- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Cypherpunks Press release
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess you all know how much I hate this "who will be our spokesman?" thread, but my opinion has been explicitly asked, so I will again comment. Hopefully, adding a few new points. At 6:55 AM 9/26/95, Craig Hubley wrote: >Damn fine idea, but how do a bunch of (p)anarchists choose a mouthpiece ? >Should we assign someone to be 'our' lawyer ? > >I'd volunteer to be 'spokespunk', I've certainly been interviewed for TV and >print enough, and know how to handle and present myself to the press, but if >this is considered an 'honor' rather than a 'pain in the ass and potential >legal lightning rod' then I'd like to suggest someone with a longer pedigree >who has been writing more code lately take it on. Tim ? I've turned down several recent chances for interviews, for these reasons: 1. I feel the people doing the work should be interviewed, not just someone who has some visibility (whatever mine might be). If PGP is the issue, then they should talk to those working on PGP. If anonymous remailers are the issue, etc. If, by some chance, they are interested in things I have directly worked on or written extensively about, then maybe they should interview me. (Although for other reasons I refused to have my name attached to the cover story in "Information Week" about "Internet Theft," BlackNet, etc.) 2. Location, location, location! The media foci are Washington, New York, and San Francisco, at least for our area of interest. Occasional forays into Austin, Miami, L.A., etc. This is where the taped interviews are done. Several "crews" recently in SF wanted "sound bites" and "video bites" from people like me. I refused, pointing out the wastefullness of my time in driving 100 miles over mountain roads to SF, fighting parking problems, waiting around, and ending up with a 7.89 second clip of me saying something scripted. (In February I stupidly agreed to travel to LA for a filming of a BBC show about encryption. Left at dawn, drove to San Jose, flew to LA, took shuttle to Hollywood, waited around for several hours while crew finished taping Alvin and Heidi Toffler, set up my laptop, was interviewed by show's producer, agreed at her repeated prodding to say "I am a Cypherpunk." Got back to my house at midnight. Guess what they used? The stupid line "I am a Cypherpunk" and maybe about 20 seconds of other random comments. This is what we face, as other high tech shows I see have the same disjointed, out-of-context flavor.) The point? These "journalists" are tuned to looking for catchy quotes, all the more so on video than in print. Text journalists can handle complex themes much better than video reporters can, for many and oft-discussed reasons. (Even more disgusting than this was a more recent appearance of a BBC film crew at a Cypherpunks meeting. They wanted to "stage" the news, to have the meeting discuss a 2-year-old topic, because that's what their script called for. I got up and left, as did several other people. I haven't seen this BBC show, but I gather from a URL that this is the one that has "performance art" examples of crypto....) Any "spokesman" needs to be easily accessible when they need a "filler quote," or a "reaction quote." However: 3. THERE IS NO SPOKESMAN, THERE IS NO CENTRAL OFFICE, THERE IS NO BOARD OF DIRECTORS! With no organization, no office, no coordination, we cannot "feed the media machine" the way it expects to be fed. Nor can we "elect" such folks. I didn't help start this list--not that this gives me more moral sway--in order that J. Random Volunteer will start speaking for "our beliefs" or will start explaining "our goals" and "our plans." Far better that journalists like Steven Levy and John Markoff subsribe to the list, or to condensations by people like Eric Blossom, and then deal directly with the experts in some area. Thus, on the latest Netscape flaw, they would contact Ray Cromwell directly, not deal with the press releases written by J. Random Volunteer. Anarchy is part of our charm. More importantly, part of our theme. Face it, we don't have a press office, we don't have staffing, and--most importantly--there is no one out there who speaks for me. A spokesman for the Cypherpunks is an oxymoron. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Insecurity in WWW oriented security
by Tim Scanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wanted to share an experience with folks on the list that points to the relavince of what c'punks have been doing looking at the Web encryption & security issues like we have. I was approached by a headhunter yesterday who wanted me to do the security for a hospital connected to the net. Straightforward stuff one would think. My inital reaction was fairly positive, and I responded that I didn't think I would have much trouble with the task as long as they had a resonable setup internaly etc. etc. (I'm not a big beliver in hard & crunchy -> soft & chewey when your accounting or other critical data is part of what can be chewed up...) Well at that point it got interesting. He told me that said client was asking as a part of their requirments that they be able to do "Secure transactions using HTML & Netscape". My reaction was somwehere allong the lines of "What do they mean by `secure transactions'!! Are they aware that the state of encryption for WWW is really poor at best right now? I told him that I thought this might not be such a hot idea, and that my interest in this whole thing would hinge totaly upon exactly what sorts of transactions they wanted to do using web servers and the like. And that depending on the answer to that, I would or would not be intrested in the whole thing. The reason for my hesitation? I don't want blood on my hands over a setup that is by definition currently in a state of very poor security. And right now I have no idea if they want to transfer MasterCard's or MRI's. But I do know that depending on what it is they're planning, it might not be a place *I* want to be. Besides being damned frightening, this points to a trend in network evolution. Organizations are planning these sorts of moves and utilizations of the technology with little thought to the possible consequences of it. And if the FBI ends up busting some psyco in the future for tampering with the transactions of MRI data, x-rays, or any of a million other possibilities, I seriously doubt that Loius Freeh will be stepping forward to remind us all of the need for robust security. Instead, it is far more likely that he would argue that it was another example of the need for increased monitoring of the internet and controls on cryptographic solutions. I found aspects of the whole conversation, juxtaposed with what has been going on lately with the list chilling to say the least. Tim Scanlon ________________________________________________________________ tfs(a)vampire.science.gmu.edu (NeXTmail, MIME) Tim Scanlon George Mason University (PGP key avail.) Public Affairs I speak for myself, but often claim demonic possession

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SAIC in MD
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/md.html **** Business Directory **** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC IN MARYLAND * Abingdon + Abingdon/Continental Drive (Loc. 591) * Annapolis + Annapolis/TRG (Loc. 178) + Annapolis/WOR (Loc. 241) * Baltimore + Baltimore/White Marsh (Loc. 221) * Bethesda + Bethesda/CHCS (Loc. 498) * California + California/SCT (Loc. 827) * Columbia + Columbia/Ideas Group (Loc. 905) + Columbia/MSO (Loc. 473) + Columbia/SSIG (Loc. 315) * Fort Ritchie + Ft. Ritchie (Loc. 700) * Frederick + Frederick (Loc. 519) + Frederick/FCRDC (Loc. 970) + Frederick/PAI (Loc. 512) + Frederick/PAI Amin. Office (Loc. 575) + Frederick/Spectrum Drive (Loc. 750) * Gaithersburg + Gaithersburg/Professional Drive (Loc. 134) + Gaithersburg/QUINCE DIAMOND (Loc. 725) + Gaithersburg/UTILITY SVCS (Loc. 555) * Germantown + Germantown/Century Blvd. (Loc. 292) + Germantown/BELLEMEADE III (Loc. 854) * Hagerstown + Hagerstown/DTG (Loc. 652) * Hanover + Hanover/Ashton Road (Loc. 745) * Joppatowne + Joppatowne/SAIC (Loc. 220) + Joppatowne/TDG (Loc. 303) * Lanham + Maryland/SYNTONIC (Loc. 860) * Laurel + Laurel/GSC (Loc. 661) * Rockville + Rockville/ NSI (Loc. 953) * Silver Spring + Silver Spring/ADELPHI (Loc. 908) + Silver Spring/WHITE OAK (Loc. 563) * Towson + Towson/JHK (Loc. 803) * Westminister + Westminister/RE WRIGHT (Loc. 930) _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 09-07-95

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Re: Announcement: RPK InvisiMail released on 12 Jan, 1998
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart compared the PR of RPK New Zealand's crypto to Peter Gutmann's claims for NZ export controls. This contrast confirms the report a few days back that any commercial crypto product that receives export approval from any country is probably compromised notwithstanding the manufacturer's claims otherwise. Not that it's news here, but this appears to be the unpublished requirement for granting of approvals, case by case. Either cooperate or face indefinite delays. As Peter noted some time ago, this is what he was running into when he could not get a clear answer about NZ regulations, and parallels reports of similar experiences in the US, UK and other countries. There is a similar current thread on UK Crypto about the difficulty of getting a straight answer about crypto policy from HMG while observing the success of cooperating crypto manufacturers. It will be interesting to see how hard Congress pushes in the new session to expose what the Administration is up to behind BXA's closed doors in contrast to open accounts. And, what will be revealed (and concealed) bit by bit from the horse-trading of the Bernstein, Karn and Junger cases.

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Re: FSTC - Request for Info
by John Curran 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:05 AM 9/2/95, Todd Glassey, Chief Technologist, Looking Glass Technologies wrote: >Hi all, > I am now looking for pointers into this mystical coonsortium of financial >wizards... A good place to start is the FSTC WWW pages: http://www.llnl.gov/fstc /John

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Re: A problem with anonymity
by David Murray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 05:15 PM 9/1/95 -0700, you wrote: >At 10:45 AM 9/2/95, David Murray wrote: >>[Akerlof, if I remember my economics right (and I am confident that I will >>be corrected if I don't) analysed a market for used cars. ... >>... So the only cars for sale would be lemons :-)] > >I haven't encountered this example, but it clearly misses some important >real-world issues. ... >Like a lot of simple game-theoretic models, the application to the real >world is quite different. True. But it does make the point that, in a perhaps surprising way, the bad can drive out the good. [I certainly don't want to get into any kind of normative v. postive methodological debate.] The lesson is not that "You can never find a decent used car", but that, in a market with particular characterisics (particularly with regard to what information is available to whom), lemons drive out the good. This just means that owners of good used cars offer them for sale in a market where pre-purchase checks are possible, etc.. But this is to concentrate on the example, not on the substance... >But I certainly agree that crypto will reignite interest in analyses of >such game theory questions. Another way of viewing anonymity vs. >non-anonymity is that knowing the True Name of a party with whom one trades >is just _one element_ of a transaction. By no means is it essential. I guess I was using True Name somewhat unusually. I didn't mean "True Name= state approved unique identifier of a human being" so much as "True Name<> easily discardable/transferrable/sellable digital pseudonym". I certainly did not mean to imply that net.commerce is impossible, or that it would only take place on the basis of True Names, however defined. Rather I was commenting that one pervasive feature of non-net.commerce is the ability to track down someone that owes you something and sue them/beat it out of them. You can't do this to a digital pseudonym. As you rightly pointed out, you can't do this to someone who escapes to South America, or to the guy who runs the market stall that won't be there tomorrow. So you take a bond, or you take your chances. I still think that, because of the (perfect) ease with which net.rep's are transferrable/cash-in-able, the chances you take in the digital domain are so much higher as to be (almost?) qualatatively different. >>If you can't rely on the unsecured promise of a digital pseudonym, and you >>can't accept reputation as 'security', how do you extend credit? > >I am willing to extend some amound of credit to PrOduct Cypher, Black >Unicorn, etc., based on their past reputation and on the fact that I can >show to others the transactions into which their pseudonyms entered and >thus expose them if they default. Now _how much_ I'm willing to extend is >of course a more complicated issue, but the principal is still there: a >purely digital pseudonym, with no possibility of being tied to a True Name, >can still be extended credit....I just said I would do so. This would, of course, allow PrOduct Cypher (for example) to cash in on hir rep. [Hir - never thought I'd see myself use it: ughhhhhhh <shiver>]. But, unlike the unscrupulous stall owner, who would have to sell the gold watch before he decamped, PC could sell hir rep before the rip-off had been done. This would be a sort of division of labour - rep-builders and rep-exploiters. In cybersapce, you could never tell whether you were dealing with the rep builder (buying a good car) or a rep exploiter (buying a lemon). Yes the rep-exploitation would be a one-shot thing. Within seconds of the sting PC's name would be mud. [And, yes, you could probably tell whether it was one of those two you were dealing with - if it asked for credit, it wouldn't be 'corn or 'pher :-)] But it is the _possibility_ of the scam that would shape the market. By the way, my final question was not rhetorical. I _do_ think methods of extending credit to pseudonyms will be developed. I just think they will be based on (possibly new) types of security interest. An old type of security interest (perhaps the oldest) could be used right away - the pledge. If Bob Pseudonymous pledges $100 worth of digital certificates, I would be glad to lend him $100 (well, perhaps $80 - gotta secure the interest:-) Cryptography might develop other ways of protecting the interests of creditors, while preserving the anonymity of debtors. In fact, I'm certain it will. And I'm just as sure the law/mercantile practice will assist in the process. And like you, I believe it is not only possible, but preferable, that this is done without the interevention/'assistance' of the state. Cheers, Dm -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMEftjllo3j8JHzalAQE1OwP+IQTX2hUfJXI8Q7ojgFcKbnvxRLngSyDp rLm0wjZvMoiLwCqwhqn6F3ypTJBD0pS1ZT7ql+rnnEsYtQ75Xu0iJFbnnIY4whNh gB1plcImYms88Rt7VEuCjHZeAMHcV3tPZL9DHQVHZXMwqWKCeyBaImVaEosJTwZj IuZ4HHCi+GE= =V7vf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: A problem with anonymity
by terrell＠sam.neosoft.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >Subject: Re: A problem with anonymity >From: monty.harder(a)famend.com (MONTY HARDER) > >TC> This is one thing that _bonding_ is designed to partially ameliorate. One >TC> posts a bond which is greater than the amount being carried, or at least is > > A variation of a bond is an escrow agent.... > > Overload Alert: I use "escrow" here in the more mundane sense of > the folks who collect your real estate taxes and homeowners' > insurance from you 1/12th at a time along with your mortgage > payment, for instance. > > If the buyer has a =nonymous= agent to recieve the payment, which is >only released to the seller upon proof(s) of performance (whether in >lump sum or on a schedule of staged payments tied to specific milestones >in a long-term project) then the buyer has someone to go after in the >event of such shenannigans. > >TC> There are still scams and manouvers to thwart this reputation capital >TC> scheme. The agent planning to "defect" (default, split, abscond, renege, >TC> etc.) can try to pile up as many pending transactions as possible, >TC> anticipating that the various transactees will be unaware of each other. > > And the escrow method dynamically scales to meet this threat, whereas >the bond is static. > > Of course, the escrow agent will extract his pound of flesh, just as >any other form of insurance. Such is the nature of life. > Actually, you guys are trying to repeat the whole history of the law merchant (today's commercial law). The basic problem was how can a buyer in one city acquire goods from a seller in another through agents acting at a distance when neither knows the other and neither is willing to risk loss on the transaction. The use of bankers, as either trusted or bonded third parties, acting as escrowees under the control of a letter of credit was the result. Buyer, B, deposits money with the bank, E, with insructions to release the money on proof of receipt of the goods. E gives B a receipt and a written promise to pay. B trades the promise to pay to Seller, S, in exchange for the goods. S, who either trusts E or has access to his bond, is willing to accept E's promise to pay, which he then negotiates. The result is that B and S have a secure transaction without trusting each other, and E gets rich. Notice, we don't care about the reputation or identity of either B or S, and a very few trusted or bonded Es can facilitate many many transacrions. Incidentially, you all are using the word "escrow" correctly. An escrow is an arrangement in which property is deposited with an escrowee to hold until the happening or failure of a contingency, at which time he delivers the property according to the escrow instructions. House sales, in which the seller deposits a deed and the buyer deposits the purchase price pending proof of title is only one kind of escrow. +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Buford C. Terrell South Texas College of Law 1303 San Jacinto, Houston, TX 77002 (713)646-1857 terrell(a)sam.neosoft.com +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

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Re: crypto email to France
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have your French office contact the American Consulate as a way of getting started. I believe the short and effective (albeit not 100% correct) answer is\ that digital privacy is not allowed unless you give the gov't the keys. /r$

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Cypherpunks Santa Cruz -- Great Party!
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I want to update the general list on how well our "Cypherpunks Santa Cruz" party/meeting went last Saturday. Apologies to those who get this twice, as I just sent it out to the folks on the mailing list of interested folks I keep. (Not all of them are readers of this list, so....) It was a great success, from all indications, and we'll be doing it on a regular basis. "Meet locally, communicate globally." --Tim >Date: Sat, 2 Sep 1995 11:03:33 -0700 >X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net >Mime-Version: 1.0 >To: (Recipient list suppressed) >From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) >Subject: Cypherpunks Santa Cruz -- Great Party! > > >This is a report on the Cypherpunks Santa Cruz party/meeting held last >Saturday at my house. For those of you on this list (52 at last count, >obviously not all locals) who missed it, it was considered by many who >commented to me to be a great success. > >Some highlights: > >- I counted 23 attendees, from as far away as Oregon (Greg Broiles) and San >Luis Obispo (Jeff Simmons), and with a bunch of folks from Marin and the >Greater Bay Area. > >- We got rolling around 5, when the first cars started filling up my >parking area. Things kept going 'til 5 in the morning (!), when the last >stragglers departed and those staying the night found their futons and >crashed. > >- Not too much was formally done. We had a round of introductions (and I >provided name tags, which were purely voluntary, in that anyone could >volunteer not to wear them and hence not be remembered by others...most >wore them). Later, after the barbecue, Bob Fleming and Cherie Kushner >described their work on micropower, ultrawideband radio "localizers." While >not strictly "crypto" related, there are overlapping themes (privacy, >surveillance, and even some of the math overlaps). > >- Mostly it was a chance for our local community of folks interested in >these issues to mingle and make contact. I expect we may have a larger >focus than just "crypto" (although Cypherpunks have always had a larger >focus than just cryptography, of course). Especially as there are folks >doing some neat stuff on the Web out here in Santa Cruz. > >- Two folks from my local ISP attended (Jay and Marc), and they have some >thoughts on possibly hosting the Cypherpunks archive site on their system, >and other ideas. They stayed until nearly 5 a.m., talking with us about >networking, Web pages, etc. > >(Santa Cruz has long been a hotbed of computer activity, especially of the >more independent sort. So the good turnout from local folks could be very >promising for Cypherpunks themes. Interestingly, Linus Torvaldis (sp?), of >Linux fame, had just been in town a couple of days before.) > >I want to avoid opening the meeting up too broadly, to, for example "anyone >interested in computers," as this would produce unpredictable turnouts and >lots of folks who want to learn to use Windows, or need help in dBase, etc. >Better to keep an ostensible focus on "Cypherpunks" themes, with forays >into related areas. > >Some people commented to me that they hope the meetings/parties are >monthly, but I suspect every other month may be more reasonable...after >all, a monthly meeting would mean another one only 3 weeks from today, and >I can't see this happening. > >Anyway, I expect to announce another one for sometime in October. I also >may be having a "PenSFA" party at my place in early November (11/11 is >being considered), and may merge the two. It's a good opportunity for >mingling. > >Another attendee offered the possibility of having a Cypherpunks Santa Cruz >meeting/party at her house, so some rotation to other venues may start to >happen. I think the notion of having these things at private houses is >better than trying to get space at a local company, for example. Parties in >houses are more intimate, less formal, and don't require the "corporate >approvals" that are sometimes needed. Besides, I'm offering my house and >have no contacts at local companies. > >I expect to be able to host a lot of these things, and if some others >volunteer as well, we'll be set. (I expect attendance will not equal the 23 >at this "first" meeting, for obvious reasons. This means meetings/parties >could even be held in apartments or condos. But I'm not suggesting this, >only noting it.) > >So, thanks for coming! > >--Tim May > ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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