December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Clipper Key Exchange
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

matsb(a)sos.sll.se (Mats Bergstrom) writes: Subj: Clipper Session Key >How do two Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack/Tessera units agree on a session key >without compromising it to the bad guys tapping the line? If not known >outside of the NSA, what possible solutions are there? In the case of the MYK-78, the simple Clipper chip to be used in phones and similar devices, that's your problem. You have to do a Diffie-Hellman exchange or RSA or something externally. Or hire a courier. This will cause compatibility problems between different manufacturers' Clipper devices, unless they agree on a standard up front. Probably everyone will clone AT&T Clipper devices, since they are going to be the first to market. If the government buys a large batch, that will set the standard. Without at least a de-facto protocol standard, the system would be almost useless. There is also the problem of adding encryption to the V.x standards for fax, LAPM for modems, etc. Each of these devices will need some kind of key exchange. The Capstone and Tessera (same thing, different package) have the ability to do a modexp operation. From this you can internally do DH exchange or RSA. As I remember, the Capstone does up to 1024 bit modexp, comparable to PGP in security. Skipjack is just a symmetric cipher like DES, except it has an 80-bit key and has (according to the review team) all of DES's problems fixed. --- Mike

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Re: Milgram & Authority
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com D >Don't you know how the US and UK physically turned back boatloads of D >people trying this? D > D >-- D >Dragon D > But these were people trying to travel en masse on (falsely acquired) immigrant visas. I was suggesting individual tourists overstaying. DCF Privacy 101 - A few years ago, Rebecca Schaefer told the State of California where she lived. Her killer used that information to find her and kill her. Only give out your address on a need to know basis. --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Schneier's source code
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said: > * we also have fragments of C code accumulated and laboriously > developed by Bruce Schneier. How many of us have bought the C code book > and used the code? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ As far as I know, there's the book, Applied Crypto, and the source code on disk. Are you referring to the C code within the same book, the disk, or a book of source code with the stuff in the disk (which contains more than the main book)? It matters to me, because though I have the fat book, I have yet to find the energy to OCR the source code. As I'm in India, I can't get the disk. If the contents of the disk are printed in a separate book, I could get *that*. The disk contains code described, but not presented in the book, including DSA, Diffie-Hellman, etc. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "What is civilisation rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in but a ribonucleic Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 hangover?" H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: The un-BBS
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Evidence, how did the cases the FCC brought turn out? If the network had used commercial radio licenses, how much more would it have cost them (per node; I have a vague idea of the size and power of a random Amateur Packet Radio node (in computer terms and cost))? Would this have given them greater immunity in prosecution? (Hmm.. if you're passing it on, you're broadcasting it? Could encryption tech be used to "enhance" APRN to give sysops "plausible deniability?" Phil

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RE: Milgram & Authority
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Timothy C. May If we go down the path of worrying about "psychic pain" inflicted on others, then how can we operate in a world of failed marriages and relationships, of hurt feelings, and of other such psychic damages? ....................................... What about the psychic trauma caused by Clipper? You could probably make a case for that, in terms of psychological warfare, given the current attitudes. Blanc

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Faking hostnames and inconvenient anon IP
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

joshua geller <joshua(a)cae.retix.com>: > [on IRC] > > Fraid not....it's a trivial matter to fake the username, and if yer a > > smart cookie, faking the hostname is just as easy. > > as far as I know, you have to hack the server to fake hostname. > > historically this practice has been frowned upon by the majority > of IRC administrators. Oh, there are other ways of faking hostnames, depending on your level of access to systems (your closest nameserver, for example). My point was that it's not quite as convenient to have anon IRC (or any other IP protocol) as it is to send anon mail through a remailer. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Voicemail +91 11 3760335; Vox/Fax/Data 6853410 H-34C Saket New Delhi 110017 INDIA The National Short-Sleeved Shirt Association says: Support your right to bare arms! -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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RSA-129
by Derek Atkins 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We are happy to announce that RSA-129 = 1143816257578888676692357799761466120102182967212423625625618429\ 35706935245733897830597123563958705058989075147599290026879543541 = 3490529510847650949147849619903898133417764638493387843990820577 * 32769132993266709549961988190834461413177642967992942539798288533 The encoded message published was 968696137546220614771409222543558829057599911245743198746951209308162\ 98225145708356931476622883989628013391990551829945157815154 This number came from an RSA encryption of the `secret' message using the public exponent 9007. When decrypted with he `secret' exponent 106698614368578024442868771328920154780709906633937862801226224496631\ 063125911774470873340168597462306553968544513277109053606095 this becomes 200805001301070903002315180419000118050019172105011309190800151919090\ 618010705 Using the decoding scheme 01=A, 02=B, ..., 26=Z, and 00 a space between words, the decoded message reads THE MAGIC WORDS ARE SQUEAMISH OSSIFRAGE To find the factorization of RSA-129, we used the double large prime variation of the multiple polynomial quadratic sieve factoring method. The sieving step took approximately 5000 mips years, and was carried out in 8 months by about 600 volunteers from more than 20 countries, on all continents except Antarctica. Combining the partial relations produced a sparse matrix of 569466 rows and 524338 columns. This matrix was reduced to a dense matrix of 188614 rows and 188160 columns using structured Gaussian elimination. Ordinary Gaussian elimination on this matrix, consisting of 35489610240 bits (4.13 gigabyte), took 45 hours on a 16K MasPar MP-1 massively parallel computer. The first three dependencies all turned out to be `unlucky' and produced the trivial factor RSA-129. The fourth dependency produced the above factorization. We would like to thank everyone who contributed their time and effort to this project. Without your help this would not have been possible. Derek Atkins Michael Graff Arjen Lenstra Paul Leyland

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mutual interest
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

you four will probably recall that I have just entered and left your encrypted channel on IRC. this message is crossposted to the cypherpunks mailing list; I, and I am sure other members of this list would be interested in the details of your encryption scheme, if any of you are willing to share. regards, josh

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The Great Clipper Debate 5/9/94
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Great Clipper Debate: National Security or National Surveillance? Sponsored by: The Georgetown University Law Center Space Law Group and Communications Law Forum In Coordination with: The George Washington University Institute for Computer and Telecommunications Systems Policy, the Association for Computing Machinery Special Interest Group for Computers and Society, and the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section. Date and Time: May 9, 1994, at 7:30 p.m. Place: The Georgetown University Law Center(Moot Court Room) 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The Administration, through the Department of Justice and the National Security Agency, has proposed a standard encryption algorithm for both the public and commercial marketplace, with the goal of making this algorithm the method of choice for persons wishing to encode their telephone and other voice and data communications. The FBI and the NSA are concerned that the increasing availability, and affordability, of encryption mechanisms will make it difficult and in some cases impossible for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to tap into and to understand the communications of criminals and other pertinent groups. This proposal has become known as the "Clipper Chip," in that it would be implemented by the voluntary insertion of a computer chip into telephone, fax machine, and other communications systems. The Clipper Chip has generated considerable controversy. Opposing it are various civil libertarian groups, as well as telecommunications companies, software and hardware manufacturers, and trade associations. The debate has raged behind closed doors, and openly in the press. On Monday, May 9, at the Georgetown University Law School, a round table debate will take place on this controversy. The participants represent both sides of the issue, and are illustrative of the various groups which have taken a stand. The participants are: Dorothy Denning, Chairperson of the Computer Science Department of Georgetown University Michael Godwin, Legal Counsel of the Electronic Frontier Foundation; Geoffrey Greiveldinger, Special Counsel to the Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section of the U.S. Department of Justice; Michael Nelson, of the Office of Science and Technology Policy of the White House; Marc Rotenberg, Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center; and Stephen Walker, President of Trusted Information Systems, Inc., and a former cryptographer with the National Security Agency In addition, there will be two moderators: Dr. Lance Hoffman, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at The George Washington University, and Andrew Grosso, a former federal prosecutor who is now an attorney in private practice in the District of Columbia. The program will last approximately two and one half hours, and will be divided into two parts. The first half will offer the panel the opportunity to respond to questions which have been submitted to the participants beforehand; the second will present the panel with questions from the audience. There is no charge for this program, and members of the public are encouraged to attend. Reservations are requested in advance, and should be directed to one of the following individuals: - C. Dianne Martin, Associate Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The George Washington University, Phillips Hall, Room 624-C, Washington, D.C. 20052; telephone: (202) 994-8238; E mail: diannem(a)seas.gwu.edu - Sherrill Klein, Staff Director, ABA Criminal Justice Section,1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; telephone: (202) 331-2624; fax: (202) 331-2220 - Francis L. Young, Young & Jatlow, 2300 N Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C. 20037; telephone: (202) 663-9080; fax: (202) 331-8001 Questions for the panelists should be submitted, in writing, to one of the moderators: - Lance Hoffman, Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20052; fax: (202) 994-0227; E mail: ictsp(a)seas.gwu.edu - Andrew Grosso, 2300 N Street, N.W., Suite 600, Washington, D.C., 20037; fax: (202) 663-9042; E mail: agrosso(a)acm.org PLEASE POST

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FAQ: Where to find PGP (minor update)
by mpj＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- WHERE TO GET THE PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY PROGRAM (PGP) (Last modified: 2 May 1994 by Mike Johnson) The latest commercial versions are 2.4 (both Viacrypt and BSAFE versions). The latest freeware Mac version is 2.3 or 2.3a, depending on the variant. The latest Amiga version is 2.3a2 The latest freeware version for all other platforms is 2.3a If you are a commercial user of PGP in the USA or Canada, contact Viacrypt in Phoenix, Arizona, USA. The commecial version of PGP is fully licensed to use the patented RSA and IDEA encryption algorithms in commercial applications, and may be used in corporate environments in the USA and Canada. It is fully compatible with, functionally the same as, and just as strong as the freeware version of PGP. Due to limitations on ViaCrypt's RSA distribution license, ViaCrypt only distributes executable code and documentation for it, but they are working on making PGP available for a variety of platforms. Call or write to them for the latest information. The latest information I have from them on compiled versions are: MS-DOS 2.4 Unix 2.4 (several different platforms) WinCIM CSNAV 2.4 Mac version expected late this summer. ViaCrypt David A. Barnhart, Product Manager 2104 West Peoria Avenue Phoenix, Arizona 85029 Tel: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 E-Mail: 70304.41(a)compuserve.com E-Mail: wk01965(a)worldlink.com Credit card orders only. (800)536-2664 (8-5 MST M-F) The freeware version of PGP is intended for noncommercial, experimental, and scholarly use. It is available on thousands of BBSes, commercial information services, and Internet anonymous-ftp archive sites on the planet called Earth. This list cannot be comprehensive, but it should give you plenty of pointers to places to find PGP. Although the latest freeware version of PGP was released from outside the USA (New Zealand), it is not supposed to be exported from the USA under a strange law called the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Because of this, please get PGP from a site outside the USA if you are outside of the USA. This data is subject to change without notice. If you find that PGP has been removed from any of these sites, please let me know so that I can update this list. Likewise, if you find PGP on a good site elsewhere (especially on any BBS that allows first time callers to access PGP for free), please let me know so that I can update this list. Thanks to Gary Edstrom and Hugh Miller for providing part of this data. FTP sites: soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/pgp (DOS, MAC) Verified: 21-Dec-93 ftp.demon.co.uk /pub/amiga/pgp /pub/archimedes /pub/pgp /pub/mac/MacPGP ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de ftp.funet.fi ghost.dsi.unimi.it /pub/crypt Verified: 21-Dec-93 ftp.tu-clausthal.de (139.174.2.10) wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/aminet/util/crypt src.doc.ic.ac.uk (Amiga) /aminet /amiga-boing ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de /pub/comp/os/os2/crypt/pgp23os2A.zip (OS/2) black.ox.ac.uk (129.67.1.165) /src/security/pgp23A.zip (MS-DOS executables & docs) /src/security/pgp23srcA.zip (Unix, MS-DOS, VMS, Amiga sources, docs, info on building PGP into mailers, editors, etc.) /src/security/pgp23A.tar.Z (Same as PGP22SRC.ZIP, in Unix tar format) /src/security/macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx (Macintosh version) iswuarchive.wustl.edu pub/aminet/util/crypt (Amiga) csn.org /mpj/README.MPJ contains variable directory name -- read this first. /mpj/help explains how to get to hidden directory containing PGP /mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgp/ contains current PGP /mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/pgptools/ contains related tools /mpj/I_will_not_export/crypto_???????/ contains other crypto info. /mpj/public/pgp/ contains PGP shells, faq documentation, etc. ftp.netcom.com /pub/dcosenza -- PGP for several platforms + some shells and steganography utilities. /pub/gbe/pgpfaq.asc -- frequently asked questions answered. /pub/mpj (see README.MPJ -- similar layout to csn.org//mpj) nic.funet.fi (128.214.6.100) /pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip /pub/crypt/pgp23A.tar.Z van-bc.wimsey.bc.ca (192.48.234.1) /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23A.zip /m/ftp2/crypto/RSA/PGP/2.3a/pgp23srcA.zip ftp.uni-kl.de (131.246.9.95) qiclab.scn.rain.com (147.28.0.97) pc.usl.edu (130.70.40.3) leif.thep.lu.se (130.235.92.55) goya.dit.upm.es (138.4.2.2) tupac-amaru.informatik.rwth-aachen.de (137.226.112.31) ftp.etsu.edu (192.43.199.20) princeton.edu (128.112.228.1) pencil.cs.missouri.edu (128.206.100.207) StealthPGP: The Amiga version can be FTP'ed from the Aminet in /pub/aminet/util/crypt/ as StealthPGP1_0.lha. Also, try an archie search for PGP using the command: archie -s pgp23 (DOS Versions) archie -s pgp2.3 (MAC Versions) ftpmail: For those individuals who do not have access to FTP, but do have access to e-mail, you can get FTP files mailed to you. For information on this service, send a message saying "Help" to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com. You will be sent an instruction sheet on how to use the ftpmail service. Another e-mail service is from nic.funet.fi. Send the following mail message to mailserv(a)nic.funet.fi: ENCODER uuencode SEND pub/crypt/pgp23srcA.zip SEND pub/crypt/pgp23A.zip This will deposit the two zipfiles, as 15 batched messages, in your mailbox with about 24 hours. Save and uudecode. BBS sites: Colorado Catacombs BBS (Longmont, CO) Mike Johnson, sysop Mac and DOS versions of PGP, PGP shells, and some other crypto stuff. Also the home of some good Bible search files and some shareware written by Mike Johnson, including DLOCK, CRYPTA, CRYPTE, CRYPTMPJ, MCP, MDIR, DELETE, PROVERB, SPLIT, ONEPAD, etc. v.32bis/v.42bis, speeds up to 14,400 baud 8 data bits, 1 stop, no parity Free access, but only one line. If busy or no answer, try again later. Downloads of crypto software are limited to the USA and Canada, but you can download on the first call if you are qualified and you answer the questions truthfully. Log in with your own name, or if someone else already used that, try a variation on your name or pseudonym. (303) 938-9654 (Boulder, Colorado number forwarded to Longmont number) (303) 678-9939 (Longmont, Colorado number) Verified: 5-2-94 Hieroglyphics Voodoo Machine (Colorado) DOS, OS2, and Mac versions. (303) 443-2457 Verified: 5-2-94 For free access for PGP, DLOCK, Secure Drive, etc., log in as "VOO DOO" with the password "NEW" (good for 30 minutes access to free files). Exec-Net (New York) Host BBS for the ILink net. (914) 667-4567 The Ferret BBS (North Little Rock, Arkansas) (501) 791-0124 also (501) 791-0125 Carrying RIME, Throbnet, Smartnet, and Usenet Special PGP users account: login name: PGP USER password: PGP This information from: Jim Wenzel <jim.wenzel(a)grapevine.lrk.ar.us> PGP 2.3A has been posted to the FidoNet Software Distribution Network and should on most if not all Canadian and U.S. nodes carrying SDN software. It has also been posted on almost all of the major private North American BBS systems, thence to countless smaller boards. Consult a list of your local BBSes; most with a sizeable file inventory should carry the program. If you find a version of the PGP package on a BBS or FTP site and it does not include the PGP User's Guide, something is wrong. The manual should always be included in the package. If it isn't, the package is suspect and should not be used or distributed. The site you found it on should remove it so that it does no further harm to others. Here is the result of an archie search for "pgp" on 4/27/94. More sites would show up if you performed a case-insensitive search for file names containing "pgp", but such a search takes a long time, and is probably not necessary. Note that archie will not find some sites, like the one at csn.org//mpj properly, due to the export control nonsense, but it does find the directory where the PGP documentation is kept. Host gatekeeper.dec.com Location: /.0/BSD/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 16 23:10 pgp Host hpcsos.col.hp.com Location: /mirrors/.hpib1/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -r--r--r-- 478 Dec 17 00:10 pgp Host netcom.com Location: /pub/halliday FILE -rwx------ 212992 Nov 27 20:21 pgp Location: /pub/kevitech FILE -rwxr-xr-x 89643 Dec 3 05:46 pgp Location: /pub/torin DIRECTORY drwx--x--x 4096 Jan 11 18:59 pgp Host quepasa.cs.tu-berlin.de Location: /.4/pub/bsd/386bsd-0.1/unofficial/doc/software FILE -rw-rw-r-- 12121 Feb 2 1993 pgp Host files1zrz.zrz.tu-berlin.de Location: /pub/mail DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 1024 Jan 11 1993 pgp Host sun.rz.tu-clausthal.de Location: /pub/atari/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 30 18:56 pgp Host ftp.uni-kl.de Location: /pub1/unix/security DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Feb 24 1993 pgp Host minnie.zdv.uni-mainz.de Location: /pub/atari/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 30 17:56 pgp Host info1.rus.uni-stuttgart.de Location: /afs/.rus.uni-stuttgart.de/sw/rs_aix32/pgp-2.3/bin FILE -rwxr-xr-x 211318 Aug 23 1993 pgp Host info2.rus.uni-stuttgart.de Location: /afs/rus.uni-stuttgart.de/sw/rs_aix32/pgp-2.3/bin FILE -rwxr-xr-x 211318 Aug 23 1993 pgp Host jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu Location: /pub/public_domain_software/NetBSD/usr/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Jun 9 1993 pgp Host bloom-picayune.mit.edu Location: /pub/usenet-by-hierarchy/alt/security DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Mar 14 00:17 pgp Host mintaka.lcs.mit.edu Location: /pub DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jun 18 1993 pgp Host cecelia.media.mit.edu Location: /pub FILE -rw-r--r-- 321424 Nov 30 20:27 pgp Host josquin.media.mit.edu Location: /pub FILE -rw-r--r-- 321424 Nov 30 20:27 pgp Host archive.egr.msu.edu Location: /pub DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 9 18:58 pgp Host xanth.cs.odu.edu Location: /pub DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Oct 18 00:00 pgp Host arthur.cs.purdue.edu Location: /pub/pcert/tools/unix DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jul 31 1993 pgp Host f.ms.uky.edu Location: /pub2/NetBSD/NetBSD-current/src/usr.bin/file/magdir FILE -rw-r--r-- 478 Dec 17 02:10 pgp Host dime.cs.umass.edu Location: /pub/rcf/exp/build/pgp-2.3 FILE -rwxr-xr-x 241916 Mar 15 15:42 pgp Location: /pub/rcf/exp/build/pgp-2.3/src FILE -rwxr-xr-x 241916 Mar 15 15:41 pgp Host granuaile.ieunet.ie Location: /ftpmail-cache/ie/tcd/maths/ftp/src/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Dec 2 11:43 pgp Host walton.maths.tcd.ie Location: /src/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 May 30 1993 pgp Location: /src/misc/pgp-2.0/src FILE -rwxr-xr-x 316640 Oct 18 1992 pgp Host cs.huji.ac.il Location: /pub/security DIRECTORY drwxrwxr-x 512 Oct 26 19:26 pgp Host ftp.germany.eu.net Location: /pub/comp/msdos/local/utils DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Jul 12 1993 pgp Host csn.org Location: /mpj/public DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Mar 14 20:30 pgp Host isy.liu.se Location: /pub/misc DIRECTORY drwxr-xr-x 512 Sep 19 00:00 pgp - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.4 mQCNAi0aFSUAAAEEAOCOKpaLepvJCFgIR4m+UvZe0IN8g7Guwc+6GH4u6UGTPxQO iAhk/MJ7E8LE4c55A1G8to2W4y3aKAHvi9QCYKnsLV8Ag0BYWo3bGGTPEfkS7NAI N+Zy6vSjuF1D6MUnbvrQJ5p4efz7a28iYRKoAdan2bfnvIYWUD9nBjyFM+vFAAUR tDdNaWNoYWVsIFBhdWwgSm9obnNvbiA8bXBqQGNzbi5vcmc+IG1wajQgW2V4cCAz MSBEZWMgOTRdiQCVAgUQLTqfXj9nBjyFM+vFAQGU7wP/ZuuHfdAnCIblNCtbLLG8 39CSg6JIVa3KWfe0WIz6dXFU3cvl2Wt094kJgZ+Nmq01INWlib2lTOznbkA9sV1W q0aJSBHFWQH29qGmIdEqThs7A5ES2w8eRjJD80lxHodRIkBcC5KI6x4Mxo8cib5V BrwsvtG0+81HD6Mrpvc+a0GJAJUCBRAtJc2rZXmEuMepZt0BAe4hA/9YANYPY4Z3 1pXv2mT6ReC09cZS5U3+xxC5brQdLsQGKuH6QVs/b5oc6NV84sh8A9tZyHG2067o 3XIEyN7PPQzRm2UUnHHqw9lBCNhMiFQsAJi4W+m8zXrVrpJWK0Wv61eV2/XIQl0V d4lxu0r+MNRP6ID6FBzA4C9rO+RYEZmwOIkAlQIFEC0aGRzb/VZRBVJGuQEBfaUD /3c2h//kg843OIcYHG4gMDqdeeZLzGlp3RVvh0Rs3/T0YylJZGjPL2L/BF/vfLlB 9E2Urh9mDG/7hiB5FncrUnkmN63IkSj+K9YyfPyYxBVx06Srj8ZzYynh0N+zledd 6cnwxRXhaD3Wc4EfSNR7BH9M2rjkGzyb5to9cgBb0ng+ =BLg5 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ___________________________________________________________ |\ /| | | | | \/ |o| | Michael Paul Johnson Colorado Catacombs BBS 303-938-9654 | | | | / _ | mpj(a)csn.org ftp:csn.org//mpj/README.MPJ for crypto stuff | | |||/ /_\ | aka mpj(a)netcom.com mpjohnson(a)ieee.org mikej(a)exabyte.com | | |||\ ( | m.p.johnso(a)nyx.cs.du.edu CIS 71331,2332 PGP key by finger | | ||| \ \_/ |___________________________________________________________| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQCVAgUBLcU3XD9nBjyFM+vFAQGgAAQAsTK+7QX/t3YIOhBqGMnyQX4+s6FHVb1K Yr8bnbYOaDDSpM29oJXW5dD+bPe79b27uOAlGIj18Fa1DAiSJN+5W9N22Zi5CfSL fIlpQKWJcEZ8dVFq5kUK/cj1JLkssnim/kxGb7lUthX2WLmC1UHki9ZDVrnNtr7+ MCO8COzlblM= =Mg6j -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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