December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

LAST CALL: Crypto export bill - one day left to make or break!
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*DISTRIBUTE WIDELY AND QUICKLY* ONE DAY DEADLINE! The House Intelligence Committee will probably make their decision on the vital issue of cryptography export tomorrow afternoon, Wed. June 15, 1994. If you've not had your say on whether the State Dept. & NSA will be allowed to continue to restrict the flow of public cryptographic products, write, call and fax *today*. Updated fax information for the entire Intelligence Cmte. is below, as is a sample letter, and background information on this important legislative action. If you don't get through on your first fax attempt, keep trying. All of these numbers have been tested and are working as of June 14. ******* What You Can Do 1) Fax a short letter TODAY to the chair of the Intelligence Committee, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS). Ask him in your own words to leave the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937 intact. You may wish to send a copy of this to the committee itself also. Fax number: +1 202 225 5398 Committee fax: +1 202 225 1991 2) If you are unable to fax a letter, send an e-mail message to Rep. Glickman at glickman(a)eff.org. We'll deliver it for you, provide it arrives before noon, at which point all such messages must be delivered. 3) Personally urge everyone you know to send a similar fax to Rep. Glickman TODAY, especially if they are among Glickman's Kansas constituents. 4) If your own Representative is on the Intelligence Committee, send him or her a copy of what you sent Rep. Glickman. ******* Phone and Fax Numbers House Intelligence Committee ---------------------------- Subcommittee phone: +1 202 225 4121 Subcommittee fax: +1 202 225 1991 <== send your fax HERE <== p st name phone fax ___________________________________________________________________________ D KS Glickman, Daniel +1 202 225 6216 +1 202 225 5398 Chair D WA Dicks, Norman D. +1 202 225 5916 +1 202 226 1176 D CA Dixon, Julian C. +1 202 225 7084 +1 202 225 4091 D NJ Torricelli, Robert +1 202 224 5061 +1 202 225 0843 D TX Coleman, Ronald D. +1 202 225 4831 +1 202 225 4831 [Coleman's staff manually switch line to fax if they hear fax tones. Preceeding your fax with a voice call might help] D CO Skaggs, David E. +1 202 225 2161 +1 202 225 9127 D NV Bilbray, James H. +1 202 225 5965 +1 202 225 8808 D CA Pelosi, Nancy +1 202 225 4965 +1 202 225 8259 D TX Laughlin, Gregory H. +1 202 225 2831 +1 202 225 1108 D AL Cramer Jr, Robert (Bud) +1 202 225 4801 private D RI Reed, John F. +1 202 225 2735 +1 202 225 9580 D MO Gephardt, Richard A. +1 202 225 2671 +1 202 225 7452 R TX Combest, Larry +1 202 225 4005 +1 202 225 9615 R NE Bereuter, Douglas +1 202 225 4806 +1 202 226 1148 R CA Dornan, Robert K. +1 202 225 2965 private [Dornan's public fax disconnected; office refuses to divulge a fax number] R FL Young, C. W. (Bill) +1 202 225 5961 +1 202 225 9764 R PA Gekas, George W. +1 202 225 4315 +1 202 225 8440 R UT Hansen, James V. +1 202 225 0453 +1 202 225 5857 R CA Lewis, Jerry +1 202 225 5861 +1 202 225 6498 R IL Michel, Robert H. +1 202 225 6201 +1 202 225 9461 ****** Sample Fax FAX to: 202-225-1991 and 202-225-5398 Representative Daniel Glickman Chair House Intelligence Committee U.S House of Representatives Dear Representative Glickman: I realize that tomorrow your committee will probably act on the encryption provisions of H.R. 3937, the Export Administration Act of 1994. I urge that you allow them to remain as they were introduced in Rep. Cantwell's H.R. 3627, and subsequently incorporated into H.R. 3937. Privacy is the basis for my concern, and I support the ability to use secure encryption. Additionally, prohibiting the export of secure cryptography from the United States puts the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage internationally, for who would choose to use crypography known to be insecure (such as the "Clipper Chip", or products intentionally weakened to pass excessively stringent export restrictions)? Please, support privacy and security by preserving the cryptography export language of H.R. 3937. <signed> ****** More Information Detailed background information on this alert: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export.alert gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export.alert http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export.alert.html BBS (+1 202 638 6119, 6120; 8N1): "Alerts" file area, export.alt The actual text of this part of H.R. 3937 is at: ftp: ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export, hr3937_crypto.excerpt http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/ITAR_export/hr3937_crypto.excerpt BBS: "Privacy--Crypto" file area, hr3937.crp For current status on the bill: ftp.eff.org, /pub/Alerts/export_alert.update gopher.eff.org, 1/Alerts, export_alert.update http://www.eff.org/pub/Alerts/export_alert.update BBS: "Alerts" file area, export.upd A general Web page on crypto export policy is at: http://www.cygnus.com/~gnu/export.html -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

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instructions on how to get PGP 2.6
by ecarp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Could someone email me the directions on how and where to get PGP 2.6? I have the directions, but they're sitting at home in my mailbox, and I'm 2 hour away from home. :( Thanks in advance... :) - -- Ed Carp, N7EKG/VE3 Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi If you want magic, let go of your armor. Magic is so much stronger than steel! -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.5 iQCVAgUBLf8d8SS9AwzY9LDxAQGMrgP/UobsKNKlYJgJDJJkgM1I9JF5P4jnXaYW QD4/3WzMkMdnI0+hxWTMRfgFru3gXoG7gCeE8qXyhzr0s2VkK4VJOD0t1fEMar6D Sxwbwj847ecymIEIc+lFTVPalEOmpQfYILJ/RKQzlZ2weMKh1hzbL9681LDiedIa VtUtZE20TmA= =LcB6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: instructions on how to get PGP 2.6
by ecarp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to the folks who responded to this - I got the instructions, and retrieved pgp 2.6. Thanks again for the very swift responses! :) -- Ed Carp, N7EKG/VE3 Ed.Carp(a)linux.org, ecarp(a)netcom.com Finger ecarp(a)netcom.com for PGP 2.5 public key an88744(a)anon.penet.fi If you want magic, let go of your armor. Magic is so much stronger than steel! -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

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Re: Waco in cyberspace
by landmann＠facstaff.wisc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:53 6/15/94 +0500, Brett Chappell wrote: >>>Dr. Clinton C. Brooks, the N.S.A.'s lead scientist on the Clipper Chip >>>told me, "You won't have a Waco in Texas, you'll have a Waco in cyberspace. >>>You could have a cult, spaeking to each other through encyrption, that >>>suddenly erupts in society - well programmed, well organized - and then >>>suddenly disappears again." The folks in Waco hadn't committed any great crime, and would have continued in their secluded existence for quite some time had the ATF not seen fit to provide a catalyst. I suppose that cyberspace, with its potential anonymity and privacy, would be the stuff ATF nightmares are made of.. NO DOORS TO KICK DOWN, and GUNS are PRETTY USELESS in CYBERSPACE!! :-) -Tom =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Thomas Landmann E-mail: landmann(a)facstaff.wisc.edu DoIT Network Systems Technology Compuserve: 76020,2055 1210 W Dayton Street, Rm 4220 AX.25: N9UDL @ WD9ESU.#SCWI.WI.NOAM Office: 608.263.1650 Home: 608.277.1115 =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= >>> Waiting for "Chicago"? Try Linux *NOW* instead! <<<

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NIST's ftp site
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of days ago, somebody mentioned that NIST's public ftp site contained the FIPS for DES in text form (I think the post was in a reply to "Massive ITAR Violation!"). Could somebody mail me a copy of that post, I deleted it and now I wish I hadn't. Also, what is the Internet address of NIST's ftp site? Thanks, Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Brooks Statement on Crypto
by David Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The following statement by Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX) was today entered in the Congressional Record and transmitted to the House Intelligence Committee. Rep. Brooks is Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and played a key role in the passage of the Computer Security Act of 1987 when he served as Chairman of the House Government Operations Committee. David Sobel <sobel(a)epic.org> Legal Counsel Electronic Privacy Information Center ============================================================= ENCRYPTION POLICY ENDANGERS U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN GLOBAL MARKETPLACE For some time now, a debate has been raging in the media and in the halls of Congress over the Administration's intention to require U.S. corporations to use and market the Clipper Chip, an encryption device developed in secret by the National Security Agency. The Clipper Chip will provide industry and others with the ability to encode telephone and computer communications. The use of the Clipper Chip as the U.S. encryption standard is a concept promoted by both the intelligence and law enforcement communities because it is designed with a back door to make it relatively easy for these agencies to listen in on these communications. The law enforcement and intelligence communities have a legitimate concern that advances in technology will make their jobs more difficult. But the issue here is whether attempts to restrict the development, use and export of encryption amounts to closing the barn door after the horse has already escaped. The notion that we can limit encryption is just plain fanciful. Encryption technology is available worldwide -- and will become more available as time goes on. First, generally available software with encryption capabilities is sold within the U.S. at thousands of retail outlets, by mail, even, over the phone. These programs may be transferred abroad in minutes by anyone using a public telephone line and a computer modem. Second, it is estimated that over 200 products from some 22 countries -- including Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, India, and South Africa -- use some form of the encryption that the Government currently prohibits U.S. companies from exporting. According to the May 16, 1994 issue of _Fortune_, not only are U.S. companies willing to purchase foreign encryption devices, American producers of encrypted software are also moving production overseas to escape the current export controls. Third, encryption techniques and technology are well understood throughout the world. Encryption is routinely taught in computer science programs. Text books explain the underlying encryption technology. International organizations have published protocols for implementing high level encryption. Actual implementations of encryption -- programs ready to use by even computer novices -- are on the Internet. The only result of continued U.S. export controls is to threaten the continued preeminence of America's computer software and hardware companies in world markets. These restrictive policies jeopardize the health of American companies, and the jobs and revenues they generate. I support, therefore, the immediate revision of current export controls over encryption devices to comport with the reality of worldwide encryption availability. I believe law enforcement and the intelligence community would be better served by finding real, and targeted ways to deal with international terrorists and criminals rather than promoting scattershot policies, which restrict American industries' ability to design, produce and market technology. Now -- more than ever -- we cannot afford to harm our economic competitiveness and justify it in the name of national security.

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Decline and Fall
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Decline and Fall of the Nation State: Tuesday's WSJ had an article on how private money market funds are starting to jawbone foreign governments just like the World Bank used to. Case cited was Fidelity Investments calling Mexican bank officials during the Peso crisis after the recent assasination. They said "we'll invest another $18 billion (of ours and other fund's money) if you do what we say and if not..." DCF "If they hadn't killed quite so many people, you'd almost have to feel sorry for them." --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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[ANSWER] NIST's ftp site
by jim＠bilbo.suite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to all who responded to my question. The answer is: csrc.ncsl.nist.gov Also, apparently, source for DES was in Appendix A of the file "/pub/nistpubs/fips181.txt". However, it was removed and replaced with the following: Appendix A This section contained a listing of the source code referenced in the Automated Password Generator Standard. This section is not available in electronic form. Complete copies of FIPS 181, including this appendix, may be purchased in hardcopy from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS) via mail or telephone. National Technical Information Service U.S. Department of Commerce 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, VA 22161 (703) 487-4650 Order by FIPSPUB181 Price: $22.50 (Same address and phone number for discount prices on quantity orders.) -------------- I wonder if they'll ship to an address outside of the US or Canada? I wonder if the people who package and mail the stuff even look at it? Jim_Miller(a)suite.com

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Cypherpunks' mail database does exist
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Vincent, you state that a fully archived, indexed cypherpunks mailing list exists as: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/cypherpunks.src Ok, so I ftp'ed to pmip.maricopa.edu & tried to get to cypherpunks.src, but even the subdirectories weren't there. I suspect that http does not imply that we ftp. What communication method is this called & how do we use it? I send this public instead of private as I suspect that a lot of lurkers don't know what is going on either. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers

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Problems with Definitions in Escrow
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by James A. Donald: If you *define* reputations to be something formal and explicit, and say that the system will work because people guard their reputations, then reputations become something that can be most efficiently granted and withdrawn by some centralized authority. . . . . . . . . . . . I am complaining about dangerous carelessness in your use and definition of words. Your use of the word reputation is as fraught with frightful consequences as Marx's use of the word "value". ................................................................. .... Perhaps when you decry the establishment of 'definitions' you mean that a concept should not be circumbscribed tightly within the boundaries of a pre-determined range of meaning? I thought what Hal intended by 'examining & defining' a term, was simply to assess what it means to those who are seeking to apply it, rather than intending to confine it in advance of any real knowledge of its actual reference. Blanc

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