December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cousin Brucie At CFP `94
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To get this in first... Bruce Sterling Saturday night in Chicago: "Being afraid of large institutions when they have computers is like being afraid of 600 pound gorillas particularly when they are on fire." DCF --- WinQwk 2.0b#1165

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Another Censorship, Freedom of Speech, Rights of Vendor Issue
by jdwilson＠gold.chem.hawaii.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To supporters of freedom of speech - please read, act and share this as your conscience dictates: Unofficially excerpted from Infoworld 3/7/94 Brian Livingston's Window Manager column. "Can CompuServe succeed in silencing Windows dissenters? Having your electronic mail account cut off is the modern equivalent of solitary confinement. Many services I use, such as Microsoft Windows forums, exist exclusively on systems such as the CompuServe Information Service. There is no other place for information. "That's why I took notice when CompuServe threatened to cut off a subscriber's account if he even mentioned on-line a lawsuit that the company filed against him. "Compuserve filed suit January 31 in Federal District Court in Ohio against Richard S. Patterson, the developer of a shareware program called Windows Navigator (WinNAV), which he has distributed on Compuserve for several years. This suit came about after Patterson complained on a Compuserve forum last December that the company's plans to release a product called Windows Navigator infringed upon his trademarks. "Prior to initiating the suit, Compuserve modified the name of its product to CompuServe Navigator, Windows Version. It asks the court to find that Patterson has "no trademark rights" that it has infringed, and for an unspecified monetary penalty. "I don't know who will prevail in this suit. But what really bothers me is this threat in a letter to Patterson dated January 31, from Kevin J. Osterkamp, Compuserve's attorney in the firm of Roetzel and Andress, of Columbus, Ohio; "I am as legal counsel for Compuserve compelled to advise you that it is Compuserves position that you will be terminated if you mention, discuss, or comment upon the lawsuit or the issues related thereto as a part of the CompuServe Information Service. Termination will also result from any other disparagment of Compuserve, its management, employees, or business practices. "I've never met Mr. Patterson, but I know him tangentially from his other software, Zip Tools, which appears in Windows Gizmos. "My columns have promoted CompuServe many times, so I asked for it's position. The gist of the reply I received from Mr. Oster- kamp was this: "Regarding the case of Compuserve vs. Patterson, my ethical obligations (and Mr. Patterson's) prohibit me from commenting directly on the case. I can, however, assure you that our request that Mr. Patterson stop using Compuserve's online services to disparage the company is simply good, old-fashioned common sense. After all, why should CompuServe - or any online service - allow a disgruntled party the opportunity to bad- mouth the company in its own forum? "Why, indeed? It's called "a free exchange of ideas." It is much sought after by people around the world. "If AT&T could cut off my phone because I criticized them while using long distance, we would be in very serious danger of losing our freedom. "It is unclear whether electronic services are "common carriers" (like AT&T) that must carry all communications, or "publishers" (like magazines) that are legally responsible for the words they choose to print. "But Compuserve knows which it prefers to be. In separate cases, it has been sued by the National Music Publishers Association and Cubby Inc. for distributing material uploaded by subscribers. Compuserve argues that it should be free from any liability because "it is a distributor and not a publisher." "Our future "information highway" will inevitably center on just five or six giant corporations. That's why it's so important that access not be denied to someone whom these entities don't like. "Because children read forums, I agree that obscene language should be banned. But I've read the forum messages, and Patterson is not guilty of that. "Do me a favor. Sit down right now and tap out a message to Mauryve Cox, the CEO of Compuserve. His I.D. number is 70003,1550. Tell him how important it is to you that no one be denied access to Compuserve forums. Send me a copy, if my account still works after this column appears. (Brian Livingston is the author of "Windows 3.1 Secrets" and "More Windows Secrets", and co-author of "Windows Gizmos." Send tips to Compuserve: 70053,2035; or fax: (206) 282-1248.)

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"Computer Insecurity" on CNN
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Next week's Science & Technology Week, airs first Saturday @ 8 am, then Sunday at 9:30. (And perhaps other times as well).

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Projects for parallel machine?
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've got access to a zippy, 9-processor, mostly unused box. What ever should I _do_ with it? Factoring routines? What? I'm looking for a decent project to work on this next quarter, and I'd like to include this big boys' muscle. Any computations that can be done in parallel are game; I just can't think of anything. Any comments appreciated. Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 548-9804 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Answers to Summit questions
by jkreznar＠ininx.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > -- Questions for Discussion Groups -- > 1. What is important to your group? Truth and honesty. > 3. What does your group want not to happen with the NII? For it to de facto preempt honest alternatives. I'm afraid that the NII will be funded in part by taxation. An honest person cannot in good conscience willfully accept services funded by taxation when he has a reasonable alternative. The NII threatens the viability of honest alternatives. The reason is that even an honest person will find it hard to justify paying more for access to a user-funded network when a cheaper alternative such as NII is available because it is sustained by expropriating the fruit of the toil of unconsenting others. Some of us would prefer that relations among people be by mutual consent or not at all. Government programs, by contrast, imply imposition by the politically victorious upon all others. > 5. What would you be able to do with the NII, that you would not > otherwise, if you did not have to worry about the cost of access? One can _not_ of course not worry about the cost. The people who install and maintain the system have to eat, too. The pertinent question is whether that money is given freely in exchange for service rendered, or is expropriated from another without his consent through taxation. An honest user of the system suffers ongoing distress to know that he benefits only because of another's oppression. The NII should not come to be. The ``N'' in NII stands for ``National''. Nations are abominations, functioning as they do to supplant personal choice with collective dictate. John E. Kreznar | Relations among people to be by jkreznar(a)ininx.com | mutual consent, or not at all. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZZwxcDhz44ugybJAQEbTwQAgCHVdhmdC3zyQWRKOhNLTFzM8AFH29re jOdOmnIKkGiJWzjPGLb/x4cagv+tS56OgfpSMmBet9xsm9f7Yf3gGpGgPVgiYr2n pseH5x7ON0a6u0YVYZX8SIPyOjUUEiDBwhAfOOALJ2fWWMI0hYhREiAQuNS1Ag8T /oYQtUFf274= =QDwY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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personal manifesto (comments appreciated)
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following is my manifesto of net.beliefs. I recognize their lack of precision, their foundation in principles of faith, and their lack of a clear vehicle for realization. I do not profess them to be a statement of cypherpunk beliefs. I do submit them for discussion, criticism, suggestion, rant, or flame. If you disagree this is your chance to educate a misguided individual with hopelessly antiquated beliefs. If you agree, this is your chance to point out badly constructed arguments, awkward sentences, repetition, and poor word choice. I cannot work for something unless I know what it is IUm working for. 1) My vision of the Net is utopian, or I would not spell it as I do, with a capitol N. While the most likely possibility is that the Net will simply mirror current society, a Net of this structure would fail to realize its potential as an agent of social change. 2) The Net has the potential to become the greatest de-centralizing force in the history of humanity. The potential ability of the individual to cheaply reach, and organize, vast numbers of like-minded individuals is unprecedented. 3) Current arguments for regulation of cryptography by government agencies depend on the argument they are maintaining their current abilities in the brave new world of cyberspace. I argue that even if this were the case, we have a responsibility to do more than simply maintain the status quo. This argument can be mapped to possible future objections by authorities. 4) It is the responsibility of the information haves to spread their knowledge to the information have-nots. A Net which allows the economic exploitation of information have-nots by those with the information is, while perhaps profitable, immoral. Information wants to be free. Knowledge which is not of a personal nature should be freely accessible. 5) Along with these positive potentials, it is possible for the Net to be constructed in such a way as to allow the formation of the most powerful authoritarian societies the world has ever seen. The potential for the death of the Individual, just as for the empowerment of the Individual, is very real. We must work to prevent totalitarianism. 6) The Net is no better than its users. Current crises of economic inequality, of homelessness and hunger, will not be affected by the Net unless we work to change them in pre-Net society. People cannot participate in a democratic society if they are not educated to a minimal level required for functioning in that society. This is the crux of our societal problems, as well as the crux of possible problems with the Net. 7) It is better to help oneUs fellow human than to hurt. It is better to give than to receive. Equally, one human has an enormous capacity to injure and exploit another human. We must decide which ability we wish to empower, and judge which we actually do. 8) There are fundamental problems with the structure of society. Realizing the democratic vision of the Net is a way to re-structure society. My hope is that this restructuring will create a better society than the one I know. I recognize it can be worse-- much worse. With vigilance, it will not be. 9) My beliefs are hopelessly utopian. I have faith in democratic principles to shape society into a more just social hierarchy. This faith must not be confused with certainty. It is impossible to predict the shape of the society which will be created. A few risks are of the tyranny of the majority, and the willful formation of totalitarian dictatorships (hyperlink Weimar Germany). The will of the people is impossible to define, much less judge, gauge, measure or regulate. We must be satisfied with approximations. 10) All actions have moral implications. Ignoring these implications is irresponsible and, yes... immoral. - -john. - -------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Blair: <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> voice: (513) 529-4877 PGP public key available upon request. KILL YOUR Privacy in the information age is a right, not a privilage. TELEVISION Information = Power = Control. Fight the centralization of information. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLZZOOBD3efpluabZAQH/swH9FmFB45S9jcMs2oqMn12wTEfqcbGFDdSN LAc5NEt1us7aipazZIouu+abSsPRlqq2lhIxOzJ65KGlYNdWjJ0tPw== =NiD7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Digital Cash
by John.Schofield＠f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--==<Quoting Uucp to John Schofield about "Re: Digital Cash">==-- Uu> I have always been skeptical of this observer-chip approach, because Uu> it wasn't clear that it was feasible to make a tamper-resistant chip Uu> economically, and because the specialized hardware that would be Uu> required would prevent the system from being used on widely-available Uu> PCs. However, now we see that our military rulers apparently trust Uu> tamper-resistant technology well enough to put it into thousands of Uu> public hands, without fear that even one chip will be opened and read. Uu> Breaking an observer only lets you double-spend the coins it holds, Uu> while breaking Clipper allows you to permanently defeat the escrow Uu> provisions of the whole system. So this suggests that the technology Uu> is adequate for observers. I once asked my grandfather if he was sure he could take apart the tractor he was working on. His response? "A man put it together." Anything one man can do, another can undo--the only variable is the degree of effort required. I'm sure we can make a tamper-resistant chip, but can we make a tamper-proof one? No. Considering the determination and intelligence of some of the people involved, I'm sure that a tamper-resistant chip would be compromised pretty quickly. --John Schofield ... I tried an internal modem, but it hurt when I walked. --- Blue Wave/RA v2.12 -- : John Schofield - via mcws.fidonet.org - Public Access (213)256-8371 : ARPA/INTERNET: John.Schofield(a)f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org : UUCP: ...!cheshire!mcws!903!John.Schofield : Compu$erve: >internet:John.Schofield@f903.n102.z1.fidonet.org

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Ames/clipper compromised?
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Okay here's the scoop on the Ames/clipper bit, from the guy who wrote it. Permission to distribute is granted as long as it is reproduced in it's entirety. Termcomp.zip, the electronic version of TERMINAL COMPROMISE is available for ftp at ftp.netsys.com under /pub/novel for those who asked. - From p00506(a)psilink.com Fri Mar 25 08:04:37 1994 Date: Fri, 25 Mar 94 11:01:56 -0500 To: talon57(a)well.sf.ca.us From: "Winn Schwartau" <p00506(a)psilink.com> Organization: Inter.Pact Subject: Ames/Clipper Connection More About Clipper and Ames by Winn Schwartau March 25, 1994. The Ames/Clipper item I wrote in the Feb. 1994 issue of Security Insider Report has apparently caused quite a hub-bub. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is looking for more, the general media has picked it up, and the net is buzzing. As a result, I have been asked to put a few words out regarding this story. First of all, it is a story, one that was told to me by a person whom I know well, respect, and was at the actual meeting where the subject of Ames/Clipper was discussed. In RISKS 15.67, Dorothy Denning said that she didn't think that the Clipper Ames story/rumor made sense. While I am sure that the people to whom she spoke told her what she wrote, I was given the story by my source who WAS AT THE MEETING. Does that make it all true? No, it doesn't. And the item in Security Insider Report contained strong caveats at both the beginning and the end of the article. It was NOT printed as 100% accurate: it was printed as I was told it, and it was read and approved prior to publication by the source. I, too, have sought for confirmation, and been unable to find it. So, when Dorothy said she couldn't, that's no surprise. I have enclosed the piece that originally appeared in SIR. I fail to understand Dorothy's inability to accept possibilities and capabilities. That's one of the basic tenets of intelligence and a strong defensive posture. I find it very easy to accept that the intelligence community is considering everything that Ames might have spilled, including Clipper. What is so strange about that? That's their job! In the same issue of SIR, I examined how the FBI used technology to monitor Ames'computer. In the next issue of SIR, I will be looking at Ames' hacking abilities and skills which possibly lend credence to the possi bility that Clipper was compromised. The tale is still unfold ing. "Ames and the Clipper Connection" (From The February, 1994 Issue of Security Insider Report) Let me preface this item with a caveat. I received a call from a very well placed and highly reliable person in Washington who passed on the information. I asked if there was any way I could confirm what he told me, and I was told no. It's too sensitive. Nonetheless, it is so intriguing that SIR readers expect and would want to know what people are thinking about, even if it turns out not to be true. We in our industry deal with possibil ities and capabilities and since this discussion did take place, I'm passing it on as it happened. If this item has any shred of truth to it, well . . . decide for yourself. My contact, we'll call him something original, like 'Joe', was asked to attend a meeting where representatives from the FBI (he wasn't clear if it was the Counter Intelligence 3 [CI-3 from Half Street who keep track of Soviets and Russians] or from FBI HQ), the CIA and the National Security Agency. All told more than a dozen and less than twenty people assembled in an off-site "neutral" location to figure out what to do. It seems, according to a number of people at this meeting, that alleged CIA traitor Aldrich Ames, had access to the Clipper keys. Whoah! I nearly fell off my keyboard when I heard that. "You mean he knew the crypto-secrets behind the whole thing?" I asked. "Why would a Humint [Human Intelligence] guy know the secrets of Clipper?" "He had access to them; it would have been a normal part of his job to be in that loop." So what this group of initialed reps are allegedly attempting to do is: 1. Determine how much access Ames had to Clipper. 2. Determine if he did have access, did he in fact take advantage of it. 3. If he did get some Clipper secrets, is there a record of that access? 4. Then, what did he do with them? The fear, understandably, is that Ames might have compromised the entire Clipper/Capstone/Tessera program. The words I also heard were, "If there's only even a 1% chance that Clipper has been compromised, the whole thing's over. We have to start from scratch." So, according to my sources, the spooks-that-be are looking for a fast alternative to Clipper and Skipjack, under the theory that Ames may have blown the whole wad. Civil libertarians might shout with glee if this turns out to be true, but I think it's a hell of way to win a ball game. Bitter sweet irony. Sure, I'm not in favor it, and I am indeed nervous about 'the other shoe' but this is not the way I wanted Clipper to go away. I repeat: as of today, this is only a story, there is no confir mation. If SIR readers have anything to add, please let us know in any way you can. (C) 1994, Winn Schwartau and Inter.Pact NOTE: As of March 24, 1994, my sources reconfirmed that the story as I told it is 100% accurate. (Security Insider Report is published monthly by Inter.Pact Press, 11511 Pine St., Seminole, FL 34642. Voice: 813-393-6600, Fax 813-393-6361, email wschwartau(a)delphi.com. Hardcopy sub scriptions are $99/Yr. and electronic site licenses are available for selected organizations.) Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced comunication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLZNPndCcBnAsu2t1AQEsJwQAhLOSV4jLiGgTGNELeZipoXqNTMjUROfo /iCGCKzJJEhk3d25/9jyZsqj7Y0O83j1+oGdqvGB/HyUeHAh/jzNSWwOFaYhBpqJ kWIIjt9YNSRBc+e7ua1bKOD6ZajYw1aOyot8yCjwO0GSZwXdWQHWgd2TkTFobHvH 8CN9hjQ84gs= =x6t+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Communications Law 302
by nobody＠soda.berkeley.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone know what happened to the banks lovely sytem a while back when New York account holders found out that withdrawls were made twice on their accounts? What happened, did someone actually get creditted with the corresponding debits, or was this another case of an operator putting up a tape twice? -- As an aside, I remember an old wire from some years ago when $58Million was held up by the US with co-operation of European authorities. In case anyone is interested the following was the reult of the legal wranglin'. and is dated 11/93. Forget Clipper, and check out how else they're stickin it to ya. In short they 'seized' data packets, at an intermediary remailer. They have made information seizable **EGADS** -- AN PTS2096146 HL U.S. WINS MAJOR VICTORY ON WIRE SEIZURES DL ESTIMATED INFORMATION UNITS: 4.7 WORDS: 569 DD 11/01/93 SO * Money Laundering Alert (MLAL) Alert International, Inc Vol. 5, No. 2 LP When operatives of the Santacruz-Londono Cali drug cartel were arrested in June 1990 in Luxembourg, a flurry of wire transfers flew from hundreds of cartel bank accounts in Europe. Anticipating the transfers, Luxembourg authorities asked other countries to freeze the money linked to those accounts TX Of the $58 million seized worldwide, $12 million was frozen in New York City banks which had served as "intermediary banks" in the wire transfers. The role of those banks was to credit the accounts of certain correspondent Colombian banks who would then notify the beneficiaries that the funds were available. The banks were instructed by DEA agents to attach all funds on deposit in the names of Cali cartel associates, including "all related entities and individuals," and to say which transfers were destined for beneficiaries in Colombia. Two groups of Colombian clothing exporters filed claims to about $6.5 million of the seized funds saying the money was legitimately earned. They also sued the New York banks for loss of use of their funds and for violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Their suits against the banks were dismissed. After a two-month trial last year, the jury found that 18 of the 22 accounts seized were forfeitable. Now, in a case of great importance to the emerging wire transfer battles between the government and the movers of dirty money, the key federal appellate court which rules on issues arising from the New York financial center has given a resounding victory to the government. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that wire transfers that pass through intermediary banks can be seized even without "alleging facts sufficient to show that specific property is tainted." All the government must show are "facts sufficient to support a reasonable belief that (it) can demonstrate probable cause for finding the property tainted," the court said. By naming the intermediary banks and the beneficiaries, the U.S. described the property with "reasonable particularity." Moreover, the U.S. did not need a warrant for the seizures because the law permits the Justice Department to seize property when it has "probable cause to believe" it is subject to civil forfeiture, said the court. "Because the (transfers were) fungible and capable of rapid motion due to modern technology,...exigent circumstances were present here," said the court, dismissing the claimants' assertions that their constitutional rights had been violated. Likewise, there was no violation of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, said the court, because the claimants did not maintain "accounts" at the banks. The ECPA also provided no relief to the claimants because that law deals with the use of "devices" to "intercept" communications. Here, no devices were used and there was no interception, said the court. The court also ruled than an EFT at an intermediary bank is "clearly a seizable res (thing) under the forfeiture statutes" and that only a "nexus" and not a "substantial connection" between seized property and illegal drug activity must be shown by the government to show probable cause. The case has far-reaching implications since a majority of international wire transfers pass through intermediary banks, many of them in New York. (U.S. vs. Daccarett, Docket Nos. 92-6229 and 6259, 2nd Cir. Ct of App., September 10, 1993). ---Richard M. Lucas, CPA, is a consultant for the Philip Manuel Resource Group and a former IRS Special Agent. COPYRIGHT 1993 by Alert International, Inc. I0607 * END OF DOCUMENT.

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Re: Ames/clipper compromised?
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks much for posting. I have a lot of trouble with much of the article, though, on purely technical grounds. Consider the following passage: The words I also heard were, "If there's only even a 1% chance that Clipper has been compromised, the whole thing's over. We have to start from scratch." What does it mean to ``compromise'' Clipper? The algorithm is known? No big deal, in my opinion -- Skipjack was almost certainly designed to be strong even if the algorithm was known. (As I've said before, I tend to believe NSA on that point. I suspect they're telling us the truth about Clipper -- just not the whole truth -- and what they've said is damning enough even if 100% accurate.) It's also quite unlikely that Ames would ever have seen the algorithm; it's just not something he'd have any reason to know. Might he have stolen the family key? More plausible, though again it's not something that would be left lying around, as opposed to being embedded in equipment. Could he have turned over a magic decoder box, which would have to know that key? Not at all unreasonable -- and the decoder boxes are at a sufficiently early stage of design that they may not yet be armored against tampering. But from everything that's been published, very few Clipper chips have been deployed so far. It would not be a major project to recall and rekey the devices. Copies of the key escrow databases? Same argument applies -- though if that's what was stolen, we have to ask how he had access to ``both'' of them. I don't believe there have ever been any categorical statements about how FISA access to Clipper conversations would be obtained. See above under ``whole truth''... It may be, of course, that the episode has made the powers that be wonder about the wisdom of keeping any such keys around. There's been a very strong trend in recent years to avoid *any* sort of cryptography where session keys live anywhere but inside sealed boxes, precisely to avoid key theft. (See Diffie's retrospective on public key technology for more detailed discussion and some examples.) And it's also why the government doesn't want to use Clipper -- as opposed to Skipjack -- for classified information. So -- if the story is true, just what did Ames steal that would require them to ``start over from scratch''? Is there another back door? That's the only thing I can think of that would require such an action -- which means that if they do hold off, there's a new topic to explore via FOIA requests and the like. --Steve Bellovin

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