December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Milgram & Authority
by dmandl＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > > Milgram, Stanley > -------------------------------- > [...] Milgram took the results as > proof that ordinary people will inflict pain on innocent people when > commanded by an authoritative figure. I would agree, but I'd add an important qualifier: "in this country" (or "in this world," or whatever). I think it's important to keep in mind exactly how obedience to authority is inculcated in people from birth. _I_ don't think it's inborn. The goal should be breaking this pattern and, if it's too late for adults, at least try to raise kids to think for themselves and not follow orders so unquestioningly. --Dave.

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Re: Internet Relay Chat
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Mon, 25 Apr 1994 rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in wrote: > > I've noticed some discussions of IRC (Internet Relay Chat), both as a possible > > model for CP interactions, as well as a location for implementations of > > BlackNet (in #wares, etc.) > > > > Note that IRC, unlike MUDS, has been designed to ensure 'true-names'. While > > you do use nicknames, anyone can find out the machine name and user ID you are > > logged in from, with a /whois. Anytime you join or leave a channel, your full > > machine name and user ID is displayed to everyone, along with your nick. This > > is different from any (possibly pseudonymous) e-mail address you register for > > incoming mail. > > Fraid not....it's a trivial matter to fake the username, and if yer a > smart cookie, faking the hostname is just as easy. as far as I know, you have to hack the server to fake hostname. historically this practice has been frowned upon by the majority of IRC administrators. but yes, faking username is trivial. josh

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Re: CU Crypto Session Sat
by freeman＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Phil Karn comments on spy-satellite resolution: > [Technical argument with which I agree, leading to approximate one-foot > resolution limit, deleted.] Phil's argument was for a 2-meter aperture at typical slant ranges in the visible-light band. I once did the calculation, also for a 2-meter aperture, with other circumstances being as optimal as I could make them; namely, looking straight down from a rather low perigee (I picked 200 Km), working in the near UV (where it still penetrates the atmosphere reasonably well -- I picked 3000 Angstroms as a round number), and with perfect seeing (which depends on luck, weather and exposure times, and perhaps on telescope and/or image-processing technology). For a circular aperture, the nominal resolving power (in radians) -- that is, the Airy disc radius to the first minimum -- is 1.22 * wavelength / aperture diameter, which for this case works out to 0.183 microradian. Multiplying by 200 Km gives 3.66 cm resolution on the ground. If one shapes the aperture to match the pattern under study, one can drive that factor of 1.22 down to as little as 0.5, but such shaping would likely be useful only for specific patterns not likely in the actual observation. I am told that careful image processing can sometimes resolve things a little below the Airy-disc limit, but not far -- the information really goes away fast at higher angular frequencies. So all in all, I am inclined to think that the best ground resolution attainable with a 2-meter aperture from orbit is about an inch. That is in fact just about enough to read a poker hand -- the spots on the cards are an inch or so apart -- but you might have trouble telling the face cards apart, as well as telling hearts from diamonds and clubs from spades. That is, if cards were well spread out you might see that a certain card had five black spots on it, or had a "face". I should probably explain about "Airy disc": The term crops up often in the study of astronomical imaging. The image of a point light source by perfect optics is a bulls-eye, a bright central spot surrounded by alternating light and dark rings, called the "Airy disc" after the physicist who first described it analytically. The 1.22 * wavelength / aperture is the angle from the center of the bright spot to the middle of the first dark ring. Of course, a possible way around this limit is to put up a larger, segmented mirror... -- Jay Freeman PS: References to physics texts on request...

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Re: message splitting for better mixing?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Miller > > The idea: > > 1) write sender-side code to split message into N parts and send each > part through a different remailer chain. > > 2) decrypt the parts as they arrive as per normal encrypted remailer > messages. > > 3) write receiver-side code to detect "a part" and stuff it in a file > until the remaining related parts arrive. When all related parts > have arrived, present the complete message to receiver. Here is a program I found in the usenet archives which will do some of the splitting and merging features. Note that the merge is smart in that you just cat the pieces together and process them. The main feature of the prog is that you can reconstruct even with a few missing pieces, necessary because of the unreliability of remailer email. I don't think the splitting is cryptographically strong, but each piece could be separately encrypted if desired. > Path: ghost.dsi.unimi.it!rpi!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!newsflash.concordia.ca!clyde.concordia.ca!altitude!mirkwood.CAM.ORG!hebrais > From: hebrais(a)mirkwood.CAM.ORG (Philippe Hebrais) > Newsgroups: alt.sources > Subject: shade -- split a file with shadows > Message-ID: <hebrais.0xu4(a)mirkwood.CAM.ORG> > Date: 13 Dec 92 07:57:05 GMT > Organization: Secte des adorateurs des semiconducteurs > Lines: 675 > X-Newsreader: MeNews 2.8.0 > > > SSSSS HH HH AAA DDDD EEEEEEE > SS SS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HHHHHHH AAAAAAA DD DD EEEE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SS SS HH HH AA AA DD DD EE > SSSSS HH HH AA AA DDDD EEEEEEE > > `shade' is a file splitting and merging utility. It takes a large > file and splits it into uniformly sized blocks. It can also output > extra blocks (called shadows). These shadows can be used to recover > missing sections if they get corrupted or it they are lost. With a > single shadow, `shade' can recover ANY single missing block. As many > shadows are needed as there are blocks missing. If too few blocks > and shadows are available, nothing can be recovered. > > For example, foo.bar (259042 bytes) is split into 5 sections > of 45000 bytes, 1 section of 34042 bytes and 2 shadows of > 45000 bytes. Each of these 8 parts is sent through email. > Even if any two of these eight parts gets lost, the original > foo.bar can be reconstructed. > > `shade' is a simple application of the chinese remainder theorem > for polynomials with coeficients modulo two. For more information > see the comments at the beginning of project.c. > > > > SAMPLE USAGE > > Split "bar" (111042 bytes) into 20000 byte chunks and output 2 > shadows. All these parts will be uuencoded and output to > foo.uu.001, foo.uu.002, etc. > > % shade -u -k 2 -l 20000 -o foo bar > [001] [002] [003] [004] [005] [006] [aaa] [aab] Done. > > Merge these parts back together: > > % rm foo.uu.003 foo.uu.005 > % cat foo.uu.* | shade -m -u > Merging bar (111042 bytes) > Got section 4 (20000 bytes) > Got section 1 (20000 bytes) > Got section 2 (20000 bytes) > Got section 6 (11042 bytes) > Got shadow 1 (20000 bytes) > Got shadow 2 (20000 bytes) > > Missing: [003] [005] > > Recovering 2 sections: > [001] [002] [aaa] [004] [aab] [006] > > > > DISTRIBUTION > > Shade is copyright Philippe Hebrais 1992. You have the permission > to use this code is anyway you feel appropriate as long as you give > credit where it is due. There is no warranty of any kind. I am not > responsible for any damage caused directly or indirectly by this > program. > > > AUTHOR > , > Philippe Hebrais <hebrais(a)mirkwood.cam.org> > > -- > Philippe Hebrais hebrais(a)mirkwood.cam.org > Voix: (514)731-9146 uunet!philmtl!altitude!mirkwood!hebrais

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spy satellites
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Two points re the spy satellite thread. First, spy satellites want to be close to what they are looking at, so they can see it better. That means they are generally in low orbits, and low orbits are fast orbits. Typical speeds are on the order of 10,000 mph. This means that any given spot is in view of a particular satellite for only a few minutes on each pass, and due to the earth's rotation it is hard to pass repeatedly over the same spot frequently. This means you need a large number of satellites in order to provide much coverage, and even then you will probably get snapshots at an interval of hours at best (I don't know how many satellites are flying). This is OK for military bases where you are looking at construction, ships, and other large equipment, but it is not at all adequate for tracking the movement of terrorists. Secondly, any technology which did allow the government to surveil us well enough to track the physical movements and meetings of terrorists would be far more of a threat than any Clipper chip! Offering satellite surveillance as an alternative to Clipper jumps from the frying pan into the fire, IMO. Hal

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Re: message splitting for better mixing?
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Here is a program I found in the usenet archives which will do some of the > splitting and merging features. Note that the merge is smart in that you > just cat the pieces together and process them. The main feature of the prog > is that you can reconstruct even with a few missing pieces, necessary because > of the unreliability of remailer email. I don't think the splitting is > cryptographically strong, but each piece could be separately encrypted if > desired. You can also get shade from either ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto/software/dist/???????/Misc/shade.tar.gz and shade.patch.gz or ftp.dsi.unimi.it:/pub/security/crypt/code/shade.tar.gz If you're outside the U.S. and Canada please use the Italian site. Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca - RIPEM MD5: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433 ViaCrypt PGP key fingerprint: 21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 low security key fingerprint: EC E7 C3 A9 2C 30 25 C6 F9 E1 25 F3 F5 AF 92 E3 cryptography archive maintainer -- anon ftp to ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto

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RE: Milgram & Authority
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > The subjects were very upset during and after the experiment. Some broke > down while administering "lethal" shocks. They often cried and begged the > "researcher" to let them stop zapping the victim. I saw a documentary about this research about ten years ago, and they made a point which hasn't come up here: that Milgram, in subjecting his exper- imental subjects to such psychological stress (many were traumatized for months afterwards about what they had done) was being just as unethical, just as unfeeling and unthinking, as his experiment was designed to show his sub- jects as being. Why was Milgram willing to push his subjects to such lengths? Was his obedience to the "authority" of abstract scientific research any more defensible than his subjects' obedience to that authority? In a strained attempt to tie this thread to the list, I will point out that our own efforts to distribute cryptographic tools will be judged by their consequences, not by our hopes. We have as much responsibility as Milgram to consider the likely results if we succeed. It will be a different world, and, we hope, a better one. But some things will be worse, of that there is little doubt. We must constantly weigh the bad against the good and take actions on that basis, rather than blindly and unthinkingly seeking to push the env- elope just to see what happens. Hal

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How to Subscribe
by Cummings, Clarke A. - SMSgt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

subscription instructions??? Or is this a **private** line.

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Re: Internet Relay Chat
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> If you did hack your own IRC server, would it be possible to eavesdrop > on channels like #warez, without anyone knowing, and without fear of being > kicked off? It seems to me that this would be the true hacker's approach > if it were possible. it's been done. this practice is also frowned upon by the generality of irc administrators. josh

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PGP Question:
by Jim Sewell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've looked in the docs for the answer but it is successful in evading me. My question: I have changed my ID string from my name to my name "-1024" and "-512" to differentiate between the different keys I have. Of course, using the -ke to do this has added a "Also known as" to my key. Since my name is the same in both and the mentioned keysizes are all that have changed I'd like to remove the AKA. Can I do this? If so how? Thanks, Jim -- Tantalus Inc. Jim Sewell Amateur Radio: KD4CKQ P.O. Box 2310 Programmer Internet: jims(a)mpgn.com Key West, FL 33045 C-Unix-PC Compu$erve: 71061,1027 (305)293-8100 PGP via email on request. 1K-bit Fingerprint: 8E 14 68 90 37 87 EF B3 C4 CF CD 9A 3E F9 4A 73 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLb19ClZo7sR6KUT1AQFQwwP8Cg1tHgG3vSOO07YtGOjrJcgKWe/9Pyr3 IKtIRV0msg8pp1RrTwp/rDiWi11DG3VxAYWbZZ8Fnf8Y5prPRCwL5vGs2WZqFoXi rMSQCxlacUBt4hbzeQQ9IzzYgA8+9YTP9RIVY9k+sd1iu9tsIcP8yjPDJ9jcBgpb BEyCWAPDpXQ= =XMdl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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