December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rarachel(a)prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian) wrote: > <<How about tarring the code together, encrypting it, and > e-mailing the message out?>> > > > Gee, how about getting arrested for exporting munitions? People have been doing that for years and no one's gotten arrested yet. :) In case you haven't noticed, people outside the US requesting crypto stuff usually don't have too much trouble finding a volunteer willing to send it to them.

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a test server?
by nelson＠crynwr.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there a PGP test server anywhere? I'd like to use its public key to encrypt a message, mail it to the server, and have it mail the plaintext back to me. I'd also like to have it look up my pubic key in the appropriate repository (which is?) and verify that my message was signed properly. -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> ftp.msen.com:pub/vendor/crynwr/crynwr.wav Crynwr Software | Crynwr Software sells packet driver support | ask4 PGP key 11 Grant St. | +1 315 268 1925 (9201 FAX) | Quakers do it in the light Potsdam, NY 13676 | LPF member - ask me about the harm software patents do.

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Re: Faking hostnames and inconvenient anon IP
by otchayanie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quoth Arsen Ray Arachelian <raachel(a)prism.poly.edu>: > >In that case one of us (who owns a machine directly plugged into the net) >should set up an anon server that doesn't check for user/host names, or >better yet, provide a bouncing off point for anonymous telnet... Say >something like you telnet to port 666 on toad.com, and then you're given >an anonymous temporary id. At that point, you are prompted with a menu for >what to do... telnet to another site, ftp into another side, call >an IRC server from somewhere, etc. All the anon server would have to do >is bounce packets... I think this idea came up before... an anon packet >forwarding service of sorts... > >If a user goes through several of these, s/he is granted pretty decent >anonimity... Perhaps another play on this would work with encrypted >packets? Where each user who dials into one of these packet bouncers >talks to it via a PGP like RSA and key-exchange system. > >All the IRC server will see is that someone named anon7 logged in from >eminar.toad.com... > in actuality, the code for this exists, has existed for some time, and has even seen some use. it is a simple telnet reflector that functions more or less in the manner you are envisioning; the irc user simply directs the client to the address and port of the 'anon server,' which grants the user its own hostname and an incremented username starting with 'an001;' these and subsequent packets are forwarded to an actual server nearby. the code was written by all-time incorrigible irc hooligan Hendrix, who also brought us the annoybots, tsunami floodbots, and countless other innovations without which irc just wouldn't be the same. the anonirc.c code is available via anon ftp at ftp.rahul.net /pub/jimi, which also houses countless other quasi-legitimate utilities and patches. the project of anonimity on irc seems to be a valuable one, notwithstanding the legion of users whose baser traits are augmented by the prospect of utter irresponsibility. the crytographic frontier on the irc is, for me at least, perhaps much more desirable territory; and of course the two used in sensible conjunction would be ideal. while there is a rudimentary form of encryption built into the unix irc client software, i confess i have only seen it used thoughtfully on one occasion, and sadly, it was to conceal the intentions of parties involved in an 'op war.' on the lighter side, i have recently seen a number of users invoking weak (or perhaps mock) encryption of the form 'CLIPPER:<apparently random digits>:<garbled message>.' so perhaps the interest is fomenting, parody can often turn trash into gold, when well executed. ---------- monad(a)tigger.jvnc.net apologia pro mea vita "The infant's first step is its first step towards death." Kozma Prutkov

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Accounts...
by Thomas Riggley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This brings up an interesting point to which I have been trying to create a person list myself. Certain systems out there offer Free account to anyone without any sort of identity check.. I have only found a couple myself and all of them seem to limit access to News and ftp unless you send them money... However I am still looking for these computers which seem to offer the best anonymous access to anyone... Could you please e-mail me ANY sights that offer free/cheap internet access via telnet that do not check id? -Tom -=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=- * * * Thomas Riggley jester(a)cyberspace.org * * * * What ever happened to privacy?! * * * -=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=--=><=-

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since I haven't seen this article float through the list, I hope John doesn't mind it being reposted. From: gnu(a)toad.com (John Gilmore) Newsgroups: alt.politics.org.nsa,comp.org.eff.talk Subject: Why is clipper worse than "no encryption like we have today"? Date: 27 Apr 94 08:50:17 GMT Organization: Cygnus Support, Mt. View, California Mike Tighe <tighe(a)convex.COM> wrote: > But the NSA is not going to control the keys, are they? I thought it was > going to be under the control of two independent agencies. And even if they > are leaked, how is that worse then the system we have today, where no keys > are required? It's worse because the market keeps moving toward providing real encryption. If Clipper succeeds, it will be by displacing real secure encryption. If real secure encryption makes it into mass market communications products, Clipper will have failed. The whole point is not to get a few Clippers used by cops; the point is to make it a worldwide standard, rather than having 3-key triple-DES with RSA and Diffie-Hellman become the worldwide standard. We'd have decent encryption in digital cellular phones *now*, except for the active intervention of Jerry Rainville of NSA, who `hosted' a meeting of the standards committee inside Ft. Meade, lied to them about export control to keep committee documents limited to a small group, and got a willing dupe from Motorola, Louis Finkelstein, to propose an encryption scheme a child could break. The IS-54 standard for digital cellular doesn't describe the encryption scheme -- it's described in a separate document, which ordinary people can't get, even though it's part of the official accredited standard. (Guess who accredits standards bodies though -- that's right, the once pure NIST.) The reason it's secret is because it's so obviously weak. The system generates a 160-bit "key" and then simply XORs it against each block of the compressed speech. Take any ten or twenty blocks and recover the key by XORing frequent speech patterns (like silence, or the letter "A") against pieces of the blocks to produce guesses at the key. You try each guess on a few blocks, and the likelihood of producing something that decodes like speech in all the blocks is small enough that you'll know when your guess is the real key. NSA is continuing to muck around in the Digital Cellular standards committee (TR 45.3) this year too. I encourage anyone who's interested to join the committee, perhaps as an observer. Contact the Telecommunications Industry Association in DC and sign up. Like any standards committee, it's open to the public and meets in various places around the country. I'll lend you a lawyer if you're a foreign national, since the committee may still believe that they must exclude foreign nationals from public discussions of cryptography. Somehow the crypto conferences have no trouble with this; I think it's called the First Amendment. NSA knows the law here -- indeed it enforces it via the State Dept -- but lied to the committee. -- John Gilmore gnu(a)toad.com -- gnu(a)cygnus.com -- gnu(a)eff.org Can we talk in private? Join me in the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Not if the FBI and NSA have their way. Ask membership(a)eff.org how.

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Re: Detweiler
by fnerd＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Who is Detweiler? > Reuben > Sounds like a good bumper sticker, T-shirt or grafito-- along the lines of "Who is John Galt?" -fnerd don't quote me - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Gradually, I become aware of a presence. Between me and sustenance stands a woman in a suit. --Michael Swaine -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a aKxB8nktcBAeQHabQP/d7yhWgpGZBIoIqII8cY9nG55HYHgvt3niQCVAgUBLMs3K ui6XaCZmKH68fOWYYySKAzPkXyfYKnOlzsIjp2tPEot1Q5A3/n54PBKrUDN9tHVz 3Ch466q9EKUuDulTU6OLsilzmRvQJn0EJhzd4pht6hSnC1R3seYNhUYhoJViCcCG sRjLQs4iVVM= =9wqs -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Schneier's source code
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Oh come on, all this talk about OCR makes it sound like nobody would ever > >be willing to just type in the code by hand. It only need be done once, .... > But seriously, isn't the point that you may make some silly typing mistake > that compiles anyway, but ruins the algorithm? Since it's perfectly legal to *import* crypto code to the US, that's simple - ship it back to the US to check if it's correct. You also do checksums for each page and maybe each line, and have them run the checksums to make sure they've typed the page correctly as well, but use the ship-back-here method for final diffs. Meanwhile, since much of crypto is eventually about economics, it's worth pointing out that you can probably hire typists in Russia who speak English and C well enough to type it in accurately, and pay them an amount of money that's small here and quite large there. I don't know if Russia has crypto import/export laws? There's certainly Russian crypto software available in the West.

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CIA & FBI, a marriage made in ___?
by Bradley W. Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does it concern anybody besides me that the CIA [with a bunch of underemployed manpower] is jumping into bed with the FBI [whose spokesman recently testified to Congress that they didn't have enough manpower to enforce the Crime Bill on us]? Does it make anybody nervous besides me that this is occurring at the same time that the 2ond and 4th amendments are being dispensed with? While the Clipper chip and digital telephony bill are being foisted on us? Is there a trend here? Ties to political aspects of crypto ought to be pretty damn obvious. Brad bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us --------------------------------------------------------------------- William J. Clinton, on MTV: <> <> [...] Now, having said that, a lot of the Asian societies that <> are doing very well now have low crime rates and high economic growth <> rates, partly because they have very coherent societies with strong <> units where the unit is more important than the individual, whether <> it's the family unit or the work unit or the community unit. <> <> My own view is that you can go to the extreme in either <> direction. And when we got organized as a country and we wrote a <> fairly radical Constitution with a radical Bill of Rights, giving a <> radical amount of individual freedom to Americans, it was assumed <> that the Americans who had that freedom would used it responsibly. <> That is, when we set up this country, abuse of people by government <> was a big problem. So if you read the Constitution, it's rooted in <> the desire to limit the ability of government's ability to mess with <> you, because that was a huge problem. It can still be a huge <> problem. But it assumed that people would basically be raised in <> coherent families, in coherent communities, and they would work for <> the common good, as well as for the individual welfare. <> <> What's happened in America today is, too many people <> live in areas where there's no family structure, no community <> structure, and no work structure. And so there's a lot of <> irresponsibility. And so a lot of people say there's too much personal <> freedom. When personal freedom's being abused, you have to move to limit <> it. That's what we did in the announcement I made last weekend on the <> public housing projects, about how we're going to have weapon sweeps <> and more things like that to try to make people safer in their communities. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Guess Who? Here is the theory: "It is thus necessary that the individual should finally come to realize that his own ego is of no importance in comparison with the existence of his nation; that the position of the indiviual ego is conditioned solely by the interests of the nation as a whole .. that above all the unity of a nation's spirit and will are worth far more than the freedom of the spirit and will of an individual..." "This state of mind, which subordinates the interests of the ego to the conservation of the community, is really the first premise for every truly human culture...The basic attitiude from which such activity arises, we call - to distinguish it from egoism and selfishness - idealism. By this we understand only the individual's capacity to make sacrifices for the community, for his fellow men." These statements were made in our century by the leader of a major Western nation. His countrymen regarded his viewpoint as uncontroversial. His political program implemented it faithfully. The statements were made by Adolf Hitler. He was explaining the moral philosopy of Nazism [National Socialism]. _The Ominous Parallels: The End of Freedom in America_, Leonard Peikoff, Stein & Day, NY, 1982. ISBN 0-8128-2850-X

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I simply had to pass this article along to c'punks... Newsgroups: comp.org.eff.talk From: milles(a)fi.gs.com (Stevens Miller) Subject: NSA remarks at "Lawyers and the Internet" Date: Tue, 26 Apr 1994 17:04:33 GMT I'm a computer programmer and attorney who is a member of the Committee on Technology and the Practice of Law, a task force assembled by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Last Friday we held a conference on "Lawyers and the Internet." Approximately 200 lawyers attended. Speaking in favor of the Clipper proposal was Stuart Baker of the NSA. I won't repeat his substantial arguments, but his formal approach (which Mike Godwin tells me is becoming a standard component of the government's pro-Clipper road show) is worth some attention. Parroting his own words at CFP, Baker told us: - The debate over the Clipper proposal is "really just a culture clash among net-heads." - Those opposing the proposal are late-coming counter-culturists, "who couldn't go to Woodstock because they had to do their trig homework." - Opponents envision themselves as would-be "cybernauts in bandoliers and pocket-protectors." I quote these remarks (as best I can from memory; my hands were shaking too much to write clearly at this point) to make it clear that our government's representative has reached a conclusion about the community opposing its plan. He has concluded that the members of that community are so beneath his respect that it is more appropriate to make fun of them than it is to respond to their views. As Godwin pointed out later, the NSA really just doesn't care what anyone says. That, he said, is why Baker repeatedly invokes the spectre of child-molestation as the chief evil Clipper will prevent; by that invocation is much meritorious debate deflected. Baker replied to this by emphasizing the reality of the pedophilia potential of networks, telling us that many users of networks "are teenaged boys with inept social skills." Regardless of the law-enforcement potential of this plan, it is worth noting that an official spokesman for the government endorses it by pointing out that its opponents valued their studies more highly than they did rock and roll. That because the popular image of the bookworm can be juxtaposed against that of Rambo in a funny way, bookworms don't have to be taken seriously. That if you play with computers as a youngster, your community, your parents and your own brain can't save you. That the government must protect you from your own ineptitude, whether you want its help or not. The message was pretty clear: Stuart Baker doesn't care what you say, but he wants the power to listen. --- Stevens R. Miller |"The complete truth is not the (212) 227-1594 | prerogative of the human judge." sharp(a)echonyc.com | New York, New York | - Supreme Court of Israel

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stop mailing to remail@infinity, please
by Eli Brandt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Somebody has been repeatedly (probably by a script) trying to remail through me to "remail(a)infinity.hip.berkeley.edu", which bounces back to me (unknown user). If it's somebody on this list, could you stop? Otherwise I'll have to have something grep for it so I can source- block the sender, and I don't really want to get into looking at incoming traffic. Eli ebrandt(a)hmc.edu

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