December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Private and Public
by doug＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <pmetzger(a)lehman.com> said: >However, this entire topic belongs on places like talk.politics.misc, >not cypherpunks. I would suggest that it be conducted elsewhere. I very strongly disagree. The social, political, and economic impact of cryptographic techniques is at least as important as the technology itself. Pure algorithms can be discussed in sci.crypt, after all. Cypherpunks do not have a common agenda, but we do share an interest in how the future world will be shaped by cryptographic technology. >Personally, I don't believe there is such a thing as a social contract -- >I never signed anything, and from what I can tell the terms on the social >contract are ones I would never have accepted. Incorrect. You have complete freedom as to your citizenship. Any time that you choose, you are free to renounce your citizenship, and thereby reject the contract that citizenship gives you. Naturalized citizens of a country/government *very* explicitly enter into the contract; those of you born into citizenship tend to not to think about the subject very deeply, but basically you are simply being granted the privilege of skipping the formalisms, on the assumption that you either accept the contract, or will explicitly opt out. If you continue to accept the freely-granted citizenship you were born into, then you are also accepting the entire contract, like it or not. If you truly reject the contract that U.S. citizenship obligates you to, with all its positive and negative points, then go ahead and give it up. Put your money where your mouth is. Otherwise, accept that citizenship is a two-way street, and work within that system to change it to your tastes, rather than denying that the contract even exists. >I would be happy to >purchase what the goverment give me on the open market -- I see no >need for government to be involved in mail delivery or garbage >collection or schools or any of the other things it runs -- from what >I can tell all it touches turns to crap. I completely agree. But this is quite a different subject. Doug -- Doug Merritt doug(a)netcom.com Professional Wild-eyed Visionary Member, Crusaders for a Better Tomorrow Unicode Novis Cypherpunks Gutenberg Wavelets Conlang Logli Alife HC_III Computational linguistics Fundamental physics Cogsci SF GA VR CASE TLAs

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No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re the Phiber Optik case. I understand that only vanilla, split-band modems (1200, 2400 baud) were tapped, on the analog loop. They were, and still are, common in the mundane telco world. Throw a bandpass filter on the upper half of the audio band, get the answer data. Throw a filter on the lower half, get the originate data. Much MUCH easier than tapping modern full-duplex full-band modems with echo cancellation and compression. I know some of the datacops involved, and I seriously doubt they have a clue about how to handle V.32 without help from the NSA, which DOES know how to intercept them. Of course, even if the modems had NSA-proof encryption built in, the victim could always intercept the decrypted data on the DTE connector... cracking is and will remain a risky and stupid thing to do...

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CRYPTO DATA warning sign
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I posted this to alt.hackers last Thursday, and I just joined cypherpunks yesterday, so I don't know whether someone copied it to the list in the intervening days. If so, sorry for the duplication. If not... This is a warning sign in the style of the diamond-shaped ones that the Department of Transportation requires on the back of vehicles carrying hazardous loads. It will look pretty butch on your read bumper. I suggest printing it onto sticker paper and then overspraying with clear acrylic or polyurethane for weatherproofing. --- Jef %! dot_crypto.ps - draw a DOT cryptographic data warning symbol % % Copyright (C) 1989, 1993 by Jef Poskanzer <jef(a)netcom.com>. % % Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its % documentation for any purpose and without fee is hereby granted, provided % that the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that % copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting % documentation. This software is provided "as is" without express or % implied warranty. /in { 72 mul } def /black { 0 setgray } def /white { 1 setgray } def /showcenter { % str -- dup stringwidth pop 2 div neg 0 rmoveto show } def % Disk - actual size, centered at 0,0. /disk_lw 0.03 in def % line width /disk_width 3.5 in def /disk_height 3.66 in def /disk_shadow 0.05 in def % Drop-shadow offset. /disk_cutoff 0.2 in def % corner cutoff size /disk_hole_width 0.18 in def /disk_hole_height 0.15 in def /disk_hole_xmargin 0.1 in def % x distange between right edges /disk_hole_ymargin 0.26 in def % y distange between bottom edges /disk_detail_radii 0.1 in def % radius of corners on details /disk_label_width 2.80 in def /disk_label_height 2.16 in def /disk_labelline_margin 0.1 in def /disk_labelline_width disk_label_width disk_labelline_margin 2 mul sub def /disk_labelline_yspacing disk_label_height 5 div def /disk_labeltext_size disk_labelline_yspacing 0.7 mul def /disk_labeltext_yoffset disk_labelline_yspacing 0.1 mul def /disk_detail_leftmargin disk_width disk_label_width sub 2 div def /disk_slidearea_width 2.38 in def /disk_slidearea_height 1.26 in def /disk_slide_width 1.87 in def /disk_slidehole_width 0.47 in def /disk_slidehole_height 0.99 in def /disk_slidehole_xmargin 0.3 in def % x distance between right edges /disk_slidehole_ymargin 0.175 in def % y distance between top edges /disk_wo2 disk_width 2 div def /disk_ho2 disk_height 2 div def /disk_outline { newpath disk_wo2 neg disk_ho2 neg moveto 0 disk_height rlineto disk_width disk_cutoff sub 0 rlineto disk_cutoff disk_cutoff neg rlineto 0 disk_height disk_cutoff sub neg rlineto closepath disk_wo2 disk_hole_xmargin sub disk_ho2 neg disk_hole_ymargin add moveto 0 disk_hole_height rlineto disk_hole_width neg 0 rlineto 0 disk_hole_height neg rlineto closepath disk_wo2 neg disk_hole_xmargin add disk_ho2 neg disk_hole_ymargin add moveto disk_hole_width 0 rlineto 0 disk_hole_height rlineto disk_hole_width neg 0 rlineto closepath } def /disk { % line1 line2 line3 line4 -- % Save args. /disk_line4 exch def /disk_line3 exch def /disk_line2 exch def /disk_line1 exch def % First draw drop-shadow. black gsave disk_shadow neg disk_shadow neg translate disk_outline fill grestore % Fill with white. white disk_outline fill % Draw outline. disk_lw setlinewidth black disk_outline stroke % Label area. newpath disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_ho2 neg moveto disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_detail_radii add disk_ho2 neg disk_label_height add disk_detail_radii sub disk_detail_radii 180 90 arcn disk_wo2 disk_detail_leftmargin sub disk_detail_radii sub disk_ho2 neg disk_label_height add disk_detail_radii sub disk_detail_radii 90 0 arcn disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_label_width add disk_ho2 neg lineto stroke % Label lines and text. gsave 0 setlinewidth disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_label_width add disk_ho2 neg translate 180 rotate /Times-Roman findfont disk_labeltext_size scalefont setfont newpath disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -1 mul moveto disk_labelline_width 0 rlineto stroke disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -1 mul disk_labeltext_yoffset add moveto disk_line1 show newpath disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -2 mul moveto disk_labelline_width 0 rlineto stroke disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -2 mul disk_labeltext_yoffset add moveto disk_line2 show newpath disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -3 mul moveto disk_labelline_width 0 rlineto stroke disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -3 mul disk_labeltext_yoffset add moveto disk_line3 show newpath disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -4 mul moveto disk_labelline_width 0 rlineto stroke disk_labelline_margin disk_labelline_yspacing -4 mul disk_labeltext_yoffset add moveto disk_line4 show grestore % Slide area. newpath disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_ho2 moveto disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_detail_radii add disk_ho2 disk_slidearea_height sub disk_detail_radii add disk_detail_radii 180 270 arc disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_slidearea_width add disk_detail_radii sub disk_ho2 disk_slidearea_height sub disk_detail_radii add disk_detail_radii 270 0 arc disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_slidearea_width add disk_ho2 lineto stroke % Slide. newpath disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_slidearea_width add disk_slide_width sub disk_ho2 moveto disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_slidearea_width add disk_slide_width sub disk_detail_radii add disk_ho2 disk_slidearea_height sub disk_detail_radii add disk_detail_radii 180 270 arc stroke % Slide hole. newpath disk_wo2 neg disk_detail_leftmargin add disk_slidearea_width add disk_slidehole_xmargin sub disk_ho2 disk_slidehole_ymargin sub moveto 0 disk_slidehole_height neg rlineto disk_slidehole_width neg 0 rlineto 0 disk_slidehole_height rlineto closepath stroke } def % DOT diamond - size 1, centered at 0,0. /DOT_lw 0.01 def % line width /DOT_inset 0.06 def % inset of inner border /DOT_bits_xspacing 0.012 def /DOT_bits_yspacing 0.020 def /DOT_bits_size 0.75 def /DOT_bits_xsize DOT_bits_xspacing DOT_bits_size mul def /DOT_bits_ysize DOT_bits_yspacing DOT_bits_size mul def /DOT_bits_nx 1 DOT_bits_xspacing div def /DOT_bits_ny 1 DOT_bits_yspacing div def /DOT_bits_xso2 DOT_bits_xsize 2 div def /DOT_bits_yso2 DOT_bits_ysize 2 div def /DOT_diskoffset 0.19 def % y-position of disk /DOT_diskscale 0.28 3.5 in div def % scale of disk /DOT_fontsize 0.09 def % size of lettering /DOT_wordoffset -0.06 def % y-position of "CRYPTO DATA" /DOT_numoffset -0.34 def % y-position of "10" /DOT_inner_outline { newpath -0.5 DOT_inset add 0 moveto 0 0.5 DOT_inset sub lineto 0.5 DOT_inset sub 0 lineto 0 -0.5 DOT_inset add lineto closepath } def /DOT_bits_0 { gsave DOT_bits_xso2 DOT_bits_yso2 scale newpath 0 0 1 0 360 arc stroke grestore }def /DOT_bits_1 { newpath 0 DOT_bits_yso2 neg moveto 0 DOT_bits_ysize rlineto stroke }def /DOT_bits { 0 setlinewidth gsave DOT_bits_nx DOT_bits_xspacing mul 2 div neg DOT_bits_ny DOT_bits_yspacing mul 2 div neg translate 0 1 DOT_bits_ny { gsave 0 exch DOT_bits_yspacing mul translate 0 1 DOT_bits_nx { gsave DOT_bits_xspacing mul 0 translate rand 2147483648 div 0.5 lt { DOT_bits_0 } { DOT_bits_1 } ifelse grestore } for grestore } for grestore } def /DOT { % Outer border. DOT_lw setlinewidth black newpath -0.5 0 moveto 0 0.5 lineto 0.5 0 lineto 0 -0.5 lineto closepath stroke % Fill inner area with 1's and 0's. gsave DOT_inner_outline clip DOT_bits grestore % Inner border. DOT_inner_outline stroke % Disk. gsave 0 DOT_diskoffset translate DOT_diskscale dup scale 45 rotate black (PGP public key) (1024 bits) () () disk grestore % "CRYPTO DATA". /Helvetica-Bold findfont DOT_fontsize scalefont setfont 0 DOT_wordoffset DOT_fontsize 0.4 mul sub moveto (CRYPTO DATA) showcenter % "10". 0 DOT_numoffset DOT_fontsize 0.4 mul sub moveto (10) showcenter } def % Main code. %/preview true def /preview false def preview { /m_x_offset 0.5 in def /m_y_offset 0.5 in def /m_x_count 1 def /m_y_count 1 def /m_size 7.5 in def /m_x_space 0 def /m_y_space 0 in def /m_angle 0 def } { /m_x_offset 0.375 in def /m_y_offset 0.75 in def /m_x_count 3 def /m_y_count 3 def /m_size 2.25 in def /m_x_space 0.50 in def /m_y_space 0.75 in def /m_angle 45 def % Use manual feed. { statusdict begin /manualfeed true def end } stopped pop } ifelse gsave m_x_offset m_y_offset translate 0 1 m_y_count 1 sub { gsave 0 exch m_size m_y_space add mul translate 0 1 m_x_count 1 sub { gsave m_size m_x_space add mul 0 translate m_size 2 div dup translate m_size dup scale m_angle rotate 1 m_angle cos div dup scale DOT grestore } for grestore } for grestore showpage

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Re: ID of anonymous posters via word analysis?
by cfrye＠ciis.mitre.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike McNally writes: >Though I agree with some other contributors that iron-clad >identification may require substantial amounts of material, I think >Mr. Ghio's point is correct to the extent that a party can satisfy >itself informally that a particular anonymous post is from some >well-known identity. Though the evidence may be useless in a legal >sense, that's not a problem in some contexts. > >For example, if Bob Scum is posting anonymously some risky notes to >a particular mailing list or newsgroup, it may be quite unfortunate >for Bob if mere suspicion arises that the notes are from him. That >suspicion need not be based on admissable-in-court evidence; if it's >noted by someone that both Bob and the anonymous author routinely use >the word "copacetic", things could heat up for poor Bob. If the risky >notes involve some socially unacceptable topics like drug use or >pornography, the fact that Bob can't actually be convicted is >unimportant. True, though the probability that two individuals would (over)use a particular word or phrase is high enough where "heating things up" would be unjustified, especially if spoofing were involved. Consider the reverse of the analytical process -- I want everyone to believe I'm Joe X, so I do a text analysis of his messages, write my own, analyze my message in comparison with Joe's, and modify it until the (or an) engine's algorithms spit out a score indicating that I'm Joe. Spoofing deluxe! I don't mean to say that informal analysis doesn't have its place, but we need to be careful about jumping to conclusions and potentially "heating things up" for innocent individuals or "convicting" them in the Court of Net.Opinion absent sufficient proof. I would agree that these analyses might form the basis for a reasonable suspicion that a particular individual is resposnible for bothersome anonymous posts, providing grounds for sysadmin notification. Curtis D. Frye cfrye(a)ciis.mitre.org "If you think I speak for MITRE, I'll tell you how much they pay me and make you feel foolish."

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Re: Nymalizer, politics on the list
by jamie＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) > I wholeheartedly support either >him or the spoofer in their call to take the politics somewhere else. > Try the Extropians list. Y'all come! -- ................................ Jamie Dinkelacker Palo Alto CA Jamie(a)netcom.com 415.941.4782 ................................

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Go away.
by pmetzger＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Go away and leave us alone.

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Cyphergurus: Advice needed
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I'm writing a Macintosh encryption application (nearing completion), which, when it encrypts a file, changes its file type and creator so that the encryption program will be launch when the file is double-clicked. I have to save four pieces of information about the original plaintext: file type, creator, data fork length, and resource fork length. These are placed in a resource in the encrypted file. What I'd like to get opinions on is _should I encrypt this header information_, since its format will be known to an attacker and, in many cases, its contents easy to guess? My inclination is to leave it plaintext, since the worst that can happen if a file type is known is the same type of attack that would _always_ be possible with an encrypted header. Thanks to all with thoughts on the subject. -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLN9hEPfv4TpIg2PxAQEZCwP9G2nysBI31CnD2UasTUHQb3itwc2S1juc TGJRvo5iB1WRFHwYwxyraae41Kf2Xsu6qiuHAQWEuvGhG4MyiZjXwZsE5FU9pxRR CV/pvSG4J/teXvJXv575Vr3lVxI6isDa4oZcMtv5rOS7ihIqF4ssuHnlOa6mHckU KW81MGB8nkQ= =cLCE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Suggested mod to PGP
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An interesting suggestion was passed to me from a FidoNet node, suggesting a way that might get PGP accepted in BBS-based networks a little easier: A new commandline switch that will cause PGP to produce it's clearsigning info, digital signature, etc, as part of a FTSC kluge line, most of which are "invisible" unless you really try to get at them (in much the same way that elm will filter out most of the headers, and you have to hit "h" to see them all). This would assuage fears of Fidomail becoming cluttered and unreadable with PGP output. This reminds me strongly of another recent proposal to have PGP use the headers, rather than the body of messages, for PG information in Internet/Usenet messages. Considering that these 2 similar ideas came from totally independent sources, this may be a good idea for developers to look at, since it seems to occur to a lot of people. -- -=> mech(a)eff.org <=- Stanton McCandlish Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp "A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715 Fido 1:109/1103 IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX Join EFF! For more information about membership, send mail to eff(a)eff.org

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Q: Can anyone locate the ISS
by an6077＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As the subject says, has anyone located the ISS (Internet Security Scan) on a ftp-site. I have seen the discussion about it, but not any sites mentioned. (I have tried archie to!) Thanks in advance. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Caller ID
by Wabasha-Kellogg High School 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I believe the frequencies used for Caller ID are per Bell 202, a straight FSK data standard. I have a copy around here somewhere & will post the appropriate numbers unless someone tells me it's NOT 202 before I find the spec ..... ... .. /s/ Bill

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