December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

S Milgram & Authority Response
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >This shows that, in real situations, people will follow herd instincts >and obey orders. >rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) Milgram had 66% go to the end of the board with the subjects believing they had killed a person with electric shock. I saw him present the paper. I asked him at the end, placing ethical questions aside, what he felt the most important finding of this research was. He paused thoughtfully, and said: We better be DAMN careful who we put in authority in this country. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbRG11/ScHuGXWgVAQG+yQQAzEXu8jNbhMTXebcgEBuqlA9OCv9we2fK NnyfE8w+TVACgikfzWg2yMWVx99zdrx5g3dlbNvkgz9qhR7tdzLmuh0pRmbN8/gP MUm4B+siLmyeSp5qk9eAxvz9WttcLk5oy0+VCPFcv4EgNRp1Ce67YM4/A5uGqDP9 FyDIvssiWTQ= =+yb+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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re; intolerance on the list
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, now that the issue of Marines on the list is settled, perhaps the good SGT could share some non classified knowledge of the USMC's extensive use of Banyan Vines. For those who didn't know, during Desert storm every Marine tank was a Banyan server, the self healing nature of this network proved very effective, in fact "Stormin Norman" gave it credit as one of the three key assets we had. Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot Ex-Marine Current NRA/ILA and other nasty stuff "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth "When the going gets weird, the weird turn pro" - Dr Hunter S Thompson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLbRJztCcBnAsu2t1AQGAEAQAg9z4ddgWqHz6EWQjCGj6dA8o6gFV3YVp q7UhK6EFzqYhhaIxXoI0z/Bvhdw+r4ZRYySXC4y0tcAYFns5mbj1Z3SB5BAytN4l FySoWWjylIRYShwLBO8pmbxF1m/SqZJWkAn9bu17uLAHSlJHxZxbhhqi1q1HtOnW ZFoaWBjs8nU= =Viyp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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TIS/PEM
by forsythe＠fiji.oc.nps.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our site is preparing to implement the PEM package from Trusted Information systems. The package is available to US/Canadian users from ftp.tis.com Any comments on this package would be appreciated. It appears to use a licensed version of RSAREF. But I just got the docs, so I can't say much else about it. "Sometimes we get lost in the darkness, The dreamers learn how to steer by the stars" ******************************************************************** ** Carl R. Forsythe ** Naval Postgraduate School ** ** forsythe(a)oc.nps.navy.mil ** Monterey, California ** ** crforsyt(a)nps.navy.mil ** Office Phone (408)-656-2836 ** ******************************************************************** Any view presented in this text is purely my own and not that of the United States Government, The Department of Defense, The Department of the Navy or The Naval Postgraduate School. PGP Key available by finger.

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Re: S Milgram & Authority Response
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > >>This shows that, in real situations, people will follow herd instincts >>and obey orders. > >>rgds-- TA (tallard(a)frb.gov) > >Milgram had 66% go to the end of the board with the subjects believing >they had killed a person with electric shock. I saw him present the paper. >I asked him at the end, placing ethical questions aside, what he felt the >most important finding of this research was. He paused thoughtfully, and >said: > > We better be DAMN careful who we put in authority in this country. Really? When was this, precisely? -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

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More futures trading analysis...
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is a paper analysis based on my phone calls to a few brokerage firms and a forage through the stack of old newspapers. If anyone has the time to read through the rest of it, I would appreciate it if you could alert me to any errors in either judgement or execution. Here are the prices for the June S&P 500 Index Futures. These contracts have a value of $500 times the cost of the index when they expire in June. That means the person who bought the contract gets $500 times the index value.The person who sold a contract would have to pay that amount. The clearing house is responsible for making sure the money gets from one place to another. If the contract expired on April 6, for instance, then it would be worth $224,025. Here are some prices gathered from a stack of newspapers waiting to be recycled. They show the S+P 500 date open high low close open-close range March 25 1994 464.70 466.50 459.80 459.95 -4.75 (+1.80 - 4.80) March 29 1994 461.35 461.35 451.00 451.65 -9.70 (+0.00 -10.35) March 31 1994 451.85 453.60.445.60 446.15 -5.70 (+1.75 - 6.25) April 4 1994 435.80 441.75 434.75 439.25 +3.45 (+5.95 - 1.05) April 6 1994 448.45 451.00 440.80 447.25 -1.20 (+2.55 - 8.35) April 7 1994 447.10 452.00 445.90 450.50 +3.40 (+4.90 - 1.20) April 8 1994 450.60 450.95 444.95 447.25 -3.35 (+0.35 -5.65) April 11 1994 447.25 450.90 446.30 450.45 +3.20 (+2.65 -0.95) April 14 1994 446.05 448.00 442.90 445.95 -0.10 (+1.95 -3.15) April 18 1994 446.05 447.80 440.70 442.40 -3.65 (+1.75 -5.35) {There are other days out there, but the newspapers were thrown away or whatever.} In practice, you can usually buy futures contracts by only putting up 5% of the current value of the contract. You can (and usually want to) put up more because the banks and brokerage houses want that amount available to cover losses. You need to maintain 5% of the current value. That means that if the price goes the wrong way and you have less than 5% on hand you have to add more money to your account. This is known as a margin call. Let's assume: Assume that the market will move at least +/- 3 points in a day. Assume that the market isn't moving too fast so you're able to close out a position moving the wrong direction at 3 points off. (There is not as much need to really worry about this because the money isn't disappearing. It's just moving in the wrong way too fast to stop it.) If you want to move $50,000 in _one_ day by opening the transaction in the morning and closing it in the evening, then you would need to move 34 contracts. The 10% margin requirements for these 34 contracts would mean that you must have about $800,000 on hand to cover losses. The cost of borrowing $800,000 for a day at a 10% annual rate is about $220 in interest. Let's assume that the market inefficiencies are about .10 to open the position and .10 to close the position. That means that the difference between the price you buy the futures and the price you sell them is different by .10 in the morning and .10 in the evening. (.10 in the wrong way.) That means you could lose $3400 in trading costs if you can't execute the 34 contract trades successfully at the same price. This gives me the following approximate transaction costs: Day 1 Commissions $200 x 2 on 34 Contr. (guess) Interest Costs $220 x 2 on $800,000 Market Inefficiencies $1700 x 2 --------- 4240 Chance of Succeeding: 50%. So if things go wrong: Day 2 Commissions $400 x 2 on 68 Contr. (guess) Interest Costs $420 x 2 on $1,600,000 Market Inefficiencies $3400 x 2 --------- $8480 Assume you guess that the market will move correctly: 50%. That means you will have moved the $50,000 by now in 75% of the cases. But if things still go wrong: Day 3 Commissions $800 x 2 on 136 Contr. (guess) Interest Costs $840 x 2 on $3,200,000 Market Inefficiencies $6800 x 2 --------- $16920 Assume you guess that the market will move correctly: 50%. That means you will have moved the $50,000 by now in 87.5% of the cases. If these conservative calculations are correct, then it is possible to move $50,000 for $4240n in all but 2^{-n} of the cases. Note, there were about 60,000 S&P 500 contracts traded in the average day. I would guess that even 544 contracts wouldn't make a too much of a difference. Especially since half would be buying and the other half would be selling. There are many places where these numbers may be off, but I believe that I've erred on the side of extreme conservatism by putting up 10% of the contracts' value. Many people who do day trading have low margin requirements. As you can see, the net profits or loss in the day was never more than 3% in the days I included. And the list included a big trading day when the market lost plenty. I've also assumed that the market inefficiences would always move against me. In one sense, this is probably fair because brokers are known to buy a contract and then resell it to a customer for a fraction more. This leads me to the following conclusions: *) It is not cheap to do this well. You could do it for less with some more risk. *) It may take very good timing to execute the straddle effectively. The market inefficiencies are the biggest cost. Being a floor broker may be essential. *) If you can open the position at the same price i.e buy and sell the contracts at the same price, then you've got a good deal. I would appreciate any questions or comments about the details in this very approximate estimate. -Peter Wayner

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Re: BEST Inc.
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the info is on the card, follow the refrigerator magnet idea if you don't want them to cash your cheque. Or do as the Sarge did. Then, instead of having a record that you purchased Pentouse Letters on April 14 at 10:33 pm in Mac's Milk on the corner of Broadway and 110th, they have a record of your withdrawal of 50 bucks from the atm and a picture in their video database as you did the withdrawal. Six of one, half a dozen of the other. [Deletions] If the info is in the database, and it is (even though _this_ pos terminal may not have access to it) then - well, if you object to this, keep up with cp and other fora, get yourself some fake or anonymous id's (?), write code, use pgp, become judgement proof, move and don't set up forwarding addresses, have your id killed, etc. Bill Garland, whose .sig just vanished <- What might be really useful is a list of the different measures used on all the states ID's. For example: Maryland uses a magnetic strip, Digitized Photo and a bar code. All that is printed on a credit card like card and not laminated. Military ID's are green and white paper with a polaroid and a signiture, normal lamination. Illinois is a normal lamination with a complete photo within, no bar code or strip, no digitized photo record. Anyone want to further the list? I wouldn't mind compiling the information. What seems key and most attractive to those who are willing to go through the trouble, is identifying the states that use limited measures, espeically avoiding the magnetic strip and digitized photo states, and getting your license(s) in the states that are "behind the times." -uni- (Dark)

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Banyan Vines / USMC
by SGT=DARREN=S.=HARLOW%ISB%MCTSSA＠nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Banyan Vines network was used extensively in Desert Storm/Shield/Sweep. Before the network was in place, people were using a single channel radio relay box called the Hadron. It was capable of being used with the KY-57 (crypto) on the PRC-77 (single channel radio), as well as satcom (PSC-3). Once the network was up and in place. Internet shots were coordinated with Quantico, VA, so that the supply cycles, and requests could be sent in real time. Not every Marine tank was a Banyan server, networks were installed down to the regiment HQ level. Remote shots were done over MUX lines with KG-84 as the crypto, on a four wire leased circuits. This allowed for secure communications within the theater of operations, as well as unclassified communications with the rear (stateside). A number of different ways are available to the Marine Corps to talk to remote spots, and new ways are being found all of the time. If there is further interest, I would be more than happy to post further to the list. Sgt Darren Harlow - Computer Security MCTSSA, Camp Pendleton, USMC Internet: harlowd(a)nwsfallbrook3.nwac.sea06.navy.mil or another less reliable & slower: harlow(a)mqg1.usmc.mil Voice: Comm: (619) 725-2970 DSN (Autovon): 365-2970 Fax: Comm: (619) 725-9512 DSN (Autovon): 365-9512 PGP Public key available upon request "The views expressed are my own, and always will be..."

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Re: Warrentless Search
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: From: Ed Carp <ecarp(a)netcom.com> : This was the famous Millikan experiment in the 50's (60's?). The Erm... wasn't that the one where people were suspended between two electric plates and the voltage adjusted so they *wouldn't* get a shock? ;-) G Nee hee Neddie! Shot in the cringe!

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Black Net
by killbarny＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard of BlackNet? BlackNet is in the business of buying, selling, trading, and otherwise dealing with information in all its many forms. Through PGP and anonymous remailers, the folks at BlackNet plan to create a huge black market in data: trade secrets, processes, production methods, nanotechnology, privacy databases, and chemical manufacturing. The only way to get in is to find a BlackNet-oriented message (one with the BlackNet PGP key), then respond to it, using anonymous remailers and PGP. It might be found in <alt.extropians> or <alt.fan.davidsternlight>. If anyone knows about this [or their address/key], please send.

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re: Sgt Russell
by Phil G. Fraering 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just wondering, but if Sgt. Russell is kicked off the list, how will we ever convert the military? Don't we want them on our side in the coup? Smiley to taste, Phil

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