December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Cop On The Net - Watch Your ***
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just when you thought it was safe to surf in the sunlight... -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 10 Jun 1994 00:13:43 -0400 From: E-d-u-p-a-g-e <info(a)ivory.educom.edu> Subject: E-d-u-p-a-g-e 06/09/94 CYBERCOP A former New Jersey police officer now spends his time cruising for suspects in cyberspace and has been involved in dozens of criminal investigations, including a sting operation that nabbed a pedophile who lured young rape victims via a bulletin board service. (Tampa Tribune 6/8/94 BayLife 5) E-MAIL PRIVACY A survey of 301 companies by Macworld Magazine showed that 78.4% of the firms do not spy on employee e-mail or search their electronic files. Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.) has drafted legislation requiring that companies tell their workers that their e-mail might be monitored. (Tampa Tribune 6/8/94 BayLife 5) PAT ROBERTSON EYES VIETNAMESE CABLE TV Religious broadcaster Pat Robertson wants to build a cable-TV system in Vietnam and is confident a deal can be struck after meeting with government and TV officials in Hanoi. The proposed system will use microwave technology to beam dozens of channels to homes. (Investor's Business Daily 6/8/94 A9)

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Remailer Chaining Security?
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" messages through various "anonymous remailers"? Do these servers not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back through the chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? =======

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hi
by lile＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just thought I'd say hi... :) -lile

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Hum, 100 - 78.4 = 21.6 % spying
by bart＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As Netsurfer posted without comment, from Edupage 06/09/94: E-MAIL PRIVACY A survey of 301 companies by Macworld Magazine showed that 78.4% of the firms do not spy on employee e-mail or search their electronic files. Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.) has drafted legislation requiring that companies tell their workers that their e-mail might be monitored. (Tampa Tribune 6/8/94 BayLife 5) If anyone has Macworld perhaps we might contact the author for further details. It seems to me a startling point to be told that one in five email users IS being spied on. How many more encryption buffs might emerge if this were common knowledge?

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Re: COCOM is dead (Was: PGP in Australia)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Joe writes: > > There are no restrictions on importing crypto into Australia, there are > > some on export (hardware only) due to COCOM. > > I thought COCOM was dead as of last March or thereabouts. > Did a replacement committee ever get formed? I was surprised not to see any discussion of this on the net, by my newspaper had found its way into the recycle bin before I got around to typing in the article or seeing if the Times or Wall St. Journal had an article with genuine details. What I remember seeing was that COCOM was disbanded, but the member governments were going to maintain the rules for a while on their own until they're sure the Commies are really gone and not just hiding under the bed somewhere and there aren't any other convenient enemies on the horizon. So it's a good start, but doesn't change any laws directly. On the other hand, with countries like Germany and Colombia legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana, who knows? Bill

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Re: Regulatory Arbitrage
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric writes: > Regulatory arbitrage is an Important concept, as well as a great phrase. > The writer is square in the middle of the mainstream in the business > world, and note how effortlessly he speaks of avoiding governments and > playing them off against each other. I'm not surprised, though my perspective has perhaps been enhanced by growing up in the land of the Delaware Corporation - part of the advantage of Delaware was that corporate taxes were low, but additionally the regulatory climate was friendly and there was almost 200 years of corporate relationships with the local government, so most disputes could be expected to be resolved reasonably fairly. It seems that business, like the net, regards censorship and other interference as damage, and routes around it.... > Arbitrage of regulation almost always leads to equalization, although > the time scales are much longer. When equalization happens, it's > almost never that the advantage decreases for the destination buyer. No surprise here - as transportation and communication improve, it becomes easier for buyers to buy things anywhere, from anyone, and the pool of available suppliers increases. And buyers are stuck with their local regulatory stupidity, but they can shop around for sellers with less stupid regulations. Meanwhile, the leverage of sellers with government-supported monopoly markets is decreased, because their local markets are less captive, and foreign markets aren't forced to buy from them; it becomes increasingly to their advantage to leverage on their current size to outcompete external competition while decreasing instead of increasing regulations on their businesses. Sometimes the only way to level the playing field is to get rid of the walls you built around it.... Bill

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security?
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)shell.portal.com wrote >>> | What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" | | messages through various "anonymous remailers"? Do these servers | | not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back through the | | chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security | | afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? | Yes. If you use only one remailer, and that remailer keeps logs, then it makes it trivial for the remailer operator to find out who sent the message. If you chain remailers, then it makes it more difficult to trace it back, but the first remailer can see the source and destination, which means someone could find out if they looked. However, if you chain and use PGP, it requires the cooperation of all remailer operators involved. If someone really tried to get a lot of remailer operators to cooperate in tracing a message, someone's going to make a stink about it. Now there is the traffic analysis problem, and the time-correlation problem. This can be solved by using the slower (UUCP) remailers. "How much is enough" is something you must decide for yourself. BTW: Which remailers keep logs? Mine does... I think Chael Hall and Hal Finney do. And catalyst doesn't (or didn't awhile ago). What about the rest?

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Re: Remailer Chaining Security?
by nobody＠cyberspace.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't have the disk space to use PGP or to keep logs. Feel free to use me...

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RE: Remailer Chaining Security?
by usura＠vox.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nobody(a)shell.portal.com writes: : What level of security is achieved by the practice of "chaining" : messages through various "anonymous remailers"? To find out your "real" identity, those who want to find out need to have cooperation of all remailer involved. If one link cannot/doesnot cooperate the chain is broken and so your ID remains hidden. : Do these servers not keeps logs by which a post could be traced back : through the chain to the source? If there is a REAL level of security : afforded, then the question arises "how much is enough"? My remailers keep no sendlogs, and they are out-side US jurisdiction. Only anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl has a database to match the allocated ID to an email adress. remail & remailer do not keep logs at all. My remailers also support PGP and changing Subjects, you can send a PGPencrypted message to VoX and it will be decypted, if the recipiant has a PGPpubKEY in my KEYring [with matching adress] mail send to him/her will also be encrypted using that KEY. If you want more info send a msg to HELP(a)vox.hacktic.nl But remember it is up to you to decide whether you trust the remail operator or not. Sending mail in a chain of remailers who support PGP will give the following : remailer 1 : recieves an ecnrypted message, the system decrypts and gives a R-R-To: remailer 2 + an "new" encrypted msg. Only remailer 1 could know the real ID of the sender but he doesnot know the contents of the remailed msg. remailer 2 : receives an encrypted message from remailer 1, the system decrypts and gives a R-R-To: remailer 3 + an "new" encrpted message. Remailer 2 only could find out that the message came from remailer 1 the real ID an contents of the message is being kept secret for remailer 2. remailer 3 : reciever an encrypted message from remailer 2, the system decrypts and gives an R-R-To: the recipiant and the decrypted message. Remailer 3 only could find out what the contents and the recipiant are, the originator will be kept hidden. Note that the encrypted messages are "enveloped" in the previous encrypted message. [The msg to rem 1 is encrypted and contains the encrypted mesg for rem 2, which does contain the encrypted message for rem 3] Regz, -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)vox.hacktic.nl>

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CYBERSPACE IS BY NAT
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com ZZ> Something which is as legalistically demented as ITAR not allowing ZZ> PGP EXE to be exported but which does allow the source and detailed ZZ> format changes to be exported! ZZ> Ah, but it doesn't. Not in any online and useful format. Submitting Hmmm, I thought the MIT FTP site had the source and file formats available for anyone to download, regardless of geographical location. * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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