December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Secure HTTP/Mosaic
by VACCINIA＠UNCVX1.OIT.UNC.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the info I got back after inquiring about S-HTTP from EIT/NCSA, skip the press release at the end if you have already seen it. I note, that PGP is one of the cryptographic message formats supported. Cool. Vaccinia(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu Thank you for your inquiry regarding Secure HTTP. This message provides some details on the protocol and the status of its implementation. The April 12th joint EIT/NCSA/RSA press release regarding Secure Mosaic is included at the end of the message. OVERVIEW OF S-HTTP We have developed a new protocol for dealing with a wide range of cryptographic modes and algorithms in the context of the World-Wide Web, based on the Web's existing HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). We call this protocol "Secure HTTP" or "S-HTTP". This protocol has been designed to enable incorporation of various cryptographic message format standards into Web clients and servers, including, but not limited to PKCS-7, PEM, and PGP. S-HTTP supports interoperation among a variety of implementations, and is backwards compatible with HTTP. S-HTTP aware clients can talk to S-HTTP oblivious servers and vice-versa, although such transactions obviously would not use S-HTTP security features. IMPLEMENTATIONS AND LICENSING EIT will make available freely usable source code for implementing S-HTTP in both clients and servers. These reference implementations of "Secure NCSA Mosaic" and "Secure NCSA HTTPD" will support two crypto engine implementations: via an integrated TIPEM library (offering PKCS-7 support) and via an "outboard" RIPEM application. RSA has agreed to permit the distribution of their TIPEM library, in binary form, without charge in conjunction with the non-commercial distribution of NCSA Mosaic. Implementors of non-commercial clients or servers may wish to use the already available RIPEM system (which is itself based on RSA's RSAREF library). Commercial implementors or distributors of WWW clients and servers are encouraged to pursue licencing arrangements with RSA or their licencees. FEATURES OF S-HTTP S-HTTP does not require client-side public key certificates (or public keys), supporting a symmetric session key operation mode. This is significant because it means that secure, spontaneous transactions can occur without requiring individual users to have an established public key. While S-HTTP will be able to take advantage of a ubiquitious certification infrastructure, its deployment does not require it. S-HTTP supports end-to-end secure transactions, in contrast with current usage of the existing HTTP authorization protocol which requires the client to attempt access and be denied before the security mechanism is employed. Clients may be "primed" to initiate a secure transaction (typically using information supplied in an HTML anchor); this is used to support encryption of fill-out forms, for example. In S-HTTP, no sensitive data need ever be sent over the network in the clear. S-HTTP provides full flexibility of cryptographic algorithms, modes and parameters. Option negotiation is used to allow clients and servers to agree on transaction modes (should the the request be signed? encrypted? both? what about the reply?); cryptographic algorithms (RSA vs. DSA for signing, DES vs. RC4 for encrypting, etc.); and certificate selection (please sign with your "Mastercard certificate"). ABOUT PKCS-7 PKCS-7 is a cryptographic message syntax standard developed by a consortium of companies lead by RSA. PKCS-7 is compatible with the Internet standards for Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) in that signed-data and signed-and-enveloped-data content, constructed in a PEM-compatible mode, can be converted into PEM messages without any cryptographic operations. PEM messages can similarly be converted into the PKCS-7 signed-data and signed-and-enveloped-data content types. In other words, PKCS-7 and PEM implementations can interoperate. PKCS-7 has the following advantages: a) PKCS-7 permits transport of 8-bit data (contrast with PEM, which requires Base-64 encoding). b) PKCS-7 can have a signature-less mode of operation. This permits secure messages to be sent from senders who do not have RSA key pairs. Signature is mandatory under PEM. c) PKCS-7 permits more flexibility in certificate format and trust models. d) PKCS-7 is explicitly designed for algorithmic flexibility. New cryptosystems, message digest algorithms and signature schemes can be added just by defining new types. SCHEDULE An "alpha quality" implementation of Secure Mosaic and HTTPD was demonstrated in public on April 12th. The protocol document is to be sent for external review (to RSA, NCSA and TIS) at the end of April. After revision, we plan to submit it as an "experimental protocol" RFC -- by late May, we expect. The reference implementation will be supplied to beta testers (to the protocol reviewers, and selected CommerceNet sponsors). Public release (to CommerceNet participants) is scheduled for September. CommerceNet will operate a certification authority, suitable for operators of S-HTTP servers (open to CommerceNet participants), beginning at that time. We expect that NCSA will make the reference implementation available to the Internet community soon after. Periodic progress reports will be reported to Internet mailing lists (such as PEM-DEV), and available on the EIT and CommerceNet Web servers (URL's http://www.commerce.net/ and http://www.eit.com/) ORIGINAL PRESS RELEASE Secure NCSA Mosaic Establishes Necessary Framework for Electronic Commerce on the Internet PALO ALTO, Calif., April 12, 1994 -- Enterprise Integration Technologies (EIT), the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois and RSA Data Security today announced agreements to jointly develop and distribute a secure version of NCSA Mosaic, the popular point-and-click interface that enables easy access to thousands of multimedia information services on the Internet. The announcement was made in conjunction with the launch of CommerceNet, a large-scale market trial of electronic commerce on the Internet. Under the agreements, EIT will integrate its Secure-HTTP software with public key cryptography from RSA into NCSA Mosaic Clients and World Wide Web (WWW) servers. WWW is a general-purpose architecture for information retrieval comprised of thousands of computers and servers that is available to anyone on Internet. The enhancements will then be made available to NCSA for widespread public distribution and commercial licensing. Jay M. Tenenbaum, chief executive officer of EIT, believes secure NCSA Mosaic will help unleash the commercial potential of the Internet by enabling buyers and sellers to meet spontaneously and transact business. "While NCSA Mosaic makes it possible to browse multimedia catalogs, view product videos, and fill out order forms, there is currently no commercially safe way to consummate a sale," said Tenenbaum. "With public key cryptography, however, one can authenticate the identity of trading partners so that access to sensitive information can be properly accounted for." This secure version of NCSA Mosaic allows users to affix digital signatures which cannot be repudiated and time stamps to contracts so that they become legally binding and auditable. In addition, sensitive information such as credit card numbers and bid amounts can be securely exchanged under encryption. Together, these capabilities provide the foundation for a broad range of financial services, including the network equivalents of credit and debit cards, letters of credit and checks. In short, such secure WWW software enables all users to safely transact day-to-day business involving even their most valuable information on the Internet. According to Joseph Hardin, director of the NCSA group that developed NCSA Mosaic, over 50,000 copies of the interface software are being downloaded monthly from NCSA's public server -- with over 300,000 copies to date. Moreover, five companies have signed license agreements with NCSA and announced plans to release commercial products based on NCSA Mosaic. "This large and rapidly growing installed base represents a vast, untapped marketplace," says Hardin. The availability of a secure version of NCSA Mosaic establishes a valid framework for companies to immediately begin large-scale commerce on the Internet." Jim Bidzos, president of RSA, sees the agreement as the beginning of a new era in electronic commerce, where companies routinely transact business over public networks. "RSA is proud to provide the enabling public key software technology and will make it available on a royalty-free basis for inclusion in NCSA's public distribution of NCSA Mosaic," said Bidzos. RSA and EIT will work together to develop attractive licensing programs for commercial use of public key technology in WWW servers." At the CommerceNet launch, Allan M. Schiffman, chief technical officer of EIT, demonstrated a working prototype of secure NCSA Mosaic, along with a companion product that provides for a secure WWW server. The prototype was implemented using RSA's TIPEM toolkit. "In integrating public key cryptography into NCSA Mosaic, we took great pains to hide the intricacies and preserve the simplicity and intuitive nature of NCSA Mosaic," explained Schiffman. Any user that is familiar with NCSA Mosaic should be able to understand and use the software's new security features. Immediately to the left of NCSA's familiar spinning globe icon, a second icon has been inserted that is designed to resemble a piece of yellow paper. When a document is signed, a red seal appears at the bottom of the paper, which the user can click on to see the public key certificates of the signer and issuing agencies. When an arriving document is encrypted, the paper folds into a closed envelope, signifying that its information is hidden from prying eyes. When the user fills out a form containing sensitive information, there is a 'secure send' button that will encrypt it prior to transmission. Distribution of Public Keys To effectively employ public-key cryptography, an infrastructure must be created to certify and standardize the usage of public key certificates. CommerceNet will certify public keys on behalf of member companies, and will also authorize third parties such as banks, public agencies, industry consortia to issue keys. Such keys will often serve as credentials, for example, identifying someone as a customer of a bank, with a guaranteed credit line. Significantly, all of the transactions involved in doing routine purchases from a catalog can be accomplished without requiring buyers to obtain public keys. Using only the server's public key, the buyer can authenticate the identity of the seller, and transmit credit card information securely by encrypting it under the seller's public key. Because there are far fewer servers than clients, public key administration issues are greatly simplified. Easy Access to Strong Security To successfully combine simplicity of operation and key administration functions with a high level of security that can be accessible to even non-sophisticated users, significant changes were necessary for existing WWW security protocols. EIT developed a new protocol called Secure-HTTP for dealing with a full range of modern cryptographic algorithms and systems in the Web. Secure-HTTP enables incorporation of a variety of cryptographic standards, including, but not limited to, RSA's PKCS-7, and Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), and supports maximal interoperation between clients and servers using different cryptographic algorithms. Cryptosystem and signature system interoperation is particularly useful between U.S. residents and non-U.S. residents, where the non-U.S. residents may have to use weaker 40-bit keys in conjunction with RSA's RC2 (TM) and RC4 (TM) variable keysize ciphers. EIT intends to publish Secure-HTTP as an Internet standard, and work with others in the WWW community to create a standard that will encourage using the Web for a wide variety of commercial transactions. Availability EIT will make Secure NCSA Mosaic software available at no charge to CommerceNet members in September and NCSA will incorporate these secure features in future NCSA Mosaic releases. Enterprise Integration Technologies Corp., of Palo Alto, Calif., (EIT) is an R&D and consulting organization, developing software and services that help companies do business on the Internet. EIT is also project manager of CommerceNet. The National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA), developer of the Mosaic hypermedia browser based at the University of Illinois in Champaign, Ill., is pursuing a wide variety of software projects aimed at making the Internet more useful and easier to use. RSA Data Security, Inc., Redwood City, Calif., invented Public Key Cryptography and performs basic research and development in the cryptographic sciences. RSA markets software that facilitates the integration of their technology into applications. Information on Secure NCSA Mosaic can be obtained by sending e-mail to shttp-info(a)eit.com. Press Contact: Nancy Teater Hamilton Communications Phone: (415) 321-0252 Fax: (415) 327-4660 Internet: nrt(a)hamilton.com

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Talk on privacy this weekend in Boulder
by nates＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I caught this one and though there might be some takers... ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date: Fri, 15 Apr 1994 11:37:39 +22305931 (MDT) From: Virnoche Mary <virnoche(a)taweret.Colorado.EDU> To: Tim Schoechle <schoechl(a)ucsu.Colorado.EDU> Subject: Privacy Program/Please forward to anyone interested The 18th Regional Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science PRIVACY AND NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES April 21 - 23, 1994 University of Colorado at Boulder Hale Science Building Thursday _____________________________________________________________ April 21 7:00 - 9:00 p.m. Images in Popular Culture I: "The Conversation" Hale 270 Feature film with Gene Hackman, John Cazale, Cindy Williams, Teri Garr, Harrison Ford and Robert Duvall Friday _________________________________________________________________ April 22 2:30 - 4:00 p.m. Welcome: Dean Charles R. Middleton Hale 230 Arts and Sciences Keynote Windows into the Soul: Privacy in Address: an Age of High Technology Dr. Gary T. Marx University of Colorado, Sociology 4:00 - 5:30 p.m. Session I Libraries, Privacy, and Hale 230 New Information Technology Panelists: David Fagerstrom Science Library "Security and Database Searches" Debbie Hollis Government Documents "Altering Government Text" Scott Seaman Circulation "Circulation and Patron Confidentiality" Moderator: Jen Owen University of Colorado, Sociology 5:30 - 7:00 p.m. Dinner Break 7:00 - 8:45 p.m. Images in Popular Culture II: "Sliver" Hale 270 Feature film with Sharon Stone, William Baldwin, and Tom Berenger 8:45 - 9:45 p.m. Refreshments and Discussion of films Hale 270 Discussion Leader: Charlotte Kunkel University of Colorado, Sociology Saturday ________________________________________________________________ April 23 9:00 - 9:55 a.m. Session II Medical Records: Hale 270 Are They Really Private? Speaker: Sheri Alpert George Mason University, Public Policy Discussants: Linda Fox, J.D. Associate Counsel, Eleanor Roosevelt Institute Mary Virnoche University of Colorado, Sociology Moderator: Mary Cornell, RRA President,Colorado Health Information Management Association 10:00 - 10:55 a.m. Session III Coming Soon Hale 270 to a Society Near You? Panelists: Tim Schoechle University of Colorado, Telecommunications "Smart Homes" Dave Hunter President, BI Inc. "Electronic Location Monitoring" Professor Omar K. Moore Responsive Environment Foundation Inc. "Interactive Multi-Dimensional Technologies" Don Eberle, J.D. Attorney in private practice 11:00 - 12:15 p.m. Session IV Newer Media Technologies, Hale 270 Privacy, and Media Practitioners Speaker: Professor Jerome Aumente Rutgers University Journalism Resources Institute Discussants: Professor Michael Tracey University of Colorado Journalism and Mass Communication Roger Fidler Knight-Ridder Director of New Media and the Information Design Lab Martin Taschdjian US West Moderator: Professor Brenda J. Allen University of Colorado, Communications 12:15 - 1:30 p.m. Lunch 1:30 - 2:45 p.m. Session V Electronic Media and the Hale 270 Transformation of Law Speaker: Professor Ethan Katsh University of Amherst Discussants: Professor Michael Strine University of Colorado, Political Science Professor Barbara Bintliff, J.D. University of Colorado Law Library Director Moderator: Professor Cal Jillson University of Colorado, Political Science 2:45 - 4:00 p.m. Session VI Cryptography and the Clipper Chip Hale 270 Speaker: Dr. Dorothy Denning Georgetown, Computer Science Discussants: Ken Klingenstein Director, Computer Network Services University of Colorado Phil Zimmerman Software Consultant, Boulder Moderator: Dr. William Moninger National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 4:15 - 5:30 p.m. Session VII What is to be Done? Hale 270 Reflections from the Front Line. Marc Rotenberg, J.D. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) Former counsel to the Senate Judiciary, Washington, D.C. Discussants: Professor Robert Trager University of Colorado Journalism and Mass Communication Sandra McCray, J.D., L.L.M. University of Colorado, Telecommunications Moderator: Scott Allman University of Colorado, Philosophy Sponsors: The Department of Sociology and its Center for the Social Study of Information Technology, The School of Journalism and Mass Communication, The Keller Center for the Study of the First Amendment, The Telecommunications Interdisciplinary Program Committee, and the Center for Values and Social Policy. Contacts: Professor Gary T. Marx Mary Virnoche Department of Sociology Department of Sociology 492-6427 492-3312 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ -nate -- +--------- | Nate Sammons <nates(a)netcom.com> PGP Key and fingerprint via finger. | Clipper == Big Brother Inside. Question Authority. Encrypt everything. +---------

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Re: Warrantless searches -- A sign of things to come?
by f_griffith＠ccsvax.sfasu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The easiest solution is to include a provision in the rental agreement >stating that you won't possess firearms in the apartment. In addition, >include a provision that indicates that the tenant wil consent to any >search requested by the landlord. You could even make these provision >optional, such that any tenant can decline to agree to them by checking >the appropriate box. > >(Most tenants in such projects probably won't bother to read them anyway). > I thought the administration had backed off the original proposal because of the uproar and had gone to the search waiver provision in the rental agreement (don't know if they included the firearms part). It appears that we're still at a point where enough protest from the informed part of the populace can have an effect.

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re: Sgt Russell
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I am sorry that my being on this list is offensive to you. I joined >this list to learn about cryptography. If anything, I would think that you >would want to help a new person get up to speed. If you can't grow up and >treat other people like human beings, maybe you ought to take yourself off of >the list and go play with your private key by yourself. I wouldn't worry about Wayne: other than an annoying propensity to toss around TLAs in such a way as to make it fairly clear that he doesn't really know what he's talking about, and a strong case of inappropriate paranoia, I suspect he's generally harmless. Annoying, tedious and occasionally laughable; but generally harmless. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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re: Intolerance on the list (was Re: Sgt Russell)
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded to: inet[cypherpunks%toad.com(a)pucc.princeton.edu] cc: Comments by: SGT DARREN S. HARLOW@ISB@MCTSSA -------------------------- [Original Message] ------------------------- Russell, I appreciate your letter to me. My political views are very conservative. I know that this puts off a number of people, but we are each entitled to our own opinion. I feel that we do need a government in power, but that they have a limited role in our society. If we didn't have at some ruling power in control, the country would be in total anarchy and we would be taken over by some intolerate country. The beauty of our system of government protects our rights. We need a military to protect everyone's ass in this country. I feel that the government infringes to much on other peoples rights in this country as it is, especially with the current president. At least with a conservative government in control, they want to keep the money and the power in the hands of the people. The use of cryptography within our system, IMHO, is to allow us a right to privacy. Personally I feel that the Clipper chip, is a severe infringement upon our rights, and I do NOT support its use. Notice that I use PGP and not PEM or DES. If someone is smart enough to use RSA, then they deserve to be able to talk in privacy. I know that it can be used for alterior motives, but that is the risk with any tool that is available for use. I hope this helps to explain my opinions a bit better. I welcome you comments. BTW, where are those political pieces that people have written. I would like to look at them, to further educate myself. Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, USMC Internet: harlow%isb%mctssa(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil or another less reliable & slower: harlow(a)mqg1.usmc.mil Voice: Comm: (619) 725-2970 DSN (Autovon): 365-2970 Fax: Comm: (619) 725-9512 DSN (Autovon): 365-9512 PGP Public key available upon request "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..."

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Re: Press Release on Secure NCSA Mosiac
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> This secure version of NCSA Mosaic allows users to affix digital signatures > which cannot be repudiated and time stamps to contracts so that they become > legally binding and auditable. In addition, sensitive information such as > credit card numbers and bid amounts can be securely exchanged under > encryption. Together, these capabilities provide the foundation for a broad > range of financial services, including the network equivalents of credit and > debit cards, letters of credit and checks. I doubt that these electronic financial instruments will be designed to offer new protections to individual privacy. As more commerce moves onto the net, opportunities for database linking will multiply drastically. In such an environment, electronic dossiers of buying and spending habits will be far easier to develop. > To effectively employ public-key cryptography, an infrastructure must be > created to certify and standardize the usage of public key certificates. > CommerceNet will certify public keys on behalf of member companies, and will > also authorize third parties such as banks, public agencies and industry > consortia to issue keys. So once again we have the command-and-control style key certificate hierarchy. Everyone is neatly ordered and positioned in the structure. A place for everyone and everyone in his place. > Such keys will often serve as credentials, for > example, identifying someone as a customer of a bank, with a guaranteed > credit line. I suppose it goes without saying that the kinds of privacy-protecting credentials we have been discussing are not what is being discussed here. Rather, we have more authentication, more registration, more tracking of every electronic financial move we make. > Significantly, all of the transactions involved in doing routine purchases > from a catalog can be accomplished without requiring buyers to obtain public > keys. Using only the server's public key, the buyer can authenticate the > identity of the seller, and transmit credit card information securely by > encrypting it under the seller's public key. Because there are fewer servers > than clients, public key administration issues are greatly simplified. Evidently the "commerce" that is being planned here does not anticipate much demand for encryption of messages from sellers to buyers; rather, the important thing is encryption in the opposite direction to protect those credit card numbers. This also, of course, limits RSA's financial commitment in making its technology available; my reading is that end-users get only the ability to validate signatures for free, and that getting to use their own keys will involve royalty payments. > Secure-HTTP enables incorporation of a variety of cryptographic standards, > including, but not limited to, RSA's PKCS-7, and Internet Privacy Enhanced > Mail (PEM), and supports maximal interoperation between clients and servers > using different cryptographic algorithms. I was pleased to see that in their later message they added support for PGP to this list, although it seems that they are still thinking mostly in terms of "officially sanctioned" systems: > Cryptosystem and signature system > interoperation is particularly useful between U.S. residents and non-U.S. > residents, where the non-U.S. residents may have to use weaker 40-bit keys in > conjunction with RSA's RC2 and RC4 variable keysize ciphers. This is outrageous! Where on earth did they get the idea that non-U.S. residents have access only to 40 bit keys and RC2/RC4? As though the only encryption the rest of the world has is whatever the U.S. government deigns to let cross its borders? What an insult to the rest of the world. And what an attempt at self-deception to pretend that these export controls are effective. I sincerely doubt that the international network community will accept such a limitation in what claims to be an international standard. The one good thing that may come from this initiative is that more people will be using and relying on encryption. Given the widespread skepticism about the government in this country, it will be that much harder to get a Clipper-like program into place. But the initiative does clearly show the pernicious effects of the combined restrictions of the RSA patents and the NSA export controls. Together [RN]SA provides a structured, ordered system which provides the minimal possible privacy necessary for electronic commerce. Far more is possible, but is un- likely under the current legal regime. Hal

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CRYPTO: Money laundering and traceability
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(In honor of the Extropians list discussion elsewhere in this thread I include an Extropians-style message prefix.) An issue related to money laundering is money traceability. I posted something on this a couple of weeks ago but I have a little more information now. We are inclined to believe that with cryptographically anonymous digital cash, "money laundering" will be trivial. A simply sends the cash to B, and there is no way for the bank or anyone else to link the two together. While this is basically true with existing digital cash proposals, there is one kind of linkage that is possible. A knows and can recognize the cash which B holds. A and the bank could cooperate so that if B goes to the bank to deposit his cash (or deposits it electronically into an account linked to his True Name), B's anonymity can be broken. This has good aspects and bad aspects. On the good side, it should make robbery and extortion harder. If you are forced at gunpoint to enter your PIN into your cash smartcard, transferring cash to the robber's "electronic purse" (love that name), then later you can call the bank and report the numbers of the stolen cash. When the robber tries to deposit it, he can be caught. Similarly, this could be a boon to law enforcement "sting" operations. When the feds pay off the anonymous assassin-for-hire or kidnapper, and he goes to deposit the cash, again he can be caught. The other side of the coin, though, is that despotic governments can use these tools to control and restrict what their people can do. If the revolutionaries try to use cryptography to isolate and protect each cell from the others, traceable cryptocash may expose them. Keith Henson posted the start of an interesting story he was writing last year, about some eco-activists using cryptography for protection as they worked to sabotage some polluter. This kind of dramatic scenario might become less possible with traceable cash. (It's possible that some banks would allow truly anonymous accounts, so that even if the cash were recognized as it was turned in, the robber would not be caught. Still, the bank could refuse to honor the money in this case, preventing the criminal from profiting by his misdeeds.) The new information I mentioned comes from a paper by David Chaum in the Eurocrypt 92 proceedings: "Transferred Cash Grows in Size," by Chaum and Torben Pryds Pederson. Chaum considers off-line cash systems where the money does not necessarily have to be returned to the bank after each transaction. His main conclusion is, as the title suggests, that the cash must grow in size at each step. But a secondary conclusion is that under the right circumstances a payor can always recognize his cash at a later point, even after it has passed through many hands. Chaum describes these circumstances as the case where the payor has infinite computing power, but it appears that the same effect would be possible if the bank cooperated with the payor, as would be likely in the kinds of cases I mentioned earlier. The fundamental problem is the impossibility of having the cash be "re-blinded" as it passes from Alice to Bob (after it was "blinded" as Alice withdrew it from the bank). If this kind of multiple blinding were possible, so that neither Alice nor the Bank could recognize the money that Bob holds, multiple-spending could not be detected. Chaum's arguments appear to apply to virtually any electronic cash system which can prevent double-spending. They suggest that traceable cash will be the rule in any digicash system. People planning their future lives of crime under the new regime will need to take this into account. Hal

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Another invasion of privacy
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was an AP story yesterday about how several states are using prisoners to input data about traffic accidents and such into databases. I believe the state that they focused on was Arkansas. An attorney received a phone call that his SSN was being sold by prisoners that had gotten it from an accident report. The state allows people to use their SSN as their drivers license number. This prisoners also have access to everything else on the report, your license number, your home address and potentially your work and home phone number. Does anybody know what other states are using prisoners for this type of work? I'm about ready to cut up all my credit cards and start paying cash for everything that I buy. Mike. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Mike Markley || The opinions here do not represent the mmarkley(a)microsoft.com || opinions of my employer. Attempts to || associate the two are pointless. "I want to look at life, In the available light" - Neil Peart -

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Re: Laundering money through commodity futures
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

One problem with using bet-doubling systems to pay bribes with, whether it's in the futures market or in the casino, is that you not only have to convince the bribee to accept the bribe and participate in a money-laundering process, you have to get him to be willing to accept a few powers of two losses before receiving the bribe. If the bribe is small relative to the liquidity of the bribee, that's fine, as long as you've got enough trust between you that the bribee isn't worried about you walking away when you've won n*2**4 and she's lost it. But if you're trying to bribe, say, an enterprising southern lawyer whose husband's a politician, with a high fraction of her net worth, she's *not* going to be in a position to cover your bets for n*16 even if she *does* trust you. On the other hand, finding an enterprising broker to switch owners of futures contracts for a small extra commission may not be so hard.

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Re: BEST Inc.
by GERSTEIN＠SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-------------- On Tue, 19 Apr 1994 04:15:01 Thomas Riggley <jester(a)grex.cyberspace.org> wrote: >On Mon, 18 Apr 1994, Jeremy Cooper wrote: > >> > >> > I was in a BEST store yesterday, and attempted to pay by check. They >> > asked for ID to verify the check and when I handed them my military ID, they >> > asked for my driver's license instead. I gave them my driver's license and >> > they used it and the magnetic strip on the back of it to verify my check. I >> >> [stuff deleted] >> >> >From what I know, there is no law that says you have to keep that >> magnetic strip up to date. Just have a little meeting between it and Mr. >> Refridgerator magnet and you could end up with some surprising results. > > Is this true? I am a NY state resident. I am under the impression that >altering either the bar code or the mag strip on the back of my license >would be as illegal as say changing the picture (Not that this is possible >in with the new NY licenses). I do not know the legality behind this but >I am aware that altering a license in ANYWAY is illegal. Although what >you are suggesting is VERY difficult to prove, it is still I would think >illegal. Unless anyone has any legal information to the contrary.... > > I would also guess that these states that have the mag strips on >their license also have fines for non-oprative strips. If they do not, I >am sure the law will be created so enough! > -Tom For what it's worth, you can de-magnetize anything you want just by going to the store. I work at a pharmacy, and they have "inventory control tags" on some of the "hotter" items. When someone wants to buy one of these items, we put the tag (actually just a magnetized strip) on a special pad that demagnetizes it (and ATM and credit cards that are put on it too :)) Also, since I live on a university campus in New Haven, security is a big thing here. We now must use ADT keycards as well as physical keys to get into the buildings. The first semester they were used, I blitzed three of them just by carying it with me all the time. We never found the reason, but I think it has something to do with the fact that I'm around computers all day. (Incidentally, there were reports of peoples credit cards being wiped by these things as well as them setting off theft detectors at record stores). Just another 0.02¢ for the pot..... adam "After this, nothing will shock me." ---------- "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4, 1994

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