December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Source Level
by Greg - Kucharo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric, In your idea to give usenet users a chance to have competing moderated groups with unmoderated ones.Don't you think that the large numbers who want a moderated group will kill all demand for the unmoderated ones?Then we would be left with only moderated groups,who grated would have more signal to noise but less lively debate.People post so much to groups because they know they can in a free manner,moderation would slow the onslaught of banal posts and plenty of posts from folks who think thier ideas too wild for the moderator.Remember the root of moderator is moderate.As in,"This food is moderately good." Greg. kryten(a)shell.portal.com "This space available"

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found this on the net someplace HACKTIC.NL Now has an encrypted remailer :) with the calgary remailer this could get interesting ... -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAi1UdrEAAAEEALWuDmA6RLFilJQrzx/GHsBiZ5ODwkwaDITQEAANq8y9q4WJ 9NZ2WB0/m1sQ0YVvlm2tH9UlvxQ1JeGf9gamBCTtcY/dENRwXlRa/JEh4cGSeeFS cPGiBg4MxEWWHYep/aCT4asltdOqS3NRqqm+X571YEDoWXqd86QBed+kEHu5AAUR tC9IYWNrLVRpYyBBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHJlbWFpbEBoYWNrdGljLm5s PokAVQIFEC1WFN+UcphdeZT3BQEBk2wB/0UREDxp4Bj+os5mNyDkx+YTfYJO14Wz emTdDyn7x/uib7PMXGkTmCO1bSG5W92G0RnVetmlo1SmDpGEgFTtCv0= =RP9M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Source Level
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 18 Feb 1994, Greg - Kucharo wrote: > Eric, > In your idea to give usenet users a chance to have competing moderated groups > with unmoderated ones.Don't you think that the large numbers who want a > moderated group will kill all demand for the unmoderated ones?Then we would be > left with only moderated groups,who grated would have more signal to noise but > less lively debate.People post so much to groups because they know they can in > a free manner,moderation would slow the onslaught of banal posts and plenty of > posts from folks who think thier ideas too wild for the moderator.Remember the > root of moderator is moderate.As in,"This food is moderately good." > > Greg. > kryten(a)shell.portal.com "This space available" > > i for one would stick to the UNmoderated groups. I think that many people thrive on the chaos there and the openess. I personally don't think I would like to have to submit articles for some guys approval, just something uncool about it to me. I don't mean uncool, like fashion, I mean it just doesnt fit with my idea of free exchange of ideas. I mean no matter how much you stress that the moderator be lenient and open you are gonna run into problems. The Inet is full, or should I say fool, of BIG fuckin egos, and they have a nifty way of clashing. A moderator just doesnt fit into my free exchange idea. Too much like an "Official(tm)" thing to me, and i don't particulalry take to official things. To me the beauty of usenet is the chaos and mass amounts of info, even the noise that goes flying thru it. Without that it would be just like every other stale BBS forum with no edge and no fun. wow, these remailers are neat

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usenet gateway
by Grand Epopt Feotus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hmm, I tried to route a letter thru a remailer and to the usenet gateway at cs.utexas.edu and it has shown no bounce back or appeared in the propernewsgroup. Is the utexas place still operating? Or, did I do something wrong. Basically what I did, was hit "R" in trn in order to make a reply, then I edited the headers and added the neccesary lines to forward the mail thru the remailer. hmm, or is the utexas place slow at sending out articles? You're eqipped with a hundred billion nueron brain, that's wired and fired, and it's a reality generating device, but you've got too do it. Free youself ----Tim Leary----

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unsubscribe
by THOMAST＠UWSTOUT.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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dos stego
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Fellow Cypherpatriots, I just finished mailing uuencoded stegodos.zip to all those who requested it. I also uploaded it to soda.berkeley.edu to /pub/cypherpunks/incoming. The file is stegodos.zip. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLWTlctCcBnAsu2t1AQFiZAQAlNnvZh5Iy4ZTZHM9lT3GYVfj0/dcEw+9 AoxuEp0uRMc0kqSPH6AL7OtgKfhxLnUZ9GGoMpGdjoMAiqSjnICMZUwLLlVzJ5Dd xIY28uwT1mqv3yCx6mynCpVlNUQ/5L+toQIvTEyhD2bScSdOeb/zdgNF3C9Y5i7L vrSUMWslTI0= =EIUS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Mimicry
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find hiding info. in falsely deleted files to be futile because of the following reasons. 1. too easy to write over them. 2. procedures to keep track of everything too complicated. 3. direct sector writing is a non-trivial programming problem, rather risky, & complicated with today's compressed disks. I have thought of a related alternative however: The use of one of the virus maker's tools - the false "BAD SECTOR" trick where good data is written into these "bad sectors". You would only want to mark a few sectors as bad & then put in only high quality information. Some kind of a "bootstrapping" operation such as a simple XOR program that turns a "garbage file" into a PGP file. The PGP could in turn be use to decrypt a stenography system for a real high security encrypt system. Remember that a user supplied password must also be used. Incidentally, if we are forced to rely on stenography systems exclusively, we may have lost a battle or 2, but we will win innumerable other battles & later - the war. Yours Turly, Gary Jeffers GO TEAM GO! GO TEAM GO! PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WAAAAYYYY BBAAACCCKKK! BEEEAAATTT STATE!

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Re: Tentacle Contest -- Great!
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>That contest by SQUISH is great! I think I was laughing halfway through >the first paragraph through to the end! >Can I become a tentacle? 8) >I hope no one takes you TOO seriously -- oh please. > > > _____ > ____......------'-----`------......_____ > -=======================================================- > `-----....._________.....-----' > ____ \ | / ____ > (____) __/_|_\__ (____) > \\_________.-'_.-----._`-._________// > `---------`.. `-----' ..'---------' > `~~~~~~~' > /------------------------------------------------------------------\ > | If God had wanted us to explore space, he would have given us | > | a moon. -- The Discovery Channel | > |------------------------------------------------------------------| > | The world is moving so fast that the man who says 'it can't be | > | is usually interrupted by the man doing it. | > |------------------------------------------------------------------| > | Joshua Danowitz, Csci Major, Hunter College, City Univ. of NY | > | Internet Address -- JODHC(a)CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU | > | Bitnet Address -- JODHC(a)CUNYVM.BITNET | > | Snail-Mail Address -- 12 E. 86 St./Apt. 605, New York, NY 10028 | > \------------------------------------------------------------------/ this is disgusting. stop it at once. or change your name or something. josh

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Digital Money
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to take issue with the recently expressed opinion that digital cash is not money, but merely a mechanism for communicating transactions. What does it mean to mint money? In the traditional sense, it means to issue something only you can produce, and guarantee that it will be accepted for some sort of goods and services. In the case of paper money, this takes the form of a printed document which is moderately difficult to forge, and which can be exchanged for goods and services of various kinds. Since the issuing agency, usually a government, is presumed to exercise prudent financial management to prevent the currency's value from decreasing, and is likely to be around for a long time, such cash can be hoarded with little risk. In making the transition from paper cash to digital cash, only one thing changes. It is now the information which represents the money, not the document itself. Since such information can be easily replicated, spent banknotes must be carefully documented and the issuing institution must allow each banknote to be spent exactly once. Cryptographic signatures and authenticity verification provide excellent protection against forgery. But these differences are minor ones. Banknotes which have been communicated to you through a secure channel, and whose contents have not been disclosed to any third party, should be for all practical purposes identical to cash. Digital banknotes issued by a national government should be just as good as physical banknotes printed by a national government. Most of the objections to using digital cash for other than immediate transactions stems from issues related to trust in the issuing institution. One would certainly have less faith in a newly formed digital bank operated through a string of anonymous remailers than one would have in digital currency issued by Citibank or Chase Manhattan. But given an issuing institution of unquestionable trust, there should be no significant difference between digital cash and real cash, and storing it for indefinite amounts of time on a floppy in your pocket should be completely risk-free. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.3a Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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Re: CERT/Whitehouse/Clipper link - smoking gun...
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

By God, I knew there was something fishy about that latest CERT release (the one that referred to things that happened last November and didn't actually say anything new, but somehow managed to hit the *WORLD* press extensively within 24 hours)... It's stuff that's been happening *since* last November. I'm quite certain that the attacks were continuing until (at the very least) shortly before the announcement. PS The statement is also false: digital signatures would have no effect on network sniffing attacks; but it's just more FUD to strengthen the Whitehouse hand in a release that was buried in a flood of releases that day on Clipper. No, you're wrong. A challenge/response login architecture based on digital signatures would have eliminated the attack. And digital signatures -- unlike most other technologies for one-time passwords -- do not require that any secret information be kept on the host. There are practical difficulties, such as entering in 160 bits of information, but for host-to-host logins, that isn't much of a problem.

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