December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

remailer@soda.berkeley.edu supports Ray's pinger
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have put Ray's pinger onto remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu. finger remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu and the list of active remailers will be at the end of the remailer instructions. If there are other remailers that I should add to the list of tested remailers please tell me.

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Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hal Finney writes: > The simple blinded signature model provides a pretty simple way to allow > only one pseudonym per True Name in a given forum, if you assume there is > some way to distinguish people in the real world. Suppose Cypherwonks > wanted only one person per nym. And suppose there was an agency which > was able to distinguish people, that is, it could tell when it had seen the > same person twice. Now, Cypherwonks asks this agency to give a single > blinded signature of a type (exponent) which is unique to that list, to > anyone who wants it, but such that nobody gets more than one. > To be accepted on the Cypherwonks list, then, somebody would have to show > a signature of this particular type, different from everyone else's. Each > person could only get one such token, which Chaum has called an is-a-person > credential (again, this is a simplification of his idea, I think). Real-world application of this protocol still depends on folks not using the credentials of friends/family/dead people, especially where "real name" <-> credential mapping isn't available. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLaT/gH3YhjZY3fMNAQFIjwQArXybGzGZnHUugI6mcOn8CwhamKC9KxK7 LmWo0lzEsrK8Iq4n17JB9fLKb8Cb3UYYinvBk1Fadr9OcAOANC1bqjDoJ3Dsvyz3 9/AFY8CfiaH9JqhRK1jAMdg2kuAFdtFBENhhXE9f6v6sedeQvclfwea1u5vMaErJ 0aq5KRAQKH4= =MFNH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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1984 NSA T-Shirt Access for Lynx Users!
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all users w/ access to Lynx, but not Mosaic: I have reconfigured t-shirt.html to support Lynx. Obviously, the gif cannot be displayed on-screen directly by Lynx, but can now be downloaded to your disk by Lynx. At this point, you can use the gif viewer of your choice to look at the images. The URL is the same: http://phoenix.aps.muohio.edu/users/jdblair/t-shirt.html (learning more and more about html) -john. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Blair: <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> voice: (513) 529-4877 PGP public key available upon request. KILL YOUR Privacy in the information age is a right, not a privilage. TELEVISION Information = Power = Control. Fight the centralization of information.

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Re: New ID technique: warning of things to come
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > I have been abroad for the past few weeks. In the course of my travels, I > was given some data about a new program that the US Dept. of State/Customs > and Immigration people are moving into limited testing at JFK and LAX. > > They want to implement a "fast, positive identification system to speed > processing of entrants to the United States by use of biometric data." > The system works by use of a handprint scanner, and a smart card. > Participants would go through an initial hand scan, and then be issued > a smartcard. Upon subsequent entries to the US, instead of going through > the normal passport check, you would place your hand on a scanner and insert > your card in the slot. The system would then positively identify you, and > clear you for entry. This was mentioned in the press a while back; it's not intended for everyone, but frequent travellers, including US subjects and non-US-subjects, would be able to get them to speed going through the border police. Don't know implementation timeframe, and as Lyle said, they weren't real explicit about what they planned to do with the data they collect. Paper passports and border police are already offensive; I've got no plans to get more people-control technology applied to me. # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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safety in Numbers ?
by Ed Switalski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, a recent c-punx posting raised an implicit question about the amount of RSA in use already. Obviously the larger and more international the user base is less likely that Uncle Sam & sidekicks etc can palm off compromised crypto and signature schemes on the rest of us. Two quotes below from the pem-dev (PEM developers) list at tis.com give grounds for optimism. I have blinded the names, as a first line of defence, (those already subscribed to the list can find the original postings by date. Note that: The Public Key scheme mentioned in message 2 may not be full RSA, but indicates the possibilities if slot-in crypto modules were available for interface to standard PC/Mac office software packages PGP has a high profile right now, but needs more users to really damange Clipper. --- Quote 1 --- Date: Thu, 31 Mar 1994 02:43:27 EST Just a data point. There are currently roughly 3,620 PGP keys on the PGP key servers --- despite the fact that use of PGP generally entails violation of RSA DSI's patents. (Note that this number only includes those people who have published their keys; others, due to the patent issue, may not have published their keys on the key servers, and so would not be counted in this figure.) There are also people using RIPEM as well. Meanwhile, we haven't even been able to get our act together to generate a PEM root key; my understanding is that this at least partially related to the liability involved in running a root which *everyone* has to trust, although there may be other show stoppers as well. So there definitely is at least some amount of demand for secure electronic mail using RSA. It's just that by and large, people just aren't using PEM to satisfy their needs. --- end of Quote 1 --- *** Come on PEM-people get yourself a root key ! Then organizations *** ill send more RSA-authenticated mail. --- Quote 2 --- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 12:20:22 EST Recent discussions with a very large software company that I won't name at this time indicates that they have on the order of 750,000 users that are already using an older form of public key cryptography. They are preparing their next release, currently plan to make it PEM compatible (although they are also looking carefully at the Apple AOCE varient), and expect that as many as 1.5 million users might be on this system within a year. This system includes a proprietary directory, and they are also planning to interface that directory to X.500. --- end of Quote 2 --- *** Thinks: the number of retrievals to date of PD crypto would be . useful to know For we are many and our name is Legion .... Regards, Ed Switalski

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RMorality and Ethics (was Pseudonym's and Reputation)
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations Quoting Detwieler(?) " ideally we can develop moral codes where our algorithms fail us. " >Ideally, you would be able to enforce these moral codes. >Ideally, they would reflect not only what is possible in reality, but >what is truly desireable. --------- McCandlish and I discussed morality and ethics early during our initial "handshake". Stanton said there is no morality, only ethics- what do you think? (substantial paraphrase I think serves the purpose of discussion) Here's my reply, and agree that the difference is semantic: *** Morality is the ablility to differentiate between right and wrong, without denotation. Thus, each situation defines an eidetic decision and implementation which would be the application of an ethical standard based on past experience. Therefore, endogenous morality is quite tangible, while exogenous morality is most likely unethical, and detrimental to the purity of being. *** Jeff Leroy Davis <eagle> -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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NSA security manual
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well Grady, You already know it's authentic. I'd love to call some of those secure phone #'s and see if my voice print still works. It would be a scream if it did >;) If any of you have tried one of the secure numbers out of curiosity, (and I've been out of the loop since 18 February 1983), you'll get a ring and a pause, then a rapid busy signal. This also lends credibility to my Psychological Warfare Primer, albeit subtely. I stated that the heavyweights in intelligence were the DIA, NSA, and the CIA, in that order. If *green* clearances are mere TS/IS, the DIA feeds them as well on a need-to-know basis. My analysis of the NSA mission is cryptography, (thanks for the hot tip, eh?), and interception. When AT&T broke up, it became possible to intercept transmissions that were previously protected by the monopoly. NSA is privy to all sorts of stuff, open long distance phone calls they can snag off the satellites without a warrent. They're pretty much public domain if one has the technology. Another thing I noticed was the Drug Policy. You note that they leave "authorized" drug use open. Amphetimines are SOP in some combat and combat simulation exercises. Christ, you want to laugh til tears roll down your cheeks, read the FOIA stuff released on the CIA's human experimentation with LSD. True keystone cop stuff. John Barlow and I were drinking some cokes and shooting the breeze here in Laramie a little over a year ago. He predicted an "opening" of the intelligence agencies after Clinton was elected- (This was the second to last weekend in October to be precise). NOW I see what he means. Thanks Grady! So THAT'S what the DoD pogues do. Can't wait to see a Field Manual for DIA intelligence officers. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Re: possible FTP site volunteer?
by Tomaz Borstnar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In-reply-to: Your message dated: Fri, 08 Apr 1994 01:33:56 EDT > This may be a lot to ask, would anyone be willing to volunteer a little > space on an ftp site for the 1984 NSA t-shirt gifs? While its easy for Me, me, me! :) > me to mail it out. You'd get a complimentary shirt out of the deal :) Great! ;) I'm taking care of ftp.arnes.si.

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No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: NSA Security Manual You realize, of course, that by posting the manual verbatim you have allowed them to discover where the leak was. They have the ability to change the wording slightly on every document, so that when you quote the document they can discover who gave it to you. That is why newspapers no longer report quotes from documents that they have, or never show pictures of secret documents. Then again, for something as simple as a manual, they may not bother to change each one. But the capability exists. user(a)host.domain.site

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Re: NSA Security Manual
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The information itself is not damning but law enforcement tends to frown on the CONCEPT of such releases. If it were seeded, Grady never would have been called. What I found interesting was that it was published in Phrack about a week ago, and nothing happened, but when Grady reposted it, suddenly phone-calls come aflying. Either this means that the NSA read Grady's posts more diligently than everyone else's, or Grady went out of his way to tell them that he'd posted it, which wouldn't surprise me... G

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