December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Stegno and DAT and digital music...
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In this week's Sunday NYT, Hans Fantel, their music guy, writes at length about the new "dithered" CD's and how the guys have improved the sound. He says that the original CD format was limited to 16 bits of sound because of costs. But many audiophiles reacted very negatively to the tinny, metalic quality to the music. For this reason, the companies have developed 20 bit DAT recording tape and then come up with ways to "dither" this into 16 bits. I am curious if anyone knows the details of these algorithms. Also, his point suggests that flipping the least significant bit of 16 bit music may not be imperceptable to some ears. If the classical music starts to sound tinny then there might be something subversive in the least significant bits. -Peter Wayner

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Remail: errors
by HFinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have been out of town for the last week, so I missed some CP mail. It looks like some good things are happening with remailers, though. Kudos to Karl, Sameer, and the others for their work! I have received many messages to my remailer in the last week which came from remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu, which were PGP-encrypted apparently in an effort to get my remailer to send them. They did not work, though, because there was no "Encrypted: PGP" header to trigger the remailer's decryption. This can be arranged by creating the message something like this: ======================================================== :: Request-Remailing-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com :: Encrypted: PGP - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- <rest of message> - -----END PGP MESSAGE------ ======================================================== This would then be sent to remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu. I don't know whether the multiplicity of such erroneous messages is just due to one person stubbornly re-trying, or whether there is an error in one of the new programs for creating chained remailer messages. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLJaNuKgTA69YIUw3AQHrNwQAowMEQwuH6YyHoj6T7AqZFLNdTf+eqJ9L LhAatHS94nmC1smkfVNq0dZmigmkvBdMNEPlBZemmxALz+KJw6OSY/ULSBmuVNEq 5rJANh3XimoJWqLISy2lZiuC5Fw2R7UvRadcdM94pncSVvev92Fyf7CqEOOtrGAK PUzRds7BVNo= =FpLa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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more than spread spectrum
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are alternatives to spread spectrum, if we're threatened with loss of freedom to communicate. We could lay our own wires/fibers. We could set up a mesh network of infrared lasers through the air. Last time I looked, there were no laws against shining lights out your window as long as they didn't bother anyone. An infrared laser could hardly bother anyone. We could produce a line of cheap cards to plug into a PC which would do packet routing, using a variety of physical links -- our own wires, lasers, very low range radio, .... Each card would connect to three or more neighbors and become part of the global mesh. Adaptive routing with no global map would suffice for the card and would keep the whole system peer-to-peer with no need for central control and no chance for central tapping. Of course all of these solutions require a high density of users. A college campus might be the right place to start. We could then branch out to cities. I suspect that a place like Chicago or NYC with high rise apartments might be the place to start -- many options for line-of-sight communications. The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks. It's a free network for the masses -- like the original USENET (with each user donating routing and store/forward) but with unrestricted, low-range, continuously operating physical links. I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card. Does anyone have hardware design/fab to donate to the effort? - Carl

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(Fwd) Re: Alt.Gvmt.Bad.Bad.Bad
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by Michael Conlen: Theft could be from thoes who do not protect there property and from thoes who do not respect others property, so can it also be said that 'bad government' can be from people not protecting there rights and people who have no respect for the rights of others? ............................................................... What should be said is that theft does not happen of its own accord; someone must decide to accomplish the so-called criminal act. To describe theft as the result of another's inaction is to imply that human action of any kind is mostly automatic, that there is a pull which will evoke action upon intelligence the way gravity affects inanimate objects, and that nothing better could be or should be expected from it. It is also to imply that the possession of intelligence is negligible because any opportunity for taking advantage of another's vulnerability will be irresistible to humans, as if they were basically scavengers looking for the spoils of other people's negligence. In which case, rather than speaking of bad Government, the aim should be to question the existence of intelligence & the possibility for morality. I don't know who would be qualified to discuss it, though, without the possession of the one and an appreciation of the other. Blanc

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Re: Cypherwaffle on spoofing
by jrk＠sys.uea.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Arthur Chandler writes: > What I find odd is the number and vehemence of posts ON A LIST DEVOTED >TO ENCRYPTION saying "Hey, it's a fact of life, accept it" -- even >dragging out Machiavelli's profoundly mistaken "if you can't enforce >it, don't prohibit it." "It's a fact of life" is a fact central to the, ahem, cypherpunk cause. Virtual personas are here. The only question is how this will change the way people deal with each other over the net. >Of all the groups on the Internet, I would >think that this one would be in a special position to say "put your >digital John Hancock on your post if you want to to taken seriously." That is one possibility: people start signing posts with IDs that verifiably mean something over a wider range of net and RL spaces than just a single small world like cypherpunks(a)com.toad. Personas which consist only of postings here might come to be taken less seriously, even if their content appears useful and constructive. I do not see what authoritarian action is needed, desirable, or practical. I would rather see a consensus emerge over how to behave in this new environment. I notice you didn't sign your post. Can I conclude that you do not want it to be taken seriously? -- ____ Richard Kennaway __\_ / School of Information Systems Internet: jrk(a)sys.uea.ac.uk \ X/ University of East Anglia uucp: ...mcsun!ukc!uea-sys!jrk \/ Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.

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German "NSA" has a Clipper plan too? + News of German conf.
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

More int'l. news of some interest. **** Begin Forwarded message **** From: Reiner Perivolaris <tutlaibe(a)w250zrz.zrz.TU-Berlin.DE> Message-Id: <9310082023.AA03362(a)w250zrz.zrz.TU-Berlin.DE> Subject: CCC'93 and You ... To: fig(a)well.sf.ca.us Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1993 13:23:34 -0700 Re-To: reiner(a)physik.tu-berlin.de X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL5] Content-Type: text Content-Length: 1827 The plan of the Clinton administration for the ISDN-Net (?!) will be a part of a workshop or a own theme and the fight for private cryptos (eg. PGP), include the trouble of P. Zimmerman. The 'Clipper/Skipjack'-Chip can/will be a theme, because storys are "on their way", that german BSI (*my* translation:Federal Office for Security of Informationsystems) and the TELEKOM (Telephoncompany) have a plan like the NSA. Where all this and more? At the CCC'93 (10. Chaos Communication Congress 1993). 27. -29. Dec. 1993 Eidelstedter Buergerhaus Alte Elbgaustr. 12 Hamburg-Eidelstedt Germany Organization: Choas Computer Club e.V. Address: CCC e.V. (Orga-CCC'93) Schwenckestr. 85 20255 Hamburg Germany I am one of the guys who organize this workshop and the congress. We are reading 'comp.org.eff.news', 'comp.org.eff.talk' and other information we can get. But only to talk about the EFF *we thing* is not enough. It would be nice, if members of Your organization will be there and have the chance to explain what EFF is doing. And when You get new members *we hope so* it will be good for Your movement and the 'global village'. **** End Forwarded Message **** -- -=> mech(a)eff.org <=- Stanton McCandlish Electronic Frontier Foundation Online Activist & SysOp "A nation that is afraid to let its people judge the truth and falsehood of ideas in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people." -JFK NitV-DC BBS 202-232-2715, Fido 1:109/? IndraNet 369:111/1, 14.4V32b 16.8ZyX

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Re: Uniqueness and "is-a-person" credentials
by hal＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I remembered about is-a-person credentials after I posted. I had thought this idea came from Chaum but I didn't see it in his 1985 paper. I don't recall the details of this credentialling mechanism, so take what I say here with a grain of salt. I hope someone can post a cite. One point is, there is no need to associate these with states. Private corporations could easily issue is-a-person credentials. You show up and let them take your thumbprint (retina print, DNA scan, ...), and they give you the credential. They don't need to know your name, just that you don't already have a credential. (The different agencies would have to share a database as is done in many industries today.) Then, if L. Detweiler wants to accuse Eric and Jamie of being the same person, they can disprove it by exhibiting their different is-a-person credentials. (They might not "exhibit" them, they might use some kind of zero-knowledge proof to show they are different.) If anonymity and spoofing get to be too bad a problem, most people may refuse to have net.dealings with anyone who is not willing to show an is-a-person credential. Among your pseudonyms, only one can show it, otherwise they will be linked. This would force all but one of your pseudonyms into second-class citizenhood on the net. This may seem unfortunate, but as those who just got through flaming Detweiler remind us, if something like this is possible then just because you don't like it, that won't stop it from happening. It may be that in the future the net is not a very anonymous environment, just because the technology exists to catch spoofers. L. Detweiler may get his wish after all. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Re: on anonymity, identity, reputation, and spoofing
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I believe it is very valuable to have an anonymous identity that nobody can associate with your actual one. Besides asking embarsassing newbie questions (which I will become more and more famous for), I am learning a lot about what it means to build up an anonymous reputation. I have posted to a few other newsgroups as well, and I am having dialogues with people through e-mail. I feel as though I have a real identity. My actual identity also has reasons for not wanting to appear on this mailing list. I wonder if I am catching some strain of multiple personality disorder... Wonderer ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a fairly strong bias these days towards staying out of meta- discussions on mailing lists and newsgroups, and primarily contributing when I have some particular expertise I can bring to bear. I'll break that rule now... There's a persistent tendency on this list to confuse technical feasibility, political feasibility, and ultimate desirability. The whole business about pseudonyms is a good example. Guess what -- the ability to use pseudonyms is not new. Yes, the Net makes it easier, but they're far from rare in the ``real world''. The potential for abuse is obvious -- and that's why the government has tried to make it harder and harder to create truly-functional aliases, to the point of criminalizing many aspects of it. Nor is the concept of an anoymous spending mechanism new. We speak of ``digital cash'' for a reason -- its essential properties are modeled on those of real cash. Of course, when real cash became problematic for the government, they did the obvious -- they promulgated laws and regulations regarding what you can do with it (i.e., the rules on forms to be filled out when leaving the country, the bank rules on large cash transactions, etc.). Are any of these laws 100% effective? Or even substantially effective? Of course not -- but they've accomplished two things. One, they've raised the ante for playing certain games that the government doesn't want played. Two -- and probably more important -- they've provided the government with a new weapon to use against you. Can't convict Al Capone of racketeering? No problem; just charge him with tax evasion. So it is with the net. When email and digital cash become social forces in the larger community, as opposed to our electronic subcommunity, you'll start to see more regulation. It might not even be purely governmental; the large companies that want to run ``the'' net have their own agendas, which concern things like large profits and keeping the government away, and have little to do with privacy. Remember Prodigy? I haven't noticed that it's lacking for customers because of their policies. Or -- envision, if you will, an ukase that the FCC will regulate the Internet, and that anyone who wants to connect will have to agree to an acceptable use policy that includes the requirement that all mail be digitally signed, both by the individual and by the site, and that mailers enforce this requirement. Can't happen? Nor do I think that ``offshore data havens'' will help. Apart from the fact that most major governments are basically in accord on the question of who makes the rules (them, not the people -- or did you see any governments denouncing Clipper? I saw lots of endorsements), there is a potent weapon that can be used: mandatory disconnection from the net for any country that doesn't co-operate enough. (Even the famed Swiss banking system is under a lot of pressure these days on such issues, and they and the Swiss government are co-operating a lot more with other countries. Wanna place any bets on creating a whole new anonymity structure?) For that matter, international bandwidth is a matter for diplomats as well as technicians; permission to create new circuits will simply be withheld. If you doubt me, try placing a call to Cuba, or to the former USSR. After your Nth ``circuits busy'' message, don't bother asking why the long distance carriers haven't installed more trunks, when there's obviously a demand for them. Certainly, there are ways around some restrictions. The inability to call directly between Israel and the Arab countries has bred call- forwarders. But to the extent that these have come to official notice of governments that care to suppress the traffic, they've been shut down. This is force majeure, friends, not bits on a wire. Cryptographic technology is an enabling mechanism for various social changes. It by no means makes them inevitable. Don't delude yourself on that; the political will to do something is more important when various alternatives exist. To allude to fiction again, I've heard people cite Margaret Atwater's ``The Handmaid's Tale'' as an argument against electronic banking and the like. In the book, at the stroke of a pen all women's bank accounts were cancelled. But that's the wrong lesson; the real issue was the governmental decision to take the action. And throughout the centuries, governments have had no trouble stripping hated minority groups of their assets, without any need for computers. If you want a Brave New Digital World, it isn't sufficient to build the tools. You also have to convince people that it's a good idea. Oh, the online world is coming; no doubt about that. But people have to be convinced that privacy and the like is in their interests, that it will solve problems that *they* will have. Equally important, they have to be convinced that it will not create new problems, to their perception (and the perception may have little to do with reality. 500 -- nay, 500,000 -- channels of digital information to the home will do nothing to educate those who prefer to learn about the world from McData Services, or from CBS/NBC/ABC/Fox/AP/UPI. There are myriad sources of information right now that most folks never see, because they don't know of them, don't trust them, or just don't want to bother. Face it, it's easier to let someone else do the editing -- but then you have to trust them. Do you want an example? Here's how to shut down an anonymous remailer. First, find a name for a host that no longer exists. Send a note through the remailer to someone putatively on that host, making it appear like a stolen account (bin(a)foo.bar.edu, or some such). The mail should appear to discuss criminal activity, and be signed with a name from the proper ethnic group. The message will be queued forever, of course, and will likely be stored on the backup tapes for the mail spool directory. Next, send a message through the remailer to president(a)whitehouse.gov, threatening the president. Poof -- the Secret Service *will* come investigating (those guys have no sense of humor). They may or may not believe that the planted note is genuine. But they will approach the appropriate dean to demand that this tool of criminal activity be shut down. Quick -- how many remailers have the support of the university? How many boards of trustees -- at state universities, often linked to the government -- will back them, if the Secret Service ``requests'' that they be shut down. The answer, of course, is to have a defense ready in terms that such people can accept. Show the good remailers can do (i.e., alt.abuse.recovery, though I know of the controversy surrounding it). Show them as a paradigm for privacy. And show that abuses are not tolerated by the community. The recent ``traitor mail'' here is actually a good example. While there have been refreshingly few calls for limiting anonymity, there's also been no tolerance for the ideas expressed. I've gone on too long, and this message has started to ramble. Enough for now. --Steve Bellovin

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ANON: _The Economist_ on South Korea
by hughes＠ah.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 11 Sep 93 Economist had an article on South Korea called "Too clean for comfort" about their president Kim Young Sam and his political housecleaning. I excerpt a relevant passage. [...] One of Mr Kim;s first presidential acts was to bare his assets. Then ministers, MPs and top civil servants were all required to disclose their net worth. To no one's surprise, while the president's people were mostly clean, many of the old guard turned out to be rolling in wealth whose origins they could not readily explain. Many resigned. The "real names" reform, announced on August 12th, was Mr Kim's most radical step yet. The issue had been hotly debated for over a decade. Hitherto South Koreans had been able to keep bank accounts in any name they cared to invent; convenient for tax evasion, and for recycling the cash-stuffed white envelopes that for decades have routinely oiled the country's wheels of business and politics alike. Mr Kim struck out of the blue. Only the secret task force drawing up the plan knew about it; they had told their families that they were on a course in America. Even Mr Kim's cabinet was informed only an hour before the public announcement. Not a word leaked out. [...] Anyone who upsets so many applecarts risks making himself a lot of enemies. But Mr Kim's positioning is good. Anyone who speaks out against real names or asset-baring must surely have something to hide. Conversely, the whole campaign is widely popular with the public, chiming as it does with the widespread perception (even in a country with one fo the world's most even distributions of income) that fat cats are licking off the cream. A new target market? Eric

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