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December 2003
- 8635 participants
- 56359 discussions
David Sternlight, here are the answers to most of your questions.
>Just so I'm absolutely clear, since I want to use PGP but not to take any
>legal risks:
>
>1. Was the person in the administration who approved this empowered to act
>for the MIT Corporation?
Yes. Jim Bruce, a vice president above Jeff Schiller approved it. Another
high level official (another VP) also knew, and I'm under the impression
that he was in favor of it, too. The decision was a formal decision
by MIT The Institution. Absolutely NOT a low-level person acting on his
own. I hope I'm making this point clear enough.
>2. Did the MIT legal counsel act with full knowledge of the patent situation
>and MIT's relationship with PKP?
Of course. With absolutely full knowledge. And extensive review.
And careful analysis. And with a formal written legal opinion to MIT.
>3. Were the counsel and administration people aware that 2.5 uses
>non-published calls to RSAREF?
Perhaps you have a different opinion of what "published" means. It is
the opinion of MIT and their lawyers that the entry points that PGP
uses are published entry points. They were not declared public in
previous versions of RSAREF, they were declared static. But now they
are declared public in the new RSAREF, even to the point of being included
in a header file as public entry points. MIT advised their lawyers
of the exact nature of this, and the MIT administration was fully informed,
and this issue was discussed to death amongst all responsible parties at
MIT before a formal decision was made.
>I'm eager to start using PGP2.5, and hope it all works out. I'm puzzled that
>Jim Bidzos hasn't acknowledged the non-infringing nature of PGP 2.5 if, in
>fact it doesn't infringe. I'm puzzled he hasn't supported 2.5 the way he has
Has Bidzos publicly asserted that PGP 2.5 is infringing? If not, then
it would not be safe to assume that it is. Silence can be interpreted in
a variety of ways. Or not interpreted at all.
MIT carries a great deal of moral authority by officially releasing PGP 2.5.
I hope this will help defuse your efforts to stamp out PGP.
-Philip Zimmermann
prz(a)acm.org
1
0
One problem I see with Karl's suggestion (if I understand it) is that
there needs to be some pre-arrangement between sender and receiver in
order for the receiver to know what "tag" will be used to identify the
next message. That way he knows to download it after scanning all the
tags (plus, he downloads a certain number of other messages as cover).
(In other words, every day he downloads five messages from the message
haven. He does this whether he has anything there or not. An eaves-
dropper doesn't know how many of the five are for him and how many are
just random.)
I think it should be possible to have a way of marking a messages as being
for a particular user without any pre-arragement, and without any outsider
being able to determine which messages are for which user. Simply encrypting
some standard constant number with the user's public key would be close to
right, although you'd have to find a way to keep the modulus size from
leaking out.
The main down side to this is that the decryption and tag check might take
too long, while Karl's pre-arranged tag idea could be very fast. Perhaps
both concepts would be useful in different contexts.
Hal
1
0
Okay, I'll call the moderation method I suggested the ``asymptotic
moderation'' method.
Some problems that people have with asymptotic moderation:
1> It requires either a trusted subset of the membership to be
1> moderators and the most trusted are also the ones with the least
1> free time, or you trust everyone. I'd hate to send a message to
1> Detweiler to see if he thinks it should be posted or not :)
We trust everyone. Let's take a look at the four possible cases here:
Good message, good moderator: message accepted.
Bad message, good moderator: message denied.
Bad message, bad moderator: message denied.
Good message, bad moderator: SEND THE MESSAGE AGAIN.
If you're confident that your post was good, but rejected out-of-hand
by a bad moderator, just send the thing again. It's highly unlikely
that the same bad moderator get it the next time around.
Obviously bad posts, though, will be rejected by everyone, no matter
how many times they get re-posted. And just to be safe, the mailing
list program can keep track of rejection slips and refuse posts from
obvious abusers (and maybe it could do something similar with the
above denial-of-service attack).
2> The trouble with random single moderators are many, but worst would
2> probably be time-delay. If the chosen moderator for a message is
2> busy, sick, or away from their desk messages could be delayed for
2> days. The problem gets even worse if a delayed message is then
2> approved, and posted out of sequence.
The mailing list program can detect cases where people are taking too
long to reply; those posts can go to a designated list maintainer (or
maintainers) for immediate approvial. People who are consistently
late will lose moderation privs. Remember that posting out of
sequence isn't necessarily a thread-killer---Usenet survived for years
with UUCP transfer delays.
3> Instead of picking random list receivers to moderate, readers should
3> choose their own moderators.
3>
3> As a moderator reads the latest messages on the list, he or she can
3> mark each one as junk or not junk. This causes advice messages to be
3> sent to their subscribers. The subscribers can use mail programs which
3> process the advice and only show messages which have passed. ("If all
3> three of my moderators say a message is junk, then don't read it,
3> otherwise, show me.")
So now we're back to kill files. Here, though, the kill file rules
are based on out-of-band messages that can be received at any time
(possibly after you've read the message!). And every user who wants
to use the kill file must set up killing software. And there's no
guarantee that people would bother to rate every message they read
(I've participated in something similar on a BB, and _that_ particular
aspect failed miserably).
4> How about auto-moderation? I came up with this idea a while back for
4> automatically moderating mailing lists. Here's how it works:
4> [. . .]
4> If a person becomes a nuisance, people send their votes in to the
4> moderator-robot, and it tallies the votes. If within XXX days more
4> thumbs down votes are received than thumbs up votes, the person is
4> placed on the disapproved list.
Pretty good, but it wouldn't do anything to stop those people who
create random net addresses and post lone MAKE.MONEY.FAST or Jesus Is
Coming!!! messages. And it's a bit too harsh to deal with
intermittent flame fests, especially flames from people who are
usually productive contributors (you know who you are).
5> There's a simpler solution. Using the majordomo hack I posted
5> earlier, mail from known abusers would be bounced to the moderator
5> for his approval or rejection. This would be a small volume, which
5> should be within the capabilities of one moderator.
How do we determine known abusers, and how can we deal with unknown
abusers or intermittent flame fests as above?
In summary, the aysmptotic moderation method has a couple of benefits.
All of the custom code is concentrated in one place; anyone with a
mail reader can perform moderation duties. The moderation duties are
simple and well-defined. You _know_ when you are being asked to make
a critical judgement (instead of judging everything---or more likely,
nothing). All of the approval/disapproval information passes through
the central site, so that site can keep track of chronic abusers
through plain ol' numbers. Finally, since the primary filtering
method does not depend on filtering specific users, it works just as
well for drive-by posters and for people who are suffering from a
temporary lack of control.
Derek
Derek Lynn Upham University of British Columbia
upham(a)cs.ubc.ca Computer Science Department
=============================================================================
"Ha! Your Leaping Tiger Kung Fu is no match for my Frightened Piglet Style!"
2
1
> From: catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com
> > Says Stewart A. Baker, Chief Counsel for the NSA, writes in Wired:
>
> But not for long... I understand he's resigned, and will be leaving
> NSA tomorrow (Friday, May 13th).
>
> Wonder what his next illustrious position will be...
Managing Editor of Wired?
1
0
I have, after 9 days, finally received from the cypherpunks list a message I
sent for distribution.
This message is being sent 0540 PST 13 May 94.
--
Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)csd.sgi.com
Silicon Graphics Inc.
Technical Assistance Center / Centre D'Assistance Technique /
Tekunikaru Ashisutansu Sentaa
Mountain View CA (415) 390-2250
================================================================
#include <std_disclaimer.h>
1
1
17 Dec '03
Forwarded message:
From: qwerty(a)netcom.com (-=Xenon=-)
Subject: Announcement: Mac Crypto Interface Project
Organization: PGP Info Clearinghouse.
Date: Thu, 12 May 1994 23:29:54 GMT
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Mac programmers, hello from The Macintosh Cryptography Interface Project.
Included here are our "Statement of Purpose", and "Interface Design Sheet".
What's public key encryption? It means if anyone encrypts something with
your public key, not even they can read it again, only you, using your
secret key. Send mail to qwerty(a)netcom.com with Subject "Bomb me!" for Gary
Edstrom's PGP FAQ and -=Xenon=-'s "Here's How to MacPGP!" guides, which are
also available from ftp.netcom.com in /pub/qwerty.
-======Statement of Purpose======-
Phillip Zimmerman's vision of giving the common man a real encryptor, humbly
called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), "Public Key Encryption for the Masses",
was an historical event. But while PGP exists for many platforms including
the Mac, it's still a command-line beast, and it shows. The current MacPGP
is a powerful tool, but unacceptably difficult to use for average Mac
users.
Welcome to The Macintosh Cryptography Interface Project.
MacPGP wont be a "program". It will be like the Trash or the Clipboard. It's
going to be part of the Mac itself. A tool to set programmers free, allowing
them to easily call upon any function of PGP from their software, and a tool
for Mac users to use within any program.
OUR GOALS:
The ability to use PGP with non-PGP fanatics! Right now this isn't possible.
Try it and see.
Our emphasis is on the Macintosh, not cryptography. PGP will be a Mac
routine, not a hacked port of the latest DOS PGP. The core PGP routines will
be incorporated into a "PGP Engine" with minimal or no interface, easily
accessed from other programs via AppleEvents. The operation of this engine
will be quick and transparent so the privacy and security offered by PGP can
become an expectation, not an inconvenience.
A simple, user-friendly interface to this Engine will be designed: a smart
system-wide menu, which will know what to do. Selecting a file and choosing
"Encrypt" will encrypt the file to the user's own public key. No passwords.
In a word processor, "Decrypt" will return a selected block of encrypted
text to its original form (only with the proper pass phrase!). For e-mail,
"Encrypt to...", containing a sub-menu of public keys, will quickly protect
an outgoing message from viewing by anyone but its intended recipient. If
not in the Finder, the Clipboard will be used automatically. Simple and
easy. Eventually programs will incorporate PGP functions as internal,
automatic features, accessing the PGP engine directly.
The goal, quite simply, is to put strong, usable security into the hands of
every Mac user.
WHAT WE NEED:
You. Programmers, who turn ideas into code. Cryptography? The cryptographic
code exists; what we need now are serious Macintosh programmers.
We also need non-programmers to help design a user-friendly environment, to
help us find problems in our programs, and to contribute ideas that will
help us make the high standards of PGP-encryption universally available.
Just as we need the most sophisticated Macintosh programmers for this
project to fly, we also need the most frustrated and inexperienced users to
make sure that we have met our goals. If you wish to help, contact Xenon
<qwerty(a)netcom.com> or Jordyn A. Buchanan <jab3418(a)u.cc.utah.edu> as soon as
possible.
We have established an international mailing list for this Project, in which
no crypto code will flow. Work on the interface will be completely
independent of the crypto code, meaning no worry for our programmers.
Officially the Macintosh Cryptography Interface Project is not even linked
to PGP, though we intend to become the official interface for the licensed
MacPGP2.5, and the inevitable EuroMacPGP cryto engine. Early on, we will use
an unofficial version of MacPGP2.3 which accepts AppleEvents, as our
temporary model crypto engine.
We need PGP2.5 to be converted into an AppleEvents engine, as an independent
project; anyone within the US interested in working on this should also
contact us. People in Europe etc. need to create their own AppleEvents
MacPGP cryto engine.
-======The MCIP Design Sheet======-
Two prototype models for this interface have been built, which are available
from ftp.netcom.com in /pub/qwerty/MCIP, or by e-mail from -=Xenon=-
<qwerty(a)netcom.com>. One is based on J. W. Walker's OtherMenu, which is also
available there.
We have a mailing list, where there will be no crypto code. This will free
programmers from worries about legal hassles involving crypto politics.
If you are a Mac programmer, contact Jordyn Buchanan <jab3418(a)u.cc.utah.edu>
or -=Xenon=- <qwerty(a)netcom.com> and we will sign you up and try to agree an
a sub-project and specific design. We are also interested in helpful
criticism of our design, and its implementation. The OtherMenu paradigm
versus our own System Extension is not cast in stone, and needs input from
experienced programmers as well as some experience with OtherMenu.
Definitions: PlainText is Mac TEXT file or text on the Clipboard. PlainFile
means any Mac file, be it a word processor document or a GIF file.
CypherText is a text-format PGP message. CypherFile is a binary PGP message,
a MacPGP file.
The Engine: A dumb PGP cryto engine which accepts AppleEvents, and acts on
files or the Clipboard. In the end it should have no interface of its own.
This will be created independently of the interface, in both US and non-US
versions.
The Interface: A system-wide menu next to Balloon Help, making PGP functions
available from any application, including the Finder.
-=Items in the PGP Menu=-
1) Encrypt/decrypt -- for all types of decryption and for immediate
encryption of personal files with the user's public key. Just select a file
in the Finder and this command will either decrypt it, asking for a
passphrase, or encrypt it with your public key, no questions asked. If the
user isn't in the Finder the Clipboard will automatically be used. PGP will
figure out if a file is already encrypted or not, and take appropriate
action upon it. Additionally, if the option key is held down during
passphrase confirmation, decrypted PlainText from the Clipboard will be
presented in a window of PGP's text editor (see below). If on decrypting a
file on the Clipboard, the output is not PlainText, a Mac binary file will
be output to the Desktop, automatically. Within the Finder, holding down the
option key while confirming pass phrase entry will launch the decrypted
file. On encrypting a personal file, the original plaintext will be securely
wiped out. On decrypting a personal file, the original will be deleted.
2) Encrypt to... -- this has a submenu containing the keys on your Public
Keyring. If you are not in the Finder, the contents of the Clipboard will be
encrypted with the person's public key you select from this menu. If you are
in the Finder, the selected file will be encrypted to that person, with a
quick dialog box appearing asking for Clipboard or Desktop (and CypherText
or CypherFile) output. A TEXT file in the Finder will be treated as text
input to PGP, but any other file will be treated as a binary Mac file. At
the top of this menu will be Group... which will allow fast single-clicking
of multiple recipients from a list. Aliases of single or multiple recipients
will also be easy to define, and will appear in a group at the top of this
menu.
3) Sign -- If not in the Finder, this will clearsign the contents of the
Clipboard (after cutting it to <80 characters per line). If in the Finder,
the selected file will be "armored" with a dialog asking for Clipboard
(CypherText) or Desktop (and CypherFile or CypherText) output.
4) Keys... -- Dialog box(s) which handles all key management, including a
quick button for adding a public key from the Clipboard, or extracting your
public key to the Clipboard. The rest is standard, but for the ability to
create Aliases for groups of people, the name of the alias then appearing at
the top of the Encrypt to... submenu.
5) "Editor..." -- A simple <80 character wide window for typing out (then
encrypting) quick e-mail or viewing normal decrypted e-mail. This is for
users of simple VT100 terminal emulators, which includes most people using
e-mail via modem. The user can choose a font and size, and resize the window
vertically. If the window for this editor is active, the PGP menu will act
upon text selected in it, or all of the text if no selection has been made.
Our goal is to actually have people use this editor for their e-mail
drafting and reading. It will also be able to save or append it's contents
to a text file, for those of us who keep e-mail logs.
6) "Options..." -- If the user has multiple key-pairs, they can select the
one for use in signing things, and for personal encryption. They can select
whether to sign things when using "Encrypt to...". They can select the File
Type Creator for output text files in the Finder. Any other options will be
set here, and be kept in a Preferences file in the Preferences folder
(duh).
That's it! One menu. No options to choose during the most commonly used
operations. Just immediate action after a single menu selection. To
demonstrate and elaborate on this interface, here now are presented various
actions a user may do. I will use my girlfriend as an example.
-=User Actions, Outlined=-
1) Encrypt her diary, which she just wrote using Microsoft Word: She saves
the file, selects it in the Finder, and encrypts it with her public key with
a single PGP menu selection ("Encrypt/decrypt"). Done.
2) Adds a day's writing to her diary: double clicks her encrypted diary,
types her passphase into a dialog box, and hits the return key, to have the
CypherFile replaced by a PlainFile. And, since she held down the option key
when she hit the return key (OK button), PGP sent an AppleEvent to open that
file, so she's already typing new stuff in Microsoft Word.
3) Decrypt the e-mail I sent her: She copies it to the Clipboard, since it's
only a couple pages of CypherText. Without leaving her VT102 modem program,
she selects "Encrypt/decrypt", is prompted for her pass phrase, and since
she holds down the option key when she hits the return key, the PlainText is
presented to her in PGP's editor window. I did have to show her how to use
Unix "mail" instead of PINE though, since PINE would require saving and then
downloading the file, it only being able to show one small block of text at
a time in a non-scrollable window.
4) Respond to my e-mail above: She just types away, using the editor's
convenient features. She selects her text and simply chooses my name from
the PGP "Encrypt to..." submenu. It ends up in the Clipboard, automatically.
She's still in her modem program, so she just pastes the CypherText into e-
mail.
5) Post a clearsigned announcement to Usenet: "Editor" lets her type it out,
then simple selecting "Sign" places the clearsigned message onto the
Clipboard. If she is responding to someone else's post, she must copy the
original then paste it into the editor.
6) Check a signature from Usenet: Copy the message to the Clipboard and
select "Encrypt/decrypt". An alert appears telling her the signature is good
or bad. The message is placed on the Clipboard, free of signature.
7) Send a huge Mac file to me, encrypted: She selects it in the Finder,
chooses my name from the "Encrypt to" submenu and hits the "PlainText /
Desktop" button. She has her modem software autotype the file into e-mail,
or uploads it. If it's not too large she can instead hit the "Clipboard"
button and just paste it into e-mail.
8) Decrypt a huge CypherText file I sent her in e-mail: she saves it and
downloads it, selects it in the Finder and selects "Encrypt/decrypt", and
after she types her pass phrase the CypherText is replaced by a PlainFile.
9) Encrypt the message "Meet at midnight, at Nell's, tomorrow!" to a group
of people who she is working on a project with. She brings up PGP's editor,
types the message, and selects the "Babes" alias, which she earlier defined,
from the "Encrypt to" submenu. Her message is automatically encrypted to
that group of people, the result being placed on the Clipboard for pasting
into e-mail.
-=Comments=-
1) PGP is a public key encryptor. No "conventional encryption" is needed in
our basic interface, since encrypting a file in your public key is so much
easier than having to very carefully type a pass phrase for the encryption
step. If someone wants IDEA-only encryption they can use Will Kinney's Curve
Encrypt, which does drag-and-drop, they can use the old MacPGP, or they can
create their own "Conventionally encrypt" feature to add to our modular
interface.
2) Our design is in flux, and flexible. However our singular goal is this:
that we can send MacPGP on a floppy to any non-sophisticated Mac user and
have them send us a public key within an hour, then start using PGP for e-
mail the next day. There will be little in the way of a manual other than as
a brief intro on exactly how to quickly set up and use PGP, Balloon Help
being enough for most operations.
3) Our interface is a separate project from the cryptography engine. Early
on we will use MacPGP2.3aV1.1 which does accept AppleEvents. This will allow
us to get started now, as well as have MacPGP2.3aV1.1 take care of features
we have not built into the interface yet, such as full key management.
4) Initially we will spool the Clipboard to disk files, then delete them
after we have the crypto engine act on them. Later the cryto engine will
have an AppleEvent option for using the Clipboard. In the end this will
likely have no interface of its own at all, and become a background-only
application.
5) We intend to be the official interface for MacPGP2.5, and hope to see
PGP2.5 quickly ported to the Mac as an AppleEvents cryptography engine, for
use by our interface and any other program such as Mac e-mail programs.
6) J. W. Walker's OtherMenu shareware ($10) may be looked at as a system-
wide menu tool kit, to which we can add our routines as CODE resources,
placed in the OtherMenu Folder in the System Folder. This will allow us to
start getting things done immediately, without any worry about building our
own System Extension. OtherMenu is actively maintained by Mr. Walker, who
has also been personable in e-mail. We can remove all the extensions that
come with OtherMenu, leaving only our own menu items! We can even place our
own icon atop our menu. This is a clean solution. CODE resources are
trivially made using Think C. Anything that we could do with an application
we can do easier with an OtherMenu CODE resource file, and our menu ends up
in the system-wide OtherMenu next to Balloon Help. OtherMenu will send any
AppleEvent we create for us, as well. There is an OtherMenu Developer Kit
available for free, though really such CODE resources are just like any Mac
program. These can be had from ftp.netcom.com in /pub/qwerty/MCIP. We may
think of OtherMenu as a part of the Mac operating system, which allows us to
add any feature to a system-wide menu.
As further persuasion, imagine that we had created a system-wide menu for
this project, by writing our own System Extension. Further, unbelievably,
imagine that we made this Extension able to accept modular plug-in PGP
features as simple CODE resources, thus creating a framework for breaking
our project into smaller independent projects. Now imagine this is true, and
thus take a look at OtherMenu, with a MacPGP icon slapped onto it. Sure it's
$10, but it's shareware, and it saves us untold development time and effort.
Later, if anyone wishes to assemble our CODE resources into a dedicated
System Extension, they are free to do so, though I don't think it will be
worth the ten bucks.
7) The interface will be somewhat inflexible in how it does things, which is
needed in order to make it very simple. Extraneous features and options will
be weeded out unmercifully until the interface is a model of simplicity.
Art, if you will. Cryptography fanatics are free to design their own
interface to the PGP Engine.
8) We want security of left-over PlainText on the user's hard disk to be
handled by PGP, automatically. On encrypting a file for personal use with
"Encrypt/decrypt", the original WILL be wiped clean from the hard disk. We
should include in our distribution FlameFile by Josh Goldfoot for wiping out
Finder files, or all unused hard disk space. In fact, FlameFile can be
operated via AppleEvents as well.
9) Since we are developing free software with limited resources and limited
time for making an impact, certain compromises have been made compared to a
perfect design. OtherMenu is one pleasant compromise. Using MacPGP2.3aV1.1
is not very happy, but will have to do for now. It has the same layout as
MacPGP2.3, but is debugged and will accept AppleEvents, in some detail. It
will not so far however allow selection of the Clipboard for input/output.
The source code for MacPGP2.3aV1.1 is also not yet available, though we will
indeed put a large effort into getting it.
Another possibility is to write some of our routines as AppleScript
applications with Apple's Script Editor, and place them in the OtherMenu
folder so they will appear as normal menu items. This would be a temporary
quick fix at best. For instance (using "Jon's Commands" for the Finder
selection part) the following does work to encrypt a file(s) selected in the
Finder to my public key, then wipe the plaintext.
tell application "MacPGP"
encrypt (finder selection) to "Xenon"
quit
end tell
tell application "FlameFile"
open (finder selection)
quit
end tell
10) Jordyn, -=Xenon=-, as well as others, do have connections with the core
PGP development community, for what it's worth. Our main interest is
becoming the interface for the next MacPGP. We need our dumb AppleEvents
crypto engine to be built from PGP2.5 by a few Mac programmers. If you
hadn't suspected it, former MacPGP development is dead, for rather boring
reasons. We will help people interested in working on the MacPGP engine in
any way we can. There should be two compatible versions, US and
international. Since MacPGP development is no longer happening, we need a
new group of dedicated people to tackle this, independently of our interface
project.
11) An encrypted file will have its name altered, as well as its icon (its
type changed to CRYPT too, so a double click will trigger PGP). There are
selection dialog boxes and hierarchical menus which show only names, so
changing an icon isn't enough. I suggest just *, appended directly to the
end of the name, which PGP will not use in any way except as a sign to the
user that file is CypherText.
12) No, this interface is not incorporation of PGP into e-mail programs so
to make it's operation transparent. The reason for this is the good old
VT102 emulator, which so many people use, since that's what came with their
modem. People using Macintosh based e-mail programs, will indeed have it
easier, once someone links those programs to PGP, so outgoing mail is
automatically encrypted, and incoming decrypted. Such uses will still have
use for our Finder-based commands however, and their e-mail programs will
use the same PGP cryto engine, via AppleEvents.
13) For this project to fly, strong leadership is required. This interface
design sheet will be maintained by -=Xenon=-, with equal contribution by
Jordyn Buchanan, and SHOULD be followed. Changes to this sheet are easy
though: tell us your story of woe, need, or ambition, and we will make
changes and issue an update. Alternatively, draft your own sheet ;-). Or get
us interested enough in your ideas that we let you take over. This sheet
will become very detailed. Given the modularity of this interface, more than
one answer to a given problem can be created, with the user choosing
favorites. Wherever a conflict in design philosophy arises, the MacPGP
USERS, not the programmers will have the greater say. That said, we are
looking for creative ideas and damming criticism so we know we are thinking
straight.
14) PGP will be free. Why are we doing this? Because ViaCrypt isn't doing
it. Unless their MacPGP is System software, free, with source code, we have
little interest in ViaCrypt as the answer to how to be able to get our
friends to use PGP with us, today. We simply want PGP to become something we
no longer think about, so we can get on with our lives instead of struggling
with the problem of getting others to use it with us. That shall remain our
goal and only purpose.
15) This project is in its infancy. Jordyn and -=Xenon=- are not yet skilled
Mac programmers, which in fact gives us an advantage in designing an
interface. We are here to reflect what the needs of users are, and to
provide organization and resources for this project. We are here by default,
there being no competition. However, and especially since this interface
project is free from legal and political hassles, we need strongly motivated
and highly skilled Mac fanatics to take our design and make it real.
16) The modularity of this interface will allow addition of special-purpose
features to PGP, such as Stealth PGP which strips PGP messages down so far
you can't tell them from noise, steganography, Magic Money functions
(Pr0duct Cypher's PGP-based money system), or anonymous remailer chaining.
In fact, without easy to use interfaces for these systems being available
for the Mac (and Windows), steganography, digital cash, and chaining of
encrypted anonymous remailers will remain obscure toys.
17) The PGP cryto engine, though not mentioned in detail herein, will become
a plaything for programmers who wish to create their own PGP-based
applications such as for sending credit card orders via e-mail, creating
local encrypted networks, making PGP encryption a transparent feature of
steganographs, or transparent incorporation of PGP into Mac-based e-mail
readers. We need to know what such programmers want out of the engine, since
our needs are simple. The engine is not slave to our interface design, and
should be pursued for its own sake. We simply hope to show that it should be
kept simple, perhaps with no interface of its own and run only by
AppleEvents (and thus AppleScript etc. if desired). A separate design effort
will be needed, mainly to simply define the required AppleEvent structures
that will negate the need for its own interface.
One thing I'd love is the ability to define a "safe" folder, the contents of
which would be encrypted, always, unless they were open. Then my diary could
sit in there, and get encrypted as soon as I was done writing and saved it
from my word processor. This could be a System Extension, always watching
that folder. With the PGP crypto engine, the writer of such an Extension
would not have to worry about any crypto code.
18) It's time to stop waiting for PGP3.0 to be released, since our interface
relies only on the most simple of concepts for AppleEvents it will send, and
altering AppleEvents is easy. If and when PGP3.0 arrives, our interface will
be ready, and porting PGP3.0 to the Mac will thus be much easier.
-=Critical Path=-
Anyone can take it upon themself to work on these.
1) Get source code for MacPGP2.3aV1.1 and alter it to accept the Clipboard
as an input/output option, which it already can do, if operated manually.
Till then we will spool the Clipboard to disk and have MacPGP2.3aV1.1 act
only on files. MacPGP2.3aV1.1 was recently released in Germany, and will act
as our temporary model crypto engine.
2) Recruit native Macintosh programmers, and do a job of inspiring them
about what this project is about, and why it is important. Also find some
frustrated MacPGP users to tell us what they need, though explanations of
what e-mail programs they use, and how they would like to interface it with
PGP. We should get our literature posted on AOL and Compuserve as well,
where many "isolated" programmers live.
3) Learn the ins and outs of J. W. Walker's OtherMenu and write up a
tutorial on how to program the Mac this way, then create our interface in
independent pieces as CODE resource files. A CODE resource is just a Mac
application stripped down a bit, so they are in fact easier than building an
application. The modularity of our interface will give people small yet
fully functional projects to work on.
4) Independently of our MCIP mailing list, port PGP2.5 to the Mac as a
background-only cryto engine, which accepts detailed AppleEvents. Create a
Developer's Kit so any Mac programmer can incorporate PGP into their
software.
5) Copyright our Interface, which is really just a few externals for
OtherMenu, rendering it free.
-=Questions=-
1) How will we handle pass phrase recycling during a long but busy e-mail
session? We could do without it completely, as an option.
2) Might we allow selection of Macintosh folders full of stuff, then create
an archive of the folder to send to PGP? Or should we just encrypt all the
files within a selected folder? That's easier.
3) Though this would require some tricks, might we have PGP use the
Clipboard indirectly, by automatically copying any selected text from a text
editing window of any application to the Clipboard? Or selecting all of the
text in a text editing area, if no selection has been made by the user? The
could be termed "magic", for it would be like an added feature to that
program that you use it in. Just select text then go to the PGP menu.
4) How can we handle a progress dialog box during long operations? The
crypto engine itself shouldn't in the end have any interface. So how do we
make a legitimate progress indicator?
5) How do we get the name of the file(s) selected when the user is in the
Finder? [If we cannot do this, we can substitute Finder activities with
drag-and-drop applications on the Desktop. There would be three of these,
one for each menu item, "Encrypt/decrypt", "Encrypt to...", and "Sign".]
"Jon's Commands", and AppleScript addition is able to get this info, though
the author said he had to delve into undocumented data structures to find
it. He seemed willing to help, or we could just use his addition.
6) What will happen if the user is in the Finder, but has selected nothing,
or has accidentally selected like their entire hard disk, which is quite
common to accidentally do? On the other hand, it wont be too uncommon for
someone to wish to encrypt the entire contents of a floppy, or even a hard
disk. A dialog box will be needed if the folder selected is a disk.
Obviously, there should be a responsive "Cancel" button/command-. option
while the encryption progress window is on the screen, which should return
all files to their original condition (that's what "Cancel" means). What if
they have nothing selected? A dialog box will appear saying they haven't
selected anything, with "Clipboard" being default, and "Cancel" as an
option.
-=Comparison of MacPGP2.3 to the New MacPGP=-
1) To encrypt a file on my hard disk, that I just wrote with a word
processor:
OLD: 1) Start up MacPGP, and wait for it to fire up (~4 seconds), 2)
Command-key and wait for dialog (1 second), 3) Command-D to get to Desktop
and click-click click-click click-click click-click click-click click-click
click-click to dig up my file deep on my hard disk (~5 seconds), 4) select
my public key from the list and hit OK if I am not using "conventional
encryption" (which I am NOT since nobody, including myself, can stand typing
a damn pass phrase SUPER carefully for an ENCRYPTION step with risk of full
data loss on making a typo), (3 seconds), 5) gaze at a HUGE dialog box of 13
buttons and three text edit boxes, selecting "treat source as Macintosh
file", "wipe original", "don't sign" and gaze again to make sure I don't
have someone else's public key accidentally chosen, and finally hit "Do it"
(~4 seconds), 6) wait while staring at a UNIX/DOS screen scrolling text at
me instead of a normal Macintosh progress box, 7) quit MacPGP.
NEW: Click on the file from the Finder and select "Encrypt/decrypt" from the
PGP menu. Decryption is IDENTICAL, except for prompting for a pass phrase,
and the option of simply double-clicking on the encrypted file.
2) To encrypt a file to someone else:
OLD: SEE ABOVE 7 STEPS!
NEW: Place my message on the Clipboard with two standard keystrokes, select
the person's name in the PGP "Encrypt to" submenu, and paste it into e-
mail.
3) To send short quick e-mail:
OLD: 1) Start up a damn word processor and copy the message to the
Clipboard, then SEE ABOVE 7 STEPS.
NEW: 1) Call up PGP's little text editor in an instant, without leaving my
e-mail program, type my message and choose the person's name in the "Encrypt
to" menu of PGP. The editor shuts down and the encrypted message ends up in
the Clipboard, ready to paste into e-mail.
4) Decrypt short e-mail I just got:
OLD: Copy it to the Clipboard and then SEE ABOVE 7 STEPS, and then start up
a damn word processor and Paste the PlainText into a document so I can read
it!
NEW: Copy it to Clipboard and hit "Encrypt/decrypt", holding down the option
key so it appears in PGP's text editor window for my viewing pleasure.
5) Add a key to my public keyring.
OLD: Copy it to Clipboard, start up a word processor, save it as text-only.
Start up PGP, "Add keys...", click-click, click-click, then click-click,
click-click, click-click, click-click to find my pubring.pgp. Then say, no,
I don't want to certify the key myself.
NEW: Copy it to Clipboard, choose "Keys..." from the PGP menu without
leaving my e-mail software, click on a button that says "Add key from
Clipboard". Done, and I'm back in e-mail.
Jordyn Buchanan <jab3418(a)u.cc.utah.edu>
-=Xenon=- <qwerty(a)netcom.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.3a
iQCVAgUBLdKCHQSzG6zrQn1RAQGrAQP+Mw9dJz4vIhnFb8s+CwL84QG3qo5rdYFE
78B4VlA/brOlWmXj6SApn0Yd+l+cLSmezZbLnnumOysk5ZXaTGbOVdv+gN6Ur4lZ
6Nk5pQ+UZNpoM3XBrsCu7k+b0opkMrEkgPv5IfMIQDTJuOOyRryispBjuaS9YuAT
QueTCgnbJWA=
=olym
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
1
0
The keyserver at wasabi.io.com has been upgraded to cover the
new format of pgp2.5 output and its 8 character Key IDs. It will
continue to serve keys requested by 6 character ID for a short
while, but the 6 character key database will not be refreshed
with new keys. After a week or two we will remove the old data
and all requests must be for 8 character Key IDs.
If you have a reference to your key at wasabi in your .signature,
please find the longer form of your key ID and update your
sig file.
Thank you.
The Mgt.
1
0
Could someone please e-mail to me the address of the Anonymous Pool listserv?
Ryan Snyder, Consultant |--->Finger me for my PGP public key.<--- ___
University of Montana CIS| |\ /|
CS000RRS(a)SELWAY.UMT.EDU | Copyright 1994 by Ryan R. Snyder. | 0 |
RYE(a)ILLUMINATI.IO.COM | |/_\|
RYE(a)CYBERSPACE.ORG |
1
0
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP)
(Last modified: 12 May 1994 by Mike Johnson)
WHAT IS THE LATEST VERSION?
The latest BETA TEST version for DOS and Unix is 2.5 (Uses RSAREF 2.0 for
U. S. Patent compliance, even though the original RSA code written by
Philip Zimmermann runs faster).
The latest commercial versions are 2.4 (both Viacrypt and BSAFE versions).
The latest freeware Mac version for which source code is available is 2.3
The latest freeware Mac version (source code not public) is 2.3aV1.1
(written by Christoph_Pagalies(a)hh2.maus.de)
The latest Amiga version is 2.3a2
The latest fully released freeware version for all other platforms is 2.3a
WHERE CAN I GET VIACRYPT PGP?
If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in
Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use
the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications,
and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully
compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware
version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license,
ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they
are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or
write to them for the latest information. The latest information I have from
them on compiled versions are:
PGP 2.4 for MS-DOS
PGP 2.4 for Unix (several different platforms)
PGP 2.4 for WinCIM CSNAV
Mac version expected late this summer.
ViaCrypt
David A. Barnhart, Product Manager
2104 West Peoria Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85029
Tel: (602) 944-0773
Fax: (602) 943-2601
E-mail: viacrypt(a)acm.org
Credit card orders only. (800)536-2664 (8-5 MST M-F)
WHERE CAN I GET THE BETA TEST PGP 2.5 FROM MIT (USES RSAREF 2.0)?
MIT-PGP 2.5 is for U. S. use only (due to some archaic export control laws),
but interoperates with PGP 2.3 and 2.3a. This is the right version to use if
you want to use it for personal (not for services you get paid for)
electronic mail privacy in the USA and Canada. To get it from the source at
MIT:
1. Read ftp://net-dist.mit.edu/pub/PGP/license.txt and agree to it.
2. Telnet to net-dist.mit.edu and log in as getpgp.
3. Answer the question and write down the directory name listed.
4. QUICKLY end the telnet session with ^C and ftp to the indicated directory
on net-dist.mit.edu (something like /pub/PGP/dist/U.S.-only-????) and get
the distribution files (pgp25.zip, pgp25doc.zip, and pgp25src.tar).
If the hidden directory name is invalid, start over at step 2, above.
You can also get PGP 2.5 from:
csn.org/mpj
ftp://csn.org/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp25.zip
ftp://csn.org/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp25src.tar
See ftp://csn.org/mpj/README.MPJ for the ???????
See ftp://csn.org/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this site's
export control methods.
ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj
ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj//I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp25.zip
ftp://ftp.netcom.com/mpj//I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/pgp25src.tar
See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/README.MPJ for the ???????
See ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/mpj/help for more help on negotiating this
site's export control methods.
TO GET THESE FILES BY EMAIL, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com
containing the word HELP in the body of the message for instructions.
You will have to work quickly to get README.MPJ then the files before
the ??????? part of the path name changes again (several times a day).
ftp.eff.org
Follow the instructions found in README.Dist that you get from one of:
ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/README.Dist
gopher.eff.org, 1/Net_info/Tools/Crypto
gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/Net_info/Tools/Crypto
http://www.eff.org/pub/Net_info/Tools/Crypto/
Colorado Catacombs BBS
Mike Johnson, sysop
Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff.
Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written
by Mike Johnson, including DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR,
DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, etc.
v.FAST/v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 28,800 bps
8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity, as fast as your modem will go.
Use ANSI terminal emulation, of if you can't, try VT-100.
Free access to PGP. If busy or no answer, try again later.
Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try
a variation on your name or pseudonym. You can request access to
crypto software on line, and if you qualify legally under the ITAR,
you can download on the first call.
Download file names: pgp25.zip (DOS version with documentation)
pgp25src.tar (Unix version and source code)
pgp25doc.zip (Documentation only -- exportable)
(303) 938-9654 (Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number)
(303) 678-9939 (Longmont, Colorado number)
Verified: This morning.
Other BBS and ftp sites will no doubt pick it up rapidly after the beta test
is completed.
Please send bug reports concerning PGP 2.5 BETA to pgp-bugs(a)mit.edu.
If you obtain a copy of this beta release code, please keep checking
http://web.mit.edu for the announcement of the final release, so that
you can update your copy of PGP2.5.
WHERE TO GET PGP 2.3a (RELEASED FROM NEW ZEALAND)
The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and
scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information
services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth.
This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers
to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was
released from outside the USA (New Zealand), it is not supposed to be
exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside
the USA if you are outside of the USA.
This data is subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been
removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this
list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any
BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me
know so that I can update this list. Thanks to Gary Edstrom and Hugh Miller
for providing part of this data.
FTP sites:
ftp.ee.und.ac.za
/pub/crypto/pgp
soda.berkeley.edu
/pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC)
Verified: 21-Dec-93
ftp.demon.co.uk
/pub/amiga/pgp
/pub/archimedes
/pub/pgp
/pub/mac/MacPGP
ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de
ftp.funet.fi
ghost.dsi.unimi.it
/pub/crypt
Verified: 21-Dec-93
ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10)
wuarchive.wustl.edu
/pub/aminet/util/crypt
src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga)
/aminet
/amiga-boing
ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de
/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2)
black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165)
/src/security/pgp23A.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs)
/src/security/pgp23srcA.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources,
docs, info on building PGP into
mailers, editors, etc.)
/src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z (Same as PGP22SRC.ZIP, in Unix tar
format)
/src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx (Macintosh version)
iswuarchive.wustl.edu
pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga)
csn.org
/mpj/README.MPJ contains variable directory name -- read this first.
/mpj/help explains how to get to hidden directory containing PGP
/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ contains current PGP
/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgptools/ contains related tools
/mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/ contains other crypto info.
/mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, etc.
ftp.netcom.com
/pub/dcosenza -- PGP for several platforms + some shells and
steganography utilities.
/pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered.
/pub/mpj (see README.MPJ -- similar layout to csn.org//mpj)
/pub/qwerty -- How to MacPGP Guide, largest steganography ftp site as
well. PGP FAQ, crypto FAQ, US Crypto Policy FAQ,
Steganograpy software list. MacUtilites for use with
MacPGP. Stealth1.1 + other steganography programs.
Send mail to qwerty(a)netcom.com with the subject
"Bomb me!" to get the PGP FAQ and MacPGP guide if you
don't have ftp access.
nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100)
/pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip
/pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip
/pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z
van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca (192.48.234.1)
/m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23A.zip
/m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23srcA.zip
ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95)
qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97)
pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3)
leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55)
goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2)
tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31)
ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20)
princeton.edu (128.112.228.1)
pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207)
StealthPGP:
The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in
/pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha.
Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command:
archie -s pgp23 (DOS Versions)
archie -s pgp2.3 (MAC Versions)
ftpmail:
For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access
to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on
this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com.
You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail
service.
Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message
to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi:
ENCODER uuencode
SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip
SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip
This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox
with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode.
For the ftp sites on netcom, send mail to ftp-request(a)netcom.com containing
the word HELP in the body of the message.
World Wide Web URLs:
(Thanks to mathew(a)mantis.co.uk)
UNIX PGP 2.3a
Compiles best with GCC 2.4.x or higher. A straight port from DOS, so
hardened UNIX users find it a bit chatty.
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23A.tar.Z
* _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z
* _NL:_ ftp://svin02.info.win.tue.nl/pub/misc/pgp23A.tar.gz
* _SE:_ ftp://ftp.sunet.se/pub/security/tools/crypt/pgp23A.tar.gz
* _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/pgp23A.tar.Z
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z
* _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z
* _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp23A.tar.Z
* _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp23A.tar.gz
_________________________________________________________________
MS-DOS PGP 2.3
Program
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23A.zip
* _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp23A.zip
* _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/pgp23A.zip
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip
* _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip
* _IT:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp23A.zip
* _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp23A.zip
Source code
Designed to compile with Turbo C; compiles fine with Microsoft Visual
C++ also.
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23srcA.zip
* _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp23srcA.zip
* _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/pgp23srcA.zip
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip
* _FI:_ ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip
* _FI:_
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp23srcA.zip
* _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp23srcA.zip
_________________________________________________________________
MACPGP 2.3
A slightly souped-up port of PGP to the Mac. Has help menus and other
goodies, but is still not a real Mac application. However, it works.
Note that the version 2.3 release of MacPGP contains the major bug-fix
which was later added to UNIX/DOS PGP 2.3. There was therefore no need
for a MacPGP 2.3A release; version 2.3 already had the bug fix by the
time it was released. There is no MacPGP 2.3A.
Program
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.3.cpt.hqx
* _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
* _SE:_ ftp://isy.liu.se/pub/misc/pgp/2.3A/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
* _FI:_
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
* _US:_
ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx.gz
Source code
Requires Think C.
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/MacPGP/MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx --
version 2.2 only
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp
* _FI:_
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/macpgp2.3src.sea.h
qx.pgp
Documentation
PGP is rather counter-intuitive to a Mac user. Luckily, there's a
guide to using MacPGP in
ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/qwerty/Here.is.How.to.MacPGP.
_________________________________________________________________
OS/2 PGP
You can, of course, run the DOS version of PGP under OS/2.
Program
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp22os2.zip -- version 2.2
only, native binaries
* _DE:_
ftp://ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2
A.zip
Source code
* _DE:_
ftp://ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de/pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23src
A.zip
_________________________________________________________________
AMIGA PGP
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/amiga/pgp/pgp21ami.lha -- version
2.1 only
* _DE:_
ftp://faui43.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/mounts/rzsuna/pub/aminet/u
til/crypt/pgp21ami.lha -- version 2.1 only
* _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_2.lha
* _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a_2.lha
Source
* _DE:_ ftp://ftp.uni-kl.de/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a2_src.lha
* _US:_ ftp://ftp.wustl.edu/pub/aminet/util/crypt/PGPAmi23a2_src.lha
_________________________________________________________________
ARCHIMEDES PGP
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/archimedes/ArcPGP23a
_________________________________________________________________
DOCUMENTATION ONLY
Want to know more about PGP, but too scared to download the actual
program in case the Feds bust down your door? Fetch this.
* _UK:_ ftp://ftp.demon.co.uk/pub/pgp/pgp23docA.zip
* _US:_ ftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/pgp/pgp23docA.zip
_________________________________________________________________
FOREIGN LANGUAGE MODULES
These are suitable for most PGP versions.
Italian
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz
* _FI:_
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.italian.t
ar.gz
Spanish
* _IT:_ ftp://ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pub/crypt/pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz
* _FI:_
ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/crypt/ghost.dsi.unimi.it/pgp-lang.spanish.t
ar.gz
German
* _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_german.txt
Swedish
* _UK:_ ftp://black.ox.ac.uk/src/security/pgp_swedish.txt
_________________________________________________________________
OTHER SITES
Some cryptographic software is available from
ftp://van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca/pub/crypto/software/. They're worried about
ITAR regulations, so you'll have to read the README file and proceed
from there.
BBS sites:
Colorado Catacombs BBS
(See also the entry above for PGP 2.5)
(303) 938-9654 (Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number)
(303) 678-9939 (Longmont, Colorado number)
Verified: This morning.
Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado)
DOS, OS2, and Mac versions.
(303) 443-2457
Verified: 5-2-94
For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO"
with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files).
Exec-Net (New York)
Host BBS for the ILink net.
(914) 667-4567
The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas)
(501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125
Carrying RIME, Throbnet, Smartnet, and Usenet
Special PGP users account:
login name: PGP USER
password: PGP
This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us>
PGP 2.3A has been posted to the FidoNet Software Distribution Network and
should on most if not all Canadian and U.S. nodes carrying SDN software. It
has also been posted on almost all of the major private North American BBS
systems, thence to countless smaller boards. Consult a list of your local
BBSes; most with a sizeable file inventory should carry the program.
If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not
include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always
be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should
not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so
that it does no further harm to others.
ARCHIE WHO?
Here is the result of an archie search for file names containing "pgp" (not
case sensitive) on 5/2/94. The search was limited to 300 matches, because,
as you can plainly see, lots of people value their privacy. Note that archie
will not find all relevant files at some sites, like the one at csn.org/mpj
properly, due to the export control nonsense, but it does find the directory
where the PGP documentation is kept.
Host gipsy.vmars.tuwien.ac.at
Location: /pub/misc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 209409 May 7 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 451114 Jul 23 1993 pgp23.tar.gz
Host swdsrv.edvz.univie.ac.at
Location: /network/misc/Mosaic/Unix/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-enc
Location: /os2/all/diskutil
FILE -r--r--r-- 1946 Mar 16 1993 pgp22.txt
Host plaza.aarnet.edu.au
Location: /micros/amiga/aminet/comm/mail
FILE -r--rw-r-- 137861 Jan 26 08:04 PGPMIP.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 1878 Jan 26 08:04 PGPMIP.readme
Location: /micros/amiga/aminet/util/crypt
FILE -r--rw-r-- 305056 Dec 26 22:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 5569 Dec 26 22:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.readme
FILE -r--rw-r-- 342426 Dec 26 22:41 PGPAmi23a_2.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 820 Dec 26 22:41 PGPAmi23a_2.readme
FILE -r--rw-r-- 96585 Sep 30 1993 PGPAmi23aplus.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 712 Sep 30 1993 PGPAmi23aplus.readme
FILE -r--rw-r-- 576574 Sep 20 1993 PGPAmiga2_3a.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 5221 Sep 20 1993 PGPAmiga2_3a.readme
FILE -r--rw-r-- 55993 Mar 21 04:41 PGPSendMail2_0.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 1455 Mar 21 04:41 PGPSendMail2_0.readme
FILE -r--rw-r-- 17141 Feb 28 19:23 StealthPGP1_0.lha
FILE -r--rw-r-- 1198 Feb 28 19:23 StealthPGP1_0.readme
Location: /micros/pc/garbo/pc/crypt
FILE -r--r--r-- 209679 Mar 7 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -r--r--r-- 62885 Oct 9 00:00 pgpfront.zip
FILE -r--r--r-- 71330 Jan 4 15:00 pgpshe30.zip
Location: /micros/pc/garbo/pc/source
FILE -r--r--r-- 521820 Mar 7 1993 pgp22src.zip
Location: /micros/pc/garbo/windows/util
FILE -r--r--r-- 13825 Sep 3 1993 pgpwin11.zip
Location: /usenet/FAQs/alt.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 09:56 pgp-faq
Location: /usenet/FAQs
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 10:09 alt.security.pgp
Location: /usenet/FAQs/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 09:45 pgp-faq
Host luga.latrobe.edu.au
Location: /archive-disk2/os2/all/diskutil
FILE -r--r--r-- 1946 Mar 16 1993 pgp22.txt
Host sunb.ocs.mq.edu.au
Location: /PC/Crypt
FILE -r--r--r-- 219951 Sep 14 1993 pgp23.zip
Host nic.switch.ch
Location: /mirror/Mosaic/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 520 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-dec
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 530 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-enc
Location: /mirror/atari/Utilities
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 280576 Apr 15 16:18 pgp23ab.lzh
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 29526 Apr 15 16:18 pgpshl06.zip
Location: /mirror/os2/all/diskutil
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 1946 Mar 16 1993 pgp22.txt
Location: /mirror/vms/DECUS/vlt93b/vltextra
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 192196 Mar 19 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 481215 Mar 19 1993 pgp22src.zip
Location: /mirror/vms/DECUS/vms92b/hkennedy
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 187758 Dec 14 1992 pgp21.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 433713 Dec 14 1992 pgp21src.zip
Host gatekeeper.dec.com
Location: /.0/BSD/FreeBSD/FreeBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--rw-r-- 478 Jun 24 1993 pgp
Location: /.0/BSD/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 16 23:10 pgp
Location: /.3/net/infosys/mosaic/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.2/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Feb 8 13:20 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Feb 8 13:20 pgp-enc
Location: /.3/net/infosys/mosaic/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.3/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 8 11:38 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 8 11:38 pgp-enc
Location: /.3/net/infosys/mosaic/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 11 14:02 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 11 14:02 pgp-enc
Host hpcsos.col.hp.com
Location: /mirrors/.hpib1/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 17 00:10 pgp
Host qiclab.scn.rain.com
Location: /pub/mail
FILE -rw-r--r-- 537455 Jan 18 1993 pgp-2.1.tar.Z
Host world.std.com
Location: /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Tools
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 8192 Apr 21 02:43 PGP
Location: /src/wuarchive/doc/EFF/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Tools/PGP
FILE -r--r--r-- 71064 Jan 13 16:57 pgpshe30.zip
Location: /src/wuarchive/packages/NCSA/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.2/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Feb 8 21:20 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Feb 8 21:20 pgp-enc
Location: /src/wuarchive/packages/NCSA/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.3/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 8 18:38 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 8 18:38 pgp-enc
Location: /src/wuarchive/packages/NCSA/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-enc
Host quepasa.cs.tu-berlin.de
Location: /.cdrom0/security
FILE -r-xr-xr-x 71064 Mar 5 11:51 pgpshe30.zip
Host sun.rz.tu-clausthal.de
Location: /pub/atari/misc
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 30 19:56 pgp
Location: /pub/atari/misc/pgp
FILE -rw-r--r-- 280454 Oct 11 00:00 pgp23ab.lzh
Location: /pub/msdos/utils/security
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 209679 Jun 21 1993 pgp22.zip
Location: /pub/unix/admin/security
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Sep 19 1993 pgp
Location: /pub/unix/admin/security/pgp
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 209409 Mar 12 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 521550 Mar 12 1993 pgp22src.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 219951 Jun 23 1993 pgp23.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 680985 Sep 19 1993 pgp23A.tar.Z
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 221332 Sep 19 1993 pgp23A.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 88070 Sep 19 1993 pgp23docA.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 998 Sep 19 1993 pgp23sigA.asc
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 547178 Sep 19 1993 pgp23srcA.zip
Host hermes.hrz.uni-bielefeld.de
Location: /.mnt1/systems/os2/all/diskutil
FILE -r--r--r-- 1946 Mar 16 1993 pgp22.txt
Host sun1.ruf.uni-freiburg.de
Location: /misc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 680985 Mar 11 14:15 pgp23A.tar.Z
Host rzsun2.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
Location: /pub/doc/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 05:15 pgp-faq
Location: /pub/security/tools/crypt
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Feb 18 22:05 pgp
Location: /pub/security/tools/crypt/pgp
FILE -r--r--r-- 449455 Jun 21 1993 pgp23.tar.gz
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 17798 May 26 1993 pgputils.zip
Host askhp.ask.uni-karlsruhe.de
Location: /pub/aegee/tmp
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 103448 Mar 12 17:18 pgp23A.zip
Location: /pub/infosystems/mosaic/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rwxr--r-- 520 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr--r-- 530 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-enc
Host ftp.uni-kl.de
Location: /pub1/unix/security
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Feb 24 1993 pgp
Location: /pub1/unix/security/pgp
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 536118 Dec 10 1992 pgp21.tar.Z
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 187758 Dec 10 1992 pgp21.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 436302 Dec 10 1992 pgp21src.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 92405 Feb 19 1993 pgprtest.tar.Z
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 17798 Feb 5 1993 pgputils.zip
Location: /pub3/amiga/aminet/comm/mail
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 137861 Jan 26 14:04 PGPMIP.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 1878 Jan 26 14:04 PGPMIP.readme
Location: /pub3/amiga/aminet/util/crypt
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 305056 Dec 27 04:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 5569 Dec 27 04:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.readme
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 342426 Dec 27 04:41 PGPAmi23a_2.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 820 Dec 27 04:41 PGPAmi23a_2.readme
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 96585 Oct 1 00:00 PGPAmi23aplus.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 712 Oct 1 00:00 PGPAmi23aplus.readme
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 576574 Sep 20 1993 PGPAmiga2_3a.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 5221 Sep 20 1993 PGPAmiga2_3a.readme
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 55993 Mar 21 20:41 PGPSendMail2_0.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 1455 Mar 21 20:41 PGPSendMail2_0.readme
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 118058 Apr 15 10:20 PGP_german_docs.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 234 Apr 15 10:20 PGP_german_docs.readme
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 17141 Mar 1 12:23 StealthPGP1_0.lha
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 1198 Mar 1 12:23 StealthPGP1_0.readme
Host minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de
Location: /pub/amiga/util/aminet/crypt
FILE -r--r--r-- 305056 Dec 27 03:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.lha
FILE -r--r--r-- 5569 Dec 27 03:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.readme
FILE -r--r--r-- 342426 Dec 27 03:41 PGPAmi23a_2.lha
FILE -r--r--r-- 820 Dec 27 03:41 PGPAmi23a_2.readme
Location: /pub/atari/misc
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 30 17:56 pgp
Location: /pub/atari/misc/pgp
FILE -rw-r--r-- 280454 Oct 11 00:00 pgp23ab.lzh
Host von-neum.uni-muenster.de
Location: /pub/unix
FILE -rw-rw---- 449445 Mar 24 13:04 pgp23.tar.gz
Host inf.informatik.uni-stuttgart.de
Location: /pub/net
FILE -r--r--r-- 680985 Aug 5 1993 pgp23A.tar.Z
Host net-1.iastate.edu
Location: /pub/netbsd/NetBSD-current/src/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 17 01:10 pgp
Host jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu
Location: /pub/public_domain_software/NetBSD/usr/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Jun 9 1993 pgp
Host mintaka.lcs.mit.edu
Location: /pub
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jun 18 1993 pgp
Location: /pub/pgp
FILE -rw-r--r-- 312726 Mar 22 1993 macpgp2.2.cpt.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 209409 Mar 22 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 521550 Mar 22 1993 pgp22src.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 219951 Jun 18 1993 pgp23.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 17798 Mar 22 1993 pgputils.zip
Host josquin.media.mit.edu
Location: /pub
FILE -rw-r--r-- 321424 Nov 30 20:27 pgp
Host archive.egr.msu.edu
Location: /pub
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 9 18:58 pgp
Host xanth.cs.odu.edu
Location: /pub
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Apr 27 13:38 pgp
Location: /pub/pgp
FILE -rw-rw-rw- 221332 Apr 27 13:38 pgp23A.zip
Host unixd1.cis.pitt.edu
Location: /users/i/n/infidel/.Backup/httpd/support/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 1019 Jan 24 16:42 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 552 Jan 24 16:42 pgp-enc
Location: /users/i/n/infidel/httpd/support/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 1019 Jan 24 16:42 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 552 Jan 24 16:42 pgp-enc
Host arthur.cs.purdue.edu
Location: /pub/pcert/tools/unix
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jul 31 1993 pgp
Location: /pub/pcert/tools/unix/pgp
FILE -r--r--r-- 209409 Mar 7 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -r--r--r-- 521550 Mar 7 1993 pgp22src.zip
Location: /pub/pcert/tools/unix/virus/misc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 19277 Feb 23 1993 pgputils.zip
Host tehran.stanford.edu
Location: /www/httpd_1.2/support/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 1019 Jan 24 13:42 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 552 Jan 24 13:42 pgp-enc
Host relay.cs.toronto.edu
Location: /pub/usenet/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 22 04:51 pgp-faq
Host uceng.uc.edu
Location: /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Tools
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 8192 Apr 20 22:43 PGP
Location: /pub/wuarchive/doc/EFF/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Tools/PGP
FILE -r--r--r-- 71064 Jan 13 11:57 pgpshe30.zip
Location: /pub/wuarchive/packages/NCSA/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.2/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Feb 8 16:20 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Feb 8 16:20 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/wuarchive/packages/NCSA/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.3/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 8 14:38 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 8 14:38 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/wuarchive/packages/NCSA/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 11 17:02 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 11 17:02 pgp-enc
Host server.uga.edu
Location: /pub/msdos/mirror/security
FILE -r--r--r-- 71064 Feb 3 15:36 pgpshe30.zip
Host mrcnext.cso.uiuc.edu
Location: /pub/faq/usenet-by-group/alt.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Apr 26 08:08 pgp-faq
Location: /pub/faq/usenet-by-group
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Apr 26 13:08 alt.security.pgp
Location: /pub/faq/usenet-by-group/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Apr 26 08:07 pgp-faq
Location: /pub/faq/usenet-by-hierarchy/alt/answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Apr 26 08:08 pgp-faq
Location: /pub/faq/usenet-by-hierarchy/alt/security
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Apr 26 13:08 pgp
Location: /pub/faq/usenet-by-hierarchy/news/answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Apr 26 08:08 pgp-faq
Host zaphod.ncsa.uiuc.edu
Location: /Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 520 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 530 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-enc
Host f.ms.uky.edu
Location: /pub2/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Dec 17 02:10 pgp
Host pith.uoregon.edu
Location: /pub/Solaris2.x/src/httpd_1.1/support/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 1019 Jan 24 21:42 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 552 Jan 24 21:42 pgp-enc
Host pc.usl.edu
Location: /pub/msdos/crypto
FILE -rw-r--r-- 187758 Jan 14 1993 pgp21.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 436302 Jan 14 1993 pgp21src.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 219951 Jun 23 1993 pgp23.zip
Host emx.cc.utexas.edu
Location: /pub/mnt/source/www/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 520 Apr 11 12:57 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 530 Apr 11 12:57 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/mnt/source/www/NCSA_httpd_1.2/support/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 1019 Jan 24 15:42 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 552 Jan 24 15:42 pgp-enc
Host tolsun.oulu.fi
Location: /pub/unix
FILE -r--r--r-- 521550 Jun 16 1993 pgp22src.zip
Host gogol.cenatls.cena.dgac.fr
Location: /pub/util
FILE -rw-r--r-- 534661 Jan 7 1993 pgp-2.1.tar.Z
Host grasp1.univ-lyon1.fr
Location: /pub/nfs-mounted/ftp.univ-lyon1.fr/mirrors/unix/Mosaic/source/Mosaic-2.2/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 315 Feb 8 22:20 pgp-dec.gz
FILE -r--r--r-- 319 Feb 8 22:20 pgp-enc.gz
Location: /pub/nfs-mounted/ftp.univ-lyon1.fr/mirrors/unix/Mosaic/source/Mosaic-2.3/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 315 Apr 8 20:38 pgp-dec.gz
FILE -r--r--r-- 319 Apr 8 20:38 pgp-enc.gz
Location: /pub/nfs-mounted/ftp.univ-lyon1.fr/mirrors/unix/Mosaic/source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 315 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-dec.gz
FILE -r--r--r-- 319 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-enc.gz
Location: /pub/nfs-mounted/ftp.univ-lyon1.fr/usenet-stats/groups/alt
FILE -rw-r--r-- 2500 Apr 5 09:39 alt.security.pgp
Host ns.urec.fr
Location: /pub/reseaux/services_infos/WWW/ncsa/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 520 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-dec
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 530 Apr 11 21:02 pgp-enc
Host granuaile.ieunet.ie
Location: /ftpmail-cache/ie/tcd/maths/ftp/src/misc
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 2 11:43 pgp
Location: /ftpmail-cache/uk/co/demon/ftp/mac
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 10 04:01 MacPGP
Host walton.maths.tcd.ie
Location: /news/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 03:45 pgp-faq
Location: /pub/msdos/misc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 227625 Apr 18 14:47 pgp23.zip
Location: /pub/sboyle
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 25 20:20 pgp
Location: /src/misc
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 21 14:52 pgp
Location: /src/network/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 520 Apr 18 12:21 pgp-dec
FILE -rwxr-xr-x 530 Apr 18 12:21 pgp-enc
Host ghost.dsi.unimi.it
Location: /pub/security/crypt
FILE -rw-r--r-- 3012 May 15 1993 MacPGP.bugfix.README
FILE -rw-r--r-- 45446 May 18 1993 MacPGP2.2.bugfix.sit.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 299477 May 18 1993 MacPGP2.2.sit.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 27882 Aug 11 1993 hint_trick_pgp00.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 312726 Mar 20 1993 macpgp2.2.cpt.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 422851 Jul 3 1993 macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 1027543 Jul 21 1993 macpgp2.3src.sea.hqx.pgp
FILE -rw-r--r-- 12873 Feb 5 18:22 pgp-lang.italian.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 91281 Jan 22 12:41 pgp-lang.spanish.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 680985 Jul 22 1993 pgp23A.tar.Z
FILE -rw-r--r-- 231 Jul 26 1993 pgp23A.tar.Z.sig
FILE -rw-r--r-- 221332 Jul 26 1993 pgp23A.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 300 Jul 26 1993 pgp23A.zip.sig
FILE -rw-r--r-- 51241 Dec 24 19:31 pgp23ltk.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 547178 Jul 26 1993 pgp23srcA.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 232 Jul 26 1993 pgp23srcA.zip.sig
FILE -rw-r--r-- 3709 Dec 4 15:02 pgpclient.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 14209 Nov 29 10:46 pgpd.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 62619 Oct 27 00:00 pgpfront.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 13689 May 10 1993 pgpmenu.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 71064 Jan 22 11:59 pgpshe30.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 142993 Feb 5 18:55 pgptools.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 17798 Feb 8 1993 pgputils.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 13825 Sep 20 1993 pgpwin11.zip
FILE -r--r--r-- 1043163 Feb 15 12:54 public-keys.pgp
FILE -r--r--r-- 1042460 Feb 15 05:39 public-keys.pgp.old
Host isfs.kuis.kyoto-u.ac.jp
Location: /BSD/FreeBSD/FreeBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Jun 24 1993 pgp
Location: /BSD/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 16 23:10 pgp
Location: /ftpmail/ftp.dit.co.jp/pub/security/tools
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 422851 Apr 21 21:57 macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
Location: /ftpmail/ftp.nig.ac.jp/pub/security
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Dec 18 04:31 PGP
Location: /ftpmail/ftp.nig.ac.jp/pub/security/PGP
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 May 22 1993 MacPGP
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 521550 May 20 1993 pgp22src.zip
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 680985 Dec 18 04:29 pgp23A.tar.Z
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 231 Dec 18 04:31 pgp23A.tar.Z.sig
Host theta.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Location: /pub1/security/docs/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 28 17:33 pgp-faq
Location: /pub1/security/tools
FILE -rw-r--r-- 422851 Mar 6 01:16 macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 451124 Oct 17 00:00 pgp23.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 680985 Feb 20 23:06 pgp23A.tar.Z
FILE -rw-r--r-- 231 Feb 20 23:06 pgp23A.tar.Z.sig
Location: /pub2/FreeBSD/FreeBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Jun 24 1993 pgp
Host news.cfi.waseda.ac.jp
Location: /pub2/FreeBSD/FreeBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Jun 24 1993 pgp
Host rena.dit.co.jp
Location: /pub/security/docs/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 1 16:53 pgp-faq
Location: /pub/security/tools
FILE -rw-r--r-- 422851 Mar 6 01:16 macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 451124 Oct 17 00:00 pgp23.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 680985 Feb 20 23:06 pgp23A.tar.Z
FILE -rw-r--r-- 231 Feb 20 23:06 pgp23A.tar.Z.sig
Host mtecv2.mty.itesm.mx
Location: /pub/Mosaic/NCSA-Mirror/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 12 03:02 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 12 03:02 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/usenet/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 07:06 pgp-faq
Host ftp.germany.eu.net
Location: /pub/comp/atari-st/mint
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 2102 Sep 21 1993 pgp23ast.zip
Location: /pub/comp/atari-st/utils
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 280576 Apr 20 15:42 pgp23ab.lzh
FILE -rw-rw-r-- 29526 Apr 20 15:42 pgpshl06.zip
Location: /pub/comp/msdos/local/utils
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jul 12 1993 pgp
Location: /pub/comp/msdos/local/utils/pgp
FILE -rw-r--r-- 449445 Jul 12 1993 pgp23.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 219951 Jul 12 1993 pgp23.zip
Location: /pub/comp/msdos/mirror.garbo/crypt
FILE -rw-r--r-- 209679 Mar 7 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 62885 Oct 9 00:00 pgpfront.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 71330 Jan 4 13:00 pgpshe30.zip
Location: /pub/comp/msdos/mirror.garbo/source
FILE -rw-r--r-- 521820 Mar 7 1993 pgp22src.zip
Location: /pub/comp/os2/mirror.ftp-os2/2_x/diskutil
FILE -rw-r--r-- 1946 Mar 16 1993 pgp22.txt
Location: /pub/comp/os2/mirror.ftp-os2/all/diskutil
FILE -rw-r--r-- 1946 Mar 16 1993 pgp22.txt
Location: /pub/infosystems/www/ncsa/Web/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -rw-r--r-- 520 Apr 11 19:02 pgp-dec
FILE -rw-r--r-- 530 Apr 11 19:02 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/newsarchive/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 19 04:12 pgp-faq
Host mcsun.eu.net
Location: /documents/faq
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Apr 20 03:51 pgp-faq
Host sol.cs.ruu.nl
Location: /NEWS.ANSWERS
DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Apr 18 11:55 pgp-faq
Host ugle.unit.no
Location: /faq/alt.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 07:27 pgp-faq
Location: /faq/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 07:26 pgp-faq
Host csn.org
Location: /fruug
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Sep 29 1993 PGP
Location: /mpj/public
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 15:09 pgp
Location: /mpj/public/pgp
FILE -rw-r--r-- 20941 Feb 22 23:07 Here.is.How.to.MacPGP!
FILE -rw-r--r-- 687646 Feb 1 07:45 pgp-elm.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 26905 Feb 22 18:03 pgp-msgs-japanese.tar.gz
FILE -rw-r--r-- 88070 Nov 6 17:44 pgp23docA.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 998 Nov 6 17:44 pgp23sigA.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 179070 Apr 18 15:08 pgpfaq.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 44956 Apr 18 15:08 pgpfaq01.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 44836 Apr 18 15:08 pgpfaq02.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 44873 Apr 18 15:08 pgpfaq03.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 45118 Apr 18 15:08 pgpfaq04.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 3460 Apr 18 15:08 pgpfaq05.asc
Host ftp.eff.org
Location: /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Tools
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 20 02:58 PGP
Location: /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/Tools/PGP
FILE -rw-r--r-- 71064 Jan 13 11:57 pgpshe30.zip
Host sune.stacken.kth.se
Location: /disk2/OS/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 17 07:10 pgp
Host isy.liu.se
Location: /pub/misc
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Sep 19 1993 pgp
Location: /pub/misc/pgp/2.1
FILE -rw-r--r-- 536118 Jan 11 1993 pgp21.tar.Z
FILE -rw-r--r-- 187758 Jan 11 1993 pgp21.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 436302 Jan 11 1993 pgp21src.zip
Location: /pub/misc/pgp/2.2
FILE -rw-r--r-- 209409 Mar 10 1993 pgp22.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 521550 Mar 10 1993 pgp22src.zip
Location: /pub/misc/pgp/2.3
FILE -rw-r--r-- 219951 Jun 17 1993 pgp23.zip
Location: /pub/misc/pgp/2.3A
FILE -rw-r--r-- 422851 Sep 19 1993 macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx
FILE -rw-r--r-- 680985 Sep 19 1993 pgp23A.tar.Z
FILE -rw-r--r-- 221332 Sep 19 1993 pgp23A.zip
FILE -rw-r--r-- 998 Sep 19 1993 pgp23sigA.asc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 547178 Sep 19 1993 pgp23srcA.zip
Host lth.se
Location: /pub/netnews/news.answers
DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Apr 18 03:44 pgp-faq
Host krynn.efd.lth.se
Location: /pub/security
FILE -rw-r--r-- 521550 Jul 24 1993 pgp22src.zip
Host leif.thep.lu.se
Location: /pub/Misc
FILE -rw-r--r-- 221332 Jul 23 1993 pgp23A.zip
Host ftp.luth.se
Location: /pub/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir
FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 17 08:10 pgp
Location: /pub/amiga/.1/comm/mail
FILE -rw-r--r-- 137861 Jan 26 15:04 PGPMIP.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 1878 Jan 26 15:04 PGPMIP.readme
Location: /pub/amiga/util/crypt
FILE -rw-r--r-- 305056 Dec 27 05:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 5569 Dec 27 05:41 PGPAmi23a2_src.readme
FILE -rw-r--r-- 342426 Dec 27 05:41 PGPAmi23a_2.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 820 Dec 27 05:41 PGPAmi23a_2.readme
FILE -rw-r--r-- 96585 Oct 1 00:00 PGPAmi23aplus.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 712 Oct 1 00:00 PGPAmi23aplus.readme
FILE -rw-r--r-- 576574 Sep 20 1993 PGPAmiga2_3a.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 5221 Sep 20 1993 PGPAmiga2_3a.readme
FILE -rw-r--r-- 55993 Mar 21 21:41 PGPSendMail2_0.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 1455 Mar 21 21:41 PGPSendMail2_0.readme
FILE -rw-r--r-- 118058 Apr 15 12:20 PGP_german_docs.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 234 Apr 15 12:20 PGP_german_docs.readme
FILE -rw-r--r-- 17141 Mar 1 13:23 StealthPGP1_0.lha
FILE -rw-r--r-- 1198 Mar 1 13:23 StealthPGP1_0.readme
Location: /pub/infosystems/www/ncsa/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.2/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Feb 8 22:20 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Feb 8 22:20 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/infosystems/www/ncsa/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.3/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 8 20:38 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 8 20:38 pgp-enc
Location: /pub/infosystems/www/ncsa/Mosaic-source/Mosaic-2.4/auth
FILE -r--r--r-- 520 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-dec
FILE -r--r--r-- 530 Apr 11 23:02 pgp-enc
Host cs6400.mcc.ac.uk
Location: /pub/src
FILE -r--r--r-- 455861 Feb 22 15:38 pgp23A.tar.gz
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.4
mQCNAi0aFSUAAAEEAOCOKpaLepvJCFgIR4m+UvZe0IN8g7Guwc+6GH4u6UGTPxQO
iAhk/MJ7E8LE4c55A1G8to2W4y3aKAHvi9QCYKnsLV8Ag0BYWo3bGGTPEfkS7NAI
N+Zy6vSjuF1D6MUnbvrQJ5p4efz7a28iYRKoAdan2bfnvIYWUD9nBjyFM+vFAAUR
tDdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajQgW2V4cCAz
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6cnwxRXhaD3Wc4EfSNR7BH9M2rjkGzyb5to9cgBb0ng+
=BLg5
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
I didn't have to generate a new key to use version 2.5, but I think keys
should be changed periodically anyway to limit damages just in case a key
got compromised and I didn't know about it.
- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.5
mQCNAi3P6L4AAAEEAM4qXLLvN7dOVuEOIMjX3AFB8HtsCeYECF428Z1dVSf8OMGr
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/BKqc0Ymr/8EmT+JsEDnypepm41otWMyYFfSiQCVAgUQLc/rww9rDjx3TioRAQF0
igQAkRrmuAmF1QLp1gFRxqMLw+dDzAtUjFpUrpvqN8yDu/TS3Ue/GdvBECFCzbcD
jA3gGviXBWfRx4w6KRVpqTSsfJt5IvcrTbYGcscIQWHPzqLiq8iu22+Ao2ImcDUB
Lu+Z+Wo2Ok00DnvAnzqjXrffo6Eq2qOoGhBlFfStXUCMvbe0HU1pa2UgSm9obnNv
biA8bXBqQG5ldGNvbS5jb20+tDBEb24ndCB1c2UgZm9yIGVuY3J5cHRpb24gYWZ0
ZXIgMzEgRGVjZW1iZXIgMTk5NS60I01pY2hhZWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bWlrZWpAZXhh
Ynl0ZS5jb20+tDBNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8NzEzMzEuMjMzMkBjb21w
dXNlcnZlLmNvbT60KU1pY2hhZWwgUC4gSm9obnNvbiA8bS5wLmpvaG5zb25AaWVl
ZS5vcmc+
=w6Cu
- -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
___________________________________________________________
|\ /| | | |
| \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 |
| | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org ftp:csn.org//mpj/README.MPJ for crypto stuff |
| |||/ /_\ | aka mpj(a)netcom.com mpjohnson(a)ieee.org mikej(a)exabyte.com |
| |||\ ( | m.p.johnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu CIS 71331,2332 PGP key by finger |
| ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________|
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.4
iQCVAgUBLdKNkD9nBjyFM+vFAQFC0wQApwvxO9KIYScX7W6+W+UVPzPBwDDWx1f7
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rcfs4f4dwE8=
=YRGv
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
1
0
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
It seems that the Government of the USA has been interfering
with the free market to reward AT&T , I don't know how much
AT&T's support of the Clipper Chip had to do with it but I'm
sure it didn't hurt. In the May 13 New York Times:
>The AT&T Corporation's winning bid for a $4 billion contract to
>modernize Saudi Arabia's phone system ,WHICH HAD BEEN SUPPORTED
>BY HEAVY CLINTON ADMINISTRATION LOBBYING , was hundreds of
>millions of dollars higher than other bids [...] The huge-scale
>deal, which was announced on Monday is the biggest
>telecommunications contract in history.
I think it's important for company's to realize there is also a
downside for supporting Clipper. As a start ,I don't see how any
self respecting Cypherpunk or Extropian could use AT&T as their
personal long distance carrier . AT&T 's not the only company in
bed with the government over Clipper (INTEL) but it is the most
visible and the easiest to boycott, MCI and Sprint do a fine
job. If 5% of the Internet users quit AT&T it would make other
companies think twice before they endorse Clipper.
John K Clark johnkc(a)well.sf.ca.us
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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oyIzweQuPC96BRivX0+cIVbNyZRMyegxw2DevyK9YGeHLnz12PaMgFwH5jzfapVO
IXvWnkmmYbu4AuT8Ej3r1gPvKRzq4xb7oIOiOVWUpAd+bRElGcE=
=rfvk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
2
1