December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Chauming for Cash
by mpd＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone successfully obtained a copy of the software for David Chaum's DigiCash system? He has it for sale on his Web page at http://digicash.support.nl/ but apparently it can only be purchased with electronic money. A classic chicken and egg situation. :) I sent him some mail but so far have not gotten a reply. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Frezza (via RadioMail) <frezza(a)radiomail.net> writes: > So much for lobbying. ...and, apparently, by/for/of the People. > Look, something is going on here that doesn't meet the eye. Nothing is > ever unanimous in Washington. These guys were told something by somebody > that caused them to vote like this. Ah, the "Deep Throat" Theory... I was waiting to see how long this would take the surface. I agree. Something _very_ unsavory is happening here, but I doubt we'll find out what it is. If I had to guess (and this is VERY uninformed, as far as wild speculation), someone in the NSA with the Power To Do So, said that they would blatantly ignore the rules, and consider all crypto their private little hunting grounds. Being as the NSA probably is used in some Intelligence work, and lots of other things the Government Hopes We Don't Find Out About, Congress probably ran the other way, as it was in Their Best Interests. Of course, this is wild speculation. It could just be that the Director of the NSA makes one hell of a matzah ball soup, and they didn't want to lose the saturday afternoon Matzah Ball 'Fests... ;-) --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)imsi.com> writes: > algorithm that factors numbers or even just breaks RSA in O(log(n)) > time or less (where n is the length of the number being factored or > the public key). I'd offer more, but it would be cruel. If you don't > know what the notation O(f(n)) means, please don't come back asking. Well, I don't know what it means. If you'd care to tell me, even in mail, I'd like to know. I've been following this thread with interest, but I don't pretend to follow this X(f(y)) notation all the time. I understand that it means we are applying function X to the result of f(y)... Anyone who's passed Trig or Elem. Functions does. I don't understand what function O(x) represents. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: Prime magnitude and keys...a ?
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Feeding frenzy! Getcher teeth in now, be there or be square.

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House Rules Committee Membership
by jmdaluz＠kquest.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kyle Wilson (ksw(a)cs.odu.edu) posted the membership of the House Rules Committee, next stop for H.R. 3937. Here's the list with phone/fax numbers added. Voice Fax Democrats: Joe Moakley (MA), Chairman 1-202-225-8273 1-202-225-7304 Butler Derrick, Jr (SC) 1-202-225-5301 na Anthony C. Beilenson (CA) 1-202-225-5911 na Martin Frost (TX) 1-202-225-3605 1-202-225-4951 David E. Bonior (MI) 1-202-225-2106 1-202-226-1169 Tony P. Hall (OH) 1-202-225-6465 na Alan Wheat (MO) 1-202-225-4535 1-202-225-5990 Bart Gordon (TN) 1-202-225-4231 1-202-225-6887 Louise McIntosh Slaughter (NY) 1-202-225-3615 1-202-225-7822 Republicans: Gerald B.H. Solomon (NY) 1-202-225-5614 1-202-225-1168 James H. Quillen (TN) 1-202-225-6356 1-202-225-7812 David Dreier (CA) 1-202-225-2305 1-202-225-4745 Porter J. Goss (FL) 1-202-225-2536 1-202-225-6820 Jose M. daLuz KnowledgeQuest Online Research jmdaluz(a)kquest.com (508) 996-6101 (vox) (508) 996-6215 (fax)

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DSS
by Dan Harmon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Network World of June 6, 1994 has a brief article on DSS. In the article it says that "some firms do not appear worried about legal threats fron PKP. AT&T, which sells SecretAgent - software that uses both DSS and RSA signatures - has not obtained a patent for DSS from PKP; neither has Information Security Corp., the Deerfield, Ill. bases company that develops SecretAgent exclusively for AT&T." What do they know that we do not? Makes you wonder about all of PKP's claims. Has PKP ever sued anyone over their patents or have they just threatened? Very curious. Dan Harmon

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Re: Cypherpunks Reported:
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <tmpCrIDG5.364(a)netcom.com>, <tmp(a)netcom.com> wrote: >austin ziegler (fantome(a)delphi.com) wrote: > >: Again, the reporter calls cypherpunks "a largely >: anonymous group of programmers," a "sinister" depiction. I see cypherpunks >: as being brazenly *open* (for the most part) about the fact that they >: despise Clipper and Skipjack. And while I *can* program, I am not a >: programmer, per se ... what about those of us who are cypherpunks because we >: value our privacy? > >I certainly haven't run into very many self-proclaimed cypherpunks. [hand raised here] >they >are pretty dense on the cypherpunk list (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) but are >far more diluted when you shine a light on them out here in Usenet. >sort of like running cockroaches. Puh-lease. Lets excerise a little basic logic here, Boxx. If the cypherpunks list is a list for cypherpunks, don't you think you'd find a lot of them there? And if, perchance, the cypherpunks are not an overwhelming majority of the net.population, don't you think you'd expect them to be "diluted" on the net at large? Come now, the same dilution argument can be made for archers, or dance instructors, or finger-painting fanciers. I don't think the cockroach metaphor is justified in any of these cases.

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Re: Prime magnitude and keys...a ?
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > If you can get the sign of the difference between RSA(your number) and > RSA(unknown key), then you can discover (unknown key) in log n time. > That implies, due to the nature of RSA, that you can factor in log n > time using whatever algorithm it is that makes the determination of > the sign of the difference. No, again it will allow you to find the secret key, it will not provide any information about the factors of that number. It might be used for that but as you have pointed out, it takes a long time. If I can take a cypher-text and look at the periodicity of the mod function when several false keys are provided I can narrow down the guess through a binary search. I am going up, not down (ie finding the factors which must be smaller than n). I am looking for n, not its *@$^%# factors. You are asking the wrong question. I am asking, since I can't factor the keys is there some periodicity in the mod function that I can attack.

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a bit more information on key escrow
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I and a few others sent a short list of questions to Dorothy Denning and Steve Kent, with a request that they forward them to the other review panel members. Here are Denning's answers. I do not know if they represent the view of the other committee members, or if more details will be forthcoming. In particular, I do not know if anyone on the committee will ask NSA to declassify any information relative to these questions. I did ask that if the answer to anything was ``it's classified'', that a persuasive rationale for the classification status be given. Reposted with permission.... --Steve Bellovin ------- Forwarded Message Date: Fri, 17 Jun 94 16:01:43 EDT From: denning(a)chair.cosc.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Steve, Here are answers to the questions you asked. The answers generally apply to the current system. In some cases, I noted changes that will be made in the target system that is under development. Regards, Dorothy Questions on Key Escrow 1. How are the halves of the unit key generated? What is the function? The Device Unique Key (KU) is a function of two Random Seed values that are brought to the chip programming facility by Escrow Officers from each of the Escrow Agents, arbitrary input from the keyboard provided by the Escrow Officers, and the Device Unique Identifier (UID). The exact function is classified in order to avoid revealing cryptographic principles about generating good keys. 2. How are the seeds generated for the unit key generation process? These are extremely sensitive values, since their compromise could give away an entire production run. Each Escrow Agent generates a separate Random Seed using a PC and NIST-developed smart card. The smart card implements a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) approved for cryptographic key generation in FIPS 171. Input from the keyboard as well as keystroke timing are used as input to the Secure Hash Algorithm. After hashing, the result is fed to the PRNG. Compromise of the Random Seed values could not give away an entire production run since the Unique Keys are also a function of arbitrary input from the keyboard. In addition, the algorithm for generating the KU values, being classified, is not generally available. 3. How is the serial number generated? Randomly? With only 32 bits, the probability of a collision is moderately high. The serial numbers are generated in sequence. 4. How are the seeds destroyed after generation? The Escrow Officers bring the seeds on floppy disks. These disks are to be destroyed or stored in the double-locked safe inside the programming facility (SCIF) until they can be destroyed. The seeds and all other key data is erased from the memory and hard disk of the computer used for key generation at the end of a programming session. The disk is then stored in the safe. 5. How is the session key encrypted within the LEAF? The details of the LEAF creation method, including the exact modes of encryption used, are classified in order to make it more difficult to build an interoperable rogue product that produced fake LEAFs in the event the Family Key should be compromised, and also to avoid revealing cryptographic principles. 6. How is the entire LEAF encrypted? The LEAF/IV package use in Tessera? In particular, is the family key used for session-level cryptographic protection of the IV? The IV is passed in the clear. See 5 about how the LEAF is encrypted. 7. How is the checksum in the LEAF calculated? See 5. 9. What is the nature of the key exchange and key negotiation protocol? The key exchange protocol on the Capstone chip is classified to avoid revealing cryptographic principles of key generation and exchange. However, it is not a requirement to use this algorithm. Other techniques can be used instead. The Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) does not specify a key exchange method and the Clipper chip does not implement one. 10. How does the Tessera card generate its random keys and IVs? A true random number generator? A pseudo-random number generator? How is it seeded? From a true random source? Why not use that all the time? There is a true random number generator on the Capstone chip. This can be used to generate all random values including the IV. The target programming device may use this random number generator in the generation of Device Unique Keys, but it would not replace the entire algorithm. 11. How are escrowed keys protected during transport and storage? What about backup? Escrowed Key Components are stored in encrypted form on floppy disks inside double locked safes. It takes 2 Escrow Officers at each Escrow Agent site to open a safe, and it takes an Escrow Officer from each Escrow Agent to form the Key Enciphering Key (KCK) needed to decrypt the Encrypted Key Components. KCK is a function of two Key Numbers, KN1 and KN2, each of which is held by one of the Escrow Agents in its safe. For backup, there are two copies of key escrow data in each safe. In addition, each Escrow Agent has a backup safe, which contains an additional two copies. Encrypted Key Components are transported on floppy disks inside tamper-detecting packages. A number is written on each package. Upon arrival, the packages are checked for tampering and the numbers are checked. In the target system, key escrow data will be transmitted electronically using cryptography for protection. 12. What mechanisms will protect the key halves during transmission to authorized wiretap agents? The same methods as for 11. 13. How will an audit trail be maintained of unit key requests and usage? Audit records are written for the following events: generation of keying material, storage of and access to keying material, request for Key Components, confirmation of a key release certification, and notification that a Unique Key was deleted in the Decrypt Processor. These records are kept in the double locked safes under two person control. 14. How will wiretap keys expire? When the Escrow Officers load the Key Components into the Decrypt Processor, they also type in the expiration date. The date is stored with the Unique Key, but the person operating the Decrypt Processor must issue a command to delete the key. When that happens, the Escrow Agents are to be notified of the key deletion. In the target system, the key will be deleted automatically when the court order expires, and the notification will be sent automatically from the Decrypt Processor. ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Cantwell bill outcome
by Dave Otto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following post to 'eff.talk presents what, IMO, is one of the most plausible explanations for the ITAR crypto restrictions. I guess I'm not nearly devious enough to work for a TLA. I believe NO request for export of the App. Crypto disk will be approved as long as this type of (semi-hidden) agenda is driving the descisions. However, with the (continuing) spread of PGP, even this argument is bogus:-) ---------- begin forwarded message ----------- Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk From: Liudvikas Bukys <bukys(a)cs.rochester.edu> Subject: My conversation with Greg Frasier (House Intelligence Committee) Sender: bukys(a)cs.rochester.edu (Liudvikas Bukys) Organization: University of Rochester Computer Science Dept Date: Fri, 17 Jun 1994 14:53:38 -0400 I decided to call around Washington a bit about the unanimous House Intelligence Committee vote against relaxation of export controls on encryption. I ended up speaking to Greg Frasier, an aide at the House Intelligence Committee. He basically reiterated the case re national security and legitimate needs of law enforcement. FYI, reportedly, the report is due (from the President) 150 days after the enactment of the bill. A couple of interesting statements from Mr. Frasier (paraphrased -- I didn't record the conversation!): That the arguments they are hearing about American companies are unproven, and that no single case of a problem has been documented (in his view). In particular, US companies are allowed some export to the non-US subsidiaries and to financial institutions, so what's the problem? ! While they are aware that software for secure encryption is ! available from non-US, they are making a best effort to prevent ! a standard from emerging, while hoping that some escrowed ! encryption scheme will gain acceptance. I was surprised by the unanimous vote, but he was not. He says that there has been a lot of discussion on this on the committee, but the security/enforce ++ment concerns generally prevail. My impression is that the range of possible outcomes went from outright rejection of export reform (at worst), to a request for a report from the President (at best). I would guess that as long as there is any hope of promulgating government key escrow, they will do their best to discourage the adoption of non-escrowed strong cryptography. Liudvikas Bukys <bukys(a)cs.rochester.edu> Dave Otto -- dave(a)marvin.jta.edd.ca.gov -- daveotto(a)acm.org "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!" [the Great Oz] {I *DO* have a life, it's just that my kids are using it right now!}

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