December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Digital Cash
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So has anyone tried to solve the problem of double spending and the online requirement of digital cash? It seems digitial cash is really only digital "check" right now as it must be verified at the bank before it can be show to be "valid." Is there any way to take cash offline? Or is this merely the copy protection problem rehashed? -uni- (Dark)

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Re: WSJ article on PGP
by lcottrell＠popmail.ucsd.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I must say: I was somewhat stunned to see my name in the WSJ. I guess P.Z. has made use of the information he gathered. I wonder if the people mentioned were all the people who responded to Zimmerman's request for legitimate PGP users. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLcYFxVVkk3dax7hlAQFp0wP+I2TloCk72yqO/hdrwZLv3DDpYlxWN2eY Q8Hea6YTwBSo5lTtZ3Jc/M6wRmOGIispftvaq3wdlnfm1Ul3yBBg1eIe5zkFNtm+ bi0oCIOkJkcCjsvsMttvXX4olF5jhV5JIfO7DYuNN7XfzWKPocr15WjrByqbF5fp fZs1LFHVKGE= =gcc0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell who does not speak for CASS/UCSD loki(a)nately.ucsd.edu PGP 2.3 key available by finger or server. "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche

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Attn DCF: Tacky Tokens for your protocol
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

frissell(a)panix.com (Duncan Frissell) wrote: >In any case, I have developed a protocol that would allow the sale of >contraband with almost no risk to the seller and reduced risk to the >buyer. It's based on modern drop shipping techniques. I intend to >publish same when/if tobacco is criminalized. Let's get some net.commerce going. I'll pay you ten Tacky Tokens for a copy of this protocol. --- Mike

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Re: A distribution solution! (fwd)
by lassie!jim%lassie＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The EFF infobot for Adam Gaffin's Big Dummies Guide is ><bdguide(a)eff.org>. It contains instructions on how to anonymous >ftp. An up to date list of sites to fpt PGP from is available in >the crypto section. > We made PGP 2.3a available at the Armory and even have the docs >for those who need them. This may be true, but the average computer user does not use Internet, know what an FTP is, know what a BOT is or know that PGP is even Available. For that mater they do not usualy use BBS's. For the use to spread they must be made aware by mediums that they are familiar with, namely the newspaper and then word of mouth. Nothing high tech there. -- * Spelling errors are intentional and international * Jim Nalbandian netcomsv!lassie!jim%lassie(a)netcom.com Tempe, Arizona, USA N7SZS(a)K7BUC.AZ.US.NA No free man shall ever be de-barred the use of arms. The strongest reason for the people to retain there right to keep and bear arms is as a last resort to protect themselves against tyranny in government. <-------- Thomas Jefferson --

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Announcing SecureDrive 1.3d
by edgar＠spectrx.sbay.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- This is to announce the availability of Version 1.3d of SecureDrive. SecureDrive Version 1.3d replaces version 1.3a. A prototype version 1.3b was sent to a few people for testing. To avoid confusion, I'm skipping 1.3b for "official" releases. Similarly, a version 1.3c was released a short time ago, which did not work with 2M13 as it claimed to do. Changes for 1.3d have added minimal new function. Rather I have sought to respond to problems brought to my attention. The main change is to support the 2M13 diskette formatter and some versions of MSDOS which were incompatible with previous versions of SecureDrive. See file BUGS13A.DOC for more detail of 1.3d changes. There is also the addition of an FPART utility designed to help you locate the physical partition parameters you can use with CRYPTDSK and LOGIN when use of the DOS disk letter fails. Releases 1.3, 1.3a, and 1.3d of Secure Drive are based on releases 1.0 and 1.1, mostly written by Mike Ingle <mikeingle(a)delphi.com> and version 1.2, with significant new code by myself. The code which we wrote is not copyrighted, but the program contains GNU Copylefted code, and therefore may be freely distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence. See file COPYING for legalese. SecureDrive provides strong encryption via the IDEA cypher (The same symmetrical cypher used by PGP) for your files on diskettes or up to four hard disk partitions. You encrypt your diskettes and/or HD partitions with CRYPTDSK. Then you can access the data by using LOGIN and SECTSR. This provides "on-the-fly" decryption (and re-encryption) as disk sectors are accessed by your applications. Entering LOGIN /C or powering off your PC clears the crypto keys from memory and your encrypted disks are "instantly" secure. Mike Ingle and I have different opinions on the distribution of SecureDrive. Under the GNU General License (copyleft) I do not need Mike's permission to distribute version 1.3d and I have not asked for same. My policy on distribution is in the version 1.3d doc: Exporting this program. Cryptography is export controlled, and sending this program outside the country may be illegal. Don't do it. The "author" of versions 1.2 and 1.3, Edgar Swank, says that the export ban should not prevent you from placing this program on public BBS's and anonymous FTP sites in the US and Canada. If individuals outside the US/Canada use the internet or international long distance to obtain copies of the program, THEY may be breaking US law. Any such foreign individuals should be aware that US law enforcement may legally (under US law) apprehend individuals who break US laws even if such individuals are not on or even have never been on US soil. Such apprehension may remove such individuals directly to US jurisdiction without benefit of extradition proceedings in such individuals' home country(ies). This has actually happened in at least two cases, Mexico -- suspect in murder of US drug agent, Panama -- Noriega -- indicted in absencia for drug smuggling. As is well known, after a small war with Panama, Noriega was brought to the USA, tried and convicted. He is now a guest of the US Government in a Florida prison. SecureDrive Version 1.3d is already available for download on the following public BBS's as SECDR13D.ZIP: Eagle's Nest (408)223-9821 Flying Dutchman (408)294-3065 Catacombs BBS (303)938-9654 It is also available from a mailserver in Texas. Send mail to Server(a)Star.Hou.TX.US with body text that looks like this get /files/public/secdr13d.zip quit This file is also available via FTP from csn.org and netcom.com csn.org:/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/secdrv/secdr13d.zip (See csn.org:/mpj/README.MPJ for the ???????) and ftp.netcom.com:/pub/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/secdrv/secdr13d.zip (See ftp.netcom.com:/pub/mpj/README.MPJ for the ???????) Here is the contents of SECDR13D.ZIP: Length Method Size Ratio Date Time CRC-32 Attr Name ------ ------ ----- ----- ---- ---- -------- ---- ---- 27510 DeflatX 8794 69% 04-22-94 08:45 a49121ce --w- SECTSR.ASM 152 Stored 152 0% 04-26-94 12:25 f2d087ce --w- SECTSR.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 04-26-94 12:25 3ce76e9e --w- FPART.SIG 19664 DeflatX 4183 79% 11-19-93 21:42 22c2502c --w- CRYPT2.ASM 16900 DeflatX 4075 76% 04-22-94 02:52 f9e21e8f --w- CRYPTDSK.C 152 Stored 152 0% 04-26-94 12:25 cccac4e4 --w- LOGIN.SIG 152 Stored 152 0% 04-26-94 12:26 28fddfaf --w- CRYPTDSK.SIG 4346 DeflatX 1717 61% 04-21-94 01:21 6694a18a --w- FPART.C 14942 DeflatX 3872 75% 04-21-94 01:19 a2053a85 --w- LOGIN.C 1463 DeflatX 549 63% 04-24-94 20:05 8d468891 --w- MAKEFILE 11557 DeflatX 3277 72% 05-09-93 19:38 e71f3eea --w- MD5.C 3407 DeflatX 1097 68% 05-11-93 12:49 f1f58517 --w- MD5.H 1355 DeflatX 629 54% 01-21-94 08:44 db63ade4 --w- RLDBIOS.ASM 11028 DeflatX 2932 74% 04-21-94 01:17 c847eebd --w- SDCOMMON.C 3182 DeflatX 972 70% 04-21-94 01:15 f899b74c --w- SECDRV.H 7669 DeflatX 2640 66% 03-02-94 19:10 3372f29f --w- SETENV.ASM 1254 DeflatX 541 57% 05-09-93 19:39 182978aa --w- USUALS.H 1152 DeflatX 586 50% 01-30-94 10:15 e44c593f --w- BUGS13.DOC 9042 DeflatX 3638 60% 04-24-94 20:22 c9333265 --w- BUGS13A.DOC 63151 DeflatX 18313 72% 04-26-94 03:01 24ca58ad --w- SECDRV.DOC 2000 DeflatX 1323 34% 04-24-94 20:06 4e9b3815 --w- SECTSR.COM 35402 DeflatX 16710 53% 04-24-94 20:06 e4e9a544 --w- CRYPTDSK.EXE 15452 DeflatX 9798 37% 04-24-94 20:06 2a8cbf0c --w- FPART.EXE 35682 DeflatX 16620 54% 04-24-94 20:06 e9de6565 --w- LOGIN.EXE 277 DeflatX 249 11% 04-24-94 20:10 e3ea295a --w- FILE_ID.DIZ 33 Stored 33 0% 07-16-93 06:09 aa6151a5 --w- M.BAT 3163 DeflatX 2073 35% 04-18-94 00:02 56aea417 --w- KEY.ASC 18321 DeflatX 6914 63% 06-14-93 22:27 0767480b --w- COPYING ------ ------ --- ------- 308560 112143 64% 28 Also note that the ZIP file contains PGP detached signatures (*.SIG) for the executable files. Finally here is my public key, also available on many public keyservers; note who has signed it. Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/87C0C7 1992/10/17 Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org> sig B707C5 Anton Sherwood <dasher(a)netcom.com> sig DD98D9 Vesselin V. Bontchev <bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de> sig D74DC1 Peter Simons <simons(a)peti.GUN.de> sig 87C0C7 Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org> Edgar W. Swank <edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com> sig 45BF5D Jeremy S. Anderson <jeremy(a)cctwin.ee.ntu.edu.tw> sig B707C5 Anton Sherwood <dasher(a)netcom.com> sig AF00E5 David Del Torto <deltorto(a)aol.com> sig DD98D9 Vesselin V. Bontchev <bontchev(a)fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de> sig 67F70B Philip R. Zimmermann <prz(a)sage.cgd.ucar.edu> - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAirfypkAAAEEAKe2jziPeFw6hY19clR2GtQ4gtGCSSVOTgPKEJzHfuC74Scf 9PEuu1kebLhHk43A9wo1vr52o4jpH/P/tnFmRtBQOMzLUzAt5rMucswtSVviMQS2 hBuc9yGJKWHVcyfA79EARKEYTdhx+2qKI+hFJcPE+rmD8wVoF94nNf3ah8DHAAUR tCdFZGdhciBXLiBTd2FuayA8ZWRnYXJAc3BlY3RyeC5zYmF5Lm9yZz6JAJQCBRAt qP0vGDOhZQi3B8UBAR3LA/YtKNne0Nq7Bv4kUcGqcRikGxz8YEFwgejC1TQxGt3P 6Z4PK9jwPXDnkXMMdsWP18TbmaO5R1zaf4+ccGIaKKvskwSSC/A2alvfUE/PnNOb 8OzNVAhKcuzU9XsZDM6FUf2N4ymyGuF9bV9Wa3ZqKM8VtE9w8AnAme3UdunmV5cd iQCVAgUQLZsPrjZWl8Yy3ZjZAQFCygP+MKnTJ9hggKQKvuZCU/oiZi71XjWY9CVY 1rKRg3HftXIwivV1lUwE1bUQH1mw7pKCdsDczbs+4G6lRx3K1e573ELdylLMVkcm oURJJXO+T7VwZtDyqa+UzUzNifyqpdvBl0EMi/jx2sEw0FRPMmwj4/llICuandaP 9kD8Z2+BAJmJAJUCBRAtmxqwD0cvWzTXTcEBAYSwA/971qA7uJrM+GAPAXJ37qLy NAKQy+XpEruOOwcl4CHKjUXuKA7Rnb66l7yYacro+be71Qxrc4EBNI1PB+rvjnKY 9ZwZTly9+gwEkmibixKwcjQs6k2hlcmuVhsZitpvqSkulFSF4rRdrRsayrvj3ad6 5L96Dx01lYBU+Xhkb3ySCokAlQIFEC2Y9KneJzX92ofAxwEBa0MD/jnlR68ZTc4Q vksX7bcyFAt4PlQC7jOoL/G/nMsZdLZZMIuh/RvKpj4fZ69qaUGUeYx1Ibm37HpP 0BovPFMDn7kT3YfmQ5f61OJDHF73WBk/XJTi4815nCzO8vb/BeJhS7DbbxTdqli7 Kp3uoVCOxBZ9nmv/Lo3Zu3qDZau7fAsrtClFZGdhciBXLiBTd2FuayA8ZWRnYXJA c3BlY3RyeC5zYWlnb24uY29tPokAlQIFECwAALo04ip/MkW/XQEBmNQD/0jUVqT0 LMoVvw7Zz2FXyWrdBn6bRlyGxeqQWhigDXRipZ824/fHbA2vkbAczEayw8ZpwRVm hWNsxxWhjYFIi92KYJbAP/XIbr+rEuTIhPKKKKhuuGLUWhfXhCFluHjs3CA6ZQwn T4jnu1NlCkcnWLbL4ktqub2zLwrHCPUe31L1iQCUAgUQK9Y50xgzoWUItwfFAQHP rAPzBbf6lQyzwbUwdxayzLDoh3HygnunLooi+yzziEVQchOgSt3sLe2I108DLxTg p+26lJYTAZB+Gg8HGyB+Nz6263D0XlVUXQi9/7CSRyd8bhYFeuFPwFzHPWZlyLDA IsuaEfBsmp2DBLgffvhUCqiiWYmP9oa+rOA+5IHS+xN8tIkAlQIFECuXMhOhwThf Sq8A5QEBqF0D/itGhJWncb4qLTC+RwC+mfC3u9IRikddKTKgLwt0Cqz1t+3k0NM7 KSDDkfWoUbUOiqTqhHTLFjST3V5WgFVyUtYNv3iw07cmMcko79B04OKTkOmZcSdC EF8uW6O5iQK0mOgG/X5B0iaee/1o2J0a4sCd429n5Q02p8TchFKHM3DciQCVAgUQ K2PmLDZWl8Yy3ZjZAQEMRgP/aIwyaXrl4Vo1as0/tptiHxBbf4yePKXkI2kCMaTF 6OYibidkqpQc3kO4bOkkOey1HBvPp1pcrXldygzWbyC6G7pTMjAez36FsoTqKdML PgLSYTnk9Ka8X96ON7GcbOyIWm4WeM3+xGtIdznt+U4hRYEJkPweLPPdpgHGa/An zreJAJUCBRArERcc4nXeDv9n9wsBAbJiA/9qly/1XYxscWBTSGXQPgwuoaMFF5R8 OujFAKyCxNv/SevVb3KW0Eypg+APtOEsB/avEg81sbIPtVQDbstPBBNLqfaZu2Qc 68ZBXDsnYbBMDrfX0Z/RCd7QzWHtUlaMVfRXOO6H+eTpu3Eza5MtIXadSwNd7n/0 3ld56wWGttc2sw== =ka+m - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLcWFSt4nNf3ah8DHAQEA1wP+OBj5DcYT3E4dwP5o28i3q5BhALLUCpNK iBF1e1u8G6Udk6Bi/n/vo5bX81yrxDpS+vmfAkN+EEQk/aGF6cvizCbG+ZfxSUkJ 8GbnOkkY68on1qOJcJcj8ONEYsAUmhnGLPzmyqM2DmHkFnkynN2Wv6uFCKIw0o36 zEaKlZ9gNlY= =XLdo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Secure Drive is now obsolete NOT
by edgar＠spectrx.sbay.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My commendations to the authors of the new Secure Device program. However, with due respect to Mike, Secure Device does -not- make SecureDrive obsolete, at least not yet. Certainly there is -no- reason for anyone who has already installed SecureDrive to switch to SecureDevice. You've already partitioned your hard disk, so you won't get the main benefit of SDev. Although SDev has some bells & whistles of it's own, it doesn't have (yet?) the ability to use/set PGPPASS that I added to SecureDrive, or the ability to automatically try the hard disk key on diskettes (but these would be easy to add). There are some other tradeoffs between SecureDrive and Sdev. SDev's device driver architecture makes it more compatible with odd hardware configureations, multiple hard drives, etc., since all encrypted "volumes" are mapped to DOS files. OTOH, this same architecture can waste disk space, especially in cases where SDev encrypted "volumes" occupy most or all of a DOS diskette or HD partition. The "outer" FAT and directory in this case are almost completely wasted. SDev's device driver also takes about 50% more memory than SECTSR. OTOH, Sdev's encrypted volumes are safer from accidental writing if the device driver is not loaded, since they're mapped to read-only DOS files. SDev may be a little more secure then SDrv. SDev's checkword to verify the password is encrypted, while SDrv's is in plaintext. SDev gets this benefit because encrypted "volumes" have their own encrypted boot record. Someone has pointed out that the plaintext checkword could be used to assist a pre-computed dictionary attack on marginally weak passphrases. Another advantage of SDev is that it was developed outside the USA and so is available world-wide without violating ITAR. SDrv has "leaked" overseas to some individuals, but is not, AFIK, being openly distributed there. SDev "volumes" always start out encrypted and empty. You can't take an existing partition or diskette and encrypt it (or decrypt it). This may be less convenient especially if disk space is scarce. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLcWpNN4nNf3ah8DHAQH/QwP9H5hTdPFtDBd1hfRDHbz9YpO5CTz/aKo3 /pgbPN3EFKVKGUFPHxnDa1J0J5PWvAezmUiArNdo18Lly0Hu6M3iEGasv06tnbwg vcyzuFPCO5jd02GwTPVldIRol2lTlGcNAVfz209YYP6xSfTKcksWxI6JMSSCCeqK fJ2QS7qcKO4= =7Idd -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.sbay.org (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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The Great Clipper Debate
by lile＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just incase you didn't see this... If someone goes, can you give us a rundown on how it goes? thanks, -lile ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Lile Elam | "Remember... No matter where you go, there you are." lile(a)netcom.com | Un*x Admin / Artist | Buckaroo Banzai ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ X-Mailer: InterCon TCP/Connect II 1.2 Message-Id: <9405021817.AA02259(a)Hacker2.cpsr.digex.net> Date: Mon, 2 May 1994 18:17:02 +0000 From: Dave Banisar <epic(a)cpsr.org> Subject: The Great Clipper Debate 5/9/94 The Great Clipper Debate: National Security or National Surveillance? Sponsored by: The Georgetown University Law Center Space Law Group and Communications Law Forum In Coordination with: The George Washington University Institute for Computer and Telecommunications Systems Policy, the Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group for Computers and Society, and the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section. Date and Time: May 9, 1994, at 7:30 p.m. Place: The Georgetown University Law Center(Moot Court Room) 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The Administration, through the Department of Justice and the National Security Agency, has proposed a standard encryption algorithm for both the public and commercial marketplace, with the goal of making this algorithm the method of choice for persons wishing to encode their telephone and other voice and data communications. The FBI and the NSA are concerned that the increasing availability, and affordability, of encryption mechanisms will make it difficult and in some cases impossible for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to tap into and to understand the communications of criminals and other pertinent groups. This proposal has become known as the "Clipper Chip," in that it would be implemented by the voluntary insertion of a computer chip into telephone, fax machine, and other communications systems. The Clipper Chip has generated considerable controversy. Opposing it are various civil libertarian groups, as well as telecommunications companies, software and hardware manufacturers, and trade associations. The debate has raged behind closed doors, and openly in the press. On Monday, May 9, at the Georgetown University Law School, a round table debate will take place on this controversy. The participants represent both sides of the issue, and are illustrative of the various groups which have taken a stand. The participants are: Dorothy Denning, Chairperson of the Computer Science Department of Georgetown University Michael Godwin, Legal Counsel of the Electronic Frontier Foundation; Geoffrey Greiveldinger, Special Counsel to the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of the U.S. Department of Justice; Michael Nelson, of the Office of Science and Technology Policy of the White House; Marc Rotenberg, Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center; and Stephen Walker, President of Trusted Information Systems, Inc., and a former cryptographer with the National Security Agency In addition, there will be two moderators: Dr. Lance Hoffman, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at The George Washington University, and Andrew Grosso, a former federal prosecutor who is now an attorney in private practice in the District of Columbia. The program will last approximately two and one half hours, and will be divided into two parts. The first half will offer the panel the opportunity to respond to questions which have been submitted to the participants beforehand; the second will present the panel with questions from the audience. There is no charge for this program, and members of the public are encouraged to attend. Reservations are requested in advance, and should be directed to one of the following individuals: - C. Dianne Martin, Associate Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The George Washington University, Phillips Hall, Room 624-C, Washington, D.C. 20052; telephone: (202) 994-8238; E mail: diannem(a)seas.gwu.edu - Sherrill Klein, Staff Director, ABA Criminal Justice Section,1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; telephone: (202) 331-2624; fax: (202) 331-2220 - Francis L. Young, Young & Jatlow, 2300 N Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20037; telephone: (202) 663-9080; fax: (202) 331-8001 Questions for the panelists should be submitted, in writing, to one of the moderators: - Lance Hoffman, Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20052; fax: (202) 994-0227; E mail: ictsp(a)seas.gwu.edu - Andrew Grosso, 2300 N Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C., 20037; fax: (202) 663-9042; E mail: agrosso(a)acm.org PLEASE POST

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A message to decision-makers
by Johan Helsingius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have been contacted by somebody editing a book about how telecommunications are changing the world and our society. To give an example of the kind of stuff they are going to have in the book, there's going to be something by Ross Perot on teledemocracy etc... They asked me to help them in getting "messages from young people around the world, messages directed to the decision-makers, containing views about the significance of telecommunications and the change in perspective that telecommunications cause". So, if you want to have your point of view presented in the book, please send me a shortish note (in English), along with your name (or pseudonym), age and state/country. The deadline is Friday morning. Julf

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Re: Why Digital Cash is Not Being Used
by jim＠bilbo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael V. Caprio Jr. asks: > So what is the natural currency to trade in on the Internet? Instead of charging for information, charge for time. You lose control of the information you sell, but you never lose control of the time you sell. People with spare time could perform services in exchange for Tacky Tokens. These Tacky Token could then be exchanged for services performed by other people. What kinds of services? Whatever people don't have time to do themselves. Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Re: Digital Cash
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Online systems are also guaranteed anonymous. Well, maybe, though traffic analysis may be a problem. I did hear of an interesting case of people paying for privacy in the real world. In Hong Kong, the Aberdeen tunnel has drive-through smart card readers for tolls. The problem is, these cards don't use a privacy- protecting protocol. And many folks there are worried about what will happen come 1997. So there's now a resale market -- stores buy toll cards in quantity, and resell them over the counter, for cash. This underscores what I've said in the past about anonymous digital cash: it's not going to go anywhere unless folks are willing to pay a premium for privacy. There are too many sound reasons for keeping audit trails (debugging, fraud detection, marketing analysis, etc. -- and note that the first is an issue even for folks with the best intentions in the word; note how many remailer operators have kept logs, at least for a while); unless there's a profit motive in doing otherwise, most folks won't. In Hong Kong, the threat is not just real and imminent, it's *perceived* as such. Whether or not there is a real threat in, say, the U.S. (let's please not debate that!), there's much less perception of one.

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