- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: MD4-derived hash functions
by daw＠quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9510261603.AA26221(a)zorch.w3.org>, <hallam(a)w3.org> wrote: > > 3DES with only two independent keys is only slightly more secure than > DES, consider a variant of the meet in the middle attack exploiting > the fact that the constraint network is reductible to two equations > in one unknown. > Huh? Are you sure you're not thinking of 2DES? 2DES is known to be not much more secure than DES: 2DES can be broken with 2^56 operations and 2^56 space. (The space requirements can be eliminated without too much extra cost in time.) Could you post a reference for your claim that 2-key 3DES is insecure? Or post an attack? Or anything? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMJLJdSoZzwIn1bdtAQFFRQGAgPceMs6vYCq4nGQQ5QT9tOLIgiGAoY8M B71KIQDP75TMiF1rgvorSWQsNZjzjhbm =3bH5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Digicash will not fly
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While Chaum is a brilliant cryptographer, he is an incompetent businessman He has demonstrated this in numerous ways. The latest being "Cash" where the bank skims off 4% to 10% every time. No one is going to use digicash under these kinds of terms and conditions. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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ques. regd. STT
by Mahesh Prakriya 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. A group of us at the U. of Penn. are doing a presentation on STT. I would like to know if you have any suggestions for us. I've taken a look at the Visa & MS home pages and have a good amount of information on STT. I'm esp. interested in finding out about the potential weaknesses in STT. thanks, Mahesh +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ Work Home ------- ----- 1717 Arch St., 3E4 1801 JFK Blvd., #512 Phila., PA 19103 Phila., PA 19103 (215)-466-5476 (215)-567-2006 Internet: prakriya(a)gradient.cis.upenn.edu http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~prakriya/home.html PGP fingerprint = 6A EC 5B F3 D4 33 F6 D1 4C DA 99 11 F9 D9 89 A7 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Austin E-Commerce Conf -- BOF?
by Stephan Somogyi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If there are any other cypherpunks-readers attending the e-commerce conference in Austin on Monday and Tuesday, it might be fun to get together for an impromptu BOF either at lunchtime or later in the evening. Email me if there is interest. _______________________________________________________________________ Stephan Somogyi Senior Editor Digital Media

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Re: Don't Kill the Messenger--A New Slant on Remailers
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:45 PM 10/20/95 +0100, "Rev. Mark Grant" <mark(a)unicorn.com> wrote: >> "You have a piece of mail awaiting at our mail delivery service. The >> originator is unknown. The title of the message is "Tentacles of Medusa >> Must Die!" You may retrieve this message by replying to this notification >> with the word "Yes" anywhere in the Subject field. This message will be >> kept for 60 days and then deleted." > >I suspect that I could easily hack this into Mixmaster in a day or two, >but wouldn't it open you to attacks where Anonymous Fed, say, sends >terrorist kiddy-porn through your remailer and busts your ISP during those >60 days for possession ? I'm not sure if it would be better or worse than >current setups from that point of view. One way to deflect this attack is to encrypt the message for storage using a symmetric-key algorithm with a randomly generated session key, and send the session key to the recipient with the notification. You still have 300 MB of planted kiddy-terrorist narcopornography on your machine, but it's encrypted and you can happily tell the judge that you _can't_ decrypt it because you don't have the key. The Feds _could_ get the keys by eavesdropping on your outgoing correspondence or using your system to send the material to themselves (or a conveniently employed child), but at least you're not storing it in plaintext. More of a problem with this system is that it's only useful for terminal remailers; to use it in the middle of a chain, the next remailer would need to be configured to auto-accept such messages, or else your remailer would need to have a list of known remailers and use direct delivery for all mail sent to them. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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QUF_jpg
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have scanned "Quantum Computation's" seven formulae and six figures as JPEG graphics files and will send for a plea: quf1.jpg -- Formulae 1-7; 32 kb. quf2.jpg -- Figures 1 and 2; 72 kb. quf3.jpg -- Figures 3 and 4; 95 kb. quf4.jpg -- Figures 5 and 6; 72 kb. Or, we will mash'em up .TIF, .PCX, .GIF, or tire-smeared pigeon. QUF_jpg (4-part package, or items selected) [or *_tif, *_pcx, *_gif, *_tsp]

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Re: Planetary rovers, SETI and other musings, was Re: update.356 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 27 Jan 1998 20:34:48 -0800 > From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > Subject: Re: Planetary rovers, SETI and other musings, was Re: update.356 > (fwd) > Nothing in quantum teleportation has been shown to propagate signals faster > than light. (If you don't believe me, look into it. Start by reading the > FTL discussions about Bell's Theorem.) The actual transportation of the state is instantanious as it must be by quantum theory, just as the change in orbits of an electron occurs instantly. However, the catch is that the command/synchronization channel must be sent in parallel and it at some point can't use the quantum transportation technique and hence the speed-of-light comes back into play. This was specificaly discussed in the original quantum transportation announcement sent out by AIP. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The most powerful passion in life is not love or hate, | | but the desire to edit somebody elses words. | | | | Sign in Ed Barsis' office | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post ek reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash cut reord mix post"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash mix cut ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"ncognito"} = "<ncognito(a)gate.net> cpunk"; $remailer{"precip"} = "<mixmaster(a)mix.precipice.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<remail(a)ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com -.-.-.---.- 7:12:57 99.97% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ************ 9:03 99.95% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ++++++++++++ 42:02 99.93% ecafe remail(a)ecafe.org **####+*##*# 1:37 99.93% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ************ 13:17 99.91% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ---------+++ 2:58:18 99.74% robo robo(a)c2.org ###--*# 25:08 99.71% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net ******** *+* 16:41 99.69% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****+* * ** 6:34 99.52% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ---- -- --- 1:44:59 99.46% c2 remail(a)c2.org + +++-- * 53:17 98.82% syrinx syrinx(a)c2.org - _ ____ .+ 55:55:41 97.38% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu *** # #-+# 24:49 97.23% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net * **+* 24:32 92.21% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net * +*** 10:39 90.65% rahul homer(a)rahul.net ***#*+ +#*** 2:53 99.79% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +++#**-*+# 7:27 86.61% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com **##*#-### 5:38 86.60% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de ____.-- 38:06:00 86.33% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com - . - - 5:24:35 63.83% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Pinkerton Risk Assessment & "Security 2000"
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For even more, free information of this type, see the Counter-Terrorism page: http://www.interlog.com/~vabiro/ An interesting collection of links and data... Joel

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I-D ACTION:draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- X-Sun-Data-Type: text X-Sun-Data-Description: text X-Sun-Data-Name: text X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii X-Sun-Content-Lines: 70 A Revised Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. Title : CyberCash Credit Card Protocol Version 0.8 Author(s) : D. Eastlake, B. Boesch, S. Crocker, M. Yesil Filename : draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt Pages : 55 Date : 10/27/1995 CyberCash is developing a general payments system for use over the Internet. The structure and communications protocols of version 0.8 are described. This version includes credit card payments only. Additional capabilities are planned for future versions. This document covers only the current CyberCash system which is one of the few operational systems in the rapidly evolving area of Internet payments. CyberCash is committed to the further development of its system and to cooperation with the Internet Engineering Task Force and other standards organizations. Internet-Drafts are available by anonymous FTP. Login with the username "anonymous" and a password of your e-mail address. After logging in, type "cd internet-drafts" and then "get draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt". A URL for the Internet-Draft is: ftp://ds.internic.net/internet-drafts/draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt Internet-Drafts directories are located at: o Africa Address: ftp.is.co.za (196.4.160.8) o Europe Address: nic.nordu.net (192.36.148.17) Address: ftp.nis.garr.it (192.12.192.10) o Pacific Rim Address: munnari.oz.au (128.250.1.21) o US East Coast Address: ds.internic.net (198.49.45.10) o US West Coast Address: ftp.isi.edu (128.9.0.32) Internet-Drafts are also available by mail. Send a message to: mailserv(a)ds.internic.net. In the body type: "FILE /internet-drafts/draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt". NOTE: The mail server at ds.internic.net can return the document in MIME-encoded form by using the "mpack" utility. To use this feature, insert the command "ENCODING mime" before the "FILE" command. To decode the response(s), you will need "munpack" or a MIME-compliant mail reader. Different MIME-compliant mail readers exhibit different behavior, especially when dealing with "multipart" MIME messages (i.e., documents which have been split up into multiple messages), so check your local documentation on how to manipulate these messages. For questions, please mail to Internet-Drafts(a)cnri.reston.va.us. Below is the data which will enable a MIME compliant mail reader implementation to automatically retrieve the ASCII version of the Internet-Draft. ----- End Included Message ----- ---------- X-Sun-Data-Type: Multipart X-Sun-Charset: us-ascii X-Sun-Content-Lines: 24 Content-Type: Multipart/Alternative; Boundary="OtherAccess" --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; access-type="mail-server"; server="mailserv(a)ds.internic.net" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <19951027135555.I-D(a)CNRI.Reston.VA.US> ENCODING mime FILE /internet-drafts/draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt --OtherAccess Content-Type: Message/External-body; name="draft-eastlake-cybercash-v08-01.txt"; site="ds.internic.net"; access-type="anon-ftp"; directory="internet-drafts" Content-Type: text/plain Content-ID: <19951027135555.I-D(a)CNRI.Reston.VA.US> --OtherAccess-- _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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