December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by matt＠staff.cs.su.oz.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have a list of anonymous remailers somewhere? matt

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Re: Anonymous remailers
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Does anyone have a list of anonymous remailers somewhere? > > matt ---------- Forwarded Message ---------- From: mg5n+remailers(a)andrew.cmu.edu (Automated reply from mail software) Subject: Info on anonymous remailers This info on internet anonymous remailers is maintained by Matthew Ghio <Ghio(a)andrew.cmu.edu> Last Updated: Mar 14 1994 The newest version of this document can be obtained by sending mail to: mg5n+remailers(a)andrew.cmu.edu Automated software will email you a copy. Notice: There have been many changes lately to various remailers. I try to keep this info as up to date as possible, but I may have missed something. If there are any errors, please let me know. The standard cypherpunks anonymous remailers are: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com catalyst(a)netcom.com nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu remailer(a)merde.dis.org remailer(a)rebma.mn.org rperkins(a)nyx.cs.du.edu rperkins(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu All of these allow you to send anonymous mail by adding the header Request-Remailing-To: and sending to one of the above addresses. Most (but not all) of these remailers also accept Anon-To: in place of Request-Remailing-To. If you can not add the required headers, place two colons (::) on the very first line of your message, then on the next line type Request-Remailing-To: and the address you want to send anonymously to. Skip a line, and then begin your message. Note that by using this method it is possible to send a message consecutively thru more than one remailer. remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com requires that you public-key encrypt your messages with PGP. This added security prevents a hacker or nosey sysadmin at your site from reading your outgoing mail or finding out where it's going. This remailer is not directly connected to the internet, so messages will be delayed about an hour. Some of the other remailers support PGP as well. For remailers which support both encryption and plaintext messages, identify encrypted messages by adding a header which reads: Encrypted: PGP Encryption keys can be found below. The bsu remailers require that you place the Subject: header in the body of the message, after the two colons and the Request-Remailing-To: line. These remailers also allow you to insert a Reply-To: line right after the Subject, so that you can have responses sent to you via an anonymous forwarding address. The other remailers require that you place two number signs (##) on a line, and then add the special headers, such as Reply-To: To get an anonymous forwarding address, send mail to mg5n+getid(a)andrew.cmu.edu There is a pseudonym-based anonymous remailer at anon.penet.fi. For information on this remailer, send mail to: help(a)anon.penet.fi There is another anonymous contact service at chop.ucsd.edu. It's not as full-featured as anon.penet.fi, but is considerably faster since it is not burdened by such a heavy load. For information on this remailer, send mail to: acs-info(a)chop.ucsd.edu Anonymous postings to usenet can be made by sending anonymous mail to one of the following mail-to-usenet gateways: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu The following lists the response times of the remailers listed above. Although measured accurately, these times are only an estimation of what you can expect. Actual response times will vary somewhat, depending on current network usage and other factors. Ping messages sent: Tue, 8 Mar 1994 00:00:00 EST (-0500) Replies received: nobody(a)shell.portal.com 00:01:57 catalyst-remailer(a)netcom.com 00:02:16 rperkins-remailer(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu 00:02:30 nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 00:02:39 remailer-admin(a)chaos.bsu.edu 00:02:43 rperkins-remailer(a)nyx.cs.du.edu 00:02:48 nobody(a)soda.berkeley.edu 00:02:51 nobody(a)jarthur.cs.hmc.edu 00:06:32 remailer(a)dis.org 00:35:34 remailer(a)rebma.rebma.mn.org 03:12:37 The following are PGP public keys of the remailers which support encryption: <remailer(a)dis.org> 512-bit key, Key ID 64E8A7, created 1993/03/05 Also known as: Anonymous Remailer <remailer(a)utter.dis.org> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQBNAiuX3kAAAAECAMd6YkS3ylajgNSzX+wYLrpW03D+99OFvePQLlR5N+R5iZBr y4FbAMeDj+eCeEAqiEyNjUxHN5tGlqx1g6tk6KcABRG0JFJlbWFpbGluZyBTZXJ2 aWNlIDxyZW1haWxlckBkaXMub3JnPokAVQIFECwomeN8p7i9YJH3xQEBDhEB/A7+ RLEw2bGJeBdBy0yXn5mIenda/tHHs9NGXJZR5BvOsU9EwVY+9s86E33R2/tgqAjY UYc5MiWS0r1+H9Zw+FeJAJUCBRArmsesg4Ds6kta1jMBAW4zA/4waabkcIHN93Jy /9OMXhRDqrRf2kickmeUWOGHF0KALLo37kAqfDvMNDtFs1u3WbdaBWdTSiLR8qIM 6TQNq0IEhAeny07AVweLlIpJc7lVN7biHqVIPknxJTAI/xscybuMUin3yALzFpWR 54uFMbd45iuKWBJ2/IGdUYcd39H0FbQsIEFub255bW91cyBSZW1haWxlciA8cmVt YWlsZXJAdXR0ZXIuZGlzLm9yZz6JAJUCBRArmsmdg4Ds6kta1jMBAbdwA/9m2GYJ 978xxchux7nnl4HAo3N+A2Nx+n40kQftWNiyJwivrG8kYwDI24QYaUpr2l6+2HDd xedEOFsX6DiHbDQK5J7dGYOigASmZHPs39lEdJ3AHvrTVYVYjOxBMQ2W6p+Q5rbn qxfmVlqRMzPRosPJ1gpbfcTzIpqznwSTl7tztQ== =v3Hk -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- <remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> 1024-bit key, Key ID B5A32F, created 1992/12/13 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCNAisrAP0AAAEEAJr3OwIfOIOoh9JndwwqFg+VyWFTAyM8S0B7wyGKI+A9sMAB mbSOIU52EszvLdZk8NH8mrOD9m3EZlt9gXOjln881RMilAunnzdXaJ6ffBKqPL+l yiefCbCo6wScVNfMSV6Di/2HMoFzVqukwRjTx8lqKt6hgy0uedtwcCemtaMvAAUR tCVSZW1haWxlciA8cmVtYWlsQGV4dHJvcGlhLndpbXNleS5jb20+iQCVAgUQK2SV p4OA7OpLWtYzAQG8eQP9F9ye/F/rXhJLNR5W/HV5k+f6E0zWSgtmTTWUYyydfJw+ lKDEDH6v+OFOFE3+fuTIL5l0zsNMSMdF5u7thSSWiwcFgaBFQF9NWmeL/uByOTSY tsB6DQSbw656SBH7c7V7jvUsPit/DubwBXZi9sOlULau3kQqXeeQxPhNE+bpMy6J AJUCBRArKwSLk3G+8Dfo40MBAXYAA/4hCVDFD0zG47pYPMg+y7NPE5LktWt2Hcwt Z4CRuT5A3eWGtG8Sd5QuHzbE4S9mD3CFn79bxZi0UDhryD8dsCG4eHiCpAcZqSvR JSkpgamdRaUQHNmMxv5goxHhRem6wXrKxZQNn5/S0NtQOrS6QKhFlGrzDIh/2ad1 J9qpyzJ/IYkARQIFECsrA9RLrSJixHgP9wEBNcEBewWpzywKk/SBDwocXebJmsT6 zug/ae78U/cu9kTX620Xcj1zqOdx9Y9Ppwem9YShaQ== =I7QE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- jarthur remailer <ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu> 512-bit key, Key ID 7D154B, created 1993/04/04 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQBNAiu+hVUAAAECAMVjEfl2IMNgSOJ+/fx1V6EbH50ofa6K4r1PBKMmkcHQextP ghwC4lXIgaAWUlLJ9x61+qf4jB5fpNUZLrF9FUsABRG0NWphcnRodXIgcmVtYWls ZXIgIGMvbyA8ZWJyYW5kdEBqYXJ0aHVyLmNsYXJlbW9udC5lZHU+iQCVAgUQK8M/ BIOA7OpLWtYzAQGJRAP9GIVi0qoQW4bjU9sikIPG4zIEbQ9O3rU1vd2uCrrnGQMM tdE9NoOx4umoVZKYTpCc96TlFQetb2UVd9JhaayXO7+nwNNHYgApkRJboolq9UzU wCRBA8k1EMAkdzCjzYglpZIQJz2yNP50Izu7g2LMbC1pHQX3CHVL7YlQrKGNLz4= =ItNk -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Anonymous Remailer <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> 510-bit key, Key ID 5620D5, created 1992/11/15 -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQBNAisGf+IAAAEB/ieS6th8hI1QBjGpmctVvsIxZBtmpykVXc3psh0XVfH4sECS ugouk2zm/PJtt59A2E5SO3xjpDjeKlkQ745WINUABRG0LFJlbWFpbGluZyBTZXJ2 aWNlIDxoZmlubmV5QHNoZWxsLnBvcnRhbC5jb20+iQCVAgUQK3Azm4OA7OpLWtYz AQHzawQAwZPaJUR9iNwyKMDm4bRSao0uu381pq6rR3nw0RI+DSLKTXPqDaT3xBmL dVv1PVguLcoao/TRLkAheV7CIxodEiI9lAC2o6lqSXCP+vm3jYmulSgUlKafXYbj LAbZpsKRAUjCpyx0wlYmoHhkA+NZDzMcWp6/1/rM/V1i4Jbt2+GJAJUCBRArBpKv qBMDr1ghTDcBASTlBACfTqODpVub15MK5A4i6eiqU8MDQGW0P0wUovPkNjscH22l 0AfRteXEUM+nB+Xwk16RG/GdrG8r9PbWzSCx6nBYb7Fj0nPnRPtS/u69THNTF2gU 2BD0j2vZF81lEHOYy6Ixao2b6Hxmab2mRta2eTg7CV6XP3eRFDPisVqgooAWgw== =arSc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- The operation of this system of remailers is a group effort which relies on the contributions of many generous people. Please do not abuse the remailers. If you have problems with a remailer, most of the remailer operators can be contacted by sending mail to the remailer's address without a remailing request header. Otherwise, follow the instructions that come in the messages from the remailer. Do not send complaints to postmaster at the site. Most of the remailers are run by people who are not the site administrators. Sending to postmaster or the site admins will most likely just make them annoyed at you, and won't get your problem resolved. If you can run an anonymous remailer, please volunteer to do so. Software is availiable from anonymous-FTP at soda.berkeley.edu in the directory /pub/cypherpunks/remailer Other remailer program code is availiable at vangogh.vis.colostate.edu in the directory /pub/nate/remailer-GUI/cpremailer.tar.Z The software can usually be run on personal accounts; Root or sysadmin access is not required in most cases. There are two usenet forums for discussion of anonymous remailer systems, alt.privacy.anon-server and alt.anonymous

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Fwd: *AVAILABLE: HIGHLY EFFICIENT ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEMS*
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Received: via nntpserv with nntp; Thu, 17 Mar 1994 17:00:49 -0500 (EST) Newsgroups: alt.2600,alt.cyberpunk.tech,talk.politics.crypto Path: andrew.cmu.edu!bb3.andrew.cmu.edu!news.sei.cmu.edu!cis.ohio-state.edu!magn us.acs.ohio-state.edu!usenet.ins.cwru.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!EU.net!s un4nl!cwi.nl!brands From: brands(a)cwi.nl (Stefan Brands) Subject: *AVAILABLE: HIGHLY EFFICIENT ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEMS* Message-ID: <CMttnF.Btu(a)cwi.nl> Sender: news(a)cwi.nl (The Daily Dross) Nntp-Posting-Host: aasgier.cwi.nl Organization: CWI, Amsterdam Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 20:45:15 GMT Lines: 188 Xref: bb3.andrew.cmu.edu alt.2600:2751 alt.cyberpunk.tech:2971 talk.politics.crypto:3810 Subject: ------- seeking interested parties for implementing, and sharing the rights to, my technologies for privacy-protected electronic transfer of certified information. **** I am a PhD student at the Cryptography Department at the Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI) in Amsterdam. In the past two years, I have developed a compact set of new techniques that enable the construction of highly efficient and secure electronic systems for off-line transfer of certified information, such that privacy is fully guaranteed. The resulting systems offers a great many advantages over any other privacy-protected systems you will find. In particular, using a subset of these techniques I have contructed off-line electronic cash systems in which the privacy of the account holders is fully guaranteed. An independent authority in the field of cryptology has recently confirmed that these systems seem to be the most practical such systems to date. I am posting this letter because I am very interested in pursuing the implementation of my systems *jointly*, in a fair business relationship, with a company capable of and interested in standardizing these systems. My technologies / ystenms are ideally suitable for smart cards, hand held computers, interactive TV, etcetera. All the rights to the technology have been transferred to me by CWI, and so part of such a cooperation would be *joint ownership of all rights*. The reason for posting this letter in a news group is that I see *no* other way to get in touch with interested parties. Before I go deeper into this, I would like to give you some more information about my technologies, and explain their many features. If you are not interested, but think you can help me by suggesting names etc.\, I would appreciate your suggestions. Privacy-protected transfer of electronic information. ----------------------------------------------------- Much work has been done to construct privacy-protected off-line cash systems previously, notably by David Chaum (formerly affiliated with CWI). This early work has resulted in two key concepts that can be used to attain the same level of security against double-spending as can trivially be attained in off-line cash systems with full traceability of payments. However, the many practical *realizations* of these concepts that have been proposed are far from satisfactory with respect to efficiency, provability of security (relative to certain well-known problems that are widely believed to be intractable), and extensibility in functionality. The new techniques I developed for my PhD thesis overcome *all* of these problems. They enable the construction of privacy-protected off-line cash systems that are almost as efficient as off-line cash systems that do *not* offer privacy. Succesful attacks against such a system provably imply that one can break a certain well-known signature scheme that is widely believed to be secure (such as the Schnorr scheme, the Guillou/Quisquater scheme, the schemes presented by Okamoto at CRYPTO 92, the Fiat/Shamir scheme etc.). The techniques in fact allow the construction of a highly efficient off-line cash system whose security (and that of all the extensions in functionality!) is based on the security of any one signature scheme of the so-called Fiat/Shamir type. Among the extensions in functionality are: prior restraint of double-spending, electronic cheques, protection against framing, currency exchange, anonymous accounts, and multi-spendable coins. All these extensions can be realized very easily without any need for additional data stuctures or basic algorithms (that is, *no* ad hoc constructions). In particular, prior restraint of double-spending can be achieved by using a tamper-resistant computing device that is capable of merely performing a signature scheme of the Fiat/Shamir type (of one's own choice), such as the Schnorr signature scheme. A highly preliminary report about a small subset of these techniques, based on the Discrete Logarithm problem, has been published by me about a year ago as a technical report at CWI. (A PostScript version of this report can be retrieved by ftp from ftp.cwi.nl, as pub/brands/CS-R9323.ps.). In August 1993 I presented these preliminary results at the CRYPTO 1993 conference in Santa Barbara. The final version of this abstract can also be retrieved by ftp from ftp.cwi.nl, as pub/brands/crypto93.ps. It's succesful acceptance can be measured by the fact that the results in the report are currently being used as the basis for a cash system by the European CAFE project, a project with 13 European partners from industry and science. I understand that some other implementations based on my report are under way as well. New developments. ----------------- In the mean time, however, I have significantly improved and *greatly* extended the techniques described in the preliminary report. Furthermore, I came up with a fully RSA-based variant that offers various advantages over the Discrete Log based variant. Contrary to the description in the preliminary report, the improved techniques allow the construction of withdrawal protocols for which it can rigorously be proven that the aforementioned attack to the withdrawal protocol is as hard as breaking a well-known signature scheme, and the efficiency of the system increases by a factor of two (a factor not to be neglected, especially not in case such a system is implemented using smart card technology!). As an interesting side note, the improved techniques do *not* use the blind signature technique as developed and patented by David Chaum. The full set of techniques can be used to construct highly efficient privacy-protected off-line mechanisms for transferring certified information, the security of which again can be *proven* assuming only the security of a certain well-known signature scheme of the Fiat/Shamir type of one's own choice. The off-line cash systems are in fact just one very particular instance of the general applicability of the complete set of techniques; it is a system in which credentials that may be shown only once can be transferred between any ``organizations'' while privacy is guaranteed. As an example of the usefulness of the new techniques, highly efficient and secure off-line cash systems can be constructed in which payments are made under pseudonym: in order to pay with a coin, an accountholder need do no more than send 35 bytes to an ``organization'' at which he has a pseudonym. For those who want to know in detail about the *many* features of the new techniques, as well as the performance of several preferred embodiments of systems that can be contructed from them, I have prepared a document that can be retrieve by ftp from ftp.cwi.nl, again in the directory pub/brands. There is a PostScript version called features.ps, as well as a plain text version called features.plain. Why am I posting this letter? ----------------------------- As I already mentioned at the start of this letter, I am very interested in pursuing the implementation of my systems *jointly*, in a fair business relationship, with a company capable of and interested in standardizing these systems. I am in the process of finishing my PhD thesis, which deals exclusively with these technologies. If you have read the detailed description of the features in my ``features'' document, then I have no doubt that you will agree with me that these systems offer a *great* many advantages over any other privacy-protected system for off-line transfer of digital information. In general, if you want to implement electronic systems for secure transfer of certified information, whether it be cash or other types of credentials, such that privacy can be guaranteed, then you will find out that this is *the* way to go. I am *not* involved with any project or company whatsoever. In particular, I want like to point out that I am *not* involved in the CAFE project, and I also do *not* have business relations with the company (DigiCash) of David Chaum, although I greatly respect his innovative work on privacy-protected transfer of electronic information. In fact, *all* rights on my technologies have been transferred to me by my employee, CWI. Due to the fact that my research was done independently of any project or company, it is extremely hard for me to get in touch with the appropriate persons at companies that are really interested in this technology *and* that have the capability of implementing it. Since projects and companies that I am not part of obviously do not provide me with such information, I see no better way to bring my technologies under the attention than by publishing this letter on the news net. If you are interested in my technologies, and want to pursue implementation together with me in the *near* future, I invite you to contact me. We can then discuss things further. Part of such a cooperation would be that *sharing* with me the rights to my technologies. My fax number is (31) 30 - 546 468 This is also my telephone number; however, I would prefer if you send fax or e-mail. My e-mail address at CWI is brands(a)cwi.nl. In case you are interested in having my work reviewed beforehand by some cryptography authority, to make sure I am not talking nonsense, I am happy to send to you a detailed description of my work. I guarantee you that he or she will *not* be able to break it, and will confirm the many statements I make about the benefits of my technologies. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the circumstances, I am happy to come over and explain my technologies in person with you. Alternatively, if you or your company is not interested in my technologies, but you think you can help me with pointers to persons at companies that might be interested in this technology, I would very much appreciate any such suggestions.

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Re: The Agency Whose Name May Not Be Spoken
by stevenJ 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mats Bergstrom muttered something about... :: ::Yeah, I wonder what Jason Bourne is up to these days. If you can track ::him you would probably get close to where the real action is. :: Ok, I'll admit my neophyteness. Who is Jason Bourne? e x t r a p o l a t e steve j. white _____________________________________________________________________________ Gort, klatu barada nicto. aragorn(a)alpha1.csd.uwm.edu

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Re: Locating Color Copiers
by joshua geller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

stevenJ say: > it's only possible to photocopy $1, $5 and $10 because anything > larger than that has that funny little strip of plastic in the bill. $10 bills are real easy to pass (as opposed to $20's or $50's). josh

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DTI Hearing on NPR
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This morning's 6:00am EST (repeated at 8:00am) hourly teaser listing of news items on National Commie Radio included the following: "In Washington today...a Senate Judiciary subcommittee holds hearings on encoding digital communications so that police agencies can still intercept calls." Newsreader was Alex Chadwick DCF -- "The Piano dies in the end." Spoiler for "The Piano" --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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CLIPPER COMPROMIZED?
by mech＠io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to a fax I received: _____ begin fwd ___________ CLIPPER COMPROMISED? "Security Insider Report," a monthly newsletter published in Seminole, Fla., has reported that government officials are seeking to determine whether former CIA employee and alleged traitor Aldrich Ames may have sold information to the Russians about the government's secret key-escrow technology used in Clipper Chip chipsets and Capstone Tessera cards. The secret key-escrow technology, dubbed Skipjack, can be used to encrypt network voice and data. _____ end _________________ This was faxed march 17, and consisted of part of a xeroxed page from a publication; unfortunately I cannot tell what the publication is. Some other headlines on it are "ARDIS aims to simplify radio-based messaging", "Vendors curb wireless hype", "AnyLAN, anytime, anywhere", and "Cheyenne prepares fix for ARCserv users woes". Next to the Cheyenne article is a round logo that says R.A.F. in large letters, and with the following cirling the logo: Network World's Reader A[missing] Force. "[missing]" means text that is cut off. Anyone know what publication this is, and which issue? The page number is 2. My best guess is it's Network World. Any corroborating stories?

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Illuminati Online infobot
by Matthew J Ghio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> E-mail auto-response message from info(a)io.com last updated: 94-02-16 > > ############################################################################## > # # > # ILLUMINATI ONLINE # > # # > ############################################################################## > > Thanks for your interest in Illuminati Online! If you have any specific > questions that are not answered here, send mail to admin(a)io.com or voice at > (512) 447-7866 for a response from a live human being. I keep getting copies of this when I didn't request it. The mails seem to be coming in response to posts made to cypherpunks. Did someone subscribe info(a)io.com to the list? Methinks someone here has a very bizarre sense of humor... :) ...wandering off to check to be sure mg5n+remailers isn't subscribed to the list...

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Re: Illuminati Online infobot
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the info stuff is from cman(a)caffeine.io.org, who recently resigned from SJG and I suspect has put that on his personal mailbox so that people mailing him about SJG business know where to go. G

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Re: spyproofing your house/work building
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Drapes so the lip readers can't see you. Make sure the drapes block IR. There are instances of even local police forces flooding the front of a house with IR light, and viewing the activities inside with IR viewers -- all of this through closed drapes. Or you could just put a nice incandescent light fixture between you and the drapes; nice IR output from those bulbs. Halogen fixtures ought to work also, but fluorescent bulbs don't produce enough IR. More importantly: attach a contact-speaker to each pane of glass, and feed Top 40 radio to it. There have been reported cases of spy types bouncing laser beams off windows and using the reflected beams to reproduce the vibrations produced in the glass by reflected sound; in other words, the window panes are large membranes which vibrate in sync with the sound that hits them, so you want to override those vibrations with something else. This reeks of paranoia, eh? Jazz

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