December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

2nd release of signing software
by cactus＠hks.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I've made a couple of changes to the format of outgoing messages that should hopefully make life easier for readers. The most noticable will be the movement of the blurb, but also very significant is the removal of the "Reply-To: " (feh on the proliferation of MUA behaviors) header, and way down on the "noticable" list is an "Errors-To: " and a "Sender: " header. Thanks for y'all's comments: keep 'em coming. - -- Todd Masco | "Roam home to a dome, Where Georgian and Gothic once stood cactus(a)hks.net | Now chemical bonds alone guard our blond(e)s, cactus(a)bb.com | And even the plumbing looks good." - B Fuller -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt69EyoZzwIn1bdtAQGLEwF8DAyzBUf0Z86xPHPKWsSaGM6cqSWJOrV8 kGDmEaQooJ9WhSYA5aOo1NtVZjgwOUgP =KRYJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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Paper available on new cipher
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce Schneier and I have been designing a block cipher, called "MacGuffin", based on a new variant of the standard Feistel (S-P) network structure. We are presenting a paper describing the cipher, entitled "The MacGuffin Block Cipher Algorithm", at the Leuven crypto algorithms workshop later this month. Here's the abstract: \begin{abstract} This paper introduces MacGuffin, a 64 bit ``codebook'' block cipher. Many of its characteristics (block size, application domain, performance and implementation structure) are similar to those of the U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES). It is based on a Feistel network, in which the cleartext is split into two sides with one side repeatedly modified according to a keyed function of the other. Previous block ciphers of this design, such as DES, operate on equal length sides. MacGuffin is unusual in that it is based on a {\em generalized unbalanced Feistel network (GUFN)} in which each round of the cipher modifies only 16 bits according to a function of the other 48. We describe the general characteristics of MacGuffin architecture and implementation and give a complete specification for the 32-round, 128-bit key version of the cipher. \end{abstract} A PostScript preprint of the paper is available via anonymous FTP from: ftp://research.att.com/dist/mab/mcg.ps A forthcoming paper will discuss the characteristics GUFN structure in more detail. Comments and analysis greatly appreciated. -matt

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public accounts / PGP / passphrases
by lmccarth＠ducie.cs.umass.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hal writes: > Just create a special key for your netcom account. Use no pass phrase; > using one would give a misleading sense of security IMO. Just pass your > mail through "pgp -saft" or equivalent and you've got it. It is easy to > do this from most editors. Could someone please elaborate on the foolishness of using PGP with a passphrase on a public machine (as I do) ? Am I wrong in thinking that my secret key is useless to an intruder until she guesses my passphrase ? I have no net access except via an account on a public machine, so I'm not about to start storing my secret key elsewhere, but I'll change my passphrase to <null> if it's irrelevant anyway. I just reviewed the PGP docs a bit and Phil says "Nobody can use your secret key file without this pass phrase.", which seems to contradict what many people on the list have said. - - -L. Futplex McCarthy; PGP key by finger or server "Don't say my head was empty, when I had things to hide...." --Men at Work - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLt6Cq2f7YYibNzjpAQF3KwP/ZgxKliBQe+BQ+Q0FfiN9ycxTRWRHlPWY qF4iqmxT70uWLm6hsSX6A88EKv1E+k4mfYhVAnT8XQCTp2wEYMVOHvlFJQiKHOCj 55Cot8bL7JCrJ+lUIDdCPOnNra61F2cc+S26EyB5jIKvudzkPLsWI49galG201M7 ILld5lrJhAw= =vc9N - -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt6D+ioZzwIn1bdtAQGz5gF+Kokq6ZW/HpgRWowG2/+3QB913tJD2opJ +gKNrxqTK40qzj/8pdNNpreKYrf4rWIi =9YBk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Brands excluded from digicash beta
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ralph wrote: >I also have had no luck getting a beta client from digicash. I >"registered" through their WWW forms page, and got no response for >about a month. Then they sent me mail saying that they would be >sending a client, but that they were unrolling it in stages. That was >about a month ago. Perhaps this means I will get my client soon. > >This does not speak well for digicash. If they were not ready to beta >their stuff, they should not have announced it. As it is, it makes >them look like a flake. Here is one possible explanation: As their beta test agreement states, the beta software is not licensed for use in the US. Some legal thing that I don't understand. A few US users are part of the beta test, probably because they kept bothering the guy who hands out the beta UID's early in the morning before he had his coffee. I know that the people on this list have been advocating ecash long before a sinlge line of code was written and that we all deserve an early try of the software. I am forwarding this to some of the folks at DigiCash, perhaps we can convince them to broaden the beta. -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. "The very atmosphere of firearms anywhere and everywhere restrains evil interference - they deserve a place of honor with all that's good." <George Washington>

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PGP Tools under Linux
by anonymous-remailer＠xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I am using PGPTools to handle all the crypto functions in the second >generation remailer that I have written. All the copies of PGPTools that I >have found seem to be set up to compile on SUN workstations only. That's interesting, because I developed it under Linux and MS/DOS, and there was a lot of trouble at the beginning with it not running on big-endian machines. It sounds like whoever "fixed" it for sparcs broke it for little-endian machines. The original should still be on ftp.csn.net; get it there and it should work. >Mixmaster is both a remailer and a front end, and therefor must run on many >different platforms. I have been able to compile PGPTools on Linux and >FreeBSD, but PGPTools produces invalid RSA blocks. If you (or anyone else >reading this) have ported PGPTools to other platforms could you send me the >source and makefile, or point me to them. If not, could you help me do it, >the source code is a tangle, and it will take me a long time to do on my own >(I am a brute force programer, not a C wizard). Get the original, test it, and post the results. Some people have asked if I am still around. Yes, I am, and I'm thinking about a major update of PGPTools. The update would involve getting out any persistent bugs I can find, cleaning up the code and making it completely reentrant, and replacing all 2.3a modules with 2.6.x modules so it is patent-safe. It also needs some kind of exception handling for disk errors and the like. A pass-through function for the disk access calls, and a way of freeing all memory before a longjmp to bail out, for example. Before doing this, I need to hear from the PGP development team. There have been rumors of an upcoming PGP API, something similar to PGPTools. If this is the case, let me know so I don't waste time writing an incompatible version. If this is not the case, let me know so I can get started. More information about NexusBucks, please. Is it for real? How many coins in circulation? Have any services been bought with them yet? What is the address of the Magic Money server? Is it fully automatic, or are messages being manually processed? "There's never been a time in our history where it's been possible to place information beyond the reach of the collective efforts of society, but with modern cryptography you can." - Phil Zimmermann "Large primes united, will never be divided!" - Pr0duct Cypher -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLt6cDcGoFIWXVYodAQGZ8AP/bZASa9sn+QzDiQkDJqacBAPhpqQHfkhL 7kWh7belMm8gA6KFmLfZcPywCWm3zU1QOS2+xRzPUGP0f7MrQjDuj3h7M4X3fDDV DiybwF4rIUAs2wBubioTYwE+as6N//CmfbtpkRdPVWhg5rnvgEOU+lzEvkhFt0tc 2MzkmHTBvIQ= =CSzj -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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CSPAN
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Although it was probably an exercise in futitility, I sent a note to CSPAN suggesting that they have PRZ as a guest on the Booknotes program that Brian Lamb hosts. I figured that maybe they could have him on in conjunction with the book version of PGP that the MIT press is coming out with. In my note I made the argument that policy concerning cryto is really policy concerning wiretapping and surveillance, and that technological changes are eroding the status quo and forcing us to decide whether we want a lot more surveillance (or at least the potential for it) or a lot less, that since this is going to have a lot to do with how the police interact with the public in the future, it's an important issue, etc. At the end, I appended the transcript of the talk PRZ gave in NYC that was recently posted to the list. I found that particular text to be pretty impressive, and I'm hoping that the folks at CSPAN will as well. There are a few details that I hope will go over well: MIT's involvement, the fact that PRZ has debated the NSA's general counsel, the quotes from the FBI director, etc. On top of that, the conference from which the transcript came seems like the sort of event that CSPAN would televise. I don't know Phil, and I don't know if he'd even want to appear on the program. But there are two things about Booknotes that I think would make it a very good forum for the cryto debate. First of all, Phil would have enough time to explain the issues. That's important, because this isn't something that can be easily packed into a sound byte. Also, although I don't know this for a fact, I would imagine that the program would probably be a pretty good way to reach people on this Hill, both members and staffers. Anyway, I sent them Phil's phone number and his email address. The encouraging thing is that I sent this out more than a day ago, and I haven't heard back from them yet. Ordinarily, when you send them email you get a form letter back within an hour or two. That gives me some hope that maybe some people over there are reading the transcript, and that perhaps they're thinking about it. I don't know if CSPAN is open to lobbying or not, but the more I think about it, the more it seems to me that it could be a very useful forum for the debate. I think it would be worthwhile to let them know the next time Phil's going to speak at an event similar to the one I took the transcript from, and see if they'd be willing to televise it. My feeling is that if we can get the word out to the public at large, we're going to win. == Alex Strasheim | finger astrashe(a)nyx.cs.du.edu alex(a)omaha.com | for my PGP 2.6.1. public key -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLt7LBhEpP7+baaPtAQF65AP+OAL3xt66v55U4Spd/5PenHYaRzs1v/vy P7HyVRI8RjH1Y+nR1cpLRYz+uilSrK9Fk1ew4Qhfja0RNh91kVe2aVHmw7dIxWHv rhFv569LFMQWj73JawdtePaXver+6deWhc8d1VL/PkgXgk5feg6mDEjRUB1GsjgZ FfkoHvrEBQA= =cHR2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Cypherpunks@hks.net service
by dmandl＠bear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: cactus(a)bb.hks.net > > The cypherpunks(a)hks.net service is now available. > > It will sign any message sent to cypherpunks(a)hks.net with its (currently > 384 bit) key and forward the signed message to cypherpunks(a)toad.com. No offense, but what's the point? What's next, automated key-signing services? Is this just intended to help people who can't sign easily to get around Eric's proposed requirement? If so, it seems like almost an embarrassment--someone setting up a meaningless message signer to spoof the cypherpunk server, which it does easily. Doesn't sound too good to me. --Dave.

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cypherpunk signing service
by sglass＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Operating System: SunOS 4.1.3_U1 Site: netcom12 X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23] MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 1021 Todd... | The cypherpunks(a)hks.net service is now available. | | It will sign any message sent to cypherpunks(a)hks.net with its (currently | 384 bit) key and forward the signed message to cypherpunks(a)toad.com. Does this look right? pub 384/27D5B76D 1994/12/01 Cypherpunk signing agent <cypherpunks(a)hks.net> Key fingerprint = 85 BA D4 6D B8 9D B6 B7 EB 74 11 48 42 45 61 F2 | I welcome any suggestions on the format of the message and the prepended | message. Why not stealth it and just appear as if the sender signed it? | I've made a couple of changes to the format of outgoing messages that | should hopefully make life easier for readers. Thanks, Todd! | The most noticable will be the movement of the blurb, but also very | significant is the removal of the "Reply-To: " (feh on the proliferation | of MUA behaviors) header, and way down on the "noticable" list is an | "Errors-To: " and a "Sender: " header. Lookin' good. | Thanks for y'all's comments: keep 'em coming. Good work. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQBFAwUBLt7OeioZzwIn1bdtAQGndwF+JJkJwvNKoSw16//vyK7nbNfxeUxGG3ar 9Ek87KCkqlg+QKbwGcCisaV1PJcu+Lns =vnS5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address belonging to the signature and forwarded.]

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using us crypto sw outside usa
by Tomaz Borstnar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello! I was wondering what is the legal status for using rsaref ooutside usa. Is it legal or not? Also, what is the legal status of RC4 code posted to the net? Thanks, Tomaz

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hello
by Alan J Lacey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

send me your zine pleas

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