December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Enuf is enuf!
by Bruce C. Dovala 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all! I _pay_ to read what's on this list. I was hoping that it would concern cryptography, remailers, etc. Detweiler was gone for a time. Now apparently it's the current fashion to flame him since he's returned. I'm not gonna pay to read rants against him. Do _something_ or talk in private. Does any of this shit belong on the list? And should I have to pay for it? I _know_ there are good minds out there, but why do I get all of these flames? Not quite what I was expecting. If you wanna talk crypto, post here. If you wanna beat Detweiler into the ground, please do it in private email! I _really_ don't care to hear attacks on another person. (Like that's why I subscribe? NOT!) Bruce

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The L.D. persona...
by qwerty-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dave Womack asked, >The other day, I noticed that MacPGP seemed >to give credit to a person with the initials L. D. In the MacPGP2.3 startup screen there appears "... L. Detweiler....". He adapted John Norstad's help routine for use in MacPGP. This was a vast improvement over the documentation that came with MacPGP2.2. You still need my "Here's How to MacPGP!" guide though ;-). He also wrote the "Privacy and Anonymity on the Internet" FAQ, which is still regularly posted to Usenet, and mentioned at the end of my Guide, and is highly recommended reading. Then he went koo-koo. Oh well. I'm sure the old timers here know more about that than I do. -=Xenon=- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWLBCQSzG6zrQn1RAQE+iwP+NjFViFSGS2LppEVeUjDnQE1/0G/NWwxw wFeLj0gYidkFtrUd37VUD0Xpvu4uWnzSEjr28QH7ycF5Zhw2rtirVb7tNaM2NeX7 vX0i8Eg3VsN3zoApm0Zdgo2dGZmxO4PES5OW4Kc33+CSjMf78L4n6D9wQX7SPc/M znS73lmdKxk= =QQrZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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unsubscribe
by Tom Cropper 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsubscribe

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Bye from Xenon.
by Nikolaos Daniel Willmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -= qwerty remailer shutdown notice =- Disclaimer: none. OK tentacles, damage control time. See what one post can start? And you think alt.w.a.s.t.e. would survive (see forwarded posts from Usenet)? I have just remembered that I arrived here on this mailing list in need of remailers, since I was being anonymously Xenon. For that I gave up my anonymity, to the remailer operators. Then I decided to gain some legitimacy by starting my own remailer on Netcom. As Netcom has no Manhattan number yet, and I like to connect at lab, that blew my anonymity for any Unix skilled person who wanted to find out who I was. Finally I lost sight of why I really came here, which was to find out ways to get PGP out to people. And now that I'm posting via qwerty, I don't even need a remailer network any more. I have also come to realize that in the next five years, the ONLY solution to keep people from abusing the remailers is a human being sitting there moderating the remailer. As I do not have the time, and do NOT think it would be profitable to try to pay some undergraduate to moderate qwerty, I have decided to shut qwerty down. The only other solution in my mind is to have qwerty forge its return address, a solution that will likely get my account revoked when the shit hits the fan after just ONE abuse causing postmaster(a)netcom.com to have to pour through sendmail logs and process logs or whatever, to find me. And qwerty(a)netcom.com has become the "PGP Information Clearinghouse". Yes I find it amusing to see "fuck-wads" whine about one bad post to their oh so precious little narrow-minded newsgroup, but I no longer see qwerty(a)netcom.com as an expendable resource, which I can afford to loose. I thought of remaining on the Cypherpunks mailing list, only because Pr0duct Cypher (PGP Tools and Magic Money), Will Kinney (Curve Encrypt), and a few other bright lights post here. But I am a man of action, not of debate, and even on turning to debate on this list, I find very few out here who are as smart, humane, creative, or radical as I am, and therefore I become unfulfilled with the level of discussion I am able to find. I made a big mistake turning away from product development and information distribution to debate, and trying to change people's opinions. This was what lead me to science. I can be found on Usenet, if ever my unsubscribe request will be fulfilled by Eric Hughes, who cannot even figure out how to automate a mailing list, or avoid silly errors with the remailing software. I am sorry to express my disappointment, and the fault lies only with myself, for I mistook you for adults. When a real (my favorite word) cryptography mailing list appears, and is announced on Usenet, I shall subscribe. The "Cypherpunks" have disappointed me, for as I have said before, they are not punks. Nor, I have found, are they "Cypher", if that imply them being competent activists. Hell, they can't even run a mailing list or an ftp site. The clincher came today, when I asked Eric Hughes, "founder of the Cypherpunk movement", about why the FUCK he hasn't fixed macpgp2.3.cpt.hqx to reflect the fact that it is a .gz file, not a .hqx text file. This, after I posted it very loudly to the list that it had a corrupt name, and that a month after I posted the same thing to Usenet. What he told me was this, and I apologize for the pathetic act of posting "personal e-mail" but well, FUCK YOU if it bothers you, or doesn't conform to some RFC standard of "netiquette": >From: hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) >Look, I don't have the permission to change the file name, or I would have >done it. soda is running with very low quotas and the administrators >changed some of the ownerships without setting the permissions right, OK? And this is our Great White Hope for who will run our future e-bank, and revolution culminating in the fall of the government as we know it? He who speaks in tongues instead of English, about remailers? When I stop laughing, I'll start crying. And Eric, "Hey". Sure liked that STUPID Cypherpunks meeting, with all the God Damned, "Eric_Hughes [Guest] orders Medusa, One Medusa, coming right up!, Don't got your snakes on today, Might I recommend a needle with that?, The bacteria on the bar die as the drink is set down., ld brings Eric_Hughes [Guest] a Medusa." PhUcK y0u EveRyb0dy ;-). Bye, till I get my hands on Stealth-PGP, which should be a few days from now. Then the fun begins: sophisticated steganography. I hope it works out with Stealth-PGP, so I don't have to convince people to rewrite PGP from the ground up, 'cause as you know it takes a lot of work to get past those "closed doors" to talk to those secretive developers of the (grassroots) upcoming new de-facto encryption standard. Why don't I disappear silently? Because I know there are many "lurkers" out there who would appreciate knowing why I left. I get mail from them often. In fact, I think the greatest power in this list, if it has power, lies in the hands of the "lurkers". Those who spread PGP, one copy at a time, and wish to learn here, not live here. And because I want this great audience to hear my words, for I think they matter and will have influence, for I say nay, these are not activists, these "Cypherpunks". They are greedy e-yuppies, who would use encryption for personal gain, at the expense of their fellow man. I have discovered that and I now must part ways, hoping I do not loose contact with those few out here on the internet who are straight thinkers and straight arrows. Another pathetically motivated, but this time nostalgic, quote from personal e-mail: From: Philip Zimmermann <prz(a)columbine.cgd.ucar.EDU> >Your letter is interesting. I'd like to discuss some ideas with you. >We should talk. Please send me your phone number, or call me at >XXX XXX-XXXX. Early morning is not the best time to call. Any other >time is. Please call me. I like your ideas. -=Xenon=- Forwarded from Usenet ("the beginning of the end"): comp.org.eff.talk #27044 (0 + 3 more) [1] From: mcwhirk(a)mail.auburn.edu (Robert K Mcwhirter) [1] Is this Blacknet stuff possible? Followup: comp.org.eff.talk Organization: Auburn University X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Date: Wed Feb 16 23:58:30 EST 1994 Lines: 51 [ Article crossposted from sura.security ] [ Author was Pat Eddy ] [ Posted on Wed, 16 Feb 94 17:11:52 -0500 ] Pat, > Can someone at SURAnet comment on this Blacknet stuff that seems to > be hitting some of the USENET newsgroups lately. Are these people > as untraceable as they say ? I saw the posts myself... The best comment I saw was a followup post, to the effect of "some darn kids out there have been taking William Gibson a little too seriously." A little more seriously, though: Yes, it may be very hard to find out who is participating in this scam -- given the number of anonymous posting services and anonymous ftp sites (some of which don't log their transactions at all) they could hide for quite some time from semi-casual scrutiny. However, given CERT's fairly long arm in this arena, I suspect it wouldn't take long for a concerted effort on the part of CERT to shut them down. That depends on CERT's perception of "blacknet" as a serious security threat -- I can't speak for them, but I'd hazard to guess that they are about as concerned about "blacknet" as we at SURAnet are... which is to say "not at all". (I base this guess on a lack on response from CERT regarding these posts.) I also think that blacknet's reach exceeds their grasp -- the claims they make about "sending cash" and "depositing funds in accounts you specify" strikes me as mighty big talk from a group that isn't on Dunn and Bradstreet's register. If anything, their goals are probably much more short term, like ripping off anyone foolish enough to show interest in their "service." And of course, there's always the chance that it was just a joke/boast/prank. Usenet is the Net of a Million Lies, after all.... Nick Vargish ---------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- - - --- |. Nick Vargish .| |. SURAnet .| |. O: (301) 982-4600 .| |. vargish(a)sura.net .| |. systems engineer .| |. rust never sleeps .| ---------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- - - --- comp.org.eff.talk #27045 (0 + 2 more) [1] From: mcwhirk(a)mail.auburn.edu (Robert K Mcwhirter) [1] Blacknet Organization: Auburn University X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL2] Date: Thu Feb 17 00:01:11 EST 1994 Lines: 19 I just corss-posted (I think I did it right) an article concerning the 'Blacknet'. What bothers me is not the blacknet itself, but the attitude of the second poster in the thread saying how CERT could 'strong-arm' the anonymous remailers to find out who was running the Blacknet. Is this possible? Would/Could CERT actually do this if they wanted to? What are they? The net.cops? - - -Bob - - -- ==== Bob Socrates McWhirter internet: mcwhirk(a)mail.auburn.edu "God is dead" "Nietzsche is dead" -Nietzsche -God -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLWLyEgSzG6zrQn1RAQFGRgQAwRKm/6vblnWxwZ9hgfwPo4VKlUwkqIGE 8rJMMDSP9F6W0iGHn0EEXTFShqTRP0DGK93DdWorbv6TIIZxbZnbO7Yrzzn/CR63 neAKwrEoyiBYHwgfw7OvPYx4erQJnd5VFKlc1eXA5usjL4reokg2HpFA/Jr2EvXx OWP1g6YPdPk= =66hE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RIP ld231782
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[longs.lance.colostate.edu] Login name: ld231782 In real life: L. Detweiler Office: Home phone: 498-8278 Directory: /users/ALUMNI/ES/ld231782 Shell: /warnuser Never logged in. Plan: This account is no longer active. E-mail to this account will be bounced; forwarding address is unavailable.

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unsubscribe
by William Thompson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

please unsubscribe me.

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Barlow Wired article on Clipper - "Jackboots on the Infobahn" !
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[note: this article and other Clipper material are archived at: ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Clipper/ Similar material can be found at soda.berkeley.edu.] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- =-=-=-=-=-=-Copyright 1993,4 Wired USA Ltd. All Rights Reserved=-=-=-=-=-= -=-=For complete copyright information, please see the end of this file=-=- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= WIRED 2.04 Electrosphere ************* Jackboots on the Infobahn ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Clipper is a last ditch attempt by the United States, the last great power from the old Industrial Era, to establish imperial control over cyberspace. By John Perry Barlow [Note: The following article will appear in the April 1994 issue of WIRED. We, the editors of WIRED, are net-casting it now in its pre-published form as a public service. Because of the vital and urgent nature of its message, we believe readers on the Net should hear and take action now. You are free to pass this article on electronically; in fact we urge you to replicate it throughout the net with our blessings. If you do, please keep the copyright statements and this note intact. For a complete listing of Clipper-related resources available through WIRED Online, send email to <infobot(a)wired.com> with the following message: "send clipper.index". - The Editors of WIRED] On January 11, I managed to schmooze myself aboard Air Force 2. It was flying out of LA, where its principal passenger had just outlined his vision of the information superhighway to a suited mob of television, show- biz, and cable types who fervently hoped to own it one day - if they could ever figure out what the hell it was. >From the standpoint of the Electronic Frontier Foundation the speech had been wildly encouraging. The administration's program, as announced by Vice President Al Gore, incorporated many of the concepts of open competition, universal access, and deregulated common carriage that we'd been pushing for the previous year. But he had said nothing about the future of privacy, except to cite among the bounties of the NII its ability to "help law enforcement agencies thwart criminals and terrorists who might use advanced telecommunications to commit crimes." On the plane I asked Gore what this implied about administration policy on cryptography. He became as noncommittal as a cigar-store Indian. "We'll be making some announcements.... I can't tell you anything more." He hurried to the front of the plane, leaving me to troubled speculation. Despite its fundamental role in assuring privacy, transaction security, and reliable identity within the NII, the Clinton administration has not demonstrated an enlightenment about cryptography up to par with the rest of its digital vision. The Clipper Chip - which threatens to be either the goofiest waste of federal dollars since President Gerald Ford's great Swine Flu program or, if actually deployed, a surveillance technology of profound malignancy - seemed at first an ugly legacy of the Reagan-Bush modus operandi. "This is going to be our Bay of Pigs," one Clinton White House official told me at the time Clipper was introduced, referring to the disastrous plan to invade Cuba that Kennedy inherited from Eisenhower. (Clipper, in case you're just tuning in, is an encryption chip that the National Security Agency and FBI hope will someday be in every phone and computer in America. It scrambles your communications, making them unintelligible to all but their intended recipients. All, that is, but the government, which would hold the "key" to your chip. The key would separated into two pieces, held in escrow, and joined with the appropriate "legal authority.") Of course, trusting the government with your privacy is like having a Peeping Tom install your window blinds. And, since the folks I've met in this White House seem like extremely smart, conscious freedom-lovers - hell, a lot of them are Deadheads - I was sure that after they were fully moved in, they'd face down the National Security Agency and the FBI, let Clipper die a natural death, and lower the export embargo on reliable encryption products. Furthermore, the National Institutes of Standards and Technology and the National Security Council have been studying both Clipper and export embargoes since April. Given that the volumes of expert testimony they had collected overwhelmingly opposed both, I expected the final report would give the administration all the support it needed to do the right thing. I was wrong. Instead, there would be no report. Apparently, they couldn't draft one that supported, on the evidence, what they had decided to do instead. THE OTHER SHOE DROPS On Friday, February 4, the other jackboot dropped. A series of announcements from the administration made it clear that cryptography would become their very own "Bosnia of telecommunications" (as one staffer put it). It wasn't just that the old Serbs in the National Security Agency and the FBI were still making the calls. The alarming new reality was that the invertebrates in the White House were only too happy to abide by them. Anything to avoid appearing soft on drugs or terrorism. So, rather than ditching Clipper, they declared it a Federal Data Processing Standard, backing that up with an immediate government order for 50,000 Clipper devices. They appointed the National Institutes of Standards and Technology and the Department of Treasury as the "trusted" third parties that would hold the Clipper key pairs. (Treasury, by the way, is also home to such trustworthy agencies as the Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.) They reaffirmed the export embargo on robust encryption products, admitting for the first time that its purpose was to stifle competition to Clipper. And they outlined a very porous set of requirements under which the cops might get the keys to your chip. (They would not go into the procedure by which the National Security Agency could get them, though they assured us it was sufficient.) They even signaled the impending return of the dread Digital Telephony, an FBI legislative initiative requiring fundamental reengineering of the information infrastructure; providing wiretapping ability to the FBI would then become the paramount design priority. INVASION OF THE BODY SNATCHERS Actually, by the time the announcements thudded down, I wasn't surprised by them. I had spent several days the previous week in and around the White House. I felt like I was in another remake of The Invasion of the Body Snatchers. My friends in the administration had been transformed. They'd been subsumed by the vast mindfield on the other side of the security clearance membrane, where dwell the monstrous bureaucratic organisms that feed on fear. They'd been infected by the institutionally paranoid National Security Agency's Weltanschauung. They used all the telltale phrases. Mike Nelson, the White House point man on the NII, told me, "If only I could tell you what I know, you'd feel the same way I do." I told him I'd been inoculated against that argument during Vietnam. (And it does seem to me that if you're going to initiate a process that might end freedom in America, you probably need an argument that isn't classified.) Besides, how does he know what he knows? Where does he get his information? Why, the National Security Agency, of course. Which, given its strong interest in the outcome, seems hardly an unimpeachable source. However they reached it, Clinton and Gore have an astonishingly simple bottom line, to which even the future of American liberty and prosperity is secondary: They believe that it is their responsibility to eliminate, by whatever means, the possibility that some terrorist might get a nuke and use it on, say, the World Trade Center. They have been convinced that such plots are more likely to ripen to hideous fruition behind a shield of encryption. The staffers I talked to were unmoved by the argument that anyone smart enough to steal a nuclear device is probably smart enough to use PGP or some other uncompromised crypto standard. And never mind that the last people who popped a hooter in the World Trade Center were able to get it there without using any cryptography and while under FBI surveillance. We are dealing with religion here. Though only ten American lives have been lost to terrorism in the last two years, the primacy of this threat has become as much an article of faith with these guys as the Catholic conviction that human life begins at conception or the Mormon belief that the Lost Tribe of Israel crossed the Atlantic in submarines. In the spirit of openness and compromise, they invited the Electronic Frontier Foundation to submit other solutions to the "problem" of the nuclear-enabled terrorist than key escrow devices, but they would not admit into discussion the argument that such a threat might, in fact, be some kind of phantasm created by the spooks to ensure their lavish budgets into the post-Cold War era. As to the possibility that good old-fashioned investigative techniques might be more valuable in preventing their show-case catastrophe (as it was after the fact in finding the alleged perpetrators of the last attack on the World Trade Center), they just hunkered down and said that when wiretaps were necessary, they were damned well necessary. When I asked about the business that American companies lose because of their inability to export good encryption products, one staffer essentially dismissed the market, saying that total world trade in crypto goods was still less than a billion dollars. (Well, right. Thanks more to the diligent efforts of the National Security Agency than to dim sales potential.) I suggested that a more immediate and costly real-world effect of their policies would be to reduce national security by isolating American commerce, owing to a lack of international confidence in the security of our data lines. I said that Bruce Sterling's fictional data-enclaves in places like the Turks and Caicos Islands were starting to look real-world inevitable. They had a couple of answers to this, one unsatisfying and the other scary. The unsatisfying answer was that the international banking community could just go on using DES, which still seemed robust enough to them. (DES is the old federal Data Encryption Standard, thought by most cryptologists to be nearing the end of its credibility.) More frightening was their willingness to counter the data-enclave future with one in which no data channels anywhere would be secure from examination by one government or another. Pointing to unnamed other countries that were developing their own mandatory standards and restrictions regarding cryptography, they said words to the effect of, "Hey, it's not like you can't outlaw the stuff. Look at France." Of course, they have also said repeatedly - and for now I believe them - that they have absolutely no plans to outlaw non-Clipper crypto in the US. But that doesn't mean that such plans wouldn't develop in the presence of some pending "emergency." Then there is that White House briefing document, issued at the time Clipper was first announced, which asserts that no US citizen "as a matter of right, is entitled to an unbreakable commercial encryption product." Now why, if it's an ability they have no intention of contesting, do they feel compelled to declare that it's not a right? Could it be that they are preparing us for the laws they'll pass after some bearded fanatic has gotten himself a surplus nuke and used something besides Clipper to conceal his plans for it? If they are thinking about such an eventuality, we should be doing so as well. How will we respond? I believe there is a strong, though currently untested, argument that outlawing unregulated crypto would violate the First Amendment, which surely protects the manner of our speech as clearly as it protects the content. But of course the First Amendment is, like the rest of the Constitution, only as good as the government's willingness to uphold it. And they are, as I say, in the mood to protect our safety over our liberty. This is not a mind-frame against which any argument is going to be very effective. And it appeared that they had already heard and rejected every argument I could possibly offer. In fact, when I drew what I thought was an original comparison between their stand against naturally proliferating crypto and the folly of King Canute (who placed his throne on the beach and commanded the tide to leave him dry), my government opposition looked pained and said he had heard that one almost as often as jokes about roadkill on the information superhighway. I hate to go to war with them. War is always nastier among friends. Furthermore, unless they've decided to let the National Security Agency design the rest of the National Information Infrastructure as well, we need to go on working closely with them on the whole range of issues like access, competition, workplace privacy, common carriage, intellectual property, and such. Besides, the proliferation of strong crypto will probably happen eventually no matter what they do. But then again, it might not. In which case we could shortly find ourselves under a government that would have the automated ability to log the time, origin and recipient of every call we made, could track our physical whereabouts continuously, could keep better account of our financial transactions than we do, and all without a warrant. Talk about crime prevention! Worse, under some vaguely defined and surely mutable "legal authority," they also would be able to listen to our calls and read our e-mail without having to do any backyard rewiring. They wouldn't need any permission at all to monitor overseas calls. If there's going to be a fight, I'd rather it be with this government than the one we'd likely face on that hard day. Hey, I've never been a paranoid before. It's always seemed to me that most governments are too incompetent to keep a good plot strung together all the way from coffee break to quitting time. But I am now very nervous about the government of the United States of America. Because Bill 'n' Al, whatever their other new-paradigm virtues, have allowed the very old-paradigm trogs of the Guardian Class to define as their highest duty the defense of America against an enemy that exists primarily in the imagination - and is therefore capable of anything. To assure absolute safety against such an enemy, there is no limit to the liberties we will eventually be asked to sacrifice. And, with a Clipper Chip in every phone, there will certainly be no technical limit on their ability to enforce those sacrifices. WHAT YOU CAN DO GET CONGRESS TO LIFT THE CRYPTO EMBARGO The administration is trying to impose Clipper on us by manipulating market forces. By purchasing massive numbers of Clipper devices, they intend to induce an economy of scale which will make them cheap while the export embargo renders all competition either expensive or nonexistent. We have to use the market to fight back. While it's unlikely that they'll back down on Clipper deployment, the Electronic Frontier Foundation believes that with sufficient public involvement, we can get Congress to eliminate the export embargo. Rep. Maria Cantwell, D-Washington, has a bill (H.R. 3627) before the Economic Policy, Trade, and Environment Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that would do exactly that. She will need a lot of help from the public. They may not care much about your privacy in DC, but they still care about your vote. Please signal your support of H.R. 3627, either by writing her directly or e-mailing her at cantwell(a)eff.org. Messages sent to that address will be printed out and delivered to her office. In the subject header of your message, please include the words "support HR 3627." In the body of your message, express your reasons for supporting the bill. You may also express your sentiments to Rep. Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs chair, by e-mailing hamilton(a)eff.org. Furthermore, since there is nothing quite as powerful as a letter from a constituent, you should check the following list of subcommittee and committee members to see if your congressional representative is among them. If so, please copy them your letter to Rep. Cantwell. > Economic Policy, Trade, and Environment Subcommittee: Democrats: Sam Gejdenson (Chair), D-Connecticut; James Oberstar, D- Minnesota; Cynthia McKinney, D-Georgia; Maria Cantwell, D-Washington; Eric Fingerhut, D-Ohio; Albert R. Wynn, D-Maryland; Harry Johnston, D-Florida; Eliot Engel, D-New York; Charles Schumer, D-New York. Republicans: Toby Roth (ranking), R-Wisconsin; Donald Manzullo, R-Illinois; Doug Bereuter, R-Nebraska; Jan Meyers, R-Kansas; Cass Ballenger, R-North Carolina; Dana Rohrabacher, R-California. > House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Democrats: Lee Hamilton (Chair), D-Indiana; Tom Lantos, D-California; Robert Torricelli, D-New Jersey; Howard Berman, D-California; Gary Ackerman, D-New York; Eni Faleomavaega, D-Somoa; Matthew Martinez, D- California; Robert Borski, D-Pennsylvania; Donal Payne, D-New Jersey; Robert Andrews, D-New Jersey; Robert Menendez, D-New Jersey; Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio; Alcee Hastings, D-Florida; Peter Deutsch, D-Florida; Don Edwards, D-California; Frank McCloskey, D-Indiana; Thomas Sawyer, D-Ohio; Luis Gutierrez, D-Illinois. Republicans: Benjamin Gilman (ranking), R-New York; William Goodling, R- Pennsylvania; Jim Leach, R-Iowa; Olympia Snowe, R-Maine; Henry Hyde, R- Illinois; Christopher Smith, R-New Jersey; Dan Burton, R-Indiana; Elton Gallegly, R-California; Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Florida; David Levy, R-New York; Lincoln Diaz-Balart, R-Florida; Ed Royce, R-California. BOYCOTT CLIPPER DEVICES AND THE COMPANIES WHICH MAKE THEM. Don't buy anything with a Clipper Chip in it. Don't buy any product from a company that manufactures devices with Big Brother inside. It is likely that the government will ask you to use Clipper for communications with the IRS or when doing business with federal agencies. They cannot, as yet, require you to do so. Just say no. LEARN ABOUT ENCRYPTION AND EXPLAIN THE ISSUES TO YOUR UNWIRED FRIENDS The administration is banking on the likelihood that this stuff is too technically obscure to agitate anyone but nerds like us. Prove them wrong by patiently explaining what's going on to all the people you know who have never touched a computer and glaze over at the mention of words like "cryptography." Maybe you glaze over yourself. Don't. It's not that hard. For some hands-on experience, download a copy of PGP - Pretty Good Privacy - a shareware encryption engine which uses the robust RSA encryption algorithm. And learn to use it. GET YOUR COMPANY TO THINK ABOUT EMBEDDING REAL CRYPTOGRAPHY IN ITS PRODUCTS If you work for a company that makes software, computer hardware, or any kind of communications device, work from within to get them to incorporate RSA or some other strong encryption scheme into their products. If they say that they are afraid to violate the export embargo, ask them to consider manufacturing such products overseas and importing them back into the United States. There appears to be no law against that. Yet. You might also lobby your company to join the Digital Privacy and Security Working Group, a coalition of companies and public interest groups - including IBM, Apple, Sun, Microsoft, and, interestingly, Clipper phone manufacturer AT&T - that is working to get the embargo lifted. ENLIST! Self-serving as it sounds coming from me, you can do a lot to help by becoming a member of one of these organizations. In addition to giving you access to the latest information on this subject, every additional member strengthens our credibility with Congress. > Join the Electronic Frontier Foundation by writing membership(a)eff.org. > Join Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility by e-mailing cpsr.info@cpsr .org. CPSR is also organizing a protest, to which you can lend your support by sending e-mail to clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org with "I oppose Clipper" in the message body. Ftp/gopher/WAIS to cpsr.org /cpsr/privacy/ crypto/clipper for more info. In his LA speech, Gore called the development of the NII "a revolution." And it is a revolutionary war we are engaged in here. Clipper is a last ditch attempt by the United States, the last great power from the old Industrial Era, to establish imperial control over cyberspace. If they win, the most liberating development in the history of humankind could become, instead, the surveillance system which will monitor our grandchildren's morality. We can be better ancestors than that. San Francisco, California Wednesday, February 9, 1994 * * * John Perry Barlow (barlow(a)eff.org) is co-founder and Vice-Chairman of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a group which defends liberty, both in Cyberspace and the Physical World. He has three daughters. =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=WIRED Online Copyright Notice=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Copyright 1993,4 Wired USA Ltd. All rights reserved. This article may be redistributed provided that the article and this notice remain intact. 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unsubscribe
by David Thiery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

please unsubscribe me...didn't realize how much there acutally was! dthiery(a)ddt.eng.uc.edu

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The L. D. persona...
by dwomack＠runner.utsa.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The other day, I noticed that MacPGP seemed to give credit to a person with the initials L. D. He certainly seems unpopular...was he at one time a more positive force? Or is this a dumb question on my part? Regards, Dave

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Re: Detweiler abuse again
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jon 'iain' Boone asks: > > What ever happened to "I hate what you say, but I will fight to the death > for your right to say it?" Sigh. Subscribing to this sentiment does not, in any way, shape or form, require one to start handing out podia and bullhorns to anyone who has an opinion to express. Put it this way: I own a Macintosh, a copy of PageMaker and a laser printer. Should I let anyone who wants to use _my_ equipment to produce a newsletter? In particular, should I allow a person whose views I consider to be heinous and reprehensible to use _my_ equipment to produce a newsletter espousing those views? To me, the obvious answer is "Of course not". Does this mean that I'm censoring that person? Does it make me an opponent of "free speech"? No, and no. I will certainly defend his right to produce a newsletter. I will certainly defend his right to buy, and use, _his_ _own_ equipment to produce a newsletter espousing whatever opinions he likes. People, _please_ learn what "censorship" is! If I submit a manuscript to Addison Wesley, and they return it to me with a rejection note, _that_ _does_ _not_ _constitute_ _censorship_. I am perfectly free to submit it to other publishers, or to publish it myself. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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