December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Wiretaps & terrorism
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Why the FBI doesn't really need wiretaps) (Part of a continuing series) >From todays (Feb 8) Boston Globe, page 3 by Larry Neumeister, AP New York- the FBI was on the trail of three of the World Trade Center bombers nearly four years before teh explosion that killed six and injured 1,000, the government said yesterday. In evidence presented at the trial of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman and 10 others, the FBI also said it had bugged the Sheik's phone a week before the blast. The surprising testimony - a day ater a key defendant switched sides - indicated that the government had more extensive knowledge of the planning for the trade center bombing than it had acknowledged. And it reaised anew questions about why the FBI was unable to prevent the 1993 bombing, one of the most serious terrorist actions in the United States. ...

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LESM - Link Encrypted Session Manager
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I finished hacking Matt's ESM to do link encryption yesterday, but for some reason the mail I sent to cypherpunks didn't get echoed back to me, so I'm sending this again. To install: get ESM and RSAREF, make sure you can compile ESM, then replace the esm.c with my hacked version and recompile. To use: same as ESM, but there's an extra option "-b bandwidth", the default is 100 cps. I've attached the modified esm.c here since it doesn't include any crypto code. To get ESM, write to cfs(a)research.att.com and state the following: - you are in the US or Canada, and - you are a US or Canadian citizen or legal permanent resident, and - You've read and understand the license and export conditions. RSAREF is in ftp://rsa.com/rsaref/ Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzqTtTl0sXKgdnV5AQEmbgP8CRxE+RCGsDXwwShWhZKGytSywyWZ8RXB RPBHZmk6UgdpCR2VVo8wXjcPuEv4SHp9ZjhFTq53JZ/s3YcV5FxF33/ivSlh1Ra4 P8GSYnoEaIJoFrJyagukbBUaY6zWCx0PcnsLoVArCxujwRYwfrQvHdiNx13z7bJh OSEhhoE9djg= =PY8P -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- E-mail: Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> URL: "http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai" =================== Exponential Increase of Complexity =================== --> singularity --> atoms --> macromolecules --> biological evolution --> central nervous systems --> symbolic communication --> homo sapiens --> digital computers --> internetworking --> close-coupled automation --> broadband brain-to-net connections --> artificial intelligence --> distributed consciousness --> group minds --> ? ? ? This message contains a file prepared for transmission using the MIME BASE64 transfer encoding scheme. If you are using Pegasus Mail or another MIME-compliant system, you should be able to extract it from within your mailer. If you cannot, please ask your system administrator for help. ---- File information ----------- File: lesm.c Date: 8 Feb 1995, 23:57 Size: 19769 bytes. Type: Text

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Re: lwall
by EFN Autoresponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DO NOT PANIC! REMAIN CALM! READ *ALL* OF THIS MESSAGE BEFORE GETTING UPSET! Your Usenet test article was received here at the news gateway machine for Oregon Public Networking, located in Eugene, Oregon, USA. The OPN newsadmins can be reached via e-mail at usenet(a)news.efn.org. Please note that we do not offer news access to sites outside of our organization. If you're a newsadmin and you'd like to run your own autoresponder, this one is available from ftp://ftp.cccd.edu/pub/usenet/innautorespond. Or you can just ask us to mail you a copy. If you want to suppress this message in the future, include the word "ignore" in the Subject: header of any subsequent articles posted to *.test. You could also post your test articles with a Distribution: header of "local" to prevent them from leaving your local machine, or you could also ask your local newsadmin to create a local *.test group that will not propagate outside of your organization. There are typically 5 possible reasons why you were sent this e-mail message: 1) You intentionally posted a Usenet news article to a *.test newsgroup. These newsgroups exist so you can verify that your articles are being propagated correctly. When your article arrives here, we send you this message as confirmation. We will only send you ONE e-mail reply for each of your test articles that we see. 2) You unintentionally posted a Usenet news article to a *.test newsgroup. This is a bit of net.childishness caused by a Followup-To: header directing all replies into a *.test newsgroup. This is done by somebody upset with the content of a discussion thread who wants to "punish" anybody who replies to his message. Your reply will be sent to *.test instead of the original newsgroup, and you will start receiving autoresponder messages similar to this one that you didn't ask for. To avoid this in the future, look for a Followup-To: header and make sure it's appropriate before replying to any articles. 3) You were a victim of a Reply-To: header directing your e-mail into a *.test newsgroup via a mail->news gateway. Similar to 2) above. 4) Somebody has forged a posting in your name to one of the *.test newsgroups. To avoid this in the future, use better net.etiquette and you will make fewer net.enemies. If you want to try and identify the forger, use the following procedure. Make a legitimate posting to the same *.test newsgroup that the forger used. We will send you an e-mail reply. Compare the Path: header from this legitimate reply with the Path: header from the forgery. The front part of the two headers will be the same or topologically similar path to your site. Where the forged header becomes substantially different can provide clues to where the forger lives. Note that if you receive multiple newsfeeds you may need to repeat this process several times so you can discover all legitimate paths between our site and yours. Once you think you've identified the forger's site, try sending POLITE e-mail to the newsadmin/ sysadmin/postmaster explaining the situation. 5) You issued a cancel control message to a *.test newsgroup. Some users dislike autoresponses for cancel messages, but the newsadmins here think it can be a valuable diagnostic tool for verifying cancel propagation. If you don't like it, use the "delete" key in your mail client! All headers plus at most 10 lines of user text from your original article are reproduced below for your perusal: Path: mars.efn.org!cs.uoregon.edu!news.uoregon.edu!vixen.cso.uiuc.edu!howland.reston.ans.net!agate!overload.lbl.gov!emf.emf.net!hilbert.dnai.com!nbn!miwok!news.zeitgeist.net!ack.berkeley.edu!not-for-mail Subject: lwall Message-ID: <PINE4545-dhfsdkjc(a)ack.berkeley.edu> NNTP-Posting-Host: ack.berkeley.edu Organization: cypherpunks Lines: 2 From: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Distribution: world Newsgroups: alt.test Date: 6 Feb 1995 19:34:19 GMT test test

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Four Horsemen
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-Id: <v01510101ab5ecb0e67cd@DialupEudora> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just a quick question: someone asked me the other day what the "Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse" were, and I told him 1) Drug Dealers 2) Terrorists 3) Pedophiles 4) Pornographers Did I get it right, or did I have a synaptic misfire somewhere along the line? Ken = Ken Kirksey And the Clinton administration launched an attack on = = kkirksey(a)world.std.com people in Texas because those people were religious = = Mac Guru & Developer nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by = = religious nuts with guns. - P.J. O'Rourke = -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLzkbhOsZNYlu+zuBAQHVigQAzkp3fIlEfT82zSaRZPkIqkkaDJ5MNyRK SOOq0QwAMB1/bGNGda0plC+aNGT1RnSpNJTS/8ISIJTDCwbmJGFYGxvRSgqyUkXO dQrd6pLbYIxH1sTPIaAoM4BnmUhYzr5L4TauPgqTLYhqGKDa8RWbHggjLyTr/UfF drRgBOM919Q= =OcUi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Judges-L FAQ
by Craig A. Johnston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It has come to my attention that the Judges-L FAQ is being distributed by someone who obtained it on this list, and being sent to people made to look as if it has issued from David Stodolsky. I must inform you that this FAQ is copyrighted material, and you are requested not to distribute it. -Craig

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To clear this up.
by Craig A. Johnston 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Something needs clearing up: I am not a Judges-L sympathizer. The previous message was posted at the request of David Stodolsky. I am subscribed to the list to see what is going on. I find the idea of the Judges-L to be repulsive, personally, as I have told DS and others. I saw no harm in relaying this message to the list. All it is likely to do is create more anti-Judges-L sentiment. David Stodolsky claims that they have no desire to hide their FAQ, but that he wishes for it to be distributed in a controlled fashion. To engage in what I deem "fair use": "...disclosure in the wrong context, or at the wrong time can cause trouble..." A beaut. In sum, I find Judges-L repulsive and plan to keep an eye on it. -Craig Johnston

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Re: Effects of S.314 (Communications Decency Act)
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:02 PM 2/8/95, Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl wrote: >Of course geographic community standards are problematic too with >telecommunications since postal inspectors from Tennessee can call >up adult bulletin boards in California... This reminds me of a joke I finally grew tired of, prescient though it may have been given current legal events in Tennessee: It's illegal in Cambridge to smoke in Boston... Most non-smokers, especially the reformed-smoker non-smokers, didn't think that that one-liner was very funny. Most small-l libertarians had a hoot or too about it though. (Just like the punchline about how many radical feminists it takes to screw in a lightbulb [A: That's really *not* funny.]) I guess I'll sit down now... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Jefferson Wheel Cypher
by kkirksey＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Message-Id: <v01510103ab5ed2c136c8@DialupEudora> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A couple of questions regarding Thomas Jefferson's Wheel Ciphyer: 1) How would you classify this cipher? It looks to me like a polyalphabetic with the plaintext also being the key, kind of like an autokey. Am I correct, or is this cipher a different animal entirely? 2) Can anyone point me to references on the cryptanalysis of this cipher? Many thanks in advance, Ken = Ken Kirksey And the Clinton administration launched an attack on = = kkirksey(a)world.std.com people in Texas because those people were religious = = Mac Guru & Developer nuts with guns. Hell, this country was founded by = = religious nuts with guns. - P.J. O'Rourke = -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLzkjt+sZNYlu+zuBAQEwPgP/XMWm/qDr1A0D49iBJdYNOX18j3DNbBvG xTOvSrzNziq9jq4026+TNpM3+PVGiji85yL3053jG26I0dJbckkVFr1PBfXmLrua nHBt5t/qy7RSvjsW80ZreeqVKwulo3NtT+XuWjU7EXZDSPUZts4JuHnGdlqQRiMo 1ERDP4+StM0= =PcEo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: a new way to do anonymity
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > I'd suggest just getting something running first, to get some > prototyping experience. Now that I've just spent some time compiling and playing with Matt's ESM program, it seems almost perfectly suited for prototyping Pipe-Net since you can use it to do nested encryption. All that's needed is to hack it so that it implements link encryption (i.e., send a constant stream of random data in between keypresses). This is what the user would do: (LESM for Link Encrypted Session Manager) lesm -l lesm -l login to server 1 lesm -s lesm -l (or better yet take over a free LESM session already running between server 1 and server 2) login to server 2 lesm -s lesm -s I wonder if Matt has the time and interest do this... If not then I guess I can try, but I've never done real crypto programming before... Wei Dai -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLzlIdDl0sXKgdnV5AQFKuwQAqhJulKWcPV8GWUM11+2zonT+EQ8q18YV TAymUlhjuYo0csHP/nmoMDRpf/9veISdBQE/GlRkc1k0JsWpPBD0+6e0nA7kCTMO xqVoXdM3F/qN31CXjMT9rgAanIXFat2Ox3bjT3g07ReaN372TPnGGvNauxO69Z52 kvWajSSXiSY= =yF/i -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The drumbeat against anonymity continues....
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In addition to the articles and editorials, I'm seeing articles slamming anonymity and pseudoanonymity (we need a better word!) in business contexts. See the latest RISKS Digest (16.79, available on Usenet in the group comp.risks) for a couple of articles of interest. One is about the Singapore plans for an automatic vehicle intentification (AVI) system to implement "road pricing" on congested roads. Phil Agre's article makes some good points, and mentions using digital cash to avoid the Big Brother problems, but notes that Singapore is not seriously considering it. The real "drumbeat" article is about cellular phone fraud and toll-free number fraud. Actaully, a couple of related articles. (Everyone should at least skim "RISKS.") Anonymity is cited as a problem. But this misses the point, that the real problem is lack of a proper payment model. As David Chaum points out, there are really only two basic payment approaches: transfer of something of value or an account-based transfer. Cash or barter are examples of the first, checks or credit card payments are examples of the second (though each has some wrinkles). Digital cash, when online cleared, behaves mostly like real cash. The phone companies that are complaining about fraud have inadequately arranged for security and need to adopt a mode that fixes this. Since physical money can't be fed into the slots of a handheld cell phone (or at least can't then be delivered to the service owner!), the solution has traditionally been an account-based payment system. (Accounts can also be better protected against fraud by having PINs, etc.) What about telephone calling cards? I don't recall the details well enough to know if they could be used on handheld units. Maybe they could be used. This could eventually be a market for digital cash. (If fraud is a serious-enough problem, costing enough, then a service which could lower costs by using digital cash could make market inroads.) What we need to watch out for are proposals to limit anonymity, to mandate national ID cards, so as to somehow limit such cases of fraud. --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Cypherpunks list: majordomo(a)toad.com with body message of only: subscribe cypherpunks. FAQ available at ftp.netcom.com in pub/tc/tcmay

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