December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Since people are talking about new remailer features, can I suggest another one - how about single-use (or limited use) anonymous return addressess (ARAs) ? There are quite a few situations I can envisage where I might want to give an anonymous return address to someone that could only be used a limited number of times, or for a limited period of time (e.g. in the medium term, buying something over the network from a company with digicash, but not wanting to receive junk mail from them afterwards). How I'd see it working is this : You'd send a message to a remailer requesting an anonymous address token, along with the email address to send to, the number of uses you want and the time period (perhaps up to some maximum set by the operator of the remailer). In the future, you'd also send some digicash in payment for the token, the value based on the number of uses and time limit. The remailer would then create an encrypted token containing an id number and the address, either signed or with an attached random number. The id, number of uses and expiry date would be stored in a database, along with the random number if you were using that for authentication. The remailer would then mail the token (probably using an anonymous return address) to the requester. The database shouldn't need to be very large if only details of the outstanding tokens are stored. BEGIN NOTES I'm not sure whether it would be better to store the address in the token or in the database, but I suspect that storing it in the token is better since it avoids the possibility of anyone getting hold of a copy of the database and reading all the addresses stored in there. However, if it's in the token then if all keys of all remailers used are compromised, you can follow the entire chain even after the token is used up, whereas if it was deleted from the database the chain would be broken forever. Perhaps a mixture of mechanisms in the remailers would be best. Another option might be to keep the address completely seperate, so the token would merely indicate whether the message should be sent to the address specified in the ARA, not for a specific address that the token was requested for. END NOTES After the ARA had been sent to someone and they used it to reply to the sender, the remailer would recognize the token, and decrypt it to get the real address, database id and authentication. If the authentication was valid and the time/usage limit not exceeded, then it would forward the message to the email address enclosed (which presumably could be another ARA), otherwise it would just ignore the message. Obviously using only a single remailer would require you to trust the operator to limit usage correctly, however chaining several limited use addresses will solve any problems if one remailer is trustworthy. Example: Message to remailer might be something like (comments in {}, -- shows begining and end of messages) : -- Request-Token 5 {uses} 14 {days} ARA {or email address} { standard PGP-encrypted ARA goes in here } Request-Token-End :: Request-Remailing-To: remail(a)foo.com {ARA to send token to via remail(a)foo.com goes here} -- The remailer would create something like : -- Limited-Use-Token: 00000001/F4870921 (ID/random authentication) {ARA or Request-Remailing-To: goes here} -- This would then be encrypted with the remailer's public key, attached to the end of the original message (after the Request-Token line was stripped off), then fed into the remailer as usual. The sender would create the ARA using this token, and forward it to whoever they wanted to communicate with. When a message using the ARA came back, it would be decrypted as usual, and if the token line was valid the database would be checked for timed expiry, updated to indicate another use, then if valid, after the token line was stripped off the message would be remailed as usual. If noone else does this in the next few months then I may hack it into a remailer once I have my own machine to run one off.

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who, me?!?!
by tmp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> tmp(a)netcom.com says: > > > > > I will always have connection to the internet if I desire > > > it, be it legal or not, > > > > pure faith. nothing guarantees this to you. > > In spite of being a complete asshole, Detweiler, you've managed to get > account after account. Doesn't that mean anything to you? !?!?!?!?! detweiler this, detweiler that!!! why does everyone keep calling me `detweiler' when my name is `tmp(a)netcom.com'?!! look, i admit i am posting pseudonymously, but your detweilerian witchhunt is a good reason why its not really a good idea for *anyone* here to post under their real name, given all this hostility, particularly to the newbies. this digital stalking is really unconscionable and intolerable. besides, even if i were detweiler-- is it just me, or does anyone get overly upset by these kinds of ad hominem attacks? seems like they should reserved for usenet & dorothy denning. <mouth wide open here> i'm a bit shocked, because i have always found parry to be very civil in the newsgroups. i am just a good cyberspatial citizen trying to build up reputation under a new name, and it doesn't help that just because i i use the word `detweiler', you throw me in your kill files. it was YOU YOU YOU who brought up this detweiler bugaboo. maybe detweiler would be happy designing those fingerprint id keyboards for the nsa. as it stands, though, i don't see any significant evidence that he is continuing his apparently over-dramatized `harassment campaign' on the list. you guys look pretty weird ranting over this detweiler guy. as far as i can tell, all he has ever done is write idiotic anonymous postings, and that's not very unusual. just a lot of `cyberbole' IMHO. (i have seen some of the detweilerian idiocy in the newsgroups, and he loves to pretend that he has `decoy' addresses. so if you are in a really paranoid mood, i suppose you could consider me a decoy. if i really were a decoy, the ruse would seem to be working very well. while `i' am running into all kinds of flames, maybe some of his other postings under other pseudonyms are going completely unchallenged.) ( in fact, considering that he has apparently lost at least one address, maybe he is doing this as preventative medicine in the future. i assume that everyone who has yelled at me and cursed me as a `detweiler' so far (tcmay, erik hughes, parry meztger, etc.) are his prime enemies. lighten up guys, i assure you that, to the contrary, i am nothing but a harmless pseudonym.) do you guys frown on pseudonymous postings to this list? i'm not too sure of the ettiquete around here. it seems to me that cyberspace is an essentially anonymous place, and no amount of screeching by the detweilers of the world is ever going to change that. besides, the constitution guarantees the right to privacy, which is essentially the same thing as using pseudonyms in cyberspace. we all have a right to trick and deceive the privacy-invading corporate monsters of the world about our identity. the lone underdog needs all the tools he can get to prevent the `information oppression' that we call Big Business. software like PGP frees us from the shackles of tyranny that our government chains us in daily. things like social security numbers and total IDs on every check we pass is orwellian. i had to get a new apartment recently, and the credit check was really horrendous. they wanted past and present employer etc. and made *me* pay $20 for them to process the application!!! just so i could have the great privilege of paying them rent every month!!! that reminds me. it would be really useful to sneak into trw and look at detweiler's credit history, if we really wanted to keep track of him. surely there are some cpunks who could pull that off <g>. hee hee, this is detweiler we are talking about, after all, and he should be hunted down like a rabid rat, hee hee. i'm really interested what becomes of that latest `detweiler hunt' proposed by whats-his-name on the list. (ok, ok, i promise not to use the d-word if everyone else stops too. <g> but so far with everyone yelling `detweiler' in this crowded theater, it's tough to avoid it.) p.s. i love you too, parry meztger, erik hughes, and tc may :) hey, i have an idea. since you guys have so much hostility to detweiler, maybe just for kicks i could start a `what to do with detweiler' list. send me your favorite ideas and i will post a summary. it could be kind of entertaining. we already have `hunt him down like a dog' -- any others? be creative!!! we could use it as the official document to mailbomb anyone who uses the d-word. <g>

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FOIA on Clipper key status....
by ADAM GERSTEIN, MACLAB ASSISTANT 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello once again... My friend and I wanted to know how that FOIA request was coming? I haven't heard anything from the list, so I thought I would ask. Also, who the hell is this Detweiler person? And why is everyone saying he's tmp(a)netcom.com? Thanks, Adam Gerstein GERSTEIN(a)SCSUC.STATEU.EDU -+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- "After this, nothing will surprise me!" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4, 1994

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nsa digital cash?
by tmp＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ok, so the nsa looked at commercial cryptography and said, `we need to control it'. and out pops clipper (quite an ugly baby, eh?) this makes me wonder. i bet that they see that announcement by visa for `digital cash' and go crazy. they are already thinking of how to put clipper into a nationwide digital cash system, don't you think? this brings up some serious issues. i doubt it will be long before there are some official government agencies developing the official u.s. digital cash system. in fact, it wouldn't surprise me if there are divisions in the nsa dedicated to doing it *this moment*. if there are any non-nsa agencies, too, the nsa will probably `pull an nist' and dominate their development. how? send in a few austere-looking spooks and speak in phrases like `imperative to national security' and `presidential directive' and *boom* the flimsy bureacrats are putty in their hands. so would anyone like to wager? i'd say that we have an official government group dedicated to digital cash standards in say, 4 years, with an official agency in say, 7 years. cpunks, are you going to be ready by then with your own cash? <g> btw, could someone tell me how the proposed visa cash system is different than debit cards (which exists today)?

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tmp@netcom.com
by perry＠bacon.imsi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If tmp(a)netcom.com isn't Detweiler, then he is invited to inform us who he is. I admit that this is unfair. However, who said life was fair? Perry

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Where is Magic Money????
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where is Magic Money to be found???? I looked on soda.berkeley.edu and it is not there. Does anyone know where it is? Ed Carp, N7EKG/VE3 ecarp(a)netcom.com 519/824-3307 an38299(a)anon.penet.fi If you want magic, let go of your armor. Magic is so much stronger than steel! -- Richard Bach, "The Bridge Across Forever"

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MacPGP and AOL(again)
by fhalper＠pilot.njin.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have figure out a way to distribute MacPGP on AOL. I uploaded a listing of where to get MacPGP and in the file description I said that I would e-mail individuals that wanted MacPGP but didn't have Internet access, along with sprea ding the word around. I will only have to mail it originally to myself and then forward it to others as they request it. Any comments or suggestions are welcome. Reuben Halper Montclair High~r MyPublicKey.asc

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encryption evaluater software
by Sheedy, E.C.C. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>July 10, 1997 > >---------- > > >Nikkei English News via Individual Inc. : (Nikkei Industrial Daily, July 8, >1997) > >Mitsubishi Electric Corp. said it has developed a software program which >can be used to evaluate the security of various symmetric-key encryption >algorithms, where the sender and recipient share the same key. > >The program analyzes a given encryption technology and displays the amount >of computing power required to deduce the key and decrypt the message. > >Secure and practical data encryption is a necessary technology for the >popularization of electronic money and electronic commerce. Mitsubishi's >program could end up becoming an index by which to objectively evaluate the >many new symmetric-key encryption methods being developed. > >The software combines the differential decryption method developed by >Israeli encryption expert Adi Shamir with Mitsubishi's proprietary linear >decryption method. By attempting to deduce the key with simple >approximations of the encryption algorithm, the program determines the >minimal volume of computations needed to crack the code, and also shows how >long the key should be in order to make decryption nearly impossible. >Mitsubishi said it has also finished development of a software program >which uncovers the key based on the pattern of random numbers generated in >the course of encrypting a message. >The next step for the company is to combine all three decryption methods >into a comprehensive program for evaluation. Working with support from the >Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the company hopes to finish >and publicize its program by next spring, providing it free of charge to >users. (More) ________________________________ kpn research E.C.C. Sheedy n m m m m m n________________________ Security & Card systems P.O. Box 15000 Telephone +31 50 582 17 92 9700 CD Groningen Telefax +31 50 312 24 15 The Netherlands e-mail e.c.c.sheedy(a)research.kpn.com ________________________________________________________________

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Earlier, somebody indicated that large primes of the form 2^(2^n)+1 exist... actually, it is conjectured that beginning with F5, all are composite. This person is probably confusing Fermat numbers with Mersenne numbers (see my earlier post) - large Mersenne primes exist, but not all Mersenne numbers are primes. Also, it was suggested that 2^128+1 is prime; this is false. You can almost do the calculation by hand using Fermat's Little Theorem. But with Mathematica: PowerMod[3, 2^128, 2^128+1] = 47511664169441434718291075092691853899 This is not 1 so 2^128+1 is definitely not prime. > The key property of them is if n is a Carmichael number and n=p*q*r, > then (p-1), (q-1), and (r-1) divide (n-1). > I wonder if Carmichael numbers always have some small factors. Well, many Carmichael numbers do have small factors, but not necessarily. If you derive the formuals for creating Carmichael numbers, you can use them to create Carmichael numbers with prime factors, arbitrarily large if your patience is willing. For example (with just a few minutes of Mathematica time) p = 600035641 q = 1200071281 r = 1800106921 n = 1296230964879005767193383441 p,q,r are prime n is a Carmichael number And incidentally, Carmichael numbers can have more than three prime factors, for instance 7 * 13 * 19 * 37, the smallest Carmichael number with four. > I should point out that the standard argument that picking 'k' > different values for 'a' and then calculating the probability as > (1/2)^k is fallacious. This would be true if the probabilities were > independent, but they aren't. There was a paper on this about five > years ago whose awareness has not been yet widespread. I no longer > have the reference. Well, for our purposes, we only care if the probability is lower or higher than (1/2)^k. Maybe you can be more certain than (1/2)^k in which case you are even happier. So this is "fallacious" because the probabilities aren't independent... so, what, are we talking larger than (1/2)^k or smaller? If smaller, then (1/2)^k is an easy to calculate upper bound. Earlier, I said: >> Failure depends on how many iterations you perform (n iterations = >> 2^-n chance of failure) and the values of the base you choose. >As I pointed out before, this probability is not correct. The trials >are not independent, so you cannot just multiply them together. Okay, this paper you keep referencing - does it apply to primality testing based on pseudoprimes (converse of Fermat's Little Theorem), or other methods, such as Miller-Rabin? The above passage (the double quoted one) applies specifically to Miller-Rabin, a test which has no "bad" inputs - e.g. there exist numbers which will always pass pseudoprime testing, but there do not exist numbers which always pass Miller-Rabin. For M-R, the chance of failure depends on the number of iterations. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLar5AYOA7OpLWtYzAQEyLQP/Wb6m+S0pBQrkqPVrbUgkLCgoT5fmLuKC +0zZ6plve65CuUSalI//L+kZmfaf2WiJnAow1V58i7YJQwMKnds3KomZKbMMpzzb Y3wbQvuNc+T0kSi7uMeJG0vuzgwjgCYzAI0Xqv2i7hkMN1wejqax8tSK0ZKualrr SEJKeTKmBvA= =RwAS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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number theory
by rperkins-remailer＠nyx.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > I should point out that the standard argument that picking 'k' > different values for 'a' and then calculating the probability as > (1/2)^k is fallacious. This would be true if the probabilities were > independent, but they aren't. There was a paper on this about five > years ago whose awareness has not been yet widespread. I no longer > have the reference. Okay, my memory has been jogged... is this a paper by Pomerance, "On the distribution of pseudoprimes"? He gave more precise estimates for the number of base-2 pseudoprimes. With his more precise estimates, the chance of a 100 digit number passing the base-2 pseudoprime test is about 1/10^13... I think his work applies only to base-2 pseudoprimes, so my statement concerning the error rate of Miller-Rabin is still correct: for s iterations, the chance of failure is 2^-s. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCUAgUBLar8xIOA7OpLWtYzAQEAmgP2NQx7a3woaZMgT5CeqOFrhqyRcYt3mAPd 9bnf+f19E4Il42e0xw9vQjOMyowB/IkATQf+//ADIFxhE9p+2MOpD8eDr9saGYOV bVwV2/bWtzsHqjsbWRH27/5lEwFXerGfJNSc1ITkZFwp1QwpzmVvn6gkOZ2lf0AJ /q3QneS7iw== =2XH+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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