- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Transparent Email
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Knumbskull Alert! On the transparent e-mail topic, I send the presumably anonymous mail headers below received here by way of The Pipeline provider. Would some kind soul verify that the headers do not disclose the true ID or true address or true path other true info that would identify the prayerfully anonymous sender? Every piece of mail coming here has such headers. Does everyone else get the same? FWIW, the mail system automagically lists the sender and the subject in a neat chart, and hides the header if commanded to do so, or reveals it to the prying mind. Thanks. John Young (signing until forbidden) PS: It's true that Pipeline was cracked last Saturday and the system shut down for a while "due to a security breach". The story in the WSJ about the "Internet Liberation Front" explained more than we clueless subscribers were allowed to know -- as the story said, corporations don't want us babes to know about our vulnerabilities, we might demand better service. ------------------- Jpunix Header: >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 28 20:14 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id UAA22639 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 20:14:45 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxsau18498; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 20:13:25 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA12541; Mon, 28 Nov 94 17:08:09 PST Received: from jpunix.com by toad.com id AA12535; Mon, 28 Nov 94 17:07:57 PST Received: (from remailer@localhost) by jpunix.com (8.6.9/8.6.6) id TAA17362 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 19:07:46 -0600 Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 19:07:46 -0600 Message-Id: <199411290107.TAA17362(a)jpunix.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: RE: Cash From: nobody(a)jpunix.com (Anonymous) Comments: This message did not originate from the above address. It was automatically remailed by an anonymous mail service. Please report inappropriate use to <remail-adm(a)jpunix.com> NOTE: Mail to nobody is sent to /dev/null Finger remailer(a)jpunix.com for remailer help. Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text Content-Length: 801 ------------------- Chaos.bsu Header (spooge): >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 28 10:09 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id KAA26339 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:09:55 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxrzg29356; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:03:33 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA25960; Mon, 28 Nov 94 07:01:07 PST Received: from bsu-cs.bsu.edu by toad.com id AA25954; Mon, 28 Nov 94 07:01:03 PST Received: (from nowhere@localhost) by bsu-cs.bsu.edu (8.6.9/8.6.6) id KAA16037 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:00:55 -0500 Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 10:00:55 -0500 Message-Id: <199411281500.KAA16037(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> From: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> X-Ttl: 2 X-Notice: This message was forwarded by a software- automated anonymous remailing service. Comment: The contents of this message are neither condoned by nor approved by Ball State University. Please report problems or complaints to nowhere(a)chaos.bsu.edu Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text Content-Length: 105 ------------------- Anon.penet.fi Header (Al Capone) >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sun Nov 27 19:49 EST 1994 Received: from news.pipeline.com (news [198.80.32.5]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id TAA05980 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Sun, 27 Nov 1994 19:49:52 -0500 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by news.pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id TAA14755 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Sun, 27 Nov 1994 19:30:25 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxrwz27537; Sun, 27 Nov 1994 19:29:53 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA16432; Sun, 27 Nov 94 16:27:21 PST Received: from anon.penet.fi by toad.com id AA16426; Sun, 27 Nov 94 16:27:16 PST Received: by anon.penet.fi (5.67/1.35) id AA03124; Mon, 28 Nov 94 01:12:06 +0200 Message-Id: <9411272312.AA03124(a)anon.penet.fi> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: an41389(a)anon.penet.fi (The Al Capone of the Info Highway) X-Anonymously-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Organization: Anonymous contact service Reply-To: an41389(a)anon.penet.fi Date: Sun, 27 Nov 1994 23:12:05 UTC Subject: How to disable telnet to port 25 Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text Content-Length: 764 ------------------- Nately Header: >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sat Nov 26 22:50 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id WAA12434 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Sat, 26 Nov 1994 22:50:31 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxrtv11771; Sat, 26 Nov 1994 22:50:04 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA02097; Sat, 26 Nov 94 19:47:48 PST Received: from ucsd.edu by toad.com id AA02091; Sat, 26 Nov 94 19:47:45 PST Received: from nately.UCSD.EDU by ucsd.edu; id TAA19011 sendmail 8.6.9/UCSD-2.2-sun via SMTP Sat, 26 Nov 1994 19:47:41 -0800 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> Received: by nately.UCSD.EDU (4.1/UCSDGENERIC.4) id AA12222 to cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Sat, 26 Nov 94 19:50:40 PST Date: Sat, 26 Nov 94 19:50:40 PST Message-Id: <9411270350.AA12222(a)nately.UCSD.EDU> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Need program pointers From: nobody(a)nately.UCSD.EDU (Anonymous) Comments: This message did not originate from the above address. It was automatically remailed by an anonymous mail service. Please report inappropriate use to <complaints(a)nately.ucsd.edu> Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text Content-Length: 978 From: IN%"storm(a)marlin.ssnet.com" 26-NOV-1994 21:38:47.14 To: IN%"cypherpunks(a)toad.com" CC: IN%"storm(a)marlin.ssnet.com" Subj: Need program pointers ------------------- Au.informix Header (Critias): >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sat Nov 26 17:58 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id RAA29778 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Sat, 26 Nov 1994 17:58:07 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxrtb28834; Sat, 26 Nov 1994 17:56:43 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA28479; Sat, 26 Nov 94 14:52:50 PST Received: from gateway.informix.com by toad.com id AA28473; Sat, 26 Nov 94 14:52:39 PST Received: from informix.com (infmx.informix.com) by gateway.informix.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA20299; Sat, 26 Nov 94 14:52:34 PST Received: from carbon.informix.com by informix.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA06617; Sat, 26 Nov 94 14:52:33 PST Received: by carbon.informix.com (4.1/SMI-4.1) id AA00381; Sat, 26 Nov 94 14:53:23 PST Date: Sat, 26 Nov 94 14:53:23 PST From: Critias_the_conspirator(a)au.informix.com Message-Id: <9411262253.AA00381(a)carbon.informix.com> Subject: Privacy Digest Apparently-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: text Content-Length: 2111 ------------------- Access Header (Uni): >From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Sat Nov 26 15:40 EST 1994 Received: from relay2.UU.NET (relay2.UU.NET [192.48.96.7]) by pipeline.com (8.6.9/8.6.9) with ESMTP id PAA21937 for <jya(a)pipeline.com>; Sat, 26 Nov 1994 15:40:51 -0500 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxrss22905; Sat, 26 Nov 1994 15:40:01 -0500 Received: by toad.com id AA24978; Sat, 26 Nov 94 12:17:51 PST Received: from access3.digex.net by toad.com id AA24972; Sat, 26 Nov 94 12:17:40 PST Received: by access3.digex.net id AA16948 (5.67b8/IDA-1.5 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com) Sat, 26 Nov 1994 15:17:29 -0500 Date: Sat, 26 Nov 1994 15:17:29 -0500 (EST) From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)access.digex.net> To: Gary Jeffers <CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Privacy Digest - Blk Unicorn , Frissell, Sandfort In-Reply-To: <9411261934.AA23910(a)toad.com> Message-Id: <Pine.SUN.3.91.941126151628.16895A-100000(a)access3.digex.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Precedence: bulk Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Content-Length: 1332

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Re: "You aren't following the _rules_!"
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Jonathan Rochkind replied: >At 3:58 AM 11/29/94 Lucky Green wrote: >>I do not mean to belittle the work that has been done but unless the >>encryption is built into the mailer and using a remailer means clicking the >>"use X remailer(s)" button and the mailer better know which ones are >>working and do the PGP envelopes it won't happen. > >Have you used premail? It pretty much does all of that. >People still aren't using premail either because they can't figure out how >to install it (doubtful it's not hard to install) or because they don't >have a need for it that's great enough to justify the (minimal) time >neccesary to ftp it and install it or wait the (sometimes more painful) >time neccesary for the computer to encrypt and/or sign your outgoing >messages. This brings up a point that I - among others - have to flog every now and then: the *x-centric nature of most of the net. I have no doubt that premail works wonders - but I don't know of any version of it that would run on my MS-DOS box a Mac an Amiga etc. I use PC Eudora for email and have pinged on QualComm every so often to ask when the commercial version will allow/support external encryption programs. As some may have noticed over the weekend I also started trying to use the PGP Tools package to try and write a PGP.DLL. For various reasons (mostly me :-) it's going to be more difficult and take longer than I thought - but I am *not* going to give up on it. Until/unless there exists fairly easy-to-implement means of including crypto for applications programmers on a variety of platforms other than *x boxes progress in the click-a-button-to-encrypt area is going to be bloody slow. > >Because premail makes it incredibly easy to use PGP on a unix box. And for >that matter the Eudora/PGP applescritps make it incredibly easy to use PGP >on a mac. And there are some people working on an applescript that will >automate using remailers on a mac too. But ease of use appearantly isn't >enough; no matter how easy it gets to use it's still going to have some >cost to the user over not using it. Even if the cost is only having to wait >the 1.5 seconds it takes your machine to decrypt/encrypt a message. Unless >there's a use for it people won't be willing to spend that 1.5 seconds per >message. This kinda supports my previous observations: the necessity of adding external scripts and such to the Mac version of Eudora slows down the program's operation more than necessary. If there were a Mac resource (of whatever kind - I'm not Mac-fluent) that the nice folks over at QualComm could use to build crypto into the program to start with then they wouldn't have the excuse of "we can't because there's nothing to do it with at the source level". My ha-penny's worth.... Dave Merriman -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtuEeMVrTvyYOzAZAQFwuwQAtGMZyS3vj1T88EgaLuKOqWARruGjWTxv V2+Lri/nPuBwm6Nkfu12MBHGXl9QlMsh58MuhvFfvA2qdgmuDBy0iHBaPq0C1L5v 1YnHiBHrYIfLkNchqapuMQSM6tbL+PJWGWikqYV2Nv7SR6Mtu+jCK8yt6biHZxIm qU9Yk4CJ0Kw= =+K/s -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)feenix.metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome, encouraged, and preferred. "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." John F. Kennedy

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Anarchists break rules, details at 11, was: The Market for Crypto--A Curmudgeon's View
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- eric(a)remailer.net (Eric Hughes) writes: > One underlying premise of Tim's argument is that the presence of these > actions at the server makes his life harder. > In what way? The server will not require a digital signature. > Unsigned messages will still be sent to the list. There need be no > change in the way that one sends and receives mail. > I refuse the argument that toad.com server actions make anybody's life > harder. A few days delay, which is what I think we are talking about, will clearly make following threads more difficult. And add to noise on the list, as the content of an early-non-signed message may be repeated and signed by someone else later on. After netcom's recent mail mis-delivery problems, I know all too well how hard it is to participate in discussions that are delivered in random-appearing order. A few hours delay will be indistinguishable to the netcom subscribers. My experience with rules and PPLs on other lists has not impressed me. YMMV. Whatcha trying to do, eric, lead that anarchists? Pat -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAwUBLtuEc7CsmOInW9opAQE/wAP+OmPDe8vD7/D5WvZpGvecPgec8oT9/sqN ghMf+uxUwiVfxe2NuSDCKrVcipYAV6h+Q3QRo/o4FijlwleT2wmaL8yxoBT5KffN SQAVINfx6n9Hb0hxH3md8JdOYD5jyOpPhEMh5JyaEUetNfK0bnXCzVUsj5v20SXp E7KXxmAZqPc= =SV9C -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: whats all this nonsense
by jrochkin＠cs.oberlin.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I just signed onto this list. What the hell is all this nonsense that I hear >about mandating PGP signed messages? > >I thought the whole grassroots crypto thing was about protecting privacy >rights and individual liberty and all that. So what if someone wants to >post a message to cypherpunks AND DOES NOT WANT ANYONE TO BE ABLE TO >PROVE THEY WROTE THE MESSAGE. Whether because they fear legal prosecution, >or some other social consequence down the line, or whatever Of course we all agree with you there, but as someone else mentioned, users would be perfectly free to sign with a _pseudonymous_ key. My key wouldn't have to be in the name of "Jonathan Rochkind," it could be "Dirk the Destroyer", or whatever else I wanted it to be. I'm not sure if Eric is suggesting that everyone submit their public key to the list or not. If he is, then things would be made a bit dificult, as you would have to make your one-time-only anonymous key, send it to toad.com, wait for it to be recognized, and _then_ send your message to the list. Assuming that not only do I not want your messages traceable to Jonathan Rochkind, but I also don't want them traceable to _each other_, then I'd have to make a new key before sending each message, and go through that whole rigamarole each time. I'm not how often people actually _would_ desire to do such a thing (generally, it's important to most people to build up a good reputation, pseudonymous or otherwise), but.... I agree you have a good point that it's important the list be set up so it's possible to contribute to it anonymously/pseudonomously. And that _some_ implementations of what Eric is suggesting might make that either impossible or just a pain in the ass (and we probably dont' want to do either). There are probably other implementations that wouldn't have this problem. Although I would still oppose them, pretty much on the grounds Tim May has been ranting about. (and I do mean ranting in the best way. :) ). People should pretty much be able to do what they want, and I don't see any compelling reason to force people to sign their messages whether they like it or not.

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Re: The Market for Crypto--A Curmudgeon's View
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, Did anyone but me notice that Eric Hughes and Tim May have reached a consensus in the on-going debate about signed posts? Tim says, "your house, your rules" and acknowledges that Eric is the de facto boss of the list. Tim expresses no real objection to Eric's first step except in a "slippery slope" sort of way. Personally, I'm against mandatory digitally signatures as a rerequisite for posting to Cypherpunks. On the other hand, I like the idea of having the list software automatic verify digital signatures. This is a valuable service I'm usually too lazy to perform for myself. Here's my suggestion. Eric should unilaterally impose his first step, i.e., all unsigned messages and messages with spoofed signatures will henceforth be flagged as such. Let's see what effect, if any, that has on the way people post their messages. After the protocol has been in effect for some time, we can re-open the topic for further discussion. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtulbk5ULTXct1IzAQERKQP/QKtfYC1MNpvxTNPeLTlxJeAcFiTrufKi M3I0vpH3gXRDZeeL+ff/8YyRbkDgYZEOu6Si/fZuiWWZCYNmAQb22QaQ9riW6amq ghIybvhd66i7rOntNIkcXOAGtk6rBJ8AVc3lFqmGEYBRW2p/+mATsAFaJ7Agj5K9 L9nc34T6Mb0= =sDH7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: CFV on Signing Posts To List?
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I disagree that a cypherpunk should be expected agree to commit everyone towards arriving at a consensus over whether anyone who posts to the list should sign their messages, or that the list owner should be expected to submit to their conclusions simply because that is what they agreed among themselves he ought do. It's a matter of (anarchist) principle. Blanc

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Mandatory message signing
by Tom Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It's usually a good idea to read for at least a month before leaping >into the discussion, so as not to overreact. I guess so. :) > > I thought the whole grassroots crypto thing was about protecting privacy > > rights and individual liberty and all that. So what if someone wants to > > post a message to cypherpunks AND DOES NOT WANT ANYONE TO BE ABLE TO > > PROVE THEY WROTE THE MESSAGE. > >Mechanisms for this already exist. For example, register a PGP key to >a pseudonym, such as "Dr. Death". >An advantage of doing this is that even though no one really knows who >"Dr. Death" is, you can sign messages certifying that yes, the person >they know as "Dr. Death" wrote this message. Without this >certification, anyone can claim to be "Dr. Death" at any given moment. Hmmm. But even with a psuedonym like that, people can still claim you were Dr. Death, and Dr. Death will have posted enough stuff about enough things so the Dr. and you can be linked fairly certainly, isn't this right? There's a reason why one should prefer the telephone over mail for many matters. That is, no one can record your call (legally) and prove that you said a certain thing at a certain time, while they can keep your letter and prove you wrote a certain thing. Honestly, the chance of someone posting a fraudulent message under someone else's email address to the cypherpunks list is pretty slim, but that possibility (or the chance that they left their computer on and someone sent something, etc.) leaves you plausible deniability if you ever want it. If one has to sign all their posts with their pgp key, or conversely with a psuedonym generated for the purpose, to me, that's beginning a dangerous practice of using the technology to invade peoples' privacy instead of expand their privacy possibilities. People who want a psuedonym identity and who want their messages to be verified against a PGP signature can easily choose to do so, presently, and if you wanted to, you could append a notice to the end of an unsigned message: NOTE: The preceding message was not accompanied by a digital signature, and its authenticity may be suspect. But I guess I just don't see why people should have to sign their messages under some given key to contribute to the group. Unless you generated and registered a new key for every message you wanted to post, there would still be unforgeable evidence linking you or your psuedonym to a series of posts. And if there was a series of posts from your psuedonym, that increases the chances it could be linked to you. And besides that, you might want to post free and clear and sign your name to it, and forget the hiding behind a psuedonym stuff. Just you don't want to sign the message digitally. This seems like a perfectly valid choice that users should have the privacy rights and freedom to make. Tom

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Elm and premail (long)
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have just finished integrating premail 0.30 with Elm on jpunix.com. Since there have been some questions about how to do this type of thing, I thought I'd give a blow-by-blow description of what I did and the pro's, con's and alternatives to what I did. 1) I installed premail as a wedge to the sendmail daemon. In other words, per Raph Levin's instructions in his README file, I renamed sendmail to something else and then renamed premail to sendmail and have it pointing to the renamed sendmail. I realize this requires system admin privs and is a big step to take, but I have testing premail working as the sendmail program with great success and at this point I have no qualms about premail/sendmail being one in the same. 2) I created the ~/.premailrc file in my home directory per Raph's README file. There is an option at the bottom to create aliases and that is what I did at first. Then, I discovered that the alias database created by Elm is compatible with premail!! 3) I edited ~/.elm/aliases.text to make changes similar to the following: The alias raph = Levin; Raph = raph(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu to raph = Levin; Raph = raph@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu^key=raph@cs.berkeley.edu Elm doesn't seem to mind this new alias structure and premail parses it just fine! I could have added a ^chain=3 also, but I decided that I may not want to email Raph through a set of remailers every time. I decided I would add the extra header during message creation. More on this later. What this does is that from now on, whenever I send email to Raph, it will automatically be encrypted with his public key with no further intervention on my part! When I want to chain the message through some remailers, I just take the H)eaders option from the Elm pre-send menu and add a header line: Chain: 3 This causes the message to be chaine through three random remailers before it gets to Raph. I also added two addition Perl scripts to Elm to help in the creation of encrypted messages for people NOT in my alias file, signing messages, and reading PGP encrypted messages that are not MIME compliant. These scripts are mailpgp and morepgp. These Perl scripts were published with version 2.3 of PGP but work fine with 2.4 and up. In Elm, I went to the options menu and replaced the default editor with mailpgp as well as the visual editor. I also replaced the default builtin+ display parameter with morepgp. These two Perl scripts are listed at the end of this message. The mailpgp script will allow you to encrypt and sign messages right before they are sent. The morepgp script will decrypt/verify incoming messages on the fly. The really nice benefit of these scripts is that you can reply to cleartext version of PGP encrypted messages. With the combination of these Perl scripts, Elm (or Pine for that matter) can be turned into an encrypted mail handler with a minimum of fuss. morepgp: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # -*- Perl -*- # written by jason steiner, jsteiner(a)anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu, Jan 1993 # # if you use or make improvements to this program i would appreciate # copies of your modifications & your PGP public key. # # Modified by Greg Spencer, greg(a)graphics.cornell.edu, May 1994 # Mostly just cleaned up things and added stuff like automatic # addition and detection (and ignoring) of keys to be added to keyring, # and signal catching, as well as environment variable control of # most site-specific stuff. # # Must set the following environment variable: # # PGPCOMMAND set to the pgp decryption command # # PAGER set to the desired pager command # # NOTE that this program NEVER writes sensitive data to a disk file. # it will only slurp it into memory, so if you have a HUGE file, you might # have problems. # setup some variables ($pgpcommand = $ENV{'PGPCOMMAND'}) || ($pgpcommand = "/usr/local/bin/pgp"); # just used for tmpfile names... ($logname = $ENV{'LOGNAME'}) || ($logname = "nobody"); # ($pager = $ENV{'PAGER'}) || ($pager="/usr/local/bin/less -i -n -s -S -c -M"); ($pager = $ENV{'PAGER'}) || ($pager="/usr/bin/more -c"); $|=1; $topgp = 0; $tokey = 0; $pgpused = 0; ($tmpdir = $ENV{'TMPDIR'}) || ($tmpdir = "/tmp"); #temporary file name $tmpfile = "${tmpdir}/.pgp1.$logname.$$"; $tmpfile2 = "${tmpdir}/.pgp2.$logname.$$"; # trap signals so we do not leave # garbage around sub catcher { local ($sig) = @_; print "Caught a SIG$sig -- exiting\n"; close (TMPFILE); close (OUTPUT); close (PAGER); unlink ($tmpfile); unlink ($tmpfile2); } $SIG{'INT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'QUIT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'HUP'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'KILL'} = 'catcher'; # make sure nobody can read stuff umask 077; # prepare a data area @tmpdata = (); @newkeys = (); while (<>) { if (!$topgp && m/^-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $topgp = 1; $pgpused = 1; unlink ($tmpfile); open (TMPFILE, ">$tmpfile") || (unlink ($tmpfile) && die "Cannot open $tmpfile for output.\n"); } if (!$topgp) { push(@tmpdata, $_); } if ((!$tokey) && (m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { $contains_keys = 1; $tokey = 1; } if ($tokey) { push (@newkeys, $_); if (m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $tokey = 0; } } if ($topgp) { print TMPFILE $_; # OK to write this to a file -- it is encrypted! if (m/^-----END PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $topgp = 0; close TMPFILE; open (CLEAR, "$pgpcommand -f < $tmpfile |") || (unlink($tmpfile) && die "Cannot open pipe to PGP.\n"); $blocktype = $_; $blocktype =~s/^-----END (PGP .*)-----/$1/; $blocktype =~s/PGP MESSAGE/DECRYPTED MESSAGE/; $blocktype =~s/PGP SIGNATURE/SIGNED MESSAGE/; chop ($blocktype); push (@tmpdata, "-----BEGIN $blocktype-----\n"); while (<CLEAR>) { push (@tmpdata, $_); if ((!$tokey) && (m/^-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { $contains_keys = 1; $tokey = 1; } if ($tokey) { push (@newkeys, $_); if (m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $tokey = 0; } } } close CLEAR; print STDERR "\n"; unlink ($tmpfile); push (@tmpdata, "-----END $blocktype-----\n"); } } } select (STDIN); $|=1; select (STDERR); $|=1; select (STDOUT); $|=1; # This handles things if we found keys that need # adding to our keyring # note that we are only writing the KEYS to the file. if ($contains_keys) { print STDERR "PGP Keys found, attempting to add...\n"; open (TMPFILE2, ">$tmpfile2"); foreach $_ (@newkeys) { print TMPFILE2; } close (TMPFILE2); # strange things happen if we do not # read/write directly from /dev/tty (perl bug??) system ("$pgpcommand -ka $tmpfile2 >/dev/tty </dev/tty 2>&1"); unlink ($tmpfile2); # get rid of it asap $pgpused = 1; } # copy the contents of @tmpdata to the pager we want to use. open (PAGER, "|$pager") || (unlink ($tmpfile1) && die "Cannot open pipe to $pager.\n"); # do "press any key to continue" # only if we had some output from PGP # (like a verified signature) # again with the /dev/tty thing (weird!) if ($pgpused) { $q=''; open (TTY, "</dev/tty") || (unlink ($tmpfile1) && die "Couldn't open /dev/tty\n"); select(TTY); $| = 1; print STDERR "Press any key to continue...\n"; $q = getc (TTY); select (STDIN); } # output the decoded thing to the pager foreach $_ (@tmpdata) { print PAGER; } @tmpdata = (); close OUTPUT; close PAGER; # cleanup unlink ($tmpfile); mailpgp: #!/usr/local/bin/perl # -*- Perl -*- # written by jason steiner, jsteiner(a)anwsun.phya.utoledo.edu, Jan 1993 # # if you use or make improvements to this program i would appreciate # copies of your modifications & your PGP public key. # # Modified by Greg Spencer, greg(a)graphics.cornell.edu, May 1994 # Mostly just cleaned up things and added stuff like automatic # addition and detection (and ignoring) of keys to be added to keyring, # and signal catching, as well as environment variable control of # most site-specific stuff. # # Must set the following environment variables: # # EDITOR or VISUAL set to editor of choice # # PGPCOMMAND set to the pgp decryption command # # PGPID or SIGNATURE set to the id you wish to # have used for your pgp signatures, etc. # # PREFIX set to the forwarded message prefix that you use # # setup some variables ($visual = $ENV{'EDITOR'}) || ($visual = $ENV{'VISUAL'}) || ($visual = 'pico'); ($pgpcommand = $ENV{'PGPCOMMAND'}) || ($pgpcommand = "/usr/local/bin/pgp"); #($myname = $ENV{'PGPID'}) || ($myname = $ENV{'SIGNATURE'}); ($prefix = $ENV{'PREFIX'}) || ($prefix = "> "); $topgp = 0; $blanks = 0; $paragraphs = 1; $blankcompress = 1; $name=@ARGV[$#ARGV]; #temporary file names $rplyfile = "$name.rply"; $pgpfile = "$name.pgp"; $ascfile = "$name.asc"; $clrfile = "$name.clr"; # trap signals so we don't leave # (possibly sensitive!) garbage around sub catcher { local($sig) = @_; print "Caught a SIG$sig -- exiting\n"; close (OUTPUT); close (PGPFILE); close (CLEAR); close (INPUT); unlink ("$pgpfile"); unlink ("$rplyfile"); unlink ("$clrfile"); unlink ("$ascfile"); } $SIG{'INT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'QUIT'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'HUP'} = 'catcher'; $SIG{'KILL'} = 'catcher'; # parse the input file to see if we're replying to an encrypted message # user may need to type in pass phrase to decode umask (077); open (INPUT, "<$name"); open (OUTPUT, ">$rplyfile") || die "Cannot open $rplyfile for output.\n"; while (<INPUT>) { # make sure to allow printing of key blocks if (!$topgp && (!m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ || m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/)) { if (m/^$prefix*$/) { if ($paragraphs) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT "\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT; } } elsif (m/^[ \t\r]*$/) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT; } } else { print OUTPUT; if ($. == 1 && !m/^$prefix/) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } else { $blanks = 0; } } } # make sure to skip key blocks because we already did 'em in morepgp if (!$topgp && m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP .*-----/ && !m/^$prefix-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/ ) { $topgp = 1; unlink ($pgpfile); open (PGPFILE, ">$pgpfile") || die "Cannot open $pgpfile for output.\n"; } if ($topgp) { $_ =~ s/^$prefix//; print PGPFILE $_; # make sure to skip key blocks because we already did 'em in morepgp if (m/^-----END PGP .*-----/ && !m/^-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----/) { $blocktype = $_; $blocktype =~ s/^-----END (PGP .*)-----/$1/; $blocktype =~ s/PGP MESSAGE/DECRYPTED MESSAGE/; $blocktype =~ s/PGP SIGNATURE/SIGNED MESSAGE/; chop ($blocktype); $topgp = 0; close (PGPFILE); system ("$pgpcommand $pgpfile -o $clrfile > /dev/tty 2>&1"); open (CLEAR, "<$clrfile") || die "Cannot open $clrfile for input.\n"; print OUTPUT "$prefix-----BEGIN $blocktype-----\n> \n"; $blanks = 0; while (<CLEAR>) { if (m/^[ \t\r]*$/) { if ($paragraphs) { if ($blankcompress) { if ($blanks == 0) { print OUTPUT "\n"; $blanks = 1; } } else { print OUTPUT "\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT "$prefix\n"; } } else { print OUTPUT "$prefix"; print OUTPUT; $blanks = 0; } } close (CLEAR); unlink ($clrfile); unlink ($pgpfile); print OUTPUT "$prefix-----END $blocktype-----\n\n"; } } } close OUTPUT; close INPUT; unlink ($name); rename ("$rplyfile", "$name"); system ($visual, @ARGV); while (!$q) { print "\nSign this message? [Y]: "; $q = <STDIN>; $q =~ s/[ \t\n]//g; $q = substr ($q, 0, 1); if (($q eq 'Y') || ($q eq 'y') || ($q eq '')) { push (@opts, '-st', '+clearsig=on'); $q = "y"; } elsif (($q ne 'N') && ($q ne 'n')) { $q = ''; } } # note that it is the default to NOT encrypt, # simply because not everyone has PGP (unfortunately :-) $q=''; while (!$q) { print "Encrypt this message? [N]: "; $q = <STDIN>; $q =~ s/[ \t\n]//g; $q = substr ($q, 0, 1); if (($q eq 'Y') || ($q eq 'y')) { push (@opts, '-e'); $q = "y"; } elsif (($q eq 'N') || ($q eq 'n') || ($q eq '')) { $q = "n"; } else { $q = ''; } } if (@opts) { if ($q eq 'y') { print "Enter receipients, each on a separate line, terminate with EOF or a single `.':\n"; { print "> "; if ($_ = <STDIN>) { chop; last if ("$_" eq '.'); push (@receipients, "$_"); redo; } last; } } system ($pgpcommand, '-a', @opts, "$name", @receipients); if ($? == 0) { unlink ($name); rename ("$ascfile", "$name"); } } - -- John A. Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)jpunix.com WWW - http://jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. Finger remailer(a)jpunix.com for remailer help. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtvwZ1OTpEThrthvAQFwlAP+MxX6olbMempfh6UYdTDGruTngH+WgRsa BacTB86oNIjlllDfZB55KJyuUs5dpP+gRRDW4BZTK6zyNuzy3tv5iErQnvDiV/Tn PjSKmJJFs7HnC88aC830eQ+ojGaXzZCE2IbaTm/a7R6SU9nLc/KnJYY5pMHjdVx+ uN0xwmRrBYw= =SUyb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Security Services
by Ian Farquhar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The Australian, Tue 29th November: Secret Service Files Lost in Blaze, by Cameron Steward (Foreign Affairs Writer) "Hundreds of top-secret documents relevant to the Federal Government's inquiry into the Australian Secret Intelligence Service were destroyed by a fire that swept through the ASIS headquarters in Canberra at the weekend." "The fire has erased highly sensitive ASIS files and archives that detailed the activities and operations of the troubled spy agency over the past decade." "The blaze is a big blow to the Government's inquiry into accountability and management of ASIS because it destroyed many of the records needed to adequately assess the organisation's performance." "But despite the suspicious timing of the accident, the Government does not believe it was arson and says that the blaze appears to have been sparked by an electrical fault." "'I can confirm that the fire broke out at 2am on Saturday morning on the fourth floor of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Building,' a DFAT spokeswoman said." "'The damage appears to have been fairly extensive and is believed to have been caused by an electrical fault.'" "Sources yesterday said the area damaged by the blzae was far greater than was originally revealed by the authorities, with the initial damage estimate of about $200,000 ballooning to at least $1 million." "The fourth floor of the DFAT building has housed ASIS for years." "One intelligence source said last night that it was 'highly coincidental' for ASIS to experience such a fire in the midst of a Government inquiry into its operations." "It was rumored yesterday that the fire also destroyed thousands of files that the service was alleged to have kept on Australian citizens." "Two former ASIS officers alleged in March that the organisation illegally held files on thousands of Australian citizens, despite the fact that it is not part of its role involving gaining foreign intelligence." "The former agents also claimed ASIS has bribed politicans in Malaysia and had helped British Intelligence obtain confidential information that harmed Australia's interests." (Small note here which was not in the article: the ASIS jargon for MI6 is 'head office'. Many of the officers were trained by MI6.) "The allegations by the former officers prompted the Government to conduct an inquiry into the control and accountability of the organisation." "The inquiry, headed by former NSW Supreme Court judge Mr Gordon Samuels, is also examining the 'protection of ASIS intelligence sources and methods' as well as the 'resolution of grievances and complaints relating to ASIS." "The inquiry has been in progress for several months. It is still taking evidence and is due to report to the Government early in the New Year." This article was transcribed without permission from the paper, for the purposes of research and study as defined in the "fair use" provisions of the Copyright act. ------- Yet another depressing but compelling reminder that our privacy has as many enemies within the Government as without. BTW, this was the same TLA which I mentioned some weeks ago in connection with the bungled raid on the Sheraton Wentworth Hotel. Ian. #include <std.disclaimer>

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Re: PGP Enhanced Messaging (PEM)
by shawn leas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Where can I get this software? Looks kinda cool. BTW... I like the idea of spurring on some pgp usage. It's a good idea. I would not object to having to sign messages. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtwEkqZRyOzqm29xAQEoKgQAywzBTW92lYiDEFQPVfmWxHg3hYnKDN70 c3gRSNjqO6VcJguXhVBHHjA3/ZBpWybys9deML/2FONUwrm50+MKotifo+7wpKnk E6LIrnuzuJdmlMTACR6Qx3FXVpnuQmuDz2jRybxDST+Iob5jItwt2SsZkSuFscDN vdxQHa26VAs= =BmiN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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