map could be phony. The person offended by E-mail can come to you and you can pretend to cooperate by giving him the phony info. If he comes back after his wild goose chase, you can say, "you mean that SOB gave me a phony address, etc.? Thanks for letting me know; I'll cancel his UUCP account immediately!" Then just change the phony net chain to something else. Another technique is to receive mail to be forwarded at one address (the public remailer address) but forward it from another. This is easy to do with two (or more) UUCP accounts. The remailer operator himself can have a policy of accepting UUCP accounts and not checking the phone number or location. Finally, it's a good thing to have remailers in different national jurisdictions. Currently the only Cypherpunks remailer not in the USA is remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com in Canada. We need more remailers in more countries. Places like Hong Kong or Russia, which don't give a shit about copyrights. Denmark or Holland, which don't give a shit about kiddy porn. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbrpPN4nNf3ah8DHAQEIxAP/bqWudrEHbmOZ+o/4VPHxjsDFw/Nih7TA SKffoFH035kXvFR6gDRVX3KErb77XhH9GJ2qcKXKZNt62Cfzpofdc4WOqXMK/syZ NuaKx0PIbO0Hqq34XpZ9xX6pgSOO+L1flREjt2kIaSO78OVBFgryqrgOFSg7Hm29 3BF6bqkKIDQ= =f4bg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Milgram & Authority
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

E>Milgram had 66% go to the end of the board with the subjects believing E>they had killed a person with electric shock. Sorry I didn't see this thread before it trailed off into personal disputes. One of my favorites. Anyone interested in liberty or politics should have read "Obedience to Authority" in which the results of this experiment are reported for popular consumption. ************ Search term: milgram Milgram, Stanley -------------------------------- The American social psychologist Stanley Milgram, b. New York City, Aug. 15,1933, d. Dec. 20, 1984, gained wide recognition for the experiments described in his book. Obedience to Authority (1974). In one, "technicians" urged participants to give a series of electric shocks of increasingly higher voltage to "subjects" who had incorrectly answered questions. About 60 percent compiled. No voltage was actually applied: the subjects were actors who feigned agony. Milgram took the results as proof that ordinary people will inflict pain on innocent people when commanded by an authoritative figure. ************ There was also a made for TV movie starring William Shatner as the researcher. Helps you understand "how they could do that" when confronted with atrocities. DCF "Why did you use force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States?" "I vuz only followink ourders!" --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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