December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

AIDs testing and privacy
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

'Punksters There was an interesting piece on a new AIDs self-test kit this morning that focused on privacy. The idea is that an AIDs self-test kit is made widely available via your local pharmacy. You use the kit's materials to draw a drop of blood, which you place on an enclosed test slide. You then seal the slide, attach a barcoded sticker, and mail in the enclosed mailer to a lab. After a few weeks, you call a 1-800 number, punch in your code (from the sticker) and you get a recording telling you if the test was negative. From this point on the piece (CBS this morning) was elaborating on whether or not a machine should be used to pass on this news, or should a "real" person be involved. Interesting... Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth

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MISC: public key revocation certificate
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 'punksters After carefull consideration of the matter I have decided to follow Philip Zimmermans request, revocation certificate follows. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiwobjEAAAEEAMvfOcPMSdd8EASpRCj5H2KdXR8f/nVcOyQ1vg6SaX6yCQb0 aO4fRgfZg2aoyQVLRPmrpV0YzeRjHwadUz3THLK3LUtA5RR6W+MHoxSQB5iVIqek Lzg5cl4O9wzovzDjc0zSQW/prCGLs9aYx/WYWWXaYngZe7kTRKKSjm8cgaFtAAUR iQCVAgUgLm34g6KSjm8cgaFtAQEunAP+MZB2xfL0mDP+OjjQDqpkn/u32SRKZ5ZF VjGhIFglJuyE+JehqmiT0liy8PJzeif95aWDtT1IOAuk9L6BwZpx9+m0PMRKkjNH 1InjapVYVPyb5JBJKo5LjcWLVdx3eyiJ0GOzb+zBQEnrBkGWe13xj9UNs37o/TjF utQ7Oi1jOAC0KEJyaWFuIEQgV2lsbGlhbXMgPHRhbG9uNTdAd2VsbC5zZi5jYS51 cz4= =3HLA - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Please note the new key; - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5t4PAAAAEEANaECzfBmf3e0wSsuObKfi0xVb74347rNH+HX3yEPPLi0b+Z pQFRLvw9ClCwOpRGBTNgaARp/Y8/eQeyzmSOIhwHfR57X5J/XGMYmGWbQ9+84jUD xE9m+2Gux1L9L0YvvekuG486PfpHNgP8US9KpOn9zXEJJ89VkFmp8FjpRfTVAAUX tChCcmlhbiBEIFdpbGxpYW1zIDx0YWxvbjU3QHdlbGwuc2YuY2EudXM+ =C1+Q - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Brian Williams Extropian Cypherpatriot "Cryptocosmology: Sufficently advanced communication is indistinguishable from noise." --Steve Witham "Have you ever had your phones tapped by the government? YOU WILL and the company that'll bring it to you.... AT&T" --James Speth -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLm39GFmp8FjpRfTVAQGbggP+M0ulfpczRkDXz335N++miPPn0zkY1gJ6 XrfGuPjVUduxcj3flDBPXSw1MHi6AqB9Hv+X2+1eD9Vta9CHGEfcsdc7SVvuhyGD +xA8SLLkbrQjoYYpegFYi2cRCO7CJUGqB39bgnG0mXp1aKn5cfyKxa8cB22Uy5UO /ZE/dtRMK1I= =0Psj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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(fwd) Re: NETCOM/FBI Spying "Business as Usual"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found this in the eff group, and think it has some implications for remailer operators and their logs. (That the FBI is subpoenaing e-mail records is not news, but the connection to the Kevin Mitnick case is.) Explanation: In an earlier message, Glen Roberts of "Full Disclosure" gave his informed speculation that this subpoena has to do with the FBI's search for uber-hacker Kevin Mitnick. The guy being subpoenaed and monitored, Lewis De Payne, comments below. The concern for remailer operators is that while I was reading this saga, all I could think of was 'Why didn't they use remailers?" I planned to comment on this in the public groups. (And I may still, if somebody else doesn't beat me to it.) But of course the concern is that if the FBI is going on a fishing expedition (a legal term :-}) for e-mail records, and Netcom is cooperating, then had they used remailers to communicate, we could now be seeing subpoenas of *remailer logs*. (This will happen eventually. All the more reasons for multiple national jurisdictions, for destruction of logs, for bonding of remailers, and for "forward secrecy" (a la Diffie-Hellman) to be implemented somehow.) > Xref: netcom.com alt.2600:23077 alt.2600hz:100 alt.privacy:18575 comp.org.eff.talk:39275 > Newsgroups: alt.2600,alt.2600hz,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk > Path: netcom.com!lewiz > From: lewiz(a)netcom.com (Lewis De Payne) > Subject: Re: NETCOM/FBI Spying "Business as Usual" > Message-ID: <lewizCvrsCz.E1B(a)netcom.com> > Followup-To: alt.2600,alt.2600hz,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk > Organization: NETCOM On-line Communication Services (408 261-4700 guest) > X-Newsreader: TIN [version 1.2 PL1] > References: <CvqnGC.Csq(a)rci.ripco.com> > Date: Wed, 7 Sep 1994 17:24:35 GMT > Approved: mitnick(a)hideout.com > Lines: 25 > > Glen Roberts (glr(a)ripco.com) wrote accurately: > : > : Some of you may be aware of the FBI subpeona for email transactions of > : lewiz(a)netcom.com. > : > : She wouldn't discuss the particulars of lewiz(a)netcom.com, and said they > : were "not open to talking about it." > > I will be sending you a story for Full Disclosure. In it, I will discuss > how tech support at netcom told another party (whose name will remain > anonymous until I receive a subpoena) that the FBI was watching my acct, > and that they were served with an order. This was disclosed to a > third-party by tech support! I will also discuss my conversation with > the various people at netcom regarding this matter, as well as the > letter I sent to netcom explaining to them that their "monitoring" of > my account to conform with the _sealed_ court order was slowing me > down too much, and that if they didn't correct it, I might go find > another provider, and then they wouldn't be able to monitor me. > > Lots more to come... in Full Disclosure Live. > > -- > cc: Kathleen Carson, S.A., FBI, LA, CA. || Pursuant to Court Order > Kenneth G. McGuire, III. S.A., FBI, LA, CA. || served August 11, 1994 > Stanley E. Ornellas, S.A., FBI, LA, CA. || on Netcom Communications >

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Social punishment 1/3: law without enforcers
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Social punishment 1/3: law without enforcers I live in a country where many laws are simply not followed. As laws are always behind the times, this can lead to an environment that, ignoring laws, follows the times. (For example due to no legal precedents there is theoretically no electronic privacy and all my mail is read. This is not, in practice the case - if my mail is indeed read, then it's probably by the NSA). When the legal system is lax, society falls back on age-old methods of keeping order - a system of taboos and 'social' punishment such as ostracization. In small tribes or villages ostracization is the most passive of punishments - indeed by definition it implies _non_-cooperation or having _nothing_ to do with a person. It is also the most powerful, often better for the society than capital punishment which simply gets rid of a person who might be useful if following the rules. Of course societies that continue to use 'social' punishment do so to enforce antideluvian values (don't talk to those people, don't engage in pre/extra- marital or deviant sex, etc). This is not the fault of the system of social punishment, rather that of the society itself. The system of social punishment can easily be adapted to educated, liberal inhabitants of cyberspace, much more easilty than can present law enforcement systems. My next post will examine the similarities between tribal and cyberspatial society. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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T-shirts
by vaccinia＠med.unc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Since we're on the subject of T-shirts, does anyone have any X-large or XX-large T-shirts with the "1984, We're a little behind Schedule!" logo on them? If someone is ever going to do another run of them I would be interested in buying one or two of them. The "Big Brother Inside" on the front and the "1984" logo on the back would be an ideal shirt! Anyway, if anybody knows where I could purchase such a shirt please contact me at the below address. Thanks. Scott G. Morham !The First, VACCINIA(a)uncvx1.oit.unc.edu! Second PGP Public Keys by Request ! and Third Levels ! of Information Storage and Retrieval !DNA, ! Biological Neural Nets, ! Cyberspace -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBLmolmD2paOMjHHAhAQGBLgP/RipTDTCeY4IcGP3padoDcNWDexgy8M94 5YUZb4rzjmv3lu/WoSI4jXV4SZAxOW8F5lia8dkxtkeKAYTVwPdmWJvJ8V3BbEYv vg4juygrULe1wX3toHnI4ueQCFDoBxacCzM1KRhpcD6q2sKyWsfZKbMniko/AhvY InA/gnPiVJo= =akOU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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NYT Fears Cypherpunks
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The article suggested that unless people turn to the State for protection from "anarchy" the State will fade. Here is my argument (recycled from a few years ago) as to why State power is fading: I expect that State authority will continue to weaken over the next few years for the following reasons: 1) The ruled outnumber the rulers. 2) The ruled outmass the rulers. 3) Traditionally, the rulers used a number of techniques to maintain their rule: a) Ideology of acquiescence and consent - The will of God, tradition, the will of the people, 'you can't fight City Hall,' Death and Taxes, The Government is All of Us, etc. b) The application of superior mobility and organization - we are everywhere, omniscience, omnipresence, etc. c) Point force. A mass of armed men in the field. 'Reduce the city. Leave no stone standing upon stone and sow the ground with salt.' 4) The effectiveness of the above require an ignorant, docile, immobile, and uncritical population: a) Respect for authority is on a rapid downward trend. Disobedience is widespread. One-third to one-half of the housing units in Nassau and Suffolk counties are illegal "in-law" apartments. Seventy-five percent of those hiring domestic workers in the US do not comply with tax and employment laws. Hundreds of thousands of assault rifle owners in New Jersey and California have not turned in their guns. I see no examples of any increase in respect for state authority. b) The mobility and organization of bureaucratic organizations is now less than the average private organization. Nation states are still geographically bound, we are not. The individual or small group has always had better organization than the State - he/it has just had less power. c) Point force only works against concentrated opponents. It is useless against mass movements of goods nd people like the market unless a totalitarian clampdown is used. If movement continues, State power is lost. 5. Freedom is not only an ideology, it is also what you get when people make relatively unconstrained choices. Even the most broken slave makes choices. When a modern, technologically advanced, mobile people makes choices, they can overwhelm control mechanisms. All they have to do is *choose*. They need not be ideologically committed libertarians. 6. Is there immigration control if millions of immigrants are on the march (here *and* in Europe)? Is there gun control if the number of guns possessed by the population (here *and* in Europe) continues to increase. If the amount of the world's wealth that is legally or illegally outside of the tax system increases, is taxation succeeding? 7. Predictions. Per capita gun ownership will continue to increase in all of the OECD countries as it has for years. Legal and illegal immigrants as a percentage of total population will continue to grow. The percentage of the Gross World Product that does not flow through the coffers of the world's States will continue to grow as it has for the last ten years. 8. Unless the above trend lines reverse and the "coercive sector" regains some moral authority freedom of choice will continue to grow. For example, if gun ownership per capita continues to grow, at some point everyone who wants a gun will have one. No gun control. 9. Controlling people is difficult. It has all of the normal problems of hydrology with the added complication that in this case the "water" is intelligent. Controlling smart, rich, well- equipped people is a doomed occupation. Unless they can figure some way to chain us back in the fields, they're doomed. DCF "Though he may be poor He will never be a slave"

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Re: Al Gore's home page
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anybody noticed that Al is being ported around Cairo tourist traps to divert attention from more articulate and threatening targets of the fundamentalists? Creeping slowly around on bright shiny crutches for laser-aiming, yet. His home page is empty because he wont be needing it? Naw.

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Data havens
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) on Wed, 7 Sep 4:14 PM >And such normative laws ("they shouldn't keep such >records and hence we'll outlaw them") won't work in an >era of strong crypto and privacy. In fact, some of us >support data havens precisely to have records of, say, >terminal diseases so we'll not lend money to >Joe-who-has-AIDS. It may not be "fair" to Joe, but >it's my money. It is worth noting that private "data havens" of all sorts abound, especially for financial matters, and most are not subject to governmental regulation. Some banks have research departments that are older and more comprehensive than credit reporting agencies. Favored customers can use them for evaluation of private deals. Large law firms maintain data banks that approach those of banks, and they grow with each case, through additions of private investigators paid for by successive clients. Security professionals, like Wackenhut and Kroll, also market the fruits of substantial data collections. To these add those of insurance, bonding, investment, financial firms and the like which help make or break business deals. It's probable that massive government-regulated consumer data banks contain far less useful information than that of the private market where serious money is made with the best, privileged information. Some may be porous but most are guarded better than Ft. Knox, with special protection against Uncle Sam's snoopers, indeed more secure than consumer records because more valuable. Any c'punkers in the security side of the financial industry want to comment? Anonymously of course. John

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Re: AIDs testing and privacy
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim wrote: > >And don't forget that hospitals and doctors will be forwarding patient >records to the National Health Recovery Act headquarters outside >Washington, right near the CIA, NSA, NRO, Central Imagery Office, FBI, >and, of course, the Big Three credit agencies. > I have not heard of this. Would someone please elaborate? -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP public key by finger

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Re: Aust crypto regulations
by M.Gream＠uts.EDU.AU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, fuck that for thinking I was living under a less restrictive regime -- and I can say goodbye to an international market for my software. ---- begin include ---- From: M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream) Newsgroups: aus.computers.ibm-pc,alt.security.pgp Subject: Re: PGP for Oz users Date: 6 Sep 1994 06:44:14 GMT Matthew Gream (M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au) wrote: > That sounds bogus to me, at least from the information you've given me > there. I've had the pleasure of being routed from our `Australian Trade [..] > I'm fairly confident in saying that there are no export restrictions on > software (specific clause stating that mass market, public domain and > "unsupported after installation" software is not covered by the > Industrial List). There do exist restrictions on hardware. All of these > restrictions are a direct result of our adherence with COCOM > regulations. I'm afraid I have to post a clarification to a clarification. I've just been in contact with the relevant people at the Defence Signals Directorate. It seems that regardless of advice obtained from other departments and documentation that points to the contrary, there are restrictive controls on software. In my conversation, the following was articulated (she was refering to the same document as previously mentioned [1]): 1. The "General Software Note" on Page 1-6 of [1] does not override the regulations in "Category 5: Telecommunications and `Information Security'", specifically s.5.A.2 and s.5.D.2. This means that they assert control over all forms of software _including_ public domain. I tried to pin-point what the "General Software Note" is for then, but didn't receive an acceptable answer. 2. DES can only be exported for specific banking and associated applications, even then only to 8 governments and certain banking groups. They accept RSA for export where it's used in Key Distribution applications. In essence, there is a list of specific uses for certain algorithms. 3. Message digests are in general OK, so long as they can't be modified to perfom cryptographic functions (ie. encryption/decryption). 4. Export is regulated on a per end user basis. In order words, they assert control over _each_ item of software sold. 5. The fact that COCOM is in a "forum" period does not affect the current regulations. 6. I specifically asked about "public domain" distribution of software via the Internet. She said that this was "highly inadvisable" and "if our government found out about it, they could take action" and asserted that it would be worse for an individual than if the violation was carried out by a company. She said that she wouldn't like someone to become a "test case", and made mention of problems in the USA. She was extremely helpfull though, but the real problem I had, and I spent most of my time on this, was that these requirements aren't solidified anywhere, and hence subjective. I'm not really surprised though, that's the whole point of it all. I wasn't concerned about "weak crypto", only DES, IDEA, RSA, MD* and locally produced algorithms. In short: Anything cryptographic, they want to know about, and they want to know about it on a per end-user basis. They advise against distribution on the "Internet" and any distribution without prior approval otherwise there could be "problems". Matthew. [1] "Australian Controls on the Export of Technology with Civil and Military Applications", Aust Dept of Defence, Sept 1992. -- Matthew Gream <M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au> -- Consent Technologies, (02) 821-2043 Disclaimer: From? \notin speaking_for(Organization?) [cfqx103] ---- end include ---- -- Matthew Gream <M.Gream(a)uts.edu.au> -- Consent Technologies, (02) 821-2043 Disclaimer: From? \notin speaking_for(Organization?) [cfqx103]

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